From 6ff1b4426e3afc61dcb67299709fde9041d59265 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Eric Paris Date: Sat, 10 Feb 2007 01:43:19 -0800 Subject: [PATCH] [PATCH] make reading /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bould not require CAP_SYS_MODULE Reading /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound requires CAP_SYS_MODULE. (see proc_dointvec_bset in kernel/sysctl.c) sysctl appears to drive all over proc reading everything it can get it's hands on and is complaining when it is being denied access to read cap-bound. Clearly writing to cap-bound should be a sensitive operation but requiring CAP_SYS_MODULE to read cap-bound seems a bit to strong. I believe the information could with reasonable certainty be obtained by looking at a bunch of the output of /proc/pid/status which has very low security protection, so at best we are just getting a little obfuscation of information. Currently SELinux policy has to 'dontaudit' capability checks for CAP_SYS_MODULE for things like sysctl which just want to read cap-bound. In doing so we also as a byproduct have to hide warnings of potential exploits such as if at some time that sysctl actually tried to load a module. I wondered if anyone would have a problem opening cap-bound up to read from anyone? Acked-by: Chris Wright Cc: Stephen Smalley Cc: James Morris Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds --- kernel/sysctl.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c index 600b33358de..41bbba1a15d 100644 --- a/kernel/sysctl.c +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c @@ -1961,7 +1961,7 @@ int proc_dointvec_bset(ctl_table *table, int write, struct file *filp, { int op; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) { + if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_MODULE)) { return -EPERM; } -- 2.41.0