We already call everything except do_proc_readlink outside of the BKL in
proc_pid_followlink, and there appears to be nothing in do_proc_readlink that
needs any special protection.
So remove this leftover from one of the BKL cleanup efforts.
Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@osdl.org>
        struct dentry *de;
        struct vfsmount *mnt = NULL;
 
-       lock_kernel();
 
        if (current->fsuid != inode->i_uid && !capable(CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE))
                goto out;
        dput(de);
        mntput(mnt);
 out:
-       unlock_kernel();
        return error;
 }