* 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6: (71 commits)
SELinux: inode_doinit_with_dentry drop no dentry printk
SELinux: new permission between tty audit and audit socket
SELinux: open perm for sock files
smack: fixes for unlabeled host support
keys: make procfiles per-user-namespace
keys: skip keys from another user namespace
keys: consider user namespace in key_permission
keys: distinguish per-uid keys in different namespaces
integrity: ima iint radix_tree_lookup locking fix
TOMOYO: Do not call tomoyo_realpath_init unless registered.
integrity: ima scatterlist bug fix
smack: fix lots of kernel-doc notation
TOMOYO: Don't create securityfs entries unless registered.
TOMOYO: Fix exception policy read failure.
SELinux: convert the avc cache hash list to an hlist
SELinux: code readability with avc_cache
SELinux: remove unused av.decided field
SELinux: more careful use of avd in avc_has_perm_noaudit
SELinux: remove the unused ae.used
SELinux: check seqno when updating an avc_node
...
--- /dev/null
+What: security/ima/policy
+Date: May 2008
+Contact: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+Description:
+ The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
+ Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
+ values of executables and other sensitive system files
+ loaded into the run-time of this system. At runtime,
+ the policy can be constrained based on LSM specific data.
+ Policies are loaded into the securityfs file ima/policy
+ by opening the file, writing the rules one at a time and
+ then closing the file. The new policy takes effect after
+ the file ima/policy is closed.
+
+ rule format: action [condition ...]
+
+ action: measure | dont_measure
+ condition:= base | lsm
+ base: [[func=] [mask=] [fsmagic=] [uid=]]
+ lsm: [[subj_user=] [subj_role=] [subj_type=]
+ [obj_user=] [obj_role=] [obj_type=]]
+
+ base: func:= [BPRM_CHECK][FILE_MMAP][INODE_PERMISSION]
+ mask:= [MAY_READ] [MAY_WRITE] [MAY_APPEND] [MAY_EXEC]
+ fsmagic:= hex value
+ uid:= decimal value
+ lsm: are LSM specific
+
+ default policy:
+ # PROC_SUPER_MAGIC
+ dont_measure fsmagic=0x9fa0
+ # SYSFS_MAGIC
+ dont_measure fsmagic=0x62656572
+ # DEBUGFS_MAGIC
+ dont_measure fsmagic=0x64626720
+ # TMPFS_MAGIC
+ dont_measure fsmagic=0x01021994
+ # SECURITYFS_MAGIC
+ dont_measure fsmagic=0x73636673
+
+ measure func=BPRM_CHECK
+ measure func=FILE_MMAP mask=MAY_EXEC
+ measure func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ uid=0
+
+ The default policy measures all executables in bprm_check,
+ all files mmapped executable in file_mmap, and all files
+ open for read by root in inode_permission.
+
+ Examples of LSM specific definitions:
+
+ SELinux:
+ # SELINUX_MAGIC
+ dont_measure fsmagic=0xF97CFF8C
+
+ dont_measure obj_type=var_log_t
+ dont_measure obj_type=auditd_log_t
+ measure subj_user=system_u func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
+ measure subj_role=system_r func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
+
+ Smack:
+ measure subj_user=_ func=INODE_PERM mask=MAY_READ
FB The frame buffer device is enabled.
HW Appropriate hardware is enabled.
IA-64 IA-64 architecture is enabled.
+ IMA Integrity measurement architecture is enabled.
IOSCHED More than one I/O scheduler is enabled.
IP_PNP IP DHCP, BOOTP, or RARP is enabled.
ISAPNP ISA PnP code is enabled.
ihash_entries= [KNL]
Set number of hash buckets for inode cache.
+ ima_audit= [IMA]
+ Format: { "0" | "1" }
+ 0 -- integrity auditing messages. (Default)
+ 1 -- enable informational integrity auditing messages.
+
+ ima_hash= [IMA]
+ Formt: { "sha1" | "md5" }
+ default: "sha1"
+
in2000= [HW,SCSI]
See header of drivers/scsi/in2000.c.
L: linux1394-devel@lists.sourceforge.net
S: Maintained
+INTEGRITY MEASUREMENT ARCHITECTURE (IMA)
+P: Mimi Zohar
+M: zohar@us.ibm.com
+S: Supported
+
IMS TWINTURBO FRAMEBUFFER DRIVER
L: linux-fbdev-devel@lists.sourceforge.net (moderated for non-subscribers)
S: Orphan
L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
L: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (suggested Cc:)
T: git kernel.org:pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/security-testing-2.6.git
+W: http://security.wiki.kernel.org/
S: Supported
SECURITY CONTACT
W: http://sourceforge.net/projects/tlan/
S: Maintained
+TOMOYO SECURITY MODULE
+P: Kentaro Takeda
+M: takedakn@nttdata.co.jp
+P: Tetsuo Handa
+M: penguin-kernel@I-love.SAKURA.ne.jp
+L: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (kernel issues)
+L: tomoyo-users-en@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers and users in English)
+L: tomoyo-dev@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for developers in Japanese)
+L: tomoyo-users@lists.sourceforge.jp (subscribers-only, for users in Japanese)
+W: http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/
+T: quilt http://svn.sourceforge.jp/svnroot/tomoyo/trunk/2.2.x/tomoyo-lsm/patches/
+S: Maintained
+
TOSHIBA ACPI EXTRAS DRIVER
P: John Belmonte
M: toshiba_acpi@memebeam.org
#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20
#define TPM_ERROR_SIZE 10
#define TPM_RET_CODE_IDX 6
-#define TPM_GET_CAP_RET_SIZE_IDX 10
-#define TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_1_IDX 14
-#define TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_2_IDX 18
-#define TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_3_IDX 22
-#define TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_4_IDX 26
-#define TPM_GET_CAP_PERM_DISABLE_IDX 16
-#define TPM_GET_CAP_PERM_INACTIVE_IDX 18
-#define TPM_GET_CAP_RET_BOOL_1_IDX 14
-#define TPM_GET_CAP_TEMP_INACTIVE_IDX 16
-
-#define TPM_CAP_IDX 13
-#define TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX 21
enum tpm_capabilities {
- TPM_CAP_FLAG = 4,
- TPM_CAP_PROP = 5,
+ TPM_CAP_FLAG = cpu_to_be32(4),
+ TPM_CAP_PROP = cpu_to_be32(5),
+ CAP_VERSION_1_1 = cpu_to_be32(0x06),
+ CAP_VERSION_1_2 = cpu_to_be32(0x1A)
};
enum tpm_sub_capabilities {
- TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR = 0x1,
- TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER = 0x3,
- TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM = 0x8,
- TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL = 0x9,
- TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER = 0x11,
- TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT = 0x15,
- TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION = 0x20,
-};
+ TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR = cpu_to_be32(0x101),
+ TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER = cpu_to_be32(0x103),
+ TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM = cpu_to_be32(0x108),
+ TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL = cpu_to_be32(0x109),
+ TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER = cpu_to_be32(0x111),
+ TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT = cpu_to_be32(0x115),
+ TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION = cpu_to_be32(0x120),
-/*
- * This is a semi generic GetCapability command for use
- * with the capability type TPM_CAP_PROP or TPM_CAP_FLAG
- * and their associated sub_capabilities.
- */
-
-static const u8 tpm_cap[] = {
- 0, 193, /* TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND */
- 0, 0, 0, 22, /* length */
- 0, 0, 0, 101, /* TPM_ORD_GetCapability */
- 0, 0, 0, 0, /* TPM_CAP_<TYPE> */
- 0, 0, 0, 4, /* TPM_CAP_SUB_<TYPE> size */
- 0, 0, 1, 0 /* TPM_CAP_SUB_<TYPE> */
};
-static ssize_t transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *data, int len,
- char *desc)
+static ssize_t transmit_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_cmd_t *cmd,
+ int len, const char *desc)
{
int err;
- len = tpm_transmit(chip, data, len);
+ len = tpm_transmit(chip,(u8 *) cmd, len);
if (len < 0)
return len;
if (len == TPM_ERROR_SIZE) {
- err = be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_RET_CODE_IDX)));
+ err = be32_to_cpu(cmd->header.out.return_code);
dev_dbg(chip->dev, "A TPM error (%d) occurred %s\n", err, desc);
return err;
}
return 0;
}
+#define TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE 200
+#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND cpu_to_be16(193)
+#define TPM_ORD_GET_CAP cpu_to_be32(101)
+
+static const struct tpm_input_header tpm_getcap_header = {
+ .tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+ .length = cpu_to_be32(22),
+ .ordinal = TPM_ORD_GET_CAP
+};
+
+ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct device *dev, __be32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
+ const char *desc)
+{
+ struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
+ int rc;
+ struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
+
+ tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
+ if (subcap_id == CAP_VERSION_1_1 || subcap_id == CAP_VERSION_1_2) {
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = subcap_id;
+ /*subcap field not necessary */
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(0);
+ tpm_cmd.header.in.length -= cpu_to_be32(sizeof(__be32));
+ } else {
+ if (subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM ||
+ subcap_id == TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL)
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_FLAG;
+ else
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = subcap_id;
+ }
+ rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, desc);
+ if (!rc)
+ *cap = tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap;
+ return rc;
+}
+
void tpm_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
- u8 data[max_t(int, ARRAY_SIZE(tpm_cap), 30)];
+ struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
ssize_t rc;
- memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap));
- data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP;
- data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
+ tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
- rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, sizeof(data),
+ rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
"attempting to determine the timeouts");
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_gen_interrupt);
void tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *chip)
{
- u8 data[max_t(int, ARRAY_SIZE(tpm_cap), 30)];
+ struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
+ struct timeout_t *timeout_cap;
+ struct duration_t *duration_cap;
ssize_t rc;
u32 timeout;
- memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap));
- data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP;
- data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
+ tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT;
- rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, sizeof(data),
+ rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
"attempting to determine the timeouts");
if (rc)
goto duration;
- if (be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_SIZE_IDX)))
+ if (be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.length)
!= 4 * sizeof(u32))
goto duration;
+ timeout_cap = &tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.timeout;
/* Don't overwrite default if value is 0 */
- timeout =
- be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_1_IDX)));
+ timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->a);
if (timeout)
chip->vendor.timeout_a = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout);
- timeout =
- be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_2_IDX)));
+ timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->b);
if (timeout)
chip->vendor.timeout_b = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout);
- timeout =
- be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_3_IDX)));
+ timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->c);
if (timeout)
chip->vendor.timeout_c = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout);
- timeout =
- be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_4_IDX)));
+ timeout = be32_to_cpu(timeout_cap->d);
if (timeout)
chip->vendor.timeout_d = usecs_to_jiffies(timeout);
duration:
- memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap));
- data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP;
- data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION;
+ tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_getcap_header;
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.cap = TPM_CAP_PROP;
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap_size = cpu_to_be32(4);
+ tpm_cmd.params.getcap_in.subcap = TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION;
- rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, sizeof(data),
+ rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
"attempting to determine the durations");
if (rc)
return;
- if (be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_SIZE_IDX)))
+ if (be32_to_cpu(tpm_cmd.header.out.return_code)
!= 3 * sizeof(u32))
return;
-
+ duration_cap = &tpm_cmd.params.getcap_out.cap.duration;
chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] =
- usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu
- (*((__be32 *) (data +
- TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_1_IDX))));
+ usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_short));
/* The Broadcom BCM0102 chipset in a Dell Latitude D820 gets the above
* value wrong and apparently reports msecs rather than usecs. So we
* fix up the resulting too-small TPM_SHORT value to make things work.
chip->vendor.duration[TPM_SHORT] = HZ;
chip->vendor.duration[TPM_MEDIUM] =
- usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu
- (*((__be32 *) (data +
- TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_2_IDX))));
+ usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_medium));
chip->vendor.duration[TPM_LONG] =
- usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu
- (*((__be32 *) (data +
- TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_3_IDX))));
+ usecs_to_jiffies(be32_to_cpu(duration_cap->tpm_long));
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_get_timeouts);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_continue_selftest);
-#define TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE 200
-
ssize_t tpm_show_enabled(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
char *buf)
{
- u8 *data;
+ cap_t cap;
ssize_t rc;
- struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
- if (chip == NULL)
- return -ENODEV;
-
- data = kzalloc(TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap));
- data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_FLAG;
- data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM;
-
- rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
- "attemtping to determine the permanent enabled state");
- if (rc) {
- kfree(data);
+ rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM, &cap,
+ "attempting to determine the permanent enabled state");
+ if (rc)
return 0;
- }
-
- rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !data[TPM_GET_CAP_PERM_DISABLE_IDX]);
- kfree(data);
+ rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !cap.perm_flags.disable);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_enabled);
ssize_t tpm_show_active(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
char *buf)
{
- u8 *data;
+ cap_t cap;
ssize_t rc;
- struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
- if (chip == NULL)
- return -ENODEV;
-
- data = kzalloc(TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap));
- data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_FLAG;
- data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM;
-
- rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
- "attemtping to determine the permanent active state");
- if (rc) {
- kfree(data);
+ rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM, &cap,
+ "attempting to determine the permanent active state");
+ if (rc)
return 0;
- }
- rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !data[TPM_GET_CAP_PERM_INACTIVE_IDX]);
-
- kfree(data);
+ rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", !cap.perm_flags.deactivated);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_active);
ssize_t tpm_show_owned(struct device * dev, struct device_attribute * attr,
char *buf)
{
- u8 *data;
+ cap_t cap;
ssize_t rc;
- struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
- if (chip == NULL)
- return -ENODEV;
-
- data = kzalloc(TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap));
- data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP;
- data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER;
-
- rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
- "attempting to determine the owner state");
- if (rc) {
- kfree(data);
+ rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER, &cap,
+ "attempting to determine the owner state");
+ if (rc)
return 0;
- }
-
- rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", data[TPM_GET_CAP_RET_BOOL_1_IDX]);
- kfree(data);
+ rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", cap.owned);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_owned);
ssize_t tpm_show_temp_deactivated(struct device * dev,
struct device_attribute * attr, char *buf)
{
- u8 *data;
+ cap_t cap;
ssize_t rc;
- struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
- if (chip == NULL)
- return -ENODEV;
+ rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL, &cap,
+ "attempting to determine the temporary state");
+ if (rc)
+ return 0;
- data = kzalloc(TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
+ rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", cap.stclear_flags.deactivated);
+ return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_temp_deactivated);
- memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap));
- data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_FLAG;
- data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL;
+/*
+ * tpm_chip_find_get - return tpm_chip for given chip number
+ */
+static struct tpm_chip *tpm_chip_find_get(int chip_num)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *pos, *chip = NULL;
- rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
- "attempting to determine the temporary state");
- if (rc) {
- kfree(data);
- return 0;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(pos, &tpm_chip_list, list) {
+ if (chip_num != TPM_ANY_NUM && chip_num != pos->dev_num)
+ continue;
+
+ if (try_module_get(pos->dev->driver->owner)) {
+ chip = pos;
+ break;
+ }
}
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return chip;
+}
- rc = sprintf(buf, "%d\n", data[TPM_GET_CAP_TEMP_INACTIVE_IDX]);
+#define TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD cpu_to_be32(21)
+#define READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE 30
+static struct tpm_input_header pcrread_header = {
+ .tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+ .length = cpu_to_be32(14),
+ .ordinal = TPM_ORDINAL_PCRREAD
+};
- kfree(data);
+int __tpm_pcr_read(struct tpm_chip *chip, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
+
+ cmd.header.in = pcrread_header;
+ cmd.params.pcrread_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(cmd.header.in.length > READ_PCR_RESULT_SIZE);
+ rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, cmd.header.in.length,
+ "attempting to read a pcr value");
+
+ if (rc == 0)
+ memcpy(res_buf, cmd.params.pcrread_out.pcr_result,
+ TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
return rc;
}
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_temp_deactivated);
-static const u8 pcrread[] = {
- 0, 193, /* TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND */
- 0, 0, 0, 14, /* length */
- 0, 0, 0, 21, /* TPM_ORD_PcrRead */
- 0, 0, 0, 0 /* PCR index */
+/**
+ * tpm_pcr_read - read a pcr value
+ * @chip_num: tpm idx # or ANY
+ * @pcr_idx: pcr idx to retrieve
+ * @res_buf: TPM_PCR value
+ * size of res_buf is 20 bytes (or NULL if you don't care)
+ *
+ * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it
+ * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing
+ * the module usage count.
+ */
+int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf)
+{
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+ int rc;
+
+ chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+ if (chip == NULL)
+ return -ENODEV;
+ rc = __tpm_pcr_read(chip, pcr_idx, res_buf);
+ module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner);
+ return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_read);
+
+/**
+ * tpm_pcr_extend - extend pcr value with hash
+ * @chip_num: tpm idx # or AN&
+ * @pcr_idx: pcr idx to extend
+ * @hash: hash value used to extend pcr value
+ *
+ * The TPM driver should be built-in, but for whatever reason it
+ * isn't, protect against the chip disappearing, by incrementing
+ * the module usage count.
+ */
+#define TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND cpu_to_be32(20)
+#define EXTEND_PCR_SIZE 34
+static struct tpm_input_header pcrextend_header = {
+ .tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+ .length = cpu_to_be32(34),
+ .ordinal = TPM_ORD_PCR_EXTEND
};
+int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash)
+{
+ struct tpm_cmd_t cmd;
+ int rc;
+ struct tpm_chip *chip;
+
+ chip = tpm_chip_find_get(chip_num);
+ if (chip == NULL)
+ return -ENODEV;
+
+ cmd.header.in = pcrextend_header;
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(be32_to_cpu(cmd.header.in.length) > EXTEND_PCR_SIZE);
+ cmd.params.pcrextend_in.pcr_idx = cpu_to_be32(pcr_idx);
+ memcpy(cmd.params.pcrextend_in.hash, hash, TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ rc = transmit_cmd(chip, &cmd, cmd.header.in.length,
+ "attempting extend a PCR value");
+
+ module_put(chip->dev->driver->owner);
+ return rc;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_pcr_extend);
+
ssize_t tpm_show_pcrs(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
- u8 *data;
+ cap_t cap;
+ u8 digest[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
ssize_t rc;
int i, j, num_pcrs;
- __be32 index;
char *str = buf;
-
struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
- if (chip == NULL)
- return -ENODEV;
- data = kzalloc(TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap));
- data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP;
- data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR;
-
- rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
+ rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR, &cap,
"attempting to determine the number of PCRS");
- if (rc) {
- kfree(data);
+ if (rc)
return 0;
- }
- num_pcrs = be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + 14)));
+ num_pcrs = be32_to_cpu(cap.num_pcrs);
for (i = 0; i < num_pcrs; i++) {
- memcpy(data, pcrread, sizeof(pcrread));
- index = cpu_to_be32(i);
- memcpy(data + 10, &index, 4);
- rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
- "attempting to read a PCR");
+ rc = __tpm_pcr_read(chip, i, digest);
if (rc)
- goto out;
+ break;
str += sprintf(str, "PCR-%02d: ", i);
for (j = 0; j < TPM_DIGEST_SIZE; j++)
- str += sprintf(str, "%02X ", *(data + 10 + j));
+ str += sprintf(str, "%02X ", digest[j]);
str += sprintf(str, "\n");
}
-out:
- kfree(data);
return str - buf;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_pcrs);
#define READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE 314
-static const u8 readpubek[] = {
- 0, 193, /* TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND */
- 0, 0, 0, 30, /* length */
- 0, 0, 0, 124, /* TPM_ORD_ReadPubek */
+#define TPM_ORD_READPUBEK cpu_to_be32(124)
+struct tpm_input_header tpm_readpubek_header = {
+ .tag = TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND,
+ .length = cpu_to_be32(30),
+ .ordinal = TPM_ORD_READPUBEK
};
ssize_t tpm_show_pubek(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
u8 *data;
+ struct tpm_cmd_t tpm_cmd;
ssize_t err;
int i, rc;
char *str = buf;
struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
- if (chip == NULL)
- return -ENODEV;
- data = kzalloc(READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- memcpy(data, readpubek, sizeof(readpubek));
-
- err = transmit_cmd(chip, data, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE,
+ tpm_cmd.header.in = tpm_readpubek_header;
+ err = transmit_cmd(chip, &tpm_cmd, READ_PUBEK_RESULT_SIZE,
"attempting to read the PUBEK");
if (err)
goto out;
256 byte modulus
ignore checksum 20 bytes
*/
-
+ data = tpm_cmd.params.readpubek_out_buffer;
str +=
sprintf(str,
"Algorithm: %02X %02X %02X %02X\nEncscheme: %02X %02X\n"
}
out:
rc = str - buf;
- kfree(data);
return rc;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_pubek);
-#define CAP_VERSION_1_1 6
-#define CAP_VERSION_1_2 0x1A
-#define CAP_VERSION_IDX 13
-static const u8 cap_version[] = {
- 0, 193, /* TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND */
- 0, 0, 0, 18, /* length */
- 0, 0, 0, 101, /* TPM_ORD_GetCapability */
- 0, 0, 0, 0,
- 0, 0, 0, 0
-};
ssize_t tpm_show_caps(struct device *dev, struct device_attribute *attr,
char *buf)
{
- u8 *data;
+ cap_t cap;
ssize_t rc;
char *str = buf;
- struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
- if (chip == NULL)
- return -ENODEV;
-
- data = kzalloc(TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap));
- data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP;
- data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER;
-
- rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
+ rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER, &cap,
"attempting to determine the manufacturer");
- if (rc) {
- kfree(data);
+ if (rc)
return 0;
- }
-
str += sprintf(str, "Manufacturer: 0x%x\n",
- be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_1_IDX))));
+ be32_to_cpu(cap.manufacturer_id));
- memcpy(data, cap_version, sizeof(cap_version));
- data[CAP_VERSION_IDX] = CAP_VERSION_1_1;
- rc = transmit_cmd(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE,
- "attempting to determine the 1.1 version");
+ rc = tpm_getcap(dev, CAP_VERSION_1_1, &cap,
+ "attempting to determine the 1.1 version");
if (rc)
- goto out;
-
+ return 0;
str += sprintf(str,
"TCG version: %d.%d\nFirmware version: %d.%d\n",
- (int) data[14], (int) data[15], (int) data[16],
- (int) data[17]);
-
-out:
- kfree(data);
+ cap.tpm_version.Major, cap.tpm_version.Minor,
+ cap.tpm_version.revMajor, cap.tpm_version.revMinor);
return str - buf;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_caps);
ssize_t tpm_show_caps_1_2(struct device * dev,
struct device_attribute * attr, char *buf)
{
- u8 *data;
- ssize_t len;
+ cap_t cap;
+ ssize_t rc;
char *str = buf;
- struct tpm_chip *chip = dev_get_drvdata(dev);
- if (chip == NULL)
- return -ENODEV;
-
- data = kzalloc(TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!data)
- return -ENOMEM;
-
- memcpy(data, tpm_cap, sizeof(tpm_cap));
- data[TPM_CAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP;
- data[TPM_CAP_SUBCAP_IDX] = TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER;
-
- len = tpm_transmit(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE);
- if (len <= TPM_ERROR_SIZE) {
- dev_dbg(chip->dev, "A TPM error (%d) occurred "
- "attempting to determine the manufacturer\n",
- be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_RET_CODE_IDX))));
- kfree(data);
+ rc = tpm_getcap(dev, TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER, &cap,
+ "attempting to determine the manufacturer");
+ if (rc)
return 0;
- }
-
str += sprintf(str, "Manufacturer: 0x%x\n",
- be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_GET_CAP_RET_UINT32_1_IDX))));
-
- memcpy(data, cap_version, sizeof(cap_version));
- data[CAP_VERSION_IDX] = CAP_VERSION_1_2;
-
- len = tpm_transmit(chip, data, TPM_INTERNAL_RESULT_SIZE);
- if (len <= TPM_ERROR_SIZE) {
- dev_err(chip->dev, "A TPM error (%d) occurred "
- "attempting to determine the 1.2 version\n",
- be32_to_cpu(*((__be32 *) (data + TPM_RET_CODE_IDX))));
- goto out;
- }
+ be32_to_cpu(cap.manufacturer_id));
+ rc = tpm_getcap(dev, CAP_VERSION_1_2, &cap,
+ "attempting to determine the 1.2 version");
+ if (rc)
+ return 0;
str += sprintf(str,
"TCG version: %d.%d\nFirmware version: %d.%d\n",
- (int) data[16], (int) data[17], (int) data[18],
- (int) data[19]);
-
-out:
- kfree(data);
+ cap.tpm_version_1_2.Major, cap.tpm_version_1_2.Minor,
+ cap.tpm_version_1_2.revMajor,
+ cap.tpm_version_1_2.revMinor);
return str - buf;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_show_caps_1_2);
#include <linux/miscdevice.h>
#include <linux/platform_device.h>
#include <linux/io.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
enum tpm_timeout {
TPM_TIMEOUT = 5, /* msecs */
outb(index, base);
outb(value & 0xFF, base+1);
}
+struct tpm_input_header {
+ __be16 tag;
+ __be32 length;
+ __be32 ordinal;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct tpm_output_header {
+ __be16 tag;
+ __be32 length;
+ __be32 return_code;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct stclear_flags_t {
+ __be16 tag;
+ u8 deactivated;
+ u8 disableForceClear;
+ u8 physicalPresence;
+ u8 physicalPresenceLock;
+ u8 bGlobalLock;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct tpm_version_t {
+ u8 Major;
+ u8 Minor;
+ u8 revMajor;
+ u8 revMinor;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct tpm_version_1_2_t {
+ __be16 tag;
+ u8 Major;
+ u8 Minor;
+ u8 revMajor;
+ u8 revMinor;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct timeout_t {
+ __be32 a;
+ __be32 b;
+ __be32 c;
+ __be32 d;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct duration_t {
+ __be32 tpm_short;
+ __be32 tpm_medium;
+ __be32 tpm_long;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct permanent_flags_t {
+ __be16 tag;
+ u8 disable;
+ u8 ownership;
+ u8 deactivated;
+ u8 readPubek;
+ u8 disableOwnerClear;
+ u8 allowMaintenance;
+ u8 physicalPresenceLifetimeLock;
+ u8 physicalPresenceHWEnable;
+ u8 physicalPresenceCMDEnable;
+ u8 CEKPUsed;
+ u8 TPMpost;
+ u8 TPMpostLock;
+ u8 FIPS;
+ u8 operator;
+ u8 enableRevokeEK;
+ u8 nvLocked;
+ u8 readSRKPub;
+ u8 tpmEstablished;
+ u8 maintenanceDone;
+ u8 disableFullDALogicInfo;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+typedef union {
+ struct permanent_flags_t perm_flags;
+ struct stclear_flags_t stclear_flags;
+ bool owned;
+ __be32 num_pcrs;
+ struct tpm_version_t tpm_version;
+ struct tpm_version_1_2_t tpm_version_1_2;
+ __be32 manufacturer_id;
+ struct timeout_t timeout;
+ struct duration_t duration;
+} cap_t;
+
+struct tpm_getcap_params_in {
+ __be32 cap;
+ __be32 subcap_size;
+ __be32 subcap;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct tpm_getcap_params_out {
+ __be32 cap_size;
+ cap_t cap;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct tpm_readpubek_params_out {
+ u8 algorithm[4];
+ u8 encscheme[2];
+ u8 sigscheme[2];
+ u8 parameters[12]; /*assuming RSA*/
+ __be32 keysize;
+ u8 modulus[256];
+ u8 checksum[20];
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+typedef union {
+ struct tpm_input_header in;
+ struct tpm_output_header out;
+} tpm_cmd_header;
+
+#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20
+struct tpm_pcrread_out {
+ u8 pcr_result[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct tpm_pcrread_in {
+ __be32 pcr_idx;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+struct tpm_pcrextend_in {
+ __be32 pcr_idx;
+ u8 hash[TPM_DIGEST_SIZE];
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+typedef union {
+ struct tpm_getcap_params_out getcap_out;
+ struct tpm_readpubek_params_out readpubek_out;
+ u8 readpubek_out_buffer[sizeof(struct tpm_readpubek_params_out)];
+ struct tpm_getcap_params_in getcap_in;
+ struct tpm_pcrread_in pcrread_in;
+ struct tpm_pcrread_out pcrread_out;
+ struct tpm_pcrextend_in pcrextend_in;
+} tpm_cmd_params;
+
+struct tpm_cmd_t {
+ tpm_cmd_header header;
+ tpm_cmd_params params;
+}__attribute__((packed));
+
+ssize_t tpm_getcap(struct device *, __be32, cap_t *, const char *);
extern void tpm_get_timeouts(struct tpm_chip *);
extern void tpm_gen_interrupt(struct tpm_chip *);
retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
if (retval < 0)
goto out_free;
+ current->in_execve = 1;
retval = -ENOMEM;
bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
goto out;
/* execve succeeded */
+ current->in_execve = 0;
mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
acct_update_integrals(current);
free_bprm(bprm);
}
out_unlock:
+ current->in_execve = 0;
mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
out_free:
#include <linux/proc_fs.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/tsacct_kern.h>
#include <linux/cn_proc.h>
MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN);
if (error)
goto exit;
+ error = ima_path_check(&nd.path, MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN);
+ if (error)
+ goto exit;
file = nameidata_to_filp(&nd, O_RDONLY|O_LARGEFILE);
error = PTR_ERR(file);
goto out_path_put;
err = inode_permission(nd.path.dentry->d_inode, MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN);
+ if (err)
+ goto out_path_put;
+ err = ima_path_check(&nd.path, MAY_EXEC | MAY_OPEN);
if (err)
goto out_path_put;
struct linux_binfmt *fmt;
retval = security_bprm_check(bprm);
+ if (retval)
+ return retval;
+ retval = ima_bprm_check(bprm);
if (retval)
return retval;
retval = mutex_lock_interruptible(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
if (retval < 0)
goto out_free;
+ current->in_execve = 1;
retval = -ENOMEM;
bprm->cred = prepare_exec_creds();
goto out;
/* execve succeeded */
+ current->in_execve = 0;
mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
acct_update_integrals(current);
free_bprm(bprm);
}
out_unlock:
+ current->in_execve = 0;
mutex_unlock(¤t->cred_exec_mutex);
out_free:
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/eventpoll.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
if (file->f_op && file->f_op->release)
file->f_op->release(inode, file);
security_file_free(file);
+ ima_file_free(file);
if (unlikely(S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_cdev != NULL))
cdev_put(inode->i_cdev);
fops_put(file->f_op);
#include <linux/hash.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/pagemap.h>
#include <linux/cdev.h>
#include <linux/bootmem.h>
inode->i_cdev = NULL;
inode->i_rdev = 0;
inode->dirtied_when = 0;
- if (security_inode_alloc(inode)) {
- if (inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode)
- inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode(inode);
- else
- kmem_cache_free(inode_cachep, (inode));
- return NULL;
- }
+
+ if (security_inode_alloc(inode))
+ goto out_free_inode;
+
+ /* allocate and initialize an i_integrity */
+ if (ima_inode_alloc(inode))
+ goto out_free_security;
spin_lock_init(&inode->i_lock);
lockdep_set_class(&inode->i_lock, &sb->s_type->i_lock_key);
inode->i_mapping = mapping;
return inode;
+
+out_free_security:
+ security_inode_free(inode);
+out_free_inode:
+ if (inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode)
+ inode->i_sb->s_op->destroy_inode(inode);
+ else
+ kmem_cache_free(inode_cachep, (inode));
+ return NULL;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(inode_init_always);
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
if (err == -EAGAIN)
err = inode_permission(nd->path.dentry->d_inode,
MAY_EXEC);
+ if (!err)
+ err = ima_path_check(&nd->path, MAY_EXEC);
if (err)
break;
error = inode_permission(inode, acc_mode);
if (error)
return error;
+
+ error = ima_path_check(path,
+ acc_mode & (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_EXEC));
+ if (error)
+ return error;
/*
* An append-only file must be opened in append mode for writing.
*/
* 1500 - 1599 kernel LSPP events
* 1600 - 1699 kernel crypto events
* 1700 - 1799 kernel anomaly records
- * 1800 - 1999 future kernel use (maybe integrity labels and related events)
+ * 1800 - 1899 kernel integrity events
+ * 1900 - 1999 future kernel use
* 2000 is for otherwise unclassified kernel audit messages (legacy)
* 2001 - 2099 unused (kernel)
* 2100 - 2199 user space anomaly records
#define AUDIT_LAST_KERN_ANOM_MSG 1799
#define AUDIT_ANOM_PROMISCUOUS 1700 /* Device changed promiscuous mode */
#define AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND 1701 /* Process ended abnormally */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA 1800 /* Data integrity verification */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA 1801 /* Metadata integrity verification */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS 1802 /* Integrity enable status */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH 1803 /* Integrity HASH type */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR 1804 /* PCR invalidation msgs */
+#define AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE 1805 /* policy rule */
#define AUDIT_KERNEL 2000 /* Asynchronous audit record. NOT A REQUEST. */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _LINUX_IMA_H
+#define _LINUX_IMA_H
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+struct linux_binprm;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA
+extern int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm);
+extern int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode);
+extern void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode);
+extern int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask);
+extern void ima_file_free(struct file *file);
+extern int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot);
+extern void ima_shm_check(struct file *file);
+
+#else
+static inline int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void ima_shm_check(struct file *file)
+{
+ return;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_H */
+#endif /* _LINUX_IMA_H */
/* ??? */
unsigned int personality;
unsigned did_exec:1;
+ unsigned in_execve:1; /* Tell the LSMs that the process is doing an
+ * execve */
pid_t pid;
pid_t tgid;
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2004,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Leendert van Doorn <leendert@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Dave Safford <safford@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ * Debora Velarde <dvelarde@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * Maintained by: <tpmdd_devel@lists.sourceforge.net>
+ *
+ * Device driver for TCG/TCPA TPM (trusted platform module).
+ * Specifications at www.trustedcomputinggroup.org
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ */
+#ifndef __LINUX_TPM_H__
+#define __LINUX_TPM_H__
+
+/*
+ * Chip num is this value or a valid tpm idx
+ */
+#define TPM_ANY_NUM 0xFFFF
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_TCG_TPM)
+
+extern int tpm_pcr_read(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, u8 *res_buf);
+extern int tpm_pcr_extend(u32 chip_num, int pcr_idx, const u8 *hash);
+#endif
+#endif
#include <linux/nsproxy.h>
#include <linux/mount.h>
#include <linux/ipc_namespace.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
error = PTR_ERR(file);
if (IS_ERR(file))
goto no_file;
+ ima_shm_check(file);
id = ipc_addid(&shm_ids(ns), &shp->shm_perm, ns->shm_ctlmni);
if (id < 0) {
file = alloc_file(path.mnt, path.dentry, f_mode, &shm_file_operations);
if (!file)
goto out_free;
+ ima_shm_check(file);
file->private_data = sfd;
file->f_mapping = shp->shm_file->f_mapping;
struct user_namespace init_user_ns = {
.kref = {
- .refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(1),
+ .refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
},
.creator = &root_user,
};
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/personality.h>
#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
#include <linux/hugetlb.h>
#include <linux/profile.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
}
error = security_file_mmap(file, reqprot, prot, flags, addr, 0);
+ if (error)
+ return error;
+ error = ima_file_mmap(file, prot);
if (error)
return error;
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
#include <linux/swap.h>
+#include <linux/ima.h>
static struct vfsmount *shm_mnt;
if (IS_ERR(file))
return PTR_ERR(file);
+ ima_shm_check(file);
if (vma->vm_file)
fput(vma->vm_file);
vma->vm_file = file;
bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem"
help
This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by
- the TPM bios character driver. It is not used by SELinux or SMACK.
+ the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is
+ not used by SELinux or SMACK.
If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
source security/selinux/Kconfig
source security/smack/Kconfig
+source security/tomoyo/Kconfig
+
+source security/integrity/ima/Kconfig
endmenu
obj-$(CONFIG_KEYS) += keys/
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux
subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack
+subdir-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo
# always enable default capabilities
obj-y += commoncap.o
# Must precede capability.o in order to stack properly.
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX) += selinux/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) += smack/built-in.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_TOMOYO) += tomoyo/built-in.o
obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_ROOTPLUG) += root_plug.o
obj-$(CONFIG_CGROUP_DEVICE) += device_cgroup.o
+
+# Object integrity file lists
+subdir-$(CONFIG_IMA) += integrity/ima
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += integrity/ima/built-in.o
* This function returns a pointer to a dentry if it succeeds. This
* pointer must be passed to the securityfs_remove() function when the file is
* to be removed (no automatic cleanup happens if your module is unloaded,
- * you are responsible here). If an error occurs, %NULL is returned.
+ * you are responsible here). If an error occurs, the function will return
+ * the erorr value (via ERR_PTR).
*
* If securityfs is not enabled in the kernel, the value %-ENODEV is
- * returned. It is not wise to check for this value, but rather, check for
- * %NULL or !%NULL instead as to eliminate the need for #ifdef in the calling
- * code.
+ * returned.
*/
struct dentry *securityfs_create_file(const char *name, mode_t mode,
struct dentry *parent, void *data,
--- /dev/null
+# IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture
+#
+config IMA
+ bool "Integrity Measurement Architecture(IMA)"
+ depends on ACPI
+ select SECURITYFS
+ select CRYPTO
+ select CRYPTO_HMAC
+ select CRYPTO_MD5
+ select CRYPTO_SHA1
+ select TCG_TPM
+ select TCG_TIS
+ help
+ The Trusted Computing Group(TCG) runtime Integrity
+ Measurement Architecture(IMA) maintains a list of hash
+ values of executables and other sensitive system files,
+ as they are read or executed. If an attacker manages
+ to change the contents of an important system file
+ being measured, we can tell.
+
+ If your system has a TPM chip, then IMA also maintains
+ an aggregate integrity value over this list inside the
+ TPM hardware, so that the TPM can prove to a third party
+ whether or not critical system files have been modified.
+ Read <http://www.usenix.org/events/sec04/tech/sailer.html>
+ to learn more about IMA.
+ If unsure, say N.
+
+config IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
+ int
+ depends on IMA
+ range 8 14
+ default 10
+ help
+ IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX determines the TPM PCR register index
+ that IMA uses to maintain the integrity aggregate of the
+ measurement list. If unsure, use the default 10.
+
+config IMA_AUDIT
+ bool
+ depends on IMA
+ default y
+ help
+ This option adds a kernel parameter 'ima_audit', which
+ allows informational auditing messages to be enabled
+ at boot. If this option is selected, informational integrity
+ auditing messages can be enabled with 'ima_audit=1' on
+ the kernel command line.
+
+config IMA_LSM_RULES
+ bool
+ depends on IMA && AUDIT && (SECURITY_SELINUX || SECURITY_SMACK)
+ default y
+ help
+ Disabling this option will disregard LSM based policy rules.
--- /dev/null
+#
+# Makefile for building Trusted Computing Group's(TCG) runtime Integrity
+# Measurement Architecture(IMA).
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_IMA) += ima.o
+
+ima-y := ima_fs.o ima_queue.o ima_init.o ima_main.o ima_crypto.o ima_api.o \
+ ima_policy.o ima_iint.o ima_audit.o
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima.h
+ * internal Integrity Measurement Architecture (IMA) definitions
+ */
+
+#ifndef __LINUX_IMA_H
+#define __LINUX_IMA_H
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/hash.h>
+#include <linux/tpm.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+
+enum ima_show_type { IMA_SHOW_BINARY, IMA_SHOW_ASCII };
+enum tpm_pcrs { TPM_PCR0 = 0, TPM_PCR8 = 8 };
+
+/* digest size for IMA, fits SHA1 or MD5 */
+#define IMA_DIGEST_SIZE 20
+#define IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX 255
+
+#define IMA_HASH_BITS 9
+#define IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE (1 << IMA_HASH_BITS)
+
+/* set during initialization */
+extern int ima_initialized;
+extern int ima_used_chip;
+extern char *ima_hash;
+
+/* IMA inode template definition */
+struct ima_template_data {
+ u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* sha1/md5 measurement hash */
+ char file_name[IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX + 1]; /* name + \0 */
+};
+
+struct ima_template_entry {
+ u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE]; /* sha1 or md5 measurement hash */
+ const char *template_name;
+ int template_len;
+ struct ima_template_data template;
+};
+
+struct ima_queue_entry {
+ struct hlist_node hnext; /* place in hash collision list */
+ struct list_head later; /* place in ima_measurements list */
+ struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+};
+extern struct list_head ima_measurements; /* list of all measurements */
+
+/* declarations */
+void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+ const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+ const char *cause, int result, int info);
+
+/* Internal IMA function definitions */
+void ima_iintcache_init(void);
+int ima_init(void);
+void ima_cleanup(void);
+int ima_fs_init(void);
+void ima_fs_cleanup(void);
+int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
+ const char *op, struct inode *inode);
+int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest);
+int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest);
+int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest);
+void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
+ const char *op, const char *cause);
+
+/*
+ * used to protect h_table and sha_table
+ */
+extern spinlock_t ima_queue_lock;
+
+struct ima_h_table {
+ atomic_long_t len; /* number of stored measurements in the list */
+ atomic_long_t violations;
+ struct hlist_head queue[IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE];
+};
+extern struct ima_h_table ima_htable;
+
+static inline unsigned long ima_hash_key(u8 *digest)
+{
+ return hash_long(*digest, IMA_HASH_BITS);
+}
+
+/* iint cache flags */
+#define IMA_MEASURED 1
+#define IMA_IINT_DUMP_STACK 512
+
+/* integrity data associated with an inode */
+struct ima_iint_cache {
+ u64 version; /* track inode changes */
+ unsigned long flags;
+ u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */
+ long readcount; /* measured files readcount */
+ long writecount; /* measured files writecount */
+ long opencount; /* opens reference count */
+ struct kref refcount; /* ima_iint_cache reference count */
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+};
+
+/* LIM API function definitions */
+int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
+ int mask, int function);
+int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file);
+void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+ const unsigned char *filename);
+int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
+ struct inode *inode);
+void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e,
+ enum ima_show_type show);
+
+/* radix tree calls to lookup, insert, delete
+ * integrity data associated with an inode.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_insert(struct inode *inode);
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_get(struct inode *inode);
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_insert_get(struct inode *inode);
+void ima_iint_delete(struct inode *inode);
+void iint_free(struct kref *kref);
+void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu);
+
+/* IMA policy related functions */
+enum ima_hooks { PATH_CHECK = 1, FILE_MMAP, BPRM_CHECK };
+
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask);
+void ima_init_policy(void);
+void ima_update_policy(void);
+int ima_parse_add_rule(char *);
+void ima_delete_rules(void);
+
+/* LSM based policy rules require audit */
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES
+
+#define security_filter_rule_init security_audit_rule_init
+#define security_filter_rule_match security_audit_rule_match
+
+#else
+
+static inline int security_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **lsmrule)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static inline int security_filter_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IMA_LSM_RULES */
+#endif
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_api.c
+ * Implements must_measure, collect_measurement, store_measurement,
+ * and store_template.
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+static const char *IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME = "ima";
+
+/*
+ * ima_store_template - store ima template measurements
+ *
+ * Calculate the hash of a template entry, add the template entry
+ * to an ordered list of measurement entries maintained inside the kernel,
+ * and also update the aggregate integrity value (maintained inside the
+ * configured TPM PCR) over the hashes of the current list of measurement
+ * entries.
+ *
+ * Applications retrieve the current kernel-held measurement list through
+ * the securityfs entries in /sys/kernel/security/ima. The signed aggregate
+ * TPM PCR (called quote) can be retrieved using a TPM user space library
+ * and is used to validate the measurement list.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise
+ */
+int ima_store_template(struct ima_template_entry *entry,
+ int violation, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ const char *op = "add_template_measure";
+ const char *audit_cause = "hashing_error";
+ int result;
+
+ memset(entry->digest, 0, sizeof(entry->digest));
+ entry->template_name = IMA_TEMPLATE_NAME;
+ entry->template_len = sizeof(entry->template);
+
+ if (!violation) {
+ result = ima_calc_template_hash(entry->template_len,
+ &entry->template,
+ entry->digest);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode,
+ entry->template_name, op,
+ audit_cause, result, 0);
+ return result;
+ }
+ }
+ result = ima_add_template_entry(entry, violation, op, inode);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_add_violation - add violation to measurement list.
+ *
+ * Violations are flagged in the measurement list with zero hash values.
+ * By extending the PCR with 0xFF's instead of with zeroes, the PCR
+ * value is invalidated.
+ */
+void ima_add_violation(struct inode *inode, const unsigned char *filename,
+ const char *op, const char *cause)
+{
+ struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+ int violation = 1;
+ int result;
+
+ /* can overflow, only indicator */
+ atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.violations);
+
+ entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!entry) {
+ result = -ENOMEM;
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+ memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
+ strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
+ result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
+ if (result < 0)
+ kfree(entry);
+err_out:
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
+ op, cause, result, 0);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_must_measure - measure decision based on policy.
+ * @inode: pointer to inode to measure
+ * @mask: contains the permission mask (MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE, MAY_EXECUTE)
+ * @function: calling function (PATH_CHECK, BPRM_CHECK, FILE_MMAP)
+ *
+ * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs:
+ * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic=
+ * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific.
+ * func: PATH_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | FILE_MMAP
+ * mask: contains the permission mask
+ * fsmagic: hex value
+ *
+ * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
+ *
+ * Return 0 to measure. Return 1 if already measured.
+ * For matching a DONT_MEASURE policy, no policy, or other
+ * error, return an error code.
+*/
+int ima_must_measure(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode,
+ int mask, int function)
+{
+ int must_measure;
+
+ if (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)
+ return 1;
+
+ must_measure = ima_match_policy(inode, function, mask);
+ return must_measure ? 0 : -EACCES;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_collect_measurement - collect file measurement
+ *
+ * Calculate the file hash, if it doesn't already exist,
+ * storing the measurement and i_version in the iint.
+ *
+ * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, error code otherwise
+ */
+int ima_collect_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file)
+{
+ int result = -EEXIST;
+
+ if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) {
+ u64 i_version = file->f_dentry->d_inode->i_version;
+
+ memset(iint->digest, 0, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ result = ima_calc_hash(file, iint->digest);
+ if (!result)
+ iint->version = i_version;
+ }
+ return result;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_store_measurement - store file measurement
+ *
+ * Create an "ima" template and then store the template by calling
+ * ima_store_template.
+ *
+ * We only get here if the inode has not already been measured,
+ * but the measurement could already exist:
+ * - multiple copies of the same file on either the same or
+ * different filesystems.
+ * - the inode was previously flushed as well as the iint info,
+ * containing the hashing info.
+ *
+ * Must be called with iint->mutex held.
+ */
+void ima_store_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+ const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+ const char *op = "add_template_measure";
+ const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
+ int result = -ENOMEM;
+ struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+ struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+ int violation = 0;
+
+ entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!entry) {
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, filename,
+ op, audit_cause, result, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+ memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
+ memcpy(entry->template.digest, iint->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ strncpy(entry->template.file_name, filename, IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
+
+ result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode);
+ if (!result)
+ iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED;
+ else
+ kfree(entry);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * File: integrity_audit.c
+ * Audit calls for the integrity subsystem
+ */
+
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static int ima_audit;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_AUDIT
+
+/* ima_audit_setup - enable informational auditing messages */
+static int __init ima_audit_setup(char *str)
+{
+ unsigned long audit;
+ int rc, result = 0;
+ char *op = "ima_audit";
+ char *cause;
+
+ rc = strict_strtoul(str, 0, &audit);
+ if (rc || audit > 1)
+ result = 1;
+ else
+ ima_audit = audit;
+ cause = ima_audit ? "enabled" : "not_enabled";
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL, NULL,
+ op, cause, result, 0);
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_audit=", ima_audit_setup);
+#endif
+
+void integrity_audit_msg(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
+ const unsigned char *fname, const char *op,
+ const char *cause, int result, int audit_info)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ if (!ima_audit && audit_info == 1) /* Skip informational messages */
+ return;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "integrity: pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
+ current->pid, current->cred->uid,
+ audit_get_loginuid(current),
+ audit_get_sessionid(current));
+ audit_log_task_context(ab);
+ switch (audit_msgno) {
+ case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA:
+ case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_METADATA:
+ case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR:
+ case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS:
+ audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s cause=%s", op, cause);
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH:
+ audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s hash=%s", op, cause);
+ break;
+ default:
+ audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s", op);
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " comm=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+ if (fname) {
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, fname);
+ }
+ if (inode)
+ audit_log_format(ab, " dev=%s ino=%lu",
+ inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_crypto.c
+ * Calculates md5/sha1 file hash, template hash, boot-aggreate hash
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static int init_desc(struct hash_desc *desc)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ desc->tfm = crypto_alloc_hash(ima_hash, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+ if (IS_ERR(desc->tfm)) {
+ pr_info("failed to load %s transform: %ld\n",
+ ima_hash, PTR_ERR(desc->tfm));
+ rc = PTR_ERR(desc->tfm);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ desc->flags = 0;
+ rc = crypto_hash_init(desc);
+ if (rc)
+ crypto_free_hash(desc->tfm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the MD5/SHA1 file digest
+ */
+int ima_calc_hash(struct file *file, char *digest)
+{
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ loff_t i_size;
+ char *rbuf;
+ int rc, offset = 0;
+
+ rc = init_desc(&desc);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ rbuf = kzalloc(PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!rbuf) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ i_size = i_size_read(file->f_dentry->d_inode);
+ while (offset < i_size) {
+ int rbuf_len;
+
+ rbuf_len = kernel_read(file, offset, rbuf, PAGE_SIZE);
+ if (rbuf_len < 0) {
+ rc = rbuf_len;
+ break;
+ }
+ offset += rbuf_len;
+ sg_init_one(sg, rbuf, rbuf_len);
+
+ rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, rbuf_len);
+ if (rc)
+ break;
+ }
+ kfree(rbuf);
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
+out:
+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the hash of a given template
+ */
+int ima_calc_template_hash(int template_len, void *template, char *digest)
+{
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg[1];
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = init_desc(&desc);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ sg_init_one(sg, template, template_len);
+ rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, sg, template_len);
+ if (!rc)
+ rc = crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr)
+{
+ if (!ima_used_chip)
+ return;
+
+ if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0)
+ pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
+}
+
+/*
+ * Calculate the boot aggregate hash
+ */
+int ima_calc_boot_aggregate(char *digest)
+{
+ struct hash_desc desc;
+ struct scatterlist sg;
+ u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ int rc, i;
+
+ rc = init_desc(&desc);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* cumulative sha1 over tpm registers 0-7 */
+ for (i = TPM_PCR0; i < TPM_PCR8; i++) {
+ ima_pcrread(i, pcr_i);
+ /* now accumulate with current aggregate */
+ sg_init_one(&sg, pcr_i, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ rc = crypto_hash_update(&desc, &sg, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ }
+ if (!rc)
+ crypto_hash_final(&desc, digest);
+ crypto_free_hash(desc.tfm);
+ return rc;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Kylene Hall <kjhall@us.ibm.com>
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@us.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_fs.c
+ * implemenents security file system for reporting
+ * current measurement list and IMA statistics
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+static int valid_policy = 1;
+#define TMPBUFLEN 12
+static ssize_t ima_show_htable_value(char __user *buf, size_t count,
+ loff_t *ppos, atomic_long_t *val)
+{
+ char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
+ ssize_t len;
+
+ len = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%li\n", atomic_long_read(val));
+ return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, tmpbuf, len);
+}
+
+static ssize_t ima_show_htable_violations(struct file *filp,
+ char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.violations);
+}
+
+static struct file_operations ima_htable_violations_ops = {
+ .read = ima_show_htable_violations
+};
+
+static ssize_t ima_show_measurements_count(struct file *filp,
+ char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return ima_show_htable_value(buf, count, ppos, &ima_htable.len);
+
+}
+
+static struct file_operations ima_measurements_count_ops = {
+ .read = ima_show_measurements_count
+};
+
+/* returns pointer to hlist_node */
+static void *ima_measurements_start(struct seq_file *m, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ loff_t l = *pos;
+ struct ima_queue_entry *qe;
+
+ /* we need a lock since pos could point beyond last element */
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, &ima_measurements, later) {
+ if (!l--) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return qe;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *ima_measurements_next(struct seq_file *m, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
+
+ /* lock protects when reading beyond last element
+ * against concurrent list-extension
+ */
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ qe = list_entry(rcu_dereference(qe->later.next),
+ struct ima_queue_entry, later);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ (*pos)++;
+
+ return (&qe->later == &ima_measurements) ? NULL : qe;
+}
+
+static void ima_measurements_stop(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+}
+
+static void ima_putc(struct seq_file *m, void *data, int datalen)
+{
+ while (datalen--)
+ seq_putc(m, *(char *)data++);
+}
+
+/* print format:
+ * 32bit-le=pcr#
+ * char[20]=template digest
+ * 32bit-le=template name size
+ * char[n]=template name
+ * eventdata[n]=template specific data
+ */
+static int ima_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+ /* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
+ struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
+ struct ima_template_entry *e;
+ int namelen;
+ u32 pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX;
+
+ /* get entry */
+ e = qe->entry;
+ if (e == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ /*
+ * 1st: PCRIndex
+ * PCR used is always the same (config option) in
+ * little-endian format
+ */
+ ima_putc(m, &pcr, sizeof pcr);
+
+ /* 2nd: template digest */
+ ima_putc(m, e->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ /* 3rd: template name size */
+ namelen = strlen(e->template_name);
+ ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
+
+ /* 4th: template name */
+ ima_putc(m, (void *)e->template_name, namelen);
+
+ /* 5th: template specific data */
+ ima_template_show(m, (struct ima_template_data *)&e->template,
+ IMA_SHOW_BINARY);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct seq_operations ima_measurments_seqops = {
+ .start = ima_measurements_start,
+ .next = ima_measurements_next,
+ .stop = ima_measurements_stop,
+ .show = ima_measurements_show
+};
+
+static int ima_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &ima_measurments_seqops);
+}
+
+static struct file_operations ima_measurements_ops = {
+ .open = ima_measurements_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+
+static void ima_print_digest(struct seq_file *m, u8 *digest)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < IMA_DIGEST_SIZE; i++)
+ seq_printf(m, "%02x", *(digest + i));
+}
+
+void ima_template_show(struct seq_file *m, void *e, enum ima_show_type show)
+{
+ struct ima_template_data *entry = e;
+ int namelen;
+
+ switch (show) {
+ case IMA_SHOW_ASCII:
+ ima_print_digest(m, entry->digest);
+ seq_printf(m, " %s\n", entry->file_name);
+ break;
+ case IMA_SHOW_BINARY:
+ ima_putc(m, entry->digest, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ namelen = strlen(entry->file_name);
+ ima_putc(m, &namelen, sizeof namelen);
+ ima_putc(m, entry->file_name, namelen);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+/* print in ascii */
+static int ima_ascii_measurements_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
+{
+ /* the list never shrinks, so we don't need a lock here */
+ struct ima_queue_entry *qe = v;
+ struct ima_template_entry *e;
+
+ /* get entry */
+ e = qe->entry;
+ if (e == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ /* 1st: PCR used (config option) */
+ seq_printf(m, "%2d ", CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX);
+
+ /* 2nd: SHA1 template hash */
+ ima_print_digest(m, e->digest);
+
+ /* 3th: template name */
+ seq_printf(m, " %s ", e->template_name);
+
+ /* 4th: template specific data */
+ ima_template_show(m, (struct ima_template_data *)&e->template,
+ IMA_SHOW_ASCII);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct seq_operations ima_ascii_measurements_seqops = {
+ .start = ima_measurements_start,
+ .next = ima_measurements_next,
+ .stop = ima_measurements_stop,
+ .show = ima_ascii_measurements_show
+};
+
+static int ima_ascii_measurements_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &ima_ascii_measurements_seqops);
+}
+
+static struct file_operations ima_ascii_measurements_ops = {
+ .open = ima_ascii_measurements_open,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+
+static ssize_t ima_write_policy(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t datalen, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *data;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (datalen >= PAGE_SIZE)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ if (*ppos != 0) {
+ /* No partial writes. */
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ data = kmalloc(datalen + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!data)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, datalen)) {
+ kfree(data);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+ *(data + datalen) = '\0';
+ rc = ima_parse_add_rule(data);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ datalen = -EINVAL;
+ valid_policy = 0;
+ }
+
+ kfree(data);
+ return datalen;
+}
+
+static struct dentry *ima_dir;
+static struct dentry *binary_runtime_measurements;
+static struct dentry *ascii_runtime_measurements;
+static struct dentry *runtime_measurements_count;
+static struct dentry *violations;
+static struct dentry *ima_policy;
+
+static atomic_t policy_opencount = ATOMIC_INIT(1);
+/*
+ * ima_open_policy: sequentialize access to the policy file
+ */
+int ima_open_policy(struct inode * inode, struct file * filp)
+{
+ if (atomic_dec_and_test(&policy_opencount))
+ return 0;
+ return -EBUSY;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_release_policy - start using the new measure policy rules.
+ *
+ * Initially, ima_measure points to the default policy rules, now
+ * point to the new policy rules, and remove the securityfs policy file,
+ * assuming a valid policy.
+ */
+static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ if (!valid_policy) {
+ ima_delete_rules();
+ valid_policy = 1;
+ atomic_set(&policy_opencount, 1);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ima_update_policy();
+ securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
+ ima_policy = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = {
+ .open = ima_open_policy,
+ .write = ima_write_policy,
+ .release = ima_release_policy
+};
+
+int ima_fs_init(void)
+{
+ ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", NULL);
+ if (IS_ERR(ima_dir))
+ return -1;
+
+ binary_runtime_measurements =
+ securityfs_create_file("binary_runtime_measurements",
+ S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
+ &ima_measurements_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements))
+ goto out;
+
+ ascii_runtime_measurements =
+ securityfs_create_file("ascii_runtime_measurements",
+ S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
+ &ima_ascii_measurements_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements))
+ goto out;
+
+ runtime_measurements_count =
+ securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count",
+ S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL,
+ &ima_measurements_count_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count))
+ goto out;
+
+ violations =
+ securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP,
+ ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(violations))
+ goto out;
+
+ ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy",
+ S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IWUSR,
+ ima_dir, NULL,
+ &ima_measure_policy_ops);
+ if (IS_ERR(ima_policy))
+ goto out;
+
+ return 0;
+out:
+ securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
+ securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
+ securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
+ securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
+ securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+void __exit ima_fs_cleanup(void)
+{
+ securityfs_remove(violations);
+ securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
+ securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
+ securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
+ securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
+ securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_iint.c
+ * - implements the IMA hooks: ima_inode_alloc, ima_inode_free
+ * - cache integrity information associated with an inode
+ * using a radix tree.
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/radix-tree.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+#define ima_iint_delete ima_inode_free
+
+RADIX_TREE(ima_iint_store, GFP_ATOMIC);
+DEFINE_SPINLOCK(ima_iint_lock);
+
+static struct kmem_cache *iint_cache __read_mostly;
+
+/* ima_iint_find_get - return the iint associated with an inode
+ *
+ * ima_iint_find_get gets a reference to the iint. Caller must
+ * remember to put the iint reference.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_get(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ iint = radix_tree_lookup(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode);
+ if (!iint)
+ goto out;
+ kref_get(&iint->refcount);
+out:
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return iint;
+}
+
+/* Allocate memory for the iint associated with the inode
+ * from the iint_cache slab, initialize the iint, and
+ * insert it into the radix tree.
+ *
+ * On success return a pointer to the iint; on failure return NULL.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_insert(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (!ima_initialized)
+ return iint;
+ iint = kmem_cache_alloc(iint_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!iint)
+ return iint;
+
+ rc = radix_tree_preload(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock);
+ rc = radix_tree_insert(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode, iint);
+ spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock);
+out:
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
+ if (rc == -EEXIST) {
+ spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock);
+ iint = radix_tree_lookup(&ima_iint_store,
+ (unsigned long)inode);
+ spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock);
+ } else
+ iint = NULL;
+ }
+ radix_tree_preload_end();
+ return iint;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_inode_alloc - allocate an iint associated with an inode
+ * @inode: pointer to the inode
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, 1 on failure.
+ */
+int ima_inode_alloc(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+ if (!ima_initialized)
+ return 0;
+
+ iint = ima_iint_insert(inode);
+ if (!iint)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* ima_iint_find_insert_get - get the iint associated with an inode
+ *
+ * Most insertions are done at inode_alloc, except those allocated
+ * before late_initcall. When the iint does not exist, allocate it,
+ * initialize and insert it, and increment the iint refcount.
+ *
+ * (Can't initialize at security_initcall before any inodes are
+ * allocated, got to wait at least until proc_init.)
+ *
+ * Return the iint.
+ */
+struct ima_iint_cache *ima_iint_find_insert_get(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint = NULL;
+
+ iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
+ if (iint)
+ return iint;
+
+ iint = ima_iint_insert(inode);
+ if (iint)
+ kref_get(&iint->refcount);
+
+ return iint;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ima_iint_find_insert_get);
+
+/* iint_free - called when the iint refcount goes to zero */
+void iint_free(struct kref *kref)
+{
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint = container_of(kref, struct ima_iint_cache,
+ refcount);
+ iint->version = 0;
+ iint->flags = 0UL;
+ if (iint->readcount != 0) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s: readcount: %ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
+ iint->readcount);
+ iint->readcount = 0;
+ }
+ if (iint->writecount != 0) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s: writecount: %ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
+ iint->writecount);
+ iint->writecount = 0;
+ }
+ if (iint->opencount != 0) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "%s: opencount: %ld\n", __FUNCTION__,
+ iint->opencount);
+ iint->opencount = 0;
+ }
+ kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1);
+ kmem_cache_free(iint_cache, iint);
+}
+
+void iint_rcu_free(struct rcu_head *rcu_head)
+{
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint = container_of(rcu_head,
+ struct ima_iint_cache, rcu);
+ kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_iint_delete - called on integrity_inode_free
+ * @inode: pointer to the inode
+ *
+ * Free the integrity information(iint) associated with an inode.
+ */
+void ima_iint_delete(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+ if (!ima_initialized)
+ return;
+ spin_lock(&ima_iint_lock);
+ iint = radix_tree_delete(&ima_iint_store, (unsigned long)inode);
+ spin_unlock(&ima_iint_lock);
+ if (iint)
+ call_rcu(&iint->rcu, iint_rcu_free);
+}
+
+static void init_once(void *foo)
+{
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint = foo;
+
+ memset(iint, 0, sizeof *iint);
+ iint->version = 0;
+ iint->flags = 0UL;
+ mutex_init(&iint->mutex);
+ iint->readcount = 0;
+ iint->writecount = 0;
+ iint->opencount = 0;
+ kref_set(&iint->refcount, 1);
+}
+
+void ima_iintcache_init(void)
+{
+ iint_cache =
+ kmem_cache_create("iint_cache", sizeof(struct ima_iint_cache), 0,
+ SLAB_PANIC, init_once);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Leendert van Doorn <leendert@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_init.c
+ * initialization and cleanup functions
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/* name for boot aggregate entry */
+static const char *boot_aggregate_name = "boot_aggregate";
+int ima_used_chip;
+
+/* Add the boot aggregate to the IMA measurement list and extend
+ * the PCR register.
+ *
+ * Calculate the boot aggregate, a SHA1 over tpm registers 0-7,
+ * assuming a TPM chip exists, and zeroes if the TPM chip does not
+ * exist. Add the boot aggregate measurement to the measurement
+ * list and extend the PCR register.
+ *
+ * If a tpm chip does not exist, indicate the core root of trust is
+ * not hardware based by invalidating the aggregate PCR value.
+ * (The aggregate PCR value is invalidated by adding one value to
+ * the measurement list and extending the aggregate PCR value with
+ * a different value.) Violations add a zero entry to the measurement
+ * list and extend the aggregate PCR value with ff...ff's.
+ */
+static void ima_add_boot_aggregate(void)
+{
+ struct ima_template_entry *entry;
+ const char *op = "add_boot_aggregate";
+ const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
+ int result = -ENOMEM;
+ int violation = 1;
+
+ entry = kmalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!entry)
+ goto err_out;
+
+ memset(&entry->template, 0, sizeof(entry->template));
+ strncpy(entry->template.file_name, boot_aggregate_name,
+ IMA_EVENT_NAME_LEN_MAX);
+ if (ima_used_chip) {
+ violation = 0;
+ result = ima_calc_boot_aggregate(entry->template.digest);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ audit_cause = "hashing_error";
+ kfree(entry);
+ goto err_out;
+ }
+ }
+ result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, NULL);
+ if (result < 0)
+ kfree(entry);
+ return;
+err_out:
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, NULL, boot_aggregate_name, op,
+ audit_cause, result, 0);
+}
+
+int ima_init(void)
+{
+ u8 pcr_i[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ int rc;
+
+ ima_used_chip = 0;
+ rc = tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, 0, pcr_i);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ ima_used_chip = 1;
+
+ if (!ima_used_chip)
+ pr_info("No TPM chip found, activating TPM-bypass!\n");
+
+ ima_add_boot_aggregate(); /* boot aggregate must be first entry */
+ ima_init_policy();
+
+ return ima_fs_init();
+}
+
+void __exit ima_cleanup(void)
+{
+ ima_fs_cleanup();
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
+ * Kylene Hall <kylene@us.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_main.c
+ * implements the IMA hooks: ima_bprm_check, ima_file_mmap,
+ * and ima_path_check.
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/mman.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+int ima_initialized;
+
+char *ima_hash = "sha1";
+static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
+{
+ const char *op = "hash_setup";
+ const char *hash = "sha1";
+ int result = 0;
+ int audit_info = 0;
+
+ if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) {
+ hash = "md5";
+ ima_hash = str;
+ } else if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) != 0) {
+ hash = "invalid_hash_type";
+ result = 1;
+ }
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_HASH, NULL, NULL, op, hash,
+ result, audit_info);
+ return 1;
+}
+__setup("ima_hash=", hash_setup);
+
+/**
+ * ima_file_free - called on __fput()
+ * @file: pointer to file structure being freed
+ *
+ * Flag files that changed, based on i_version;
+ * and decrement the iint readcount/writecount.
+ */
+void ima_file_free(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+ if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ return;
+ iint = ima_iint_find_get(inode);
+ if (!iint)
+ return;
+
+ mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+ if (iint->opencount <= 0) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO
+ "%s: %s open/free imbalance (r:%ld w:%ld o:%ld f:%ld)\n",
+ __FUNCTION__, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
+ iint->readcount, iint->writecount,
+ iint->opencount, atomic_long_read(&file->f_count));
+ if (!(iint->flags & IMA_IINT_DUMP_STACK)) {
+ dump_stack();
+ iint->flags |= IMA_IINT_DUMP_STACK;
+ }
+ }
+ iint->opencount--;
+
+ if ((file->f_mode & (FMODE_READ | FMODE_WRITE)) == FMODE_READ)
+ iint->readcount--;
+
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
+ iint->writecount--;
+ if (iint->writecount == 0) {
+ if (iint->version != inode->i_version)
+ iint->flags &= ~IMA_MEASURED;
+ }
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+ kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
+}
+
+/* ima_read_write_check - reflect possible reading/writing errors in the PCR.
+ *
+ * When opening a file for read, if the file is already open for write,
+ * the file could change, resulting in a file measurement error.
+ *
+ * Opening a file for write, if the file is already open for read, results
+ * in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
+ *
+ * In either case invalidate the PCR.
+ */
+enum iint_pcr_error { TOMTOU, OPEN_WRITERS };
+static void ima_read_write_check(enum iint_pcr_error error,
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint,
+ struct inode *inode,
+ const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+ switch (error) {
+ case TOMTOU:
+ if (iint->readcount > 0)
+ ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
+ "ToMToU");
+ break;
+ case OPEN_WRITERS:
+ if (iint->writecount > 0)
+ ima_add_violation(inode, filename, "invalid_pcr",
+ "open_writers");
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static int get_path_measurement(struct ima_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file,
+ const unsigned char *filename)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (IS_ERR(file)) {
+ pr_info("%s dentry_open failed\n", filename);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ iint->opencount++;
+ iint->readcount++;
+
+ rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
+ if (!rc)
+ ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_path_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @path: contains a pointer to the path to be measured
+ * @mask: contains MAY_READ, MAY_WRITE or MAY_EXECUTE
+ *
+ * Measure the file being open for readonly, based on the
+ * ima_must_measure() policy decision.
+ *
+ * Keep read/write counters for all files, but only
+ * invalidate the PCR for measured files:
+ * - Opening a file for write when already open for read,
+ * results in a time of measure, time of use (ToMToU) error.
+ * - Opening a file for read when already open for write,
+ * could result in a file measurement error.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
+ * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
+ */
+int ima_path_check(struct path *path, int mask)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = path->dentry->d_inode;
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+ struct file *file = NULL;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ return 0;
+ iint = ima_iint_find_insert_get(inode);
+ if (!iint)
+ return 0;
+
+ mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+ iint->opencount++;
+ if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0))
+ iint->writecount++;
+ else if (mask & (MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC))
+ iint->readcount++;
+
+ rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, MAY_READ, PATH_CHECK);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) || (mask == 0))
+ ima_read_write_check(TOMTOU, iint, inode,
+ path->dentry->d_name.name);
+
+ if ((mask & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)) != MAY_READ)
+ goto out;
+
+ ima_read_write_check(OPEN_WRITERS, iint, inode,
+ path->dentry->d_name.name);
+ if (!(iint->flags & IMA_MEASURED)) {
+ struct dentry *dentry = dget(path->dentry);
+ struct vfsmount *mnt = mntget(path->mnt);
+
+ file = dentry_open(dentry, mnt, O_RDONLY, current->cred);
+ rc = get_path_measurement(iint, file, dentry->d_name.name);
+ }
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+ if (file)
+ fput(file);
+ kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename,
+ int mask, int function)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ return 0;
+ iint = ima_iint_find_insert_get(inode);
+ if (!iint)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+ rc = ima_must_measure(iint, inode, mask, function);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file);
+ if (!rc)
+ ima_store_measurement(iint, file, filename);
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+ kref_put(&iint->refcount, iint_free);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static void opencount_get(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = file->f_dentry->d_inode;
+ struct ima_iint_cache *iint;
+
+ if (!ima_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
+ return;
+ iint = ima_iint_find_insert_get(inode);
+ if (!iint)
+ return;
+ mutex_lock(&iint->mutex);
+ iint->opencount++;
+ mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex);
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_file_mmap - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @file: pointer to the file to be measured (May be NULL)
+ * @prot: contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ *
+ * Measure files being mmapped executable based on the ima_must_measure()
+ * policy decision.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
+ * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
+ */
+int ima_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long prot)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!file)
+ return 0;
+ if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
+ rc = process_measurement(file, file->f_dentry->d_name.name,
+ MAY_EXEC, FILE_MMAP);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * ima_shm_check - IPC shm and shmat create/fput a file
+ *
+ * Maintain the opencount for these files to prevent unnecessary
+ * imbalance messages.
+ */
+void ima_shm_check(struct file *file)
+{
+ opencount_get(file);
+ return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_bprm_check - based on policy, collect/store measurement.
+ * @bprm: contains the linux_binprm structure
+ *
+ * The OS protects against an executable file, already open for write,
+ * from being executed in deny_write_access() and an executable file,
+ * already open for execute, from being modified in get_write_access().
+ * So we can be certain that what we verify and measure here is actually
+ * what is being executed.
+ *
+ * Return 0 on success, an error code on failure.
+ * (Based on the results of appraise_measurement().)
+ */
+int ima_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = process_measurement(bprm->file, bprm->filename,
+ MAY_EXEC, BPRM_CHECK);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int __init init_ima(void)
+{
+ int error;
+
+ ima_iintcache_init();
+ error = ima_init();
+ ima_initialized = 1;
+ return error;
+}
+
+static void __exit cleanup_ima(void)
+{
+ ima_cleanup();
+}
+
+late_initcall(init_ima); /* Start IMA after the TPM is available */
+
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Integrity Measurement Architecture");
+MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2008 IBM Corporation
+ * Author: Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the License.
+ *
+ * ima_policy.c
+ * - initialize default measure policy rules
+ *
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+
+#include "ima.h"
+
+/* flags definitions */
+#define IMA_FUNC 0x0001
+#define IMA_MASK 0x0002
+#define IMA_FSMAGIC 0x0004
+#define IMA_UID 0x0008
+
+enum ima_action { UNKNOWN = -1, DONT_MEASURE = 0, MEASURE };
+
+#define MAX_LSM_RULES 6
+enum lsm_rule_types { LSM_OBJ_USER, LSM_OBJ_ROLE, LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
+ LSM_SUBJ_USER, LSM_SUBJ_ROLE, LSM_SUBJ_TYPE
+};
+
+struct ima_measure_rule_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ enum ima_action action;
+ unsigned int flags;
+ enum ima_hooks func;
+ int mask;
+ unsigned long fsmagic;
+ uid_t uid;
+ struct {
+ void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
+ int type; /* audit type */
+ } lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
+};
+
+/* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
+ * written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, and .uid
+ */
+static struct ima_measure_rule_entry default_rules[] = {
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = PROC_SUPER_MAGIC,
+ .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SYSFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = DEBUGFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = TMPFS_MAGIC,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = SECURITYFS_MAGIC,
+ .flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = DONT_MEASURE,.fsmagic = 0xF97CFF8C,.flags = IMA_FSMAGIC},
+ {.action = MEASURE,.func = FILE_MMAP,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+ {.action = MEASURE,.func = BPRM_CHECK,.mask = MAY_EXEC,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK},
+ {.action = MEASURE,.func = PATH_CHECK,.mask = MAY_READ,.uid = 0,
+ .flags = IMA_FUNC | IMA_MASK | IMA_UID}
+};
+
+static LIST_HEAD(measure_default_rules);
+static LIST_HEAD(measure_policy_rules);
+static struct list_head *ima_measure;
+
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_measure_mutex);
+
+/**
+ * ima_match_rules - determine whether an inode matches the measure rule.
+ * @rule: a pointer to a rule
+ * @inode: a pointer to an inode
+ * @func: LIM hook identifier
+ * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
+ *
+ * Returns true on rule match, false on failure.
+ */
+static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *rule,
+ struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+{
+ struct task_struct *tsk = current;
+ int i;
+
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && rule->func != func)
+ return false;
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_MASK) && rule->mask != mask)
+ return false;
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_FSMAGIC)
+ && rule->fsmagic != inode->i_sb->s_magic)
+ return false;
+ if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && rule->uid != tsk->cred->uid)
+ return false;
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
+ int rc;
+ u32 osid, sid;
+
+ if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
+ continue;
+
+ switch (i) {
+ case LSM_OBJ_USER:
+ case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
+ rule->lsm[i].type,
+ AUDIT_EQUAL,
+ rule->lsm[i].rule,
+ NULL);
+ break;
+ case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
+ case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(sid,
+ rule->lsm[i].type,
+ AUDIT_EQUAL,
+ rule->lsm[i].rule,
+ NULL);
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!rc)
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_match_policy - decision based on LSM and other conditions
+ * @inode: pointer to an inode for which the policy decision is being made
+ * @func: IMA hook identifier
+ * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC)
+ *
+ * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type)
+ * conditions.
+ *
+ * (There is no need for locking when walking the policy list,
+ * as elements in the list are never deleted, nor does the list
+ * change.)
+ */
+int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask)
+{
+ struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
+
+ list_for_each_entry(entry, ima_measure, list) {
+ bool rc;
+
+ rc = ima_match_rules(entry, inode, func, mask);
+ if (rc)
+ return entry->action;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_init_policy - initialize the default measure rules.
+ *
+ * ima_measure points to either the measure_default_rules or the
+ * the new measure_policy_rules.
+ */
+void ima_init_policy(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(default_rules); i++)
+ list_add_tail(&default_rules[i].list, &measure_default_rules);
+ ima_measure = &measure_default_rules;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_update_policy - update default_rules with new measure rules
+ *
+ * Called on file .release to update the default rules with a complete new
+ * policy. Once updated, the policy is locked, no additional rules can be
+ * added to the policy.
+ */
+void ima_update_policy(void)
+{
+ const char *op = "policy_update";
+ const char *cause = "already exists";
+ int result = 1;
+ int audit_info = 0;
+
+ if (ima_measure == &measure_default_rules) {
+ ima_measure = &measure_policy_rules;
+ cause = "complete";
+ result = 0;
+ }
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
+ NULL, op, cause, result, audit_info);
+}
+
+enum {
+ Opt_err = -1,
+ Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure,
+ Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type,
+ Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type,
+ Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, Opt_uid
+};
+
+static match_table_t policy_tokens = {
+ {Opt_measure, "measure"},
+ {Opt_dont_measure, "dont_measure"},
+ {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"},
+ {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"},
+ {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"},
+ {Opt_subj_user, "subj_user=%s"},
+ {Opt_subj_role, "subj_role=%s"},
+ {Opt_subj_type, "subj_type=%s"},
+ {Opt_func, "func=%s"},
+ {Opt_mask, "mask=%s"},
+ {Opt_fsmagic, "fsmagic=%s"},
+ {Opt_uid, "uid=%s"},
+ {Opt_err, NULL}
+};
+
+static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry,
+ char *args, int lsm_rule, int audit_type)
+{
+ int result;
+
+ entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type;
+ result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
+ AUDIT_EQUAL, args,
+ &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
+ return result;
+}
+
+static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+ char *p;
+ int result = 0;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_INTEGRITY_RULE);
+
+ entry->action = -1;
+ while ((p = strsep(&rule, " \n")) != NULL) {
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+ int token;
+ unsigned long lnum;
+
+ if (result < 0)
+ break;
+ if (!*p)
+ continue;
+ token = match_token(p, policy_tokens, args);
+ switch (token) {
+ case Opt_measure:
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "measure");
+ entry->action = MEASURE;
+ break;
+ case Opt_dont_measure:
+ audit_log_format(ab, "%s ", "dont_measure");
+ entry->action = DONT_MEASURE;
+ break;
+ case Opt_func:
+ audit_log_format(ab, "func=%s ", args[0].from);
+ if (strcmp(args[0].from, "PATH_CHECK") == 0)
+ entry->func = PATH_CHECK;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "FILE_MMAP") == 0)
+ entry->func = FILE_MMAP;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "BPRM_CHECK") == 0)
+ entry->func = BPRM_CHECK;
+ else
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ if (!result)
+ entry->flags |= IMA_FUNC;
+ break;
+ case Opt_mask:
+ audit_log_format(ab, "mask=%s ", args[0].from);
+ if ((strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_EXEC")) == 0)
+ entry->mask = MAY_EXEC;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_WRITE") == 0)
+ entry->mask = MAY_WRITE;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_READ") == 0)
+ entry->mask = MAY_READ;
+ else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "MAY_APPEND") == 0)
+ entry->mask = MAY_APPEND;
+ else
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ if (!result)
+ entry->flags |= IMA_MASK;
+ break;
+ case Opt_fsmagic:
+ audit_log_format(ab, "fsmagic=%s ", args[0].from);
+ result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 16,
+ &entry->fsmagic);
+ if (!result)
+ entry->flags |= IMA_FSMAGIC;
+ break;
+ case Opt_uid:
+ audit_log_format(ab, "uid=%s ", args[0].from);
+ result = strict_strtoul(args[0].from, 10, &lnum);
+ if (!result) {
+ entry->uid = (uid_t) lnum;
+ if (entry->uid != lnum)
+ result = -EINVAL;
+ else
+ entry->flags |= IMA_UID;
+ }
+ break;
+ case Opt_obj_user:
+ audit_log_format(ab, "obj_user=%s ", args[0].from);
+ result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+ LSM_OBJ_USER,
+ AUDIT_OBJ_USER);
+ break;
+ case Opt_obj_role:
+ audit_log_format(ab, "obj_role=%s ", args[0].from);
+ result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+ LSM_OBJ_ROLE,
+ AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE);
+ break;
+ case Opt_obj_type:
+ audit_log_format(ab, "obj_type=%s ", args[0].from);
+ result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+ LSM_OBJ_TYPE,
+ AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE);
+ break;
+ case Opt_subj_user:
+ audit_log_format(ab, "subj_user=%s ", args[0].from);
+ result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+ LSM_SUBJ_USER,
+ AUDIT_SUBJ_USER);
+ break;
+ case Opt_subj_role:
+ audit_log_format(ab, "subj_role=%s ", args[0].from);
+ result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+ LSM_SUBJ_ROLE,
+ AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE);
+ break;
+ case Opt_subj_type:
+ audit_log_format(ab, "subj_type=%s ", args[0].from);
+ result = ima_lsm_rule_init(entry, args[0].from,
+ LSM_SUBJ_TYPE,
+ AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE);
+ break;
+ case Opt_err:
+ audit_log_format(ab, "UNKNOWN=%s ", p);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (entry->action == UNKNOWN)
+ result = -EINVAL;
+
+ audit_log_format(ab, "res=%d", !result ? 0 : 1);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ return result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * ima_parse_add_rule - add a rule to measure_policy_rules
+ * @rule - ima measurement policy rule
+ *
+ * Uses a mutex to protect the policy list from multiple concurrent writers.
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure.
+ */
+int ima_parse_add_rule(char *rule)
+{
+ const char *op = "update_policy";
+ struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry;
+ int result = 0;
+ int audit_info = 0;
+
+ /* Prevent installed policy from changing */
+ if (ima_measure != &measure_default_rules) {
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
+ NULL, op, "already exists",
+ -EACCES, audit_info);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!entry) {
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
+ NULL, op, "-ENOMEM", -ENOMEM, audit_info);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&entry->list);
+
+ result = ima_parse_rule(rule, entry);
+ if (!result) {
+ mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+ list_add_tail(&entry->list, &measure_policy_rules);
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+ } else {
+ kfree(entry);
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_STATUS, NULL,
+ NULL, op, "invalid policy", result,
+ audit_info);
+ }
+ return result;
+}
+
+/* ima_delete_rules called to cleanup invalid policy */
+void ima_delete_rules(void)
+{
+ struct ima_measure_rule_entry *entry, *tmp;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, tmp, &measure_policy_rules, list) {
+ list_del(&entry->list);
+ kfree(entry);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_measure_mutex);
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2005,2006,2007,2008 IBM Corporation
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Serge Hallyn <serue@us.ibm.com>
+ * Reiner Sailer <sailer@watson.ibm.com>
+ * Mimi Zohar <zohar@us.ibm.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the
+ * License.
+ *
+ * File: ima_queue.c
+ * Implements queues that store template measurements and
+ * maintains aggregate over the stored measurements
+ * in the pre-configured TPM PCR (if available).
+ * The measurement list is append-only. No entry is
+ * ever removed or changed during the boot-cycle.
+ */
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include "ima.h"
+
+LIST_HEAD(ima_measurements); /* list of all measurements */
+
+/* key: inode (before secure-hashing a file) */
+struct ima_h_table ima_htable = {
+ .len = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0),
+ .violations = ATOMIC_LONG_INIT(0),
+ .queue[0 ... IMA_MEASURE_HTABLE_SIZE - 1] = HLIST_HEAD_INIT
+};
+
+/* mutex protects atomicity of extending measurement list
+ * and extending the TPM PCR aggregate. Since tpm_extend can take
+ * long (and the tpm driver uses a mutex), we can't use the spinlock.
+ */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(ima_extend_list_mutex);
+
+/* lookup up the digest value in the hash table, and return the entry */
+static struct ima_queue_entry *ima_lookup_digest_entry(u8 *digest_value)
+{
+ struct ima_queue_entry *qe, *ret = NULL;
+ unsigned int key;
+ struct hlist_node *pos;
+ int rc;
+
+ key = ima_hash_key(digest_value);
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(qe, pos, &ima_htable.queue[key], hnext) {
+ rc = memcmp(qe->entry->digest, digest_value, IMA_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ ret = qe;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* ima_add_template_entry helper function:
+ * - Add template entry to measurement list and hash table.
+ *
+ * (Called with ima_extend_list_mutex held.)
+ */
+static int ima_add_digest_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry)
+{
+ struct ima_queue_entry *qe;
+ unsigned int key;
+
+ qe = kmalloc(sizeof(*qe), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (qe == NULL) {
+ pr_err("OUT OF MEMORY ERROR creating queue entry.\n");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ qe->entry = entry;
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&qe->later);
+ list_add_tail_rcu(&qe->later, &ima_measurements);
+
+ atomic_long_inc(&ima_htable.len);
+ key = ima_hash_key(entry->digest);
+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&qe->hnext, &ima_htable.queue[key]);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash)
+{
+ int result = 0;
+
+ if (!ima_used_chip)
+ return result;
+
+ result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX, hash);
+ if (result != 0)
+ pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n");
+ return result;
+}
+
+/* Add template entry to the measurement list and hash table,
+ * and extend the pcr.
+ */
+int ima_add_template_entry(struct ima_template_entry *entry, int violation,
+ const char *op, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ u8 digest[IMA_DIGEST_SIZE];
+ const char *audit_cause = "hash_added";
+ int audit_info = 1;
+ int result = 0;
+
+ mutex_lock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+ if (!violation) {
+ memcpy(digest, entry->digest, sizeof digest);
+ if (ima_lookup_digest_entry(digest)) {
+ audit_cause = "hash_exists";
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ result = ima_add_digest_entry(entry);
+ if (result < 0) {
+ audit_cause = "ENOMEM";
+ audit_info = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (violation) /* invalidate pcr */
+ memset(digest, 0xff, sizeof digest);
+
+ result = ima_pcr_extend(digest);
+ if (result != 0) {
+ audit_cause = "TPM error";
+ audit_info = 0;
+ }
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&ima_extend_list_mutex);
+ integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_PCR, inode, entry->template_name,
+ op, audit_cause, result, audit_info);
+ return result;
+}
atomic_t nkeys; /* number of keys */
atomic_t nikeys; /* number of instantiated keys */
uid_t uid;
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns;
int qnkeys; /* number of keys allocated to this user */
int qnbytes; /* number of bytes allocated to this user */
};
extern spinlock_t key_user_lock;
extern struct key_user root_key_user;
-extern struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid);
+extern struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid,
+ struct user_namespace *user_ns);
extern void key_user_put(struct key_user *user);
/*
#include <linux/workqueue.h>
#include <linux/random.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include "internal.h"
static struct kmem_cache *key_jar;
* get the key quota record for a user, allocating a new record if one doesn't
* already exist
*/
-struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid)
+struct key_user *key_user_lookup(uid_t uid, struct user_namespace *user_ns)
{
struct key_user *candidate = NULL, *user;
struct rb_node *parent = NULL;
p = &(*p)->rb_left;
else if (uid > user->uid)
p = &(*p)->rb_right;
+ else if (user_ns < user->user_ns)
+ p = &(*p)->rb_left;
+ else if (user_ns > user->user_ns)
+ p = &(*p)->rb_right;
else
goto found;
}
atomic_set(&candidate->nkeys, 0);
atomic_set(&candidate->nikeys, 0);
candidate->uid = uid;
+ candidate->user_ns = get_user_ns(user_ns);
candidate->qnkeys = 0;
candidate->qnbytes = 0;
spin_lock_init(&candidate->lock);
if (atomic_dec_and_lock(&user->usage, &key_user_lock)) {
rb_erase(&user->node, &key_user_tree);
spin_unlock(&key_user_lock);
+ put_user_ns(user->user_ns);
kfree(user);
}
quotalen = desclen + type->def_datalen;
/* get hold of the key tracking for this user */
- user = key_user_lookup(uid);
+ user = key_user_lookup(uid, cred->user->user_ns);
if (!user)
goto no_memory_1;
/* change the UID */
if (uid != (uid_t) -1 && uid != key->uid) {
ret = -ENOMEM;
- newowner = key_user_lookup(uid);
+ newowner = key_user_lookup(uid, current_user_ns());
if (!newowner)
goto error_put;
&keyring_name_hash[bucket],
type_data.link
) {
+ if (keyring->user->user_ns != current_user_ns())
+ continue;
+
if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &keyring->flags))
continue;
key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+ if (key->user->user_ns != cred->user->user_ns)
+ goto use_other_perms;
+
/* use the second 8-bits of permissions for keys the caller owns */
if (key->uid == cred->fsuid) {
kperm = key->perm >> 16;
}
}
+use_other_perms:
+
/* otherwise use the least-significant 8-bits */
kperm = key->perm;
*/
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS
+static struct rb_node *__key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
+{
+ while (n) {
+ struct key *key = rb_entry(n, struct key, serial_node);
+ if (key->user->user_ns == current_user_ns())
+ break;
+ n = rb_next(n);
+ }
+ return n;
+}
+
+static struct rb_node *key_serial_next(struct rb_node *n)
+{
+ return __key_serial_next(rb_next(n));
+}
+
+static struct rb_node *key_serial_first(struct rb_root *r)
+{
+ struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);
+ return __key_serial_next(n);
+}
+
static int proc_keys_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
return seq_open(file, &proc_keys_ops);
spin_lock(&key_serial_lock);
- _p = rb_first(&key_serial_tree);
+ _p = key_serial_first(&key_serial_tree);
while (pos > 0 && _p) {
pos--;
- _p = rb_next(_p);
+ _p = key_serial_next(_p);
}
return _p;
static void *proc_keys_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
{
(*_pos)++;
- return rb_next((struct rb_node *) v);
+ return key_serial_next((struct rb_node *) v);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS_DEBUG_PROC_KEYS */
+static struct rb_node *__key_user_next(struct rb_node *n)
+{
+ while (n) {
+ struct key_user *user = rb_entry(n, struct key_user, node);
+ if (user->user_ns == current_user_ns())
+ break;
+ n = rb_next(n);
+ }
+ return n;
+}
+
+static struct rb_node *key_user_next(struct rb_node *n)
+{
+ return __key_user_next(rb_next(n));
+}
+
+static struct rb_node *key_user_first(struct rb_root *r)
+{
+ struct rb_node *n = rb_first(r);
+ return __key_user_next(n);
+}
/*****************************************************************************/
/*
* implement "/proc/key-users" to provides a list of the key users
spin_lock(&key_user_lock);
- _p = rb_first(&key_user_tree);
+ _p = key_user_first(&key_user_tree);
while (pos > 0 && _p) {
pos--;
- _p = rb_next(_p);
+ _p = key_user_next(_p);
}
return _p;
static void *proc_key_users_next(struct seq_file *p, void *v, loff_t *_pos)
{
(*_pos)++;
- return rb_next((struct rb_node *) v);
+ return key_user_next((struct rb_node *) v);
}
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/user_namespace.h>
#include <asm/uaccess.h>
#include "internal.h"
.nkeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
.nikeys = ATOMIC_INIT(2),
.uid = 0,
+ .user_ns = &init_user_ns,
};
/*****************************************************************************/
kenter("");
- user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid());
+ user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid(), current_user_ns());
if (!user)
return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
u32 tsid;
u16 tclass;
struct av_decision avd;
- atomic_t used; /* used recently */
};
struct avc_node {
struct avc_entry ae;
- struct list_head list;
+ struct hlist_node list; /* anchored in avc_cache->slots[i] */
struct rcu_head rhead;
};
struct avc_cache {
- struct list_head slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS];
+ struct hlist_head slots[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* head for avc_node->list */
spinlock_t slots_lock[AVC_CACHE_SLOTS]; /* lock for writes */
atomic_t lru_hint; /* LRU hint for reclaim scan */
atomic_t active_nodes;
int i;
for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&avc_cache.slots[i]);
+ INIT_HLIST_HEAD(&avc_cache.slots[i]);
spin_lock_init(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i]);
}
atomic_set(&avc_cache.active_nodes, 0);
{
int i, chain_len, max_chain_len, slots_used;
struct avc_node *node;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
rcu_read_lock();
slots_used = 0;
max_chain_len = 0;
for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
- if (!list_empty(&avc_cache.slots[i])) {
+ head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
+ if (!hlist_empty(head)) {
+ struct hlist_node *next;
+
slots_used++;
chain_len = 0;
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &avc_cache.slots[i], list)
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list)
chain_len++;
if (chain_len > max_chain_len)
max_chain_len = chain_len;
static void avc_node_delete(struct avc_node *node)
{
- list_del_rcu(&node->list);
+ hlist_del_rcu(&node->list);
call_rcu(&node->rhead, avc_node_free);
atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
}
static void avc_node_replace(struct avc_node *new, struct avc_node *old)
{
- list_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
+ hlist_replace_rcu(&old->list, &new->list);
call_rcu(&old->rhead, avc_node_free);
atomic_dec(&avc_cache.active_nodes);
}
struct avc_node *node;
int hvalue, try, ecx;
unsigned long flags;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+ struct hlist_node *next;
+ spinlock_t *lock;
for (try = 0, ecx = 0; try < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; try++) {
hvalue = atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.lru_hint) & (AVC_CACHE_SLOTS - 1);
+ head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+ lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
- if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags))
+ if (!spin_trylock_irqsave(lock, flags))
continue;
rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry(node, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
- if (atomic_dec_and_test(&node->ae.used)) {
- /* Recently Unused */
- avc_node_delete(node);
- avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
- ecx++;
- if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags);
- goto out;
- }
+ hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list) {
+ avc_node_delete(node);
+ avc_cache_stats_incr(reclaims);
+ ecx++;
+ if (ecx >= AVC_CACHE_RECLAIM) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
+ goto out;
}
}
rcu_read_unlock();
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flags);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flags);
}
out:
return ecx;
goto out;
INIT_RCU_HEAD(&node->rhead);
- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&node->list);
- atomic_set(&node->ae.used, 1);
+ INIT_HLIST_NODE(&node->list);
avc_cache_stats_incr(allocations);
if (atomic_inc_return(&avc_cache.active_nodes) > avc_cache_threshold)
return node;
}
-static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct avc_entry *ae)
+static void avc_node_populate(struct avc_node *node, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
{
node->ae.ssid = ssid;
node->ae.tsid = tsid;
node->ae.tclass = tclass;
- memcpy(&node->ae.avd, &ae->avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
+ memcpy(&node->ae.avd, avd, sizeof(node->ae.avd));
}
static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
struct avc_node *node, *ret = NULL;
int hvalue;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+ struct hlist_node *next;
hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
- list_for_each_entry_rcu(node, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
+ head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(node, next, head, list) {
if (ssid == node->ae.ssid &&
tclass == node->ae.tclass &&
tsid == node->ae.tsid) {
}
}
- if (ret == NULL) {
- /* cache miss */
- goto out;
- }
-
- /* cache hit */
- if (atomic_read(&ret->ae.used) != 1)
- atomic_set(&ret->ae.used, 1);
-out:
return ret;
}
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
- * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass
*
* Look up an AVC entry that is valid for the
- * @requested permissions between the SID pair
* (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions
* based on @tclass. If a valid AVC entry exists,
* then this function return the avc_node.
* Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
*/
-static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested)
+static struct avc_node *avc_lookup(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
{
struct avc_node *node;
avc_cache_stats_incr(lookups);
node = avc_search_node(ssid, tsid, tclass);
- if (node && ((node->ae.avd.decided & requested) == requested)) {
+ if (node)
avc_cache_stats_incr(hits);
- goto out;
- }
+ else
+ avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
- node = NULL;
- avc_cache_stats_incr(misses);
-out:
return node;
}
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
- * @ae: AVC entry
+ * @avd: resulting av decision
*
* Insert an AVC entry for the SID pair
* (@ssid, @tsid) and class @tclass.
* The access vectors and the sequence number are
* normally provided by the security server in
* response to a security_compute_av() call. If the
- * sequence number @ae->avd.seqno is not less than the latest
+ * sequence number @avd->seqno is not less than the latest
* revocation notification, then the function copies
* the access vectors into a cache entry, returns
* avc_node inserted. Otherwise, this function returns NULL.
*/
-static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct avc_entry *ae)
+static struct avc_node *avc_insert(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, struct av_decision *avd)
{
struct avc_node *pos, *node = NULL;
int hvalue;
unsigned long flag;
- if (avc_latest_notif_update(ae->avd.seqno, 1))
+ if (avc_latest_notif_update(avd->seqno, 1))
goto out;
node = avc_alloc_node();
if (node) {
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+ struct hlist_node *next;
+ spinlock_t *lock;
+
hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
- avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, ae);
+ avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+
+ head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+ lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
- spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
- list_for_each_entry(pos, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
+ spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+ hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) {
if (pos->ae.ssid == ssid &&
pos->ae.tsid == tsid &&
pos->ae.tclass == tclass) {
goto found;
}
}
- list_add_rcu(&node->list, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue]);
+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&node->list, head);
found:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
}
out:
return node;
* @event : Updating event
* @perms : Permission mask bits
* @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
+ * @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
*
* if a valid AVC entry doesn't exist,this function returns -ENOENT.
* if kmalloc() called internal returns NULL, this function returns -ENOMEM.
* otherwise, this function update the AVC entry. The original AVC-entry object
* will release later by RCU.
*/
-static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass)
+static int avc_update_node(u32 event, u32 perms, u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,
+ u32 seqno)
{
int hvalue, rc = 0;
unsigned long flag;
struct avc_node *pos, *node, *orig = NULL;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+ struct hlist_node *next;
+ spinlock_t *lock;
node = avc_alloc_node();
if (!node) {
/* Lock the target slot */
hvalue = avc_hash(ssid, tsid, tclass);
- spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
- list_for_each_entry(pos, &avc_cache.slots[hvalue], list) {
+ head = &avc_cache.slots[hvalue];
+ lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue];
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(pos, next, head, list) {
if (ssid == pos->ae.ssid &&
tsid == pos->ae.tsid &&
- tclass == pos->ae.tclass){
+ tclass == pos->ae.tclass &&
+ seqno == pos->ae.avd.seqno){
orig = pos;
break;
}
* Copy and replace original node.
*/
- avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae);
+ avc_node_populate(node, ssid, tsid, tclass, &orig->ae.avd);
switch (event) {
case AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT:
}
avc_node_replace(node, orig);
out_unlock:
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[hvalue], flag);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
out:
return rc;
}
int i, rc = 0, tmprc;
unsigned long flag;
struct avc_node *node;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+ struct hlist_node *next;
+ spinlock_t *lock;
for (i = 0; i < AVC_CACHE_SLOTS; i++) {
- spin_lock_irqsave(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i], flag);
+ head = &avc_cache.slots[i];
+ lock = &avc_cache.slots_lock[i];
+
+ spin_lock_irqsave(lock, flag);
/*
* With preemptable RCU, the outer spinlock does not
* prevent RCU grace periods from ending.
*/
rcu_read_lock();
- list_for_each_entry(node, &avc_cache.slots[i], list)
+ hlist_for_each_entry(node, next, head, list)
avc_node_delete(node);
rcu_read_unlock();
- spin_unlock_irqrestore(&avc_cache.slots_lock[i], flag);
+ spin_unlock_irqrestore(lock, flag);
}
for (c = avc_callbacks; c; c = c->next) {
int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 tclass, u32 requested,
unsigned flags,
- struct av_decision *avd)
+ struct av_decision *in_avd)
{
struct avc_node *node;
- struct avc_entry entry, *p_ae;
+ struct av_decision avd_entry, *avd;
int rc = 0;
u32 denied;
rcu_read_lock();
- node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested);
+ node = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);
if (!node) {
rcu_read_unlock();
- rc = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, &entry.avd);
+
+ if (in_avd)
+ avd = in_avd;
+ else
+ avd = &avd_entry;
+
+ rc = security_compute_av(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, avd);
if (rc)
goto out;
rcu_read_lock();
- node = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, &entry);
+ node = avc_insert(ssid, tsid, tclass, avd);
+ } else {
+ if (in_avd)
+ memcpy(in_avd, &node->ae.avd, sizeof(*in_avd));
+ avd = &node->ae.avd;
}
- p_ae = node ? &node->ae : &entry;
-
- if (avd)
- memcpy(avd, &p_ae->avd, sizeof(*avd));
-
- denied = requested & ~(p_ae->avd.allowed);
+ denied = requested & ~(avd->allowed);
if (denied) {
if (flags & AVC_STRICT)
rc = -EACCES;
else if (!selinux_enforcing || security_permissive_sid(ssid))
avc_update_node(AVC_CALLBACK_GRANT, requested, ssid,
- tsid, tclass);
+ tsid, tclass, avd->seqno);
else
rc = -EACCES;
}
#define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
#define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
-#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
+#define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
Opt_fscontext = 2,
Opt_defcontext = 3,
Opt_rootcontext = 4,
+ Opt_labelsupport = 5,
};
static const match_table_t tokens = {
{Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
{Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
{Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
+ {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
{Opt_error, NULL},
};
}
}
- sbsec->initialized = 1;
+ sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
+ if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
+ sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
+ sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
+ sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
+ sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+
/* Initialize the root inode. */
rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
- if (!sbsec->initialized)
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
return -EINVAL;
if (!ss_initialized)
return -EINVAL;
- /*
- * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
- * settings this is going to need a mask
- */
- tmp = sbsec->flags;
+ tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
/* count the number of mount options for this sb */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
if (tmp & 0x01)
opts->num_mnt_opts++;
tmp >>= 1;
}
+ /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
+ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+ opts->num_mnt_opts++;
opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
}
+ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
+ opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
+ }
BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
{
+ char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
+
/* check if the old mount command had the same options */
- if (sbsec->initialized)
+ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
(old_sid != new_sid))
return 1;
/* check if we were passed the same options twice,
* aka someone passed context=a,context=b
*/
- if (!sbsec->initialized)
- if (sbsec->flags & flag)
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
+ if (mnt_flags & flag)
return 1;
return 0;
}
* this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
* will be used for both mounts)
*/
- if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
&& (num_opts == 0))
goto out;
*/
for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
u32 sid;
+
+ if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
+ continue;
rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
if (rc) {
}
}
- if (sbsec->initialized) {
+ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
/* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
- if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
goto out_double_mount;
rc = 0;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
- sbsec->proc = 1;
+ sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
/* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
- rc = security_fs_use(sbsec->proc ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
+ rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
if (rc) {
printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
__func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
}
/* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
- BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
+ BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
/* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
- if (newsbsec->initialized)
+ if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
return;
mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
goto out_err;
}
break;
-
+ case Opt_labelsupport:
+ break;
default:
rc = -EINVAL;
printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
char *prefix;
for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
- char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
+ char *has_comma;
+
+ if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
+ has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
+ else
+ has_comma = NULL;
switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
case CONTEXT_MNT:
case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
break;
+ case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
+ seq_putc(m, ',');
+ seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
+ continue;
default:
BUG();
};
goto out_unlock;
sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
- if (!sbsec->initialized) {
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
/* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
after the initial policy is loaded and the security
server is ready to handle calls. */
dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
}
if (!dentry) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
- "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
- inode->i_ino);
+ /*
+ * this is can be hit on boot when a file is accessed
+ * before the policy is loaded. When we load policy we
+ * may find inodes that have no dentry on the
+ * sbsec->isec_head list. No reason to complain as these
+ * will get fixed up the next time we go through
+ * inode_doinit with a dentry, before these inodes could
+ * be used again by userspace.
+ */
goto out_unlock;
}
len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
- context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
+ context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
if (!context) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
dput(dentry);
goto out_unlock;
}
+ context[len] = '\0';
rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
context, len);
if (rc == -ERANGE) {
}
kfree(context);
len = rc;
- context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
+ context = kmalloc(len+1, GFP_NOFS);
if (!context) {
rc = -ENOMEM;
dput(dentry);
goto out_unlock;
}
+ context[len] = '\0';
rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
context, len);
sbsec->def_sid,
GFP_NOFS);
if (rc) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
- "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
- __func__, context, -rc,
- inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
+ char *dev = inode->i_sb->s_id;
+ unsigned long ino = inode->i_ino;
+
+ if (rc == -EINVAL) {
+ if (printk_ratelimit())
+ printk(KERN_NOTICE "SELinux: inode=%lu on dev=%s was found to have an invalid "
+ "context=%s. This indicates you may need to relabel the inode or the "
+ "filesystem in question.\n", ino, dev, context);
+ } else {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
+ "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
+ __func__, context, -rc, dev, ino);
+ }
kfree(context);
/* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
rc = 0;
/* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
- if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
+ if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
if (proci->pde) {
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
if (rc)
return rc;
- if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+ if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
if (rc)
return rc;
av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
av |= DIR__OPEN;
+ else if (S_ISSOCK(mode))
+ av |= SOCK_FILE__OPEN;
else
printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
"unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
+ rc = cap_ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
if (rc)
return rc;
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
+ rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
if (rc)
return rc;
if (error)
return error;
- return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ return cap_capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
}
static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
{
int error;
- error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
+ error = cap_capset(new, old,
effective, inheritable, permitted);
if (error)
return error;
return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
}
+/*
+ * (This comment used to live with the selinux_task_setuid hook,
+ * which was removed).
+ *
+ * Since setuid only affects the current process, and since the SELinux
+ * controls are not based on the Linux identity attributes, SELinux does not
+ * need to control this operation. However, SELinux does control the use of
+ * the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the capable hook.
+ */
+
static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
int cap, int audit)
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
+ rc = cap_capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
if (rc)
return rc;
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
+ rc = cap_syslog(type);
if (rc)
return rc;
* mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
* succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
*
- * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
- * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
- * the capability is granted.
- *
* Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
* processes that allocate mappings.
*/
struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
+ rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
if (rc)
return rc;
return 0;
}
-static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
-{
- return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
-}
-
static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
}
- return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
+ return (atsecure || cap_bprm_secureexec(bprm));
}
extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
int rc, i;
- secondary_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
-
new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
return;
int rc, i;
unsigned long flags;
- secondary_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
-
osid = tsec->osid;
sid = tsec->sid;
return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
- match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
+ match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
+ match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
}
static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
void *data)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
sid = tsec->sid;
newsid = tsec->create_sid;
- if (!newsid || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
+ if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
&newsid);
}
/* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
- if (sbsec->initialized) {
+ if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
isec->sid = newsid;
isec->initialized = 1;
}
- if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+ if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (name) {
static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
}
static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
}
static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
}
static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
}
static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
if (!mask) {
/* No permission to check. Existence test. */
static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
return 0;
return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
- if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
+ if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
return len;
}
-static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
-}
-
-static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
-{
- return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
-}
-
static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
{
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
unsigned long prot)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
if (selinux_checkreqprot)
prot = reqprot;
#ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
- rc = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
{
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
}
return 0;
}
-/*
- * commit new credentials
- */
-static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
-{
- secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
-}
-
/*
* set the security data for a kernel service
* - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
return 0;
}
-static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
-{
- /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
- since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
- identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
- this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
- of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
- capable hook. */
- return 0;
-}
-
-static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
- int flags)
-{
- return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
-}
-
-static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
-{
- /* See the comment for setuid above. */
- return 0;
-}
-
static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
{
return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
*secid = task_sid(p);
}
-static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
-{
- /* See the comment for setuid above. */
- return 0;
-}
-
static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
+ rc = cap_task_setnice(p, nice);
if (rc)
return rc;
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
+ rc = cap_task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
if (rc)
return rc;
static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
{
struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
/* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
{
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
+ rc = cap_task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
if (rc)
return rc;
u32 perm;
int rc;
- rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
-
if (!sig)
perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
else
return rc;
}
-static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
- unsigned long arg2,
- unsigned long arg3,
- unsigned long arg4,
- unsigned long arg5)
-{
- /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
- any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
- the state of the current process. */
- return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
-}
-
static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
{
return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
struct avc_audit_data ad;
int err;
- err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
- if (err)
- return err;
-
isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
{
int err;
- err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
+ err = cap_netlink_send(sk, skb);
if (err)
return err;
int err;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
- err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
+ err = cap_netlink_recv(skb, capability);
if (err)
return err;
char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
{
u32 perms;
- int rc;
-
- rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
- if (rc)
- return rc;
if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
perms = SHM__READ;
.netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
.bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
- .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
.bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
.bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
.bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
.inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
.inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
.inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
- .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
- .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
.inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
.file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
.task_create = selinux_task_create,
.cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
.cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
- .cred_commit = selinux_cred_commit,
.kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
.kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
- .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
- .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid,
- .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
.task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
.task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
.task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
.task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
- .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
.task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
.task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
.task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
.task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
.task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
.task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
- .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
.task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
.ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__EXECMOD, "execmod")
S_(SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, CHR_FILE__OPEN, "open")
S_(SECCLASS_BLK_FILE, BLK_FILE__OPEN, "open")
+ S_(SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE, SOCK_FILE__OPEN, "open")
S_(SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE, FIFO_FILE__OPEN, "open")
S_(SECCLASS_FD, FD__USE, "use")
S_(SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET, TCP_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, "connectto")
S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY, "nlmsg_relay")
S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV, "nlmsg_readpriv")
+ S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT, "nlmsg_tty_audit")
S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ, "nlmsg_read")
S_(SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET, NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE, "nlmsg_write")
S_(SECCLASS_ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION__SENDTO, "sendto")
#define SOCK_FILE__SWAPON 0x00004000UL
#define SOCK_FILE__QUOTAON 0x00008000UL
#define SOCK_FILE__MOUNTON 0x00010000UL
+#define SOCK_FILE__OPEN 0x00020000UL
#define FIFO_FILE__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define FIFO_FILE__READ 0x00000002UL
#define FIFO_FILE__WRITE 0x00000004UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE 0x00800000UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY 0x01000000UL
#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READPRIV 0x02000000UL
+#define NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT 0x04000000UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__IOCTL 0x00000001UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__READ 0x00000002UL
#define NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET__WRITE 0x00000004UL
u32 def_sid; /* default SID for labeling */
u32 mntpoint_sid; /* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */
unsigned int behavior; /* labeling behavior */
- unsigned char initialized; /* initialization flag */
unsigned char flags; /* which mount options were specified */
- unsigned char proc; /* proc fs */
struct mutex lock;
struct list_head isec_head;
spinlock_t isec_lock;
#define POLICYDB_VERSION_MAX POLICYDB_VERSION_BOUNDARY
#endif
+/* Mask for just the mount related flags */
+#define SE_MNTMASK 0x0f
+/* Super block security struct flags for mount options */
#define CONTEXT_MNT 0x01
#define FSCONTEXT_MNT 0x02
#define ROOTCONTEXT_MNT 0x04
#define DEFCONTEXT_MNT 0x08
+/* Non-mount related flags */
+#define SE_SBINITIALIZED 0x10
+#define SE_SBPROC 0x20
+#define SE_SBLABELSUPP 0x40
#define CONTEXT_STR "context="
#define FSCONTEXT_STR "fscontext="
#define ROOTCONTEXT_STR "rootcontext="
#define DEFCONTEXT_STR "defcontext="
+#define LABELSUPP_STR "seclabel"
struct netlbl_lsm_secattr;
#define SEL_VEC_MAX 32
struct av_decision {
u32 allowed;
- u32 decided;
u32 auditallow;
u32 auditdeny;
u32 seqno;
{ AUDIT_USER, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_RELAY },
{ AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
{ AUDIT_TTY_GET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_READ },
- { AUDIT_TTY_SET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_WRITE },
+ { AUDIT_TTY_SET, NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET__NLMSG_TTY_AUDIT },
};
length = scnprintf(buf, SIMPLE_TRANSACTION_LIMIT,
"%x %x %x %x %u",
- avd.allowed, avd.decided,
+ avd.allowed, 0xffffffff,
avd.auditallow, avd.auditdeny,
avd.seqno);
out2:
* Initialize the access vectors to the default values.
*/
avd->allowed = 0;
- avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
avd->auditallow = 0;
avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
avd->seqno = latest_granting;
if (!ss_initialized) {
avd->allowed = 0xffffffff;
- avd->decided = 0xffffffff;
avd->auditallow = 0;
avd->auditdeny = 0xffffffff;
avd->seqno = latest_granting;
/**
* smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
- * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
- * @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @obj_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
*
* This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
* in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
/**
* smack_ptrace_may_access - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
* @ctp: child task pointer
+ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode
*
* Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
*
/**
* smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
- * @type: file system type
* @orig: where to start
- * @smackopts
+ * @smackopts: mount options string
*
* Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
*
/**
* smack_sb_mount - Smack check for mounting
* @dev_name: unused
- * @nd: mount point
+ * @path: mount point
* @type: unused
* @flags: unused
* @data: unused
/**
* smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
- * @inode - the inode in need of a blob
+ * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
*
* Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
*/
/**
* smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
- * @inode - the inode with a blob
+ * @inode: the inode with a blob
*
* Clears the blob pointer in inode
*/
* smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
* @inode: the inode in question
* @mask: the access requested
- * @nd: unused
*
* This is the important Smack hook.
*
* @inode: the object
* @name: attribute name
* @buffer: where to put the result
- * @size: size of the buffer
- * @err: unused
+ * @alloc: unused
*
* Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
*/
/**
* smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
* @file: the object
- * @cmd unused
+ * @cmd: unused
*
* Returns 0 if current has write access, error code otherwise
*/
return 0;
}
-/*
- * commit new credentials
+/**
+ * smack_cred_commit - commit new credentials
* @new: the new credentials
* @old: the original credentials
*/
/**
* smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
- * @new points to the set of credentials to be modified.
- * @secid specifies the security ID to be set
+ * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
+ * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
*
* Set the security data for a kernel service.
*/
/**
* smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
- * @new points to the set of credentials to be modified
- * @inode points to the inode to use as a reference
+ * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
+ * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
*
* Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
* as the objective context of the specified inode
/**
* smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
* @p: task to copy from
- * inode: inode to copy to
+ * @inode: inode to copy to
*
* Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
*/
* smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
* @sk: the socket
* @family: unused
- * @priority: memory allocation priority
+ * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
*
* Assign Smack pointers to current
*
/**
* smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
- * @ipcp: the object permissions
+ * @ipp: the object permissions
* @secid: where result will be saved
*/
static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
/**
* smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
* @sock: the socket
- * @msghdr: the message
+ * @msg: the message
* @size: the size of the message
*
* Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination
/**
- * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat
- * pair to smack
+ * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
* @sap: netlabel secattr
* @sip: where to put the result
*
* @sock: the socket
* @optval: user's destination
* @optlen: size thereof
- * @len: max thereoe
+ * @len: max thereof
*
* returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
*/
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
-/*
+/**
* smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
* @secid: incoming integer
* @secdata: destination
return 0;
}
-/*
+/**
* smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
* @secdata: smack label
* @seclen: how long result is
return 0;
}
-/*
+/**
* smack_release_secctx - don't do anything.
- * @key_ref: unused
- * @context: unused
- * @perm: unused
+ * @secdata: unused
+ * @seclen: unused
*
* Exists to make sure nothing gets done, and properly
*/
/**
* smk_write_load - write() for /smack/load
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
* @buf: where to get the data from
* @count: bytes sent
* @ppos: where to start - must be 0
/**
* smk_unlbl_ambient - initialize the unlabeled domain
+ * @oldambient: previous domain string
*/
static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient)
{
/**
* smk_write_cipso - write() for /smack/cipso
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
* @buf: where to get the data from
* @count: bytes sent
* @ppos: where to start
/**
* smk_write_netlbladdr - write() for /smack/netlabel
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
* @buf: where to get the data from
* @count: bytes sent
* @ppos: where to start
/**
* smk_write_doi - write() for /smack/doi
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
* @buf: where to get the data from
* @count: bytes sent
* @ppos: where to start
/**
* smk_write_direct - write() for /smack/direct
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
* @buf: where to get the data from
* @count: bytes sent
* @ppos: where to start
/**
* smk_write_ambient - write() for /smack/ambient
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
* @buf: where to get the data from
* @count: bytes sent
* @ppos: where to start
/**
* smk_write_onlycap - write() for /smack/onlycap
- * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
* @buf: where to get the data from
* @count: bytes sent
* @ppos: where to start
--- /dev/null
+config SECURITY_TOMOYO
+ bool "TOMOYO Linux Support"
+ depends on SECURITY
+ select SECURITYFS
+ select SECURITY_PATH
+ default n
+ help
+ This selects TOMOYO Linux, pathname-based access control.
+ Required userspace tools and further information may be
+ found at <http://tomoyo.sourceforge.jp/>.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
--- /dev/null
+obj-y = common.o realpath.o tomoyo.o domain.o file.o
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/common.c
+ *
+ * Common functions for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/uaccess.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/hardirq.h>
+#include "realpath.h"
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tomoyo.h"
+
+/* Has loading policy done? */
+bool tomoyo_policy_loaded;
+
+/* String table for functionality that takes 4 modes. */
+static const char *tomoyo_mode_4[4] = {
+ "disabled", "learning", "permissive", "enforcing"
+};
+/* String table for functionality that takes 2 modes. */
+static const char *tomoyo_mode_2[4] = {
+ "disabled", "enabled", "enabled", "enabled"
+};
+
+/* Table for profile. */
+static struct {
+ const char *keyword;
+ unsigned int current_value;
+ const unsigned int max_value;
+} tomoyo_control_array[TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX] = {
+ [TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE] = { "MAC_FOR_FILE", 0, 3 },
+ [TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY] = { "MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY", 2048, INT_MAX },
+ [TOMOYO_VERBOSE] = { "TOMOYO_VERBOSE", 1, 1 },
+};
+
+/* Profile table. Memory is allocated as needed. */
+static struct tomoyo_profile {
+ unsigned int value[TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX];
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *comment;
+} *tomoyo_profile_ptr[TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES];
+
+/* Permit policy management by non-root user? */
+static bool tomoyo_manage_by_non_root;
+
+/* Utility functions. */
+
+/* Open operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file);
+/* Close /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tomoyo_close_control(struct file *file);
+/* Read operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tomoyo_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
+ const int buffer_len);
+/* Write operation for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static int tomoyo_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
+ const int buffer_len);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_byte_range - Check whether the string isa \ooo style octal value.
+ *
+ * @str: Pointer to the string.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @str is a \ooo style octal value, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * TOMOYO uses \ooo style representation for 0x01 - 0x20 and 0x7F - 0xFF.
+ * This function verifies that \ooo is in valid range.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_byte_range(const char *str)
+{
+ return *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '3' &&
+ *str >= '0' && *str++ <= '7' &&
+ *str >= '0' && *str <= '7';
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_alphabet_char - Check whether the character is an alphabet.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is an alphabet character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_alphabet_char(const char c)
+{
+ return (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z');
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_make_byte - Make byte value from three octal characters.
+ *
+ * @c1: The first character.
+ * @c2: The second character.
+ * @c3: The third character.
+ *
+ * Returns byte value.
+ */
+static inline u8 tomoyo_make_byte(const u8 c1, const u8 c2, const u8 c3)
+{
+ return ((c1 - '0') << 6) + ((c2 - '0') << 3) + (c3 - '0');
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_str_starts - Check whether the given string starts with the given keyword.
+ *
+ * @src: Pointer to pointer to the string.
+ * @find: Pointer to the keyword.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @src starts with @find, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The @src is updated to point the first character after the @find
+ * if @src starts with @find.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_str_starts(char **src, const char *find)
+{
+ const int len = strlen(find);
+ char *tmp = *src;
+
+ if (strncmp(tmp, find, len))
+ return false;
+ tmp += len;
+ *src = tmp;
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_normalize_line - Format string.
+ *
+ * @buffer: The line to normalize.
+ *
+ * Leading and trailing whitespaces are removed.
+ * Multiple whitespaces are packed into single space.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void tomoyo_normalize_line(unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+ unsigned char *sp = buffer;
+ unsigned char *dp = buffer;
+ bool first = true;
+
+ while (tomoyo_is_invalid(*sp))
+ sp++;
+ while (*sp) {
+ if (!first)
+ *dp++ = ' ';
+ first = false;
+ while (tomoyo_is_valid(*sp))
+ *dp++ = *sp++;
+ while (tomoyo_is_invalid(*sp))
+ sp++;
+ }
+ *dp = '\0';
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_correct_path - Validate a pathname.
+ * @filename: The pathname to check.
+ * @start_type: Should the pathname start with '/'?
+ * 1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care
+ * @pattern_type: Can the pathname contain a wildcard?
+ * 1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care
+ * @end_type: Should the pathname end with '/'?
+ * 1 = must / -1 = must not / 0 = don't care
+ * @function: The name of function calling me.
+ *
+ * Check whether the given filename follows the naming rules.
+ * Returns true if @filename follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
+ const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type,
+ const char *function)
+{
+ bool contains_pattern = false;
+ unsigned char c;
+ unsigned char d;
+ unsigned char e;
+ const char *original_filename = filename;
+
+ if (!filename)
+ goto out;
+ c = *filename;
+ if (start_type == 1) { /* Must start with '/' */
+ if (c != '/')
+ goto out;
+ } else if (start_type == -1) { /* Must not start with '/' */
+ if (c == '/')
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (c)
+ c = *(filename + strlen(filename) - 1);
+ if (end_type == 1) { /* Must end with '/' */
+ if (c != '/')
+ goto out;
+ } else if (end_type == -1) { /* Must not end with '/' */
+ if (c == '/')
+ goto out;
+ }
+ while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') {
+ if (c == '\\') {
+ switch ((c = *filename++)) {
+ case '\\': /* "\\" */
+ continue;
+ case '$': /* "\$" */
+ case '+': /* "\+" */
+ case '?': /* "\?" */
+ case '*': /* "\*" */
+ case '@': /* "\@" */
+ case 'x': /* "\x" */
+ case 'X': /* "\X" */
+ case 'a': /* "\a" */
+ case 'A': /* "\A" */
+ case '-': /* "\-" */
+ if (pattern_type == -1)
+ break; /* Must not contain pattern */
+ contains_pattern = true;
+ continue;
+ case '0': /* "\ooo" */
+ case '1':
+ case '2':
+ case '3':
+ d = *filename++;
+ if (d < '0' || d > '7')
+ break;
+ e = *filename++;
+ if (e < '0' || e > '7')
+ break;
+ c = tomoyo_make_byte(c, d, e);
+ if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c))
+ continue; /* pattern is not \000 */
+ }
+ goto out;
+ } else if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if (pattern_type == 1) { /* Must contain pattern */
+ if (!contains_pattern)
+ goto out;
+ }
+ return true;
+ out:
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid pathname '%s'\n", function,
+ original_filename);
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_correct_domain - Check whether the given domainname follows the naming rules.
+ * @domainname: The domainname to check.
+ * @function: The name of function calling me.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @domainname follows the naming rules, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_is_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname,
+ const char *function)
+{
+ unsigned char c;
+ unsigned char d;
+ unsigned char e;
+ const char *org_domainname = domainname;
+
+ if (!domainname || strncmp(domainname, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME,
+ TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN))
+ goto out;
+ domainname += TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN;
+ if (!*domainname)
+ return true;
+ do {
+ if (*domainname++ != ' ')
+ goto out;
+ if (*domainname++ != '/')
+ goto out;
+ while ((c = *domainname) != '\0' && c != ' ') {
+ domainname++;
+ if (c == '\\') {
+ c = *domainname++;
+ switch ((c)) {
+ case '\\': /* "\\" */
+ continue;
+ case '0': /* "\ooo" */
+ case '1':
+ case '2':
+ case '3':
+ d = *domainname++;
+ if (d < '0' || d > '7')
+ break;
+ e = *domainname++;
+ if (e < '0' || e > '7')
+ break;
+ c = tomoyo_make_byte(c, d, e);
+ if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c))
+ /* pattern is not \000 */
+ continue;
+ }
+ goto out;
+ } else if (tomoyo_is_invalid(c)) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ } while (*domainname);
+ return true;
+ out:
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid domainname '%s'\n", function,
+ org_domainname);
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_domain_def - Check whether the given token can be a domainname.
+ *
+ * @buffer: The token to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @buffer possibly be a domainname, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer)
+{
+ return !strncmp(buffer, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME, TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_find_domain - Find a domain by the given name.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The domainname to find.
+ *
+ * Caller must call down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); or
+ * down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock); .
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" if found, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain(const char *domainname)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+ struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+
+ name.name = domainname;
+ tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+ list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+ if (!domain->is_deleted &&
+ !tomoyo_pathcmp(&name, domain->domainname))
+ return domain;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_depth - Evaluate the number of '/' in a string.
+ *
+ * @pathname: The string to evaluate.
+ *
+ * Returns path depth of the string.
+ *
+ * I score 2 for each of the '/' in the @pathname
+ * and score 1 if the @pathname ends with '/'.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_path_depth(const char *pathname)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+
+ if (pathname) {
+ const char *ep = pathname + strlen(pathname);
+ if (pathname < ep--) {
+ if (*ep != '/')
+ i++;
+ while (pathname <= ep)
+ if (*ep-- == '/')
+ i += 2;
+ }
+ }
+ return i;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_const_part_length - Evaluate the initial length without a pattern in a token.
+ *
+ * @filename: The string to evaluate.
+ *
+ * Returns the initial length without a pattern in @filename.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_const_part_length(const char *filename)
+{
+ char c;
+ int len = 0;
+
+ if (!filename)
+ return 0;
+ while ((c = *filename++) != '\0') {
+ if (c != '\\') {
+ len++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ c = *filename++;
+ switch (c) {
+ case '\\': /* "\\" */
+ len += 2;
+ continue;
+ case '0': /* "\ooo" */
+ case '1':
+ case '2':
+ case '3':
+ c = *filename++;
+ if (c < '0' || c > '7')
+ break;
+ c = *filename++;
+ if (c < '0' || c > '7')
+ break;
+ len += 4;
+ continue;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_fill_path_info - Fill in "struct tomoyo_path_info" members.
+ *
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" to fill in.
+ *
+ * The caller sets "struct tomoyo_path_info"->name.
+ */
+void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr)
+{
+ const char *name = ptr->name;
+ const int len = strlen(name);
+
+ ptr->total_len = len;
+ ptr->const_len = tomoyo_const_part_length(name);
+ ptr->is_dir = len && (name[len - 1] == '/');
+ ptr->is_patterned = (ptr->const_len < len);
+ ptr->hash = full_name_hash(name, len);
+ ptr->depth = tomoyo_path_depth(name);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2 - Pattern matching without '/' character
+ * and "\-" pattern.
+ *
+ * @filename: The start of string to check.
+ * @filename_end: The end of string to check.
+ * @pattern: The start of pattern to compare.
+ * @pattern_end: The end of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(const char *filename,
+ const char *filename_end,
+ const char *pattern,
+ const char *pattern_end)
+{
+ while (filename < filename_end && pattern < pattern_end) {
+ char c;
+ if (*pattern != '\\') {
+ if (*filename++ != *pattern++)
+ return false;
+ continue;
+ }
+ c = *filename;
+ pattern++;
+ switch (*pattern) {
+ int i;
+ int j;
+ case '?':
+ if (c == '/') {
+ return false;
+ } else if (c == '\\') {
+ if (filename[1] == '\\')
+ filename++;
+ else if (tomoyo_is_byte_range(filename + 1))
+ filename += 3;
+ else
+ return false;
+ }
+ break;
+ case '\\':
+ if (c != '\\')
+ return false;
+ if (*++filename != '\\')
+ return false;
+ break;
+ case '+':
+ if (!isdigit(c))
+ return false;
+ break;
+ case 'x':
+ if (!isxdigit(c))
+ return false;
+ break;
+ case 'a':
+ if (!tomoyo_is_alphabet_char(c))
+ return false;
+ break;
+ case '0':
+ case '1':
+ case '2':
+ case '3':
+ if (c == '\\' && tomoyo_is_byte_range(filename + 1)
+ && strncmp(filename + 1, pattern, 3) == 0) {
+ filename += 3;
+ pattern += 2;
+ break;
+ }
+ return false; /* Not matched. */
+ case '*':
+ case '@':
+ for (i = 0; i <= filename_end - filename; i++) {
+ if (tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(
+ filename + i, filename_end,
+ pattern + 1, pattern_end))
+ return true;
+ c = filename[i];
+ if (c == '.' && *pattern == '@')
+ break;
+ if (c != '\\')
+ continue;
+ if (filename[i + 1] == '\\')
+ i++;
+ else if (tomoyo_is_byte_range(filename + i + 1))
+ i += 3;
+ else
+ break; /* Bad pattern. */
+ }
+ return false; /* Not matched. */
+ default:
+ j = 0;
+ c = *pattern;
+ if (c == '$') {
+ while (isdigit(filename[j]))
+ j++;
+ } else if (c == 'X') {
+ while (isxdigit(filename[j]))
+ j++;
+ } else if (c == 'A') {
+ while (tomoyo_is_alphabet_char(filename[j]))
+ j++;
+ }
+ for (i = 1; i <= j; i++) {
+ if (tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(
+ filename + i, filename_end,
+ pattern + 1, pattern_end))
+ return true;
+ }
+ return false; /* Not matched or bad pattern. */
+ }
+ filename++;
+ pattern++;
+ }
+ while (*pattern == '\\' &&
+ (*(pattern + 1) == '*' || *(pattern + 1) == '@'))
+ pattern += 2;
+ return filename == filename_end && pattern == pattern_end;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern - Pattern matching without without '/' character.
+ *
+ * @filename: The start of string to check.
+ * @filename_end: The end of string to check.
+ * @pattern: The start of pattern to compare.
+ * @pattern_end: The end of pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename matches @pattern, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern(const char *filename,
+ const char *filename_end,
+ const char *pattern,
+ const char *pattern_end)
+{
+ const char *pattern_start = pattern;
+ bool first = true;
+ bool result;
+
+ while (pattern < pattern_end - 1) {
+ /* Split at "\-" pattern. */
+ if (*pattern++ != '\\' || *pattern++ != '-')
+ continue;
+ result = tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(filename,
+ filename_end,
+ pattern_start,
+ pattern - 2);
+ if (first)
+ result = !result;
+ if (result)
+ return false;
+ first = false;
+ pattern_start = pattern;
+ }
+ result = tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern2(filename, filename_end,
+ pattern_start, pattern_end);
+ return first ? result : !result;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_path_matches_pattern - Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern.
+ * @filename: The filename to check.
+ * @pattern: The pattern to compare.
+ *
+ * Returns true if matches, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The following patterns are available.
+ * \\ \ itself.
+ * \ooo Octal representation of a byte.
+ * \* More than or equals to 0 character other than '/'.
+ * \@ More than or equals to 0 character other than '/' or '.'.
+ * \? 1 byte character other than '/'.
+ * \$ More than or equals to 1 decimal digit.
+ * \+ 1 decimal digit.
+ * \X More than or equals to 1 hexadecimal digit.
+ * \x 1 hexadecimal digit.
+ * \A More than or equals to 1 alphabet character.
+ * \a 1 alphabet character.
+ * \- Subtraction operator.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern)
+{
+ /*
+ if (!filename || !pattern)
+ return false;
+ */
+ const char *f = filename->name;
+ const char *p = pattern->name;
+ const int len = pattern->const_len;
+
+ /* If @pattern doesn't contain pattern, I can use strcmp(). */
+ if (!pattern->is_patterned)
+ return !tomoyo_pathcmp(filename, pattern);
+ /* Dont compare if the number of '/' differs. */
+ if (filename->depth != pattern->depth)
+ return false;
+ /* Compare the initial length without patterns. */
+ if (strncmp(f, p, len))
+ return false;
+ f += len;
+ p += len;
+ /* Main loop. Compare each directory component. */
+ while (*f && *p) {
+ const char *f_delimiter = strchr(f, '/');
+ const char *p_delimiter = strchr(p, '/');
+ if (!f_delimiter)
+ f_delimiter = f + strlen(f);
+ if (!p_delimiter)
+ p_delimiter = p + strlen(p);
+ if (!tomoyo_file_matches_to_pattern(f, f_delimiter,
+ p, p_delimiter))
+ return false;
+ f = f_delimiter;
+ if (*f)
+ f++;
+ p = p_delimiter;
+ if (*p)
+ p++;
+ }
+ /* Ignore trailing "\*" and "\@" in @pattern. */
+ while (*p == '\\' &&
+ (*(p + 1) == '*' || *(p + 1) == '@'))
+ p += 2;
+ return !*f && !*p;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_io_printf - Transactional printf() to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer" structure.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @fmt: The printf()'s format string, followed by parameters.
+ *
+ * Returns true if output was written, false otherwise.
+ *
+ * The snprintf() will truncate, but tomoyo_io_printf() won't.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_io_printf(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ int len;
+ int pos = head->read_avail;
+ int size = head->readbuf_size - pos;
+
+ if (size <= 0)
+ return false;
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ len = vsnprintf(head->read_buf + pos, size, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ if (pos + len >= head->readbuf_size)
+ return false;
+ head->read_avail += len;
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_exe - Get tomoyo_realpath() of current process.
+ *
+ * Returns the tomoyo_realpath() of current process on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * This function uses tomoyo_alloc(), so the caller must call tomoyo_free()
+ * if this function didn't return NULL.
+ */
+static const char *tomoyo_get_exe(void)
+{
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
+ struct vm_area_struct *vma;
+ const char *cp = NULL;
+
+ if (!mm)
+ return NULL;
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ for (vma = mm->mmap; vma; vma = vma->vm_next) {
+ if ((vma->vm_flags & VM_EXECUTABLE) && vma->vm_file) {
+ cp = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&vma->vm_file->f_path);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ return cp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_msg - Get warning message.
+ *
+ * @is_enforce: Is it enforcing mode?
+ *
+ * Returns "ERROR" or "WARNING".
+ */
+const char *tomoyo_get_msg(const bool is_enforce)
+{
+ if (is_enforce)
+ return "ERROR";
+ else
+ return "WARNING";
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_flags - Check mode for specified functionality.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @index: The functionality to check mode.
+ *
+ * TOMOYO checks only process context.
+ * This code disables TOMOYO's enforcement in case the function is called from
+ * interrupt context.
+ */
+unsigned int tomoyo_check_flags(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const u8 index)
+{
+ const u8 profile = domain->profile;
+
+ if (WARN_ON(in_interrupt()))
+ return 0;
+ return tomoyo_policy_loaded && index < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX
+#if TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES != 256
+ && profile < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES
+#endif
+ && tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] ?
+ tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile]->value[index] : 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_verbose_mode - Check whether TOMOYO is verbose mode.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if domain policy violation warning should be printed to
+ * console.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_verbose_mode(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain)
+{
+ return tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_VERBOSE) != 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok - Check for domain's quota.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ *
+ * Returns true if the domain is not exceeded quota, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain)
+{
+ unsigned int count = 0;
+ struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+
+ if (!domain)
+ return true;
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+ if (ptr->type & TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED)
+ continue;
+ switch (tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr)) {
+ struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record *acl1;
+ struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record *acl2;
+ u16 perm;
+ case TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL:
+ acl1 = container_of(ptr,
+ struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record,
+ head);
+ perm = acl1->perm;
+ if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm &
+ ((1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL) |
+ (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL)))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL))
+ count++;
+ break;
+ case TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL:
+ acl2 = container_of(ptr,
+ struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record,
+ head);
+ perm = acl2->perm;
+ if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK_ACL))
+ count++;
+ if (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME_ACL))
+ count++;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+ if (count < tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY))
+ return true;
+ if (!domain->quota_warned) {
+ domain->quota_warned = true;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-WARNING: "
+ "Domain '%s' has so many ACLs to hold. "
+ "Stopped learning mode.\n", domain->domainname->name);
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile - Create a new profile.
+ *
+ * @profile: Profile number to create.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_profile" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+static struct tomoyo_profile *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile(const unsigned
+ int profile)
+{
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+ struct tomoyo_profile *ptr = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ if (profile >= TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES)
+ return NULL;
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ mutex_lock(&lock);
+ ptr = tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile];
+ if (ptr)
+ goto ok;
+ ptr = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*ptr));
+ if (!ptr)
+ goto ok;
+ for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX; i++)
+ ptr->value[i] = tomoyo_control_array[i].current_value;
+ mb(); /* Avoid out-of-order execution. */
+ tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] = ptr;
+ ok:
+ mutex_unlock(&lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_profile - Write to profile table.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ char *data = head->write_buf;
+ unsigned int i;
+ unsigned int value;
+ char *cp;
+ struct tomoyo_profile *profile;
+ unsigned long num;
+
+ cp = strchr(data, '-');
+ if (cp)
+ *cp = '\0';
+ if (strict_strtoul(data, 10, &num))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (cp)
+ data = cp + 1;
+ profile = tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_profile(num);
+ if (!profile)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ cp = strchr(data, '=');
+ if (!cp)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *cp = '\0';
+ if (!strcmp(data, "COMMENT")) {
+ profile->comment = tomoyo_save_name(cp + 1);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(data, tomoyo_control_array[i].keyword))
+ continue;
+ if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &value) != 1) {
+ int j;
+ const char **modes;
+ switch (i) {
+ case TOMOYO_VERBOSE:
+ modes = tomoyo_mode_2;
+ break;
+ default:
+ modes = tomoyo_mode_4;
+ break;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) {
+ if (strcmp(cp + 1, modes[j]))
+ continue;
+ value = j;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (j == 4)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (value > tomoyo_control_array[i].max_value) {
+ value = tomoyo_control_array[i].max_value;
+ }
+ profile->value[i] = value;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_profile - Read from profile table.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ static const int total = TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX + 1;
+ int step;
+
+ if (head->read_eof)
+ return 0;
+ for (step = head->read_step; step < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES * total;
+ step++) {
+ const u8 index = step / total;
+ u8 type = step % total;
+ const struct tomoyo_profile *profile
+ = tomoyo_profile_ptr[index];
+ head->read_step = step;
+ if (!profile)
+ continue;
+ if (!type) { /* Print profile' comment tag. */
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-COMMENT=%s\n",
+ index, profile->comment ?
+ profile->comment->name : ""))
+ break;
+ continue;
+ }
+ type--;
+ if (type < TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX) {
+ const unsigned int value = profile->value[type];
+ const char **modes = NULL;
+ const char *keyword
+ = tomoyo_control_array[type].keyword;
+ switch (tomoyo_control_array[type].max_value) {
+ case 3:
+ modes = tomoyo_mode_4;
+ break;
+ case 1:
+ modes = tomoyo_mode_2;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (modes) {
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-%s=%s\n", index,
+ keyword, modes[value]))
+ break;
+ } else {
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u-%s=%u\n", index,
+ keyword, value))
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (step == TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES * total)
+ head->read_eof = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Structure for policy manager. */
+struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ /* A path to program or a domainname. */
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *manager;
+ bool is_domain; /* True if manager is a domainname. */
+ bool is_deleted; /* True if this entry is deleted. */
+};
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_policy_manager_list);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_manager_entry - Add a manager entry.
+ *
+ * @manager: The path to manager or the domainnamme.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_manager_entry(const char *manager,
+ const bool is_delete)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *new_entry;
+ struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_manager;
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+ bool is_domain = false;
+
+ if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(manager)) {
+ if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(manager, __func__))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ is_domain = true;
+ } else {
+ if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(manager, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ saved_manager = tomoyo_save_name(manager);
+ if (!saved_manager)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ down_write(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) {
+ if (ptr->manager != saved_manager)
+ continue;
+ ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+ error = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (is_delete) {
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+ if (!new_entry)
+ goto out;
+ new_entry->manager = saved_manager;
+ new_entry->is_domain = is_domain;
+ list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list);
+ error = 0;
+ out:
+ up_write(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_manager_policy - Write manager policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_manager_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ char *data = head->write_buf;
+ bool is_delete = tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DELETE);
+
+ if (!strcmp(data, "manage_by_non_root")) {
+ tomoyo_manage_by_non_root = !is_delete;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return tomoyo_update_manager_entry(data, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_manager_policy - Read manager policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_manager_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ struct list_head *pos;
+ bool done = true;
+
+ if (head->read_eof)
+ return 0;
+ down_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2,
+ &tomoyo_policy_manager_list) {
+ struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr;
+ ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry,
+ list);
+ if (ptr->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s\n", ptr->manager->name)) {
+ done = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+ head->read_eof = done;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_policy_manager - Check whether the current process is a policy manager.
+ *
+ * Returns true if the current process is permitted to modify policy
+ * via /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_is_policy_manager(void)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_policy_manager_entry *ptr;
+ const char *exe;
+ const struct task_struct *task = current;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname = tomoyo_domain()->domainname;
+ bool found = false;
+
+ if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+ return true;
+ if (!tomoyo_manage_by_non_root && (task->cred->uid || task->cred->euid))
+ return false;
+ down_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) {
+ if (!ptr->is_deleted && ptr->is_domain
+ && !tomoyo_pathcmp(domainname, ptr->manager)) {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+ if (found)
+ return true;
+ exe = tomoyo_get_exe();
+ if (!exe)
+ return false;
+ down_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_policy_manager_list, list) {
+ if (!ptr->is_deleted && !ptr->is_domain
+ && !strcmp(exe, ptr->manager->name)) {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_policy_manager_list_lock);
+ if (!found) { /* Reduce error messages. */
+ static pid_t last_pid;
+ const pid_t pid = current->pid;
+ if (last_pid != pid) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s ( %s ) is not permitted to "
+ "update policies.\n", domainname->name, exe);
+ last_pid = pid;
+ }
+ }
+ tomoyo_free(exe);
+ return found;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_select_one - Parse select command.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @data: String to parse.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_is_select_one(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+ const char *data)
+{
+ unsigned int pid;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
+
+ if (sscanf(data, "pid=%u", &pid) == 1) {
+ struct task_struct *p;
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+ if (p)
+ domain = tomoyo_real_domain(p);
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+ } else if (!strncmp(data, "domain=", 7)) {
+ if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(data + 7)) {
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ domain = tomoyo_find_domain(data + 7);
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ }
+ } else
+ return false;
+ head->write_var1 = domain;
+ /* Accessing read_buf is safe because head->io_sem is held. */
+ if (!head->read_buf)
+ return true; /* Do nothing if open(O_WRONLY). */
+ head->read_avail = 0;
+ tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# select %s\n", data);
+ head->read_single_domain = true;
+ head->read_eof = !domain;
+ if (domain) {
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *d;
+ head->read_var1 = NULL;
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(d, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+ if (d == domain)
+ break;
+ head->read_var1 = &d->list;
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_bit = 0;
+ head->read_step = 0;
+ if (domain->is_deleted)
+ tomoyo_io_printf(head, "# This is a deleted domain.\n");
+ }
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_domain_policy - Write domain policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_domain_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ char *data = head->write_buf;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = head->write_var1;
+ bool is_delete = false;
+ bool is_select = false;
+ bool is_undelete = false;
+ unsigned int profile;
+
+ if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DELETE))
+ is_delete = true;
+ else if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_SELECT))
+ is_select = true;
+ else if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_UNDELETE))
+ is_undelete = true;
+ if (is_select && tomoyo_is_select_one(head, data))
+ return 0;
+ /* Don't allow updating policies by non manager programs. */
+ if (!tomoyo_is_policy_manager())
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (tomoyo_is_domain_def(data)) {
+ domain = NULL;
+ if (is_delete)
+ tomoyo_delete_domain(data);
+ else if (is_select) {
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ domain = tomoyo_find_domain(data);
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ } else if (is_undelete)
+ domain = tomoyo_undelete_domain(data);
+ else
+ domain = tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(data, 0);
+ head->write_var1 = domain;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!domain)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (sscanf(data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "%u", &profile) == 1
+ && profile < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES) {
+ if (tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] || !tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+ domain->profile = (u8) profile;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!strcmp(data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ)) {
+ tomoyo_set_domain_flag(domain, is_delete,
+ TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return tomoyo_write_file_policy(data, domain, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_single_path_acl - Print a single path ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_print_single_path_acl(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+ struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record *
+ ptr)
+{
+ int pos;
+ u8 bit;
+ const char *atmark = "";
+ const char *filename;
+ const u16 perm = ptr->perm;
+
+ filename = ptr->filename->name;
+ for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION;
+ bit++) {
+ const char *msg;
+ if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
+ continue;
+ /* Print "read/write" instead of "read" and "write". */
+ if ((bit == TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL ||
+ bit == TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL)
+ && (perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL)))
+ continue;
+ msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(bit);
+ pos = head->read_avail;
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s\n", msg,
+ atmark, filename))
+ goto out;
+ }
+ head->read_bit = 0;
+ return true;
+ out:
+ head->read_bit = bit;
+ head->read_avail = pos;
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_double_path_acl - Print a double path ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_print_double_path_acl(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+ struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record *
+ ptr)
+{
+ int pos;
+ const char *atmark1 = "";
+ const char *atmark2 = "";
+ const char *filename1;
+ const char *filename2;
+ const u8 perm = ptr->perm;
+ u8 bit;
+
+ filename1 = ptr->filename1->name;
+ filename2 = ptr->filename2->name;
+ for (bit = head->read_bit; bit < TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION;
+ bit++) {
+ const char *msg;
+ if (!(perm & (1 << bit)))
+ continue;
+ msg = tomoyo_dp2keyword(bit);
+ pos = head->read_avail;
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "allow_%s %s%s %s%s\n", msg,
+ atmark1, filename1, atmark2, filename2))
+ goto out;
+ }
+ head->read_bit = 0;
+ return true;
+ out:
+ head->read_bit = bit;
+ head->read_avail = pos;
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_print_entry - Print an ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ * @ptr: Pointer to an ACL entry.
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_print_entry(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head,
+ struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+ const u8 acl_type = tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr);
+
+ if (acl_type & TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED)
+ return true;
+ if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL) {
+ struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record *acl
+ = container_of(ptr,
+ struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record,
+ head);
+ return tomoyo_print_single_path_acl(head, acl);
+ }
+ if (acl_type == TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL) {
+ struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record *acl
+ = container_of(ptr,
+ struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record,
+ head);
+ return tomoyo_print_double_path_acl(head, acl);
+ }
+ BUG(); /* This must not happen. */
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_domain_policy - Read domain policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_domain_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ struct list_head *dpos;
+ struct list_head *apos;
+ bool done = true;
+
+ if (head->read_eof)
+ return 0;
+ if (head->read_step == 0)
+ head->read_step = 1;
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_cookie(dpos, head->read_var1, &tomoyo_domain_list) {
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+ const char *quota_exceeded = "";
+ const char *transition_failed = "";
+ const char *ignore_global_allow_read = "";
+ domain = list_entry(dpos, struct tomoyo_domain_info, list);
+ if (head->read_step != 1)
+ goto acl_loop;
+ if (domain->is_deleted && !head->read_single_domain)
+ continue;
+ /* Print domainname and flags. */
+ if (domain->quota_warned)
+ quota_exceeded = "quota_exceeded\n";
+ if (domain->flags & TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED)
+ transition_failed = "transition_failed\n";
+ if (domain->flags &
+ TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ)
+ ignore_global_allow_read
+ = TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ "\n";
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head,
+ "%s\n" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "%u\n"
+ "%s%s%s\n", domain->domainname->name,
+ domain->profile, quota_exceeded,
+ transition_failed,
+ ignore_global_allow_read)) {
+ done = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ head->read_step = 2;
+acl_loop:
+ if (head->read_step == 3)
+ goto tail_mark;
+ /* Print ACL entries in the domain. */
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_cookie(apos, head->read_var2,
+ &domain->acl_info_list) {
+ struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr
+ = list_entry(apos, struct tomoyo_acl_info,
+ list);
+ if (!tomoyo_print_entry(head, ptr)) {
+ done = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+ if (!done)
+ break;
+ head->read_step = 3;
+tail_mark:
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "\n")) {
+ done = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ head->read_step = 1;
+ if (head->read_single_domain)
+ break;
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ head->read_eof = done;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_domain_profile - Assign profile for specified domain.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to doing
+ *
+ * ( echo "select " $domainname; echo "use_profile " $profile ) |
+ * /usr/lib/ccs/loadpolicy -d
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_domain_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ char *data = head->write_buf;
+ char *cp = strchr(data, ' ');
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+ unsigned long profile;
+
+ if (!cp)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *cp = '\0';
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ domain = tomoyo_find_domain(cp + 1);
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ if (strict_strtoul(data, 10, &profile))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (domain && profile < TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES
+ && (tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile] || !tomoyo_policy_loaded))
+ domain->profile = (u8) profile;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_domain_profile - Read only domainname and profile.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns list of profile number and domainname pairs.
+ *
+ * This is equivalent to doing
+ *
+ * grep -A 1 '^<kernel>' /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy |
+ * awk ' { if ( domainname == "" ) { if ( $1 == "<kernel>" )
+ * domainname = $0; } else if ( $1 == "use_profile" ) {
+ * print $2 " " domainname; domainname = ""; } } ; '
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_domain_profile(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ struct list_head *pos;
+ bool done = true;
+
+ if (head->read_eof)
+ return 0;
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var1, &tomoyo_domain_list) {
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+ domain = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_domain_info, list);
+ if (domain->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%u %s\n", domain->profile,
+ domain->domainname->name)) {
+ done = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ head->read_eof = done;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_pid: Specify PID to obtain domainname.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_pid(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ unsigned long pid;
+ /* No error check. */
+ strict_strtoul(head->write_buf, 10, &pid);
+ head->read_step = (int) pid;
+ head->read_eof = false;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_pid - Get domainname of the specified PID.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns the domainname which the specified PID is in on success,
+ * empty string otherwise.
+ * The PID is specified by tomoyo_write_pid() so that the user can obtain
+ * using read()/write() interface rather than sysctl() interface.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_pid(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ if (head->read_avail == 0 && !head->read_eof) {
+ const int pid = head->read_step;
+ struct task_struct *p;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ p = find_task_by_vpid(pid);
+ if (p)
+ domain = tomoyo_real_domain(p);
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+ if (domain)
+ tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%d %u %s", pid, domain->profile,
+ domain->domainname->name);
+ head->read_eof = true;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_exception_policy - Write exception policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_exception_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ char *data = head->write_buf;
+ bool is_delete = tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DELETE);
+
+ if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN))
+ return tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(data, false,
+ is_delete);
+ if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN))
+ return tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(data, true, is_delete);
+ if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN))
+ return tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(data, false,
+ is_delete);
+ if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN))
+ return tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(data, true,
+ is_delete);
+ if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS))
+ return tomoyo_write_alias_policy(data, is_delete);
+ if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ))
+ return tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy(data, is_delete);
+ if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN))
+ return tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(data, is_delete);
+ if (tomoyo_str_starts(&data, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE))
+ return tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(data, is_delete);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_exception_policy - Read exception policy.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_exception_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ if (!head->read_eof) {
+ switch (head->read_step) {
+ case 0:
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 1;
+ case 1:
+ if (!tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(head))
+ break;
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 2;
+ case 2:
+ if (!tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(head))
+ break;
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 3;
+ case 3:
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 4;
+ case 4:
+ if (!tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy(head))
+ break;
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 5;
+ case 5:
+ if (!tomoyo_read_alias_policy(head))
+ break;
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 6;
+ case 6:
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 7;
+ case 7:
+ if (!tomoyo_read_file_pattern(head))
+ break;
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 8;
+ case 8:
+ if (!tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(head))
+ break;
+ head->read_var2 = NULL;
+ head->read_step = 9;
+ case 9:
+ head->read_eof = true;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* path to policy loader */
+static const char *tomoyo_loader = "/sbin/tomoyo-init";
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_policy_loader_exists - Check whether /sbin/tomoyo-init exists.
+ *
+ * Returns true if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_policy_loader_exists(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Don't activate MAC if the policy loader doesn't exist.
+ * If the initrd includes /sbin/init but real-root-dev has not
+ * mounted on / yet, activating MAC will block the system since
+ * policies are not loaded yet.
+ * Thus, let do_execve() call this function everytime.
+ */
+ struct nameidata nd;
+
+ if (path_lookup(tomoyo_loader, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd)) {
+ printk(KERN_INFO "Not activating Mandatory Access Control now "
+ "since %s doesn't exist.\n", tomoyo_loader);
+ return false;
+ }
+ path_put(&nd.path);
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_load_policy - Run external policy loader to load policy.
+ *
+ * @filename: The program about to start.
+ *
+ * This function checks whether @filename is /sbin/init , and if so
+ * invoke /sbin/tomoyo-init and wait for the termination of /sbin/tomoyo-init
+ * and then continues invocation of /sbin/init.
+ * /sbin/tomoyo-init reads policy files in /etc/tomoyo/ directory and
+ * writes to /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interfaces.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_load_policy(const char *filename)
+{
+ char *argv[2];
+ char *envp[3];
+
+ if (tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+ return;
+ /*
+ * Check filename is /sbin/init or /sbin/tomoyo-start.
+ * /sbin/tomoyo-start is a dummy filename in case where /sbin/init can't
+ * be passed.
+ * You can create /sbin/tomoyo-start by
+ * "ln -s /bin/true /sbin/tomoyo-start".
+ */
+ if (strcmp(filename, "/sbin/init") &&
+ strcmp(filename, "/sbin/tomoyo-start"))
+ return;
+ if (!tomoyo_policy_loader_exists())
+ return;
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "Calling %s to load policy. Please wait.\n",
+ tomoyo_loader);
+ argv[0] = (char *) tomoyo_loader;
+ argv[1] = NULL;
+ envp[0] = "HOME=/";
+ envp[1] = "PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin";
+ envp[2] = NULL;
+ call_usermodehelper(argv[0], argv, envp, 1);
+
+ printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01\n");
+ printk(KERN_INFO "Mandatory Access Control activated.\n");
+ tomoyo_policy_loaded = true;
+ { /* Check all profiles currently assigned to domains are defined. */
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+ const u8 profile = domain->profile;
+ if (tomoyo_profile_ptr[profile])
+ continue;
+ panic("Profile %u (used by '%s') not defined.\n",
+ profile, domain->domainname->name);
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_version: Get version.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns version information.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_version(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ if (!head->read_eof) {
+ tomoyo_io_printf(head, "2.2.0-pre");
+ head->read_eof = true;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_self_domain - Get the current process's domainname.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns the current process's domainname.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_self_domain(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ if (!head->read_eof) {
+ /*
+ * tomoyo_domain()->domainname != NULL
+ * because every process belongs to a domain and
+ * the domain's name cannot be NULL.
+ */
+ tomoyo_io_printf(head, "%s", tomoyo_domain()->domainname->name);
+ head->read_eof = true;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_open_control - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @type: Type of interface.
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Associates policy handler and returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = tomoyo_alloc(sizeof(*head));
+
+ if (!head)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ mutex_init(&head->io_sem);
+ switch (type) {
+ case TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/domain_policy */
+ head->write = tomoyo_write_domain_policy;
+ head->read = tomoyo_read_domain_policy;
+ break;
+ case TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/exception_policy */
+ head->write = tomoyo_write_exception_policy;
+ head->read = tomoyo_read_exception_policy;
+ break;
+ case TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain */
+ head->read = tomoyo_read_self_domain;
+ break;
+ case TOMOYO_DOMAIN_STATUS:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.domain_status */
+ head->write = tomoyo_write_domain_profile;
+ head->read = tomoyo_read_domain_profile;
+ break;
+ case TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/.process_status */
+ head->write = tomoyo_write_pid;
+ head->read = tomoyo_read_pid;
+ break;
+ case TOMOYO_VERSION:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/version */
+ head->read = tomoyo_read_version;
+ head->readbuf_size = 128;
+ break;
+ case TOMOYO_MEMINFO:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/meminfo */
+ head->write = tomoyo_write_memory_quota;
+ head->read = tomoyo_read_memory_counter;
+ head->readbuf_size = 512;
+ break;
+ case TOMOYO_PROFILE:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/profile */
+ head->write = tomoyo_write_profile;
+ head->read = tomoyo_read_profile;
+ break;
+ case TOMOYO_MANAGER:
+ /* /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/manager */
+ head->write = tomoyo_write_manager_policy;
+ head->read = tomoyo_read_manager_policy;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)) {
+ /*
+ * No need to allocate read_buf since it is not opened
+ * for reading.
+ */
+ head->read = NULL;
+ } else {
+ if (!head->readbuf_size)
+ head->readbuf_size = 4096 * 2;
+ head->read_buf = tomoyo_alloc(head->readbuf_size);
+ if (!head->read_buf) {
+ tomoyo_free(head);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!(file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)) {
+ /*
+ * No need to allocate write_buf since it is not opened
+ * for writing.
+ */
+ head->write = NULL;
+ } else if (head->write) {
+ head->writebuf_size = 4096 * 2;
+ head->write_buf = tomoyo_alloc(head->writebuf_size);
+ if (!head->write_buf) {
+ tomoyo_free(head->read_buf);
+ tomoyo_free(head);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+ file->private_data = head;
+ /*
+ * Call the handler now if the file is
+ * /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain
+ * so that the user can use
+ * cat < /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/self_domain"
+ * to know the current process's domainname.
+ */
+ if (type == TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN)
+ tomoyo_read_control(file, NULL, 0);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_control - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buffer: Poiner to buffer to write to.
+ * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
+ *
+ * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_read_control(struct file *file, char __user *buffer,
+ const int buffer_len)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+ struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
+ char *cp;
+
+ if (!head->read)
+ return -ENOSYS;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem))
+ return -EINTR;
+ /* Call the policy handler. */
+ len = head->read(head);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* Write to buffer. */
+ len = head->read_avail;
+ if (len > buffer_len)
+ len = buffer_len;
+ if (!len)
+ goto out;
+ /* head->read_buf changes by some functions. */
+ cp = head->read_buf;
+ if (copy_to_user(buffer, cp, len)) {
+ len = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ head->read_avail -= len;
+ memmove(cp, cp + len, head->read_avail);
+ out:
+ mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem);
+ return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_control - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buffer: Pointer to buffer to read from.
+ * @buffer_len: Size of @buffer.
+ *
+ * Returns @buffer_len on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_write_control(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
+ const int buffer_len)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
+ int error = buffer_len;
+ int avail_len = buffer_len;
+ char *cp0 = head->write_buf;
+
+ if (!head->write)
+ return -ENOSYS;
+ if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, buffer, buffer_len))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ /* Don't allow updating policies by non manager programs. */
+ if (head->write != tomoyo_write_pid &&
+ head->write != tomoyo_write_domain_policy &&
+ !tomoyo_is_policy_manager())
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (mutex_lock_interruptible(&head->io_sem))
+ return -EINTR;
+ /* Read a line and dispatch it to the policy handler. */
+ while (avail_len > 0) {
+ char c;
+ if (head->write_avail >= head->writebuf_size - 1) {
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ } else if (get_user(c, buffer)) {
+ error = -EFAULT;
+ break;
+ }
+ buffer++;
+ avail_len--;
+ cp0[head->write_avail++] = c;
+ if (c != '\n')
+ continue;
+ cp0[head->write_avail - 1] = '\0';
+ head->write_avail = 0;
+ tomoyo_normalize_line(cp0);
+ head->write(head);
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&head->io_sem);
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_close_control - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Releases memory and returns 0.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_close_control(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data;
+
+ /* Release memory used for policy I/O. */
+ tomoyo_free(head->read_buf);
+ head->read_buf = NULL;
+ tomoyo_free(head->write_buf);
+ head->write_buf = NULL;
+ tomoyo_free(head);
+ head = NULL;
+ file->private_data = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_alloc_acl_element - Allocate permanent memory for ACL entry.
+ *
+ * @acl_type: Type of ACL entry.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to the ACL entry on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+void *tomoyo_alloc_acl_element(const u8 acl_type)
+{
+ int len;
+ struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+
+ switch (acl_type) {
+ case TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL:
+ len = sizeof(struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record);
+ break;
+ case TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL:
+ len = sizeof(struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record);
+ break;
+ default:
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ ptr = tomoyo_alloc_element(len);
+ if (!ptr)
+ return NULL;
+ ptr->type = acl_type;
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_open - open() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode".
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ const int key = ((u8 *) file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_private)
+ - ((u8 *) NULL);
+ return tomoyo_open_control(key, file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_release - close() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @inode: Pointer to "struct inode".
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return tomoyo_close_control(file);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read - read() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buf: Pointer to buffer.
+ * @count: Size of @buf.
+ * @ppos: Unused.
+ *
+ * Returns bytes read on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static ssize_t tomoyo_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count,
+ loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return tomoyo_read_control(file, buf, count);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write - write() for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * @file: Pointer to "struct file".
+ * @buf: Pointer to buffer.
+ * @count: Size of @buf.
+ * @ppos: Unused.
+ *
+ * Returns @count on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static ssize_t tomoyo_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return tomoyo_write_control(file, buf, count);
+}
+
+/* Operations for /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface. */
+static const struct file_operations tomoyo_operations = {
+ .open = tomoyo_open,
+ .release = tomoyo_release,
+ .read = tomoyo_read,
+ .write = tomoyo_write,
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_create_entry - Create interface files under /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ directory.
+ *
+ * @name: The name of the interface file.
+ * @mode: The permission of the interface file.
+ * @parent: The parent directory.
+ * @key: Type of interface.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+static void __init tomoyo_create_entry(const char *name, const mode_t mode,
+ struct dentry *parent, const u8 key)
+{
+ securityfs_create_file(name, mode, parent, ((u8 *) NULL) + key,
+ &tomoyo_operations);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_initerface_init - Initialize /sys/kernel/security/tomoyo/ interface.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+static int __init tomoyo_initerface_init(void)
+{
+ struct dentry *tomoyo_dir;
+
+ /* Don't create securityfs entries unless registered. */
+ if (current_cred()->security != &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+ return 0;
+
+ tomoyo_dir = securityfs_create_dir("tomoyo", NULL);
+ tomoyo_create_entry("domain_policy", 0600, tomoyo_dir,
+ TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY);
+ tomoyo_create_entry("exception_policy", 0600, tomoyo_dir,
+ TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY);
+ tomoyo_create_entry("self_domain", 0400, tomoyo_dir,
+ TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN);
+ tomoyo_create_entry(".domain_status", 0600, tomoyo_dir,
+ TOMOYO_DOMAIN_STATUS);
+ tomoyo_create_entry(".process_status", 0600, tomoyo_dir,
+ TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS);
+ tomoyo_create_entry("meminfo", 0600, tomoyo_dir,
+ TOMOYO_MEMINFO);
+ tomoyo_create_entry("profile", 0600, tomoyo_dir,
+ TOMOYO_PROFILE);
+ tomoyo_create_entry("manager", 0600, tomoyo_dir,
+ TOMOYO_MANAGER);
+ tomoyo_create_entry("version", 0400, tomoyo_dir,
+ TOMOYO_VERSION);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+fs_initcall(tomoyo_initerface_init);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/common.h
+ *
+ * Common functions for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H
+#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H
+
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/file.h>
+#include <linux/kmod.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/namei.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+
+struct dentry;
+struct vfsmount;
+
+/* Temporary buffer for holding pathnames. */
+struct tomoyo_page_buffer {
+ char buffer[4096];
+};
+
+/* Structure for holding a token. */
+struct tomoyo_path_info {
+ const char *name;
+ u32 hash; /* = full_name_hash(name, strlen(name)) */
+ u16 total_len; /* = strlen(name) */
+ u16 const_len; /* = tomoyo_const_part_length(name) */
+ bool is_dir; /* = tomoyo_strendswith(name, "/") */
+ bool is_patterned; /* = tomoyo_path_contains_pattern(name) */
+ u16 depth; /* = tomoyo_path_depth(name) */
+};
+
+/*
+ * This is the max length of a token.
+ *
+ * A token consists of only ASCII printable characters.
+ * Non printable characters in a token is represented in \ooo style
+ * octal string. Thus, \ itself is represented as \\.
+ */
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN 4000
+
+/* Structure for holding requested pathname. */
+struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data {
+ /* Keep "head" first, for this pointer is passed to tomoyo_free(). */
+ struct tomoyo_path_info head;
+ char bariier1[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */
+ char body[TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN];
+ char barrier2[16]; /* Safeguard for overrun. */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Common header for holding ACL entries.
+ *
+ * Packing "struct tomoyo_acl_info" allows
+ * "struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record" to embed "u16" and
+ * "struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record" to embed "u8"
+ * without enlarging their structure size.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_acl_info {
+ struct list_head list;
+ /*
+ * Type of this ACL entry.
+ *
+ * MSB is is_deleted flag.
+ */
+ u8 type;
+} __packed;
+
+/* This ACL entry is deleted. */
+#define TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED 0x80
+
+/* Structure for domain information. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct list_head acl_info_list;
+ /* Name of this domain. Never NULL. */
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname;
+ u8 profile; /* Profile number to use. */
+ u8 is_deleted; /* Delete flag.
+ 0 = active.
+ 1 = deleted but undeletable.
+ 255 = deleted and no longer undeletable. */
+ bool quota_warned; /* Quota warnning flag. */
+ /* DOMAIN_FLAGS_*. Use tomoyo_set_domain_flag() to modify. */
+ u8 flags;
+};
+
+/* Profile number is an integer between 0 and 255. */
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_PROFILES 256
+
+/* Ignore "allow_read" directive in exception policy. */
+#define TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ 1
+/*
+ * This domain was unable to create a new domain at tomoyo_find_next_domain()
+ * because the name of the domain to be created was too long or
+ * it could not allocate memory.
+ * More than one process continued execve() without domain transition.
+ */
+#define TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED 2
+
+/*
+ * Structure for "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_read",
+ * "allow_write", "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir",
+ * "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar",
+ * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink" and "allow_rewrite" directive.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record {
+ struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL */
+ u16 perm;
+ /* Pointer to single pathname. */
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "allow_rename" and "allow_link" directive. */
+struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record {
+ struct tomoyo_acl_info head; /* type = TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL */
+ u8 perm;
+ /* Pointer to single pathname. */
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename1;
+ /* Pointer to single pathname. */
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename2;
+};
+
+/* Keywords for ACLs. */
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS "alias "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ "allow_read "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DELETE "delete "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE "deny_rewrite "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN "file_pattern "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN "initialize_domain "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN "keep_domain "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN "no_initialize_domain "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_NO_KEEP_DOMAIN "no_keep_domain "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_SELECT "select "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_UNDELETE "undelete "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_USE_PROFILE "use_profile "
+#define TOMOYO_KEYWORD_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ "ignore_global_allow_read"
+/* A domain definition starts with <kernel>. */
+#define TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME "<kernel>"
+#define TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME_LEN (sizeof(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME) - 1)
+
+/* Index numbers for Access Controls. */
+#define TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE 0 /* domain_policy.conf */
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY 1
+#define TOMOYO_VERBOSE 2
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_CONTROL_INDEX 3
+
+/* Structure for reading/writing policy via securityfs interfaces. */
+struct tomoyo_io_buffer {
+ int (*read) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
+ int (*write) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *);
+ /* Exclusive lock for this structure. */
+ struct mutex io_sem;
+ /* The position currently reading from. */
+ struct list_head *read_var1;
+ /* Extra variables for reading. */
+ struct list_head *read_var2;
+ /* The position currently writing to. */
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *write_var1;
+ /* The step for reading. */
+ int read_step;
+ /* Buffer for reading. */
+ char *read_buf;
+ /* EOF flag for reading. */
+ bool read_eof;
+ /* Read domain ACL of specified PID? */
+ bool read_single_domain;
+ /* Extra variable for reading. */
+ u8 read_bit;
+ /* Bytes available for reading. */
+ int read_avail;
+ /* Size of read buffer. */
+ int readbuf_size;
+ /* Buffer for writing. */
+ char *write_buf;
+ /* Bytes available for writing. */
+ int write_avail;
+ /* Size of write buffer. */
+ int writebuf_size;
+};
+
+/* Check whether the domain has too many ACL entries to hold. */
+bool tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain);
+/* Transactional sprintf() for policy dump. */
+bool tomoyo_io_printf(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head, const char *fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__ ((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+/* Check whether the domainname is correct. */
+bool tomoyo_is_correct_domain(const unsigned char *domainname,
+ const char *function);
+/* Check whether the token is correct. */
+bool tomoyo_is_correct_path(const char *filename, const s8 start_type,
+ const s8 pattern_type, const s8 end_type,
+ const char *function);
+/* Check whether the token can be a domainname. */
+bool tomoyo_is_domain_def(const unsigned char *buffer);
+/* Check whether the given filename matches the given pattern. */
+bool tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern);
+/* Read "alias" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tomoyo_read_alias_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/*
+ * Read "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entry
+ * in exception policy.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tomoyo_read_file_pattern(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/* Read "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */
+bool tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+/* Write domain policy violation warning message to console? */
+bool tomoyo_verbose_mode(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain);
+/* Convert double path operation to operation name. */
+const char *tomoyo_dp2keyword(const u8 operation);
+/* Get the last component of the given domainname. */
+const char *tomoyo_get_last_name(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain);
+/* Get warning message. */
+const char *tomoyo_get_msg(const bool is_enforce);
+/* Convert single path operation to operation name. */
+const char *tomoyo_sp2keyword(const u8 operation);
+/* Delete a domain. */
+int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *data);
+/* Create "alias" entry in exception policy. */
+int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/*
+ * Create "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" entry
+ * in exception policy.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
+ const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" entry in exception policy. */
+int tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
+ const bool is_delete);
+/*
+ * Create "allow_read/write", "allow_execute", "allow_read", "allow_write",
+ * "allow_create", "allow_unlink", "allow_mkdir", "allow_rmdir",
+ * "allow_mkfifo", "allow_mksock", "allow_mkblock", "allow_mkchar",
+ * "allow_truncate", "allow_symlink", "allow_rewrite", "allow_rename" and
+ * "allow_link" entry in domain policy.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_file_policy(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "allow_read" entry in exception policy. */
+int tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "deny_rewrite" entry in exception policy. */
+int tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/* Create "file_pattern" entry in exception policy. */
+int tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete);
+/* Find a domain by the given name. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain(const char *domainname);
+/* Find or create a domain by the given name. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
+ domainname,
+ const u8 profile);
+/* Undelete a domain. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_undelete_domain(const char *domainname);
+/* Check mode for specified functionality. */
+unsigned int tomoyo_check_flags(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const u8 index);
+/* Allocate memory for structures. */
+void *tomoyo_alloc_acl_element(const u8 acl_type);
+/* Fill in "struct tomoyo_path_info" members. */
+void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr);
+/* Run policy loader when /sbin/init starts. */
+void tomoyo_load_policy(const char *filename);
+/* Change "struct tomoyo_domain_info"->flags. */
+void tomoyo_set_domain_flag(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const bool is_delete, const u8 flags);
+
+/* strcmp() for "struct tomoyo_path_info" structure. */
+static inline bool tomoyo_pathcmp(const struct tomoyo_path_info *a,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *b)
+{
+ return a->hash != b->hash || strcmp(a->name, b->name);
+}
+
+/* Get type of an ACL entry. */
+static inline u8 tomoyo_acl_type1(struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+ return ptr->type & ~TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED;
+}
+
+/* Get type of an ACL entry. */
+static inline u8 tomoyo_acl_type2(struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr)
+{
+ return ptr->type;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_valid - Check whether the character is a valid char.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is a valid character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_valid(const unsigned char c)
+{
+ return c > ' ' && c < 127;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_invalid - Check whether the character is an invalid char.
+ *
+ * @c: The character to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @c is an invalid character, false otherwise.
+ */
+static inline bool tomoyo_is_invalid(const unsigned char c)
+{
+ return c && (c <= ' ' || c >= 127);
+}
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */
+extern struct list_head tomoyo_domain_list;
+extern struct rw_semaphore tomoyo_domain_list_lock;
+
+/* Lock for domain->acl_info_list. */
+extern struct rw_semaphore tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock;
+
+/* Has /sbin/init started? */
+extern bool tomoyo_policy_loaded;
+
+/* The kernel's domain. */
+extern struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain;
+
+/**
+ * list_for_each_cookie - iterate over a list with cookie.
+ * @pos: the &struct list_head to use as a loop cursor.
+ * @cookie: the &struct list_head to use as a cookie.
+ * @head: the head for your list.
+ *
+ * Same with list_for_each() except that this primitive uses @cookie
+ * so that we can continue iteration.
+ * @cookie must be NULL when iteration starts, and @cookie will become
+ * NULL when iteration finishes.
+ */
+#define list_for_each_cookie(pos, cookie, head) \
+ for (({ if (!cookie) \
+ cookie = head; }), \
+ pos = (cookie)->next; \
+ prefetch(pos->next), pos != (head) || ((cookie) = NULL); \
+ (cookie) = pos, pos = pos->next)
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_COMMON_H) */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/domain.c
+ *
+ * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tomoyo.h"
+#include "realpath.h"
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+
+/* Variables definitions.*/
+
+/* The initial domain. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain;
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_info". */
+LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_list);
+DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+
+/* Structure for "initialize_domain" and "no_initialize_domain" keyword. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname; /* This may be NULL */
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *program;
+ bool is_deleted;
+ bool is_not; /* True if this entry is "no_initialize_domain". */
+ /* True if the domainname is tomoyo_get_last_name(). */
+ bool is_last_name;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "keep_domain" and "no_keep_domain" keyword. */
+struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *program; /* This may be NULL */
+ bool is_deleted;
+ bool is_not; /* True if this entry is "no_keep_domain". */
+ /* True if the domainname is tomoyo_get_last_name(). */
+ bool is_last_name;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "alias" keyword. */
+struct tomoyo_alias_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *original_name;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *aliased_name;
+ bool is_deleted;
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_set_domain_flag - Set or clear domain's attribute flags.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ * @flags: Flags to set or clear.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_set_domain_flag(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const bool is_delete, const u8 flags)
+{
+ /* We need to serialize because this is bitfield operation. */
+ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(lock);
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+ spin_lock(&lock);
+ if (!is_delete)
+ domain->flags |= flags;
+ else
+ domain->flags &= ~flags;
+ spin_unlock(&lock);
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_last_name - Get last component of a domainname.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ *
+ * Returns the last component of the domainname.
+ */
+const char *tomoyo_get_last_name(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain)
+{
+ const char *cp0 = domain->domainname->name;
+ const char *cp1 = strrchr(cp0, ' ');
+
+ if (cp1)
+ return cp1 + 1;
+ return cp0;
+}
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_initializer_list);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain. May be NULL.
+ * @program: The name of program.
+ * @is_not: True if it is "no_initialize_domain" entry.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(const char *domainname,
+ const char *program,
+ const bool is_not,
+ const bool is_delete)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *new_entry;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_program;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname = NULL;
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+ bool is_last_name = false;
+
+ if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(program, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+ return -EINVAL; /* No patterns allowed. */
+ if (domainname) {
+ if (!tomoyo_is_domain_def(domainname) &&
+ tomoyo_is_correct_path(domainname, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+ is_last_name = true;
+ else if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname, __func__))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ saved_domainname = tomoyo_save_name(domainname);
+ if (!saved_domainname)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ saved_program = tomoyo_save_name(program);
+ if (!saved_program)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ down_write(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list, list) {
+ if (ptr->is_not != is_not ||
+ ptr->domainname != saved_domainname ||
+ ptr->program != saved_program)
+ continue;
+ ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+ error = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (is_delete) {
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+ if (!new_entry)
+ goto out;
+ new_entry->domainname = saved_domainname;
+ new_entry->program = saved_program;
+ new_entry->is_not = is_not;
+ new_entry->is_last_name = is_last_name;
+ list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list);
+ error = 0;
+ out:
+ up_write(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_domain_initializer_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ struct list_head *pos;
+ bool done = true;
+
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2,
+ &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list) {
+ const char *no;
+ const char *from = "";
+ const char *domain = "";
+ struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr;
+ ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry,
+ list);
+ if (ptr->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ no = ptr->is_not ? "no_" : "";
+ if (ptr->domainname) {
+ from = " from ";
+ domain = ptr->domainname->name;
+ }
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head,
+ "%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_INITIALIZE_DOMAIN
+ "%s%s%s\n", no, ptr->program->name, from,
+ domain)) {
+ done = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
+ return done;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data: String to parse.
+ * @is_not: True if it is "no_initialize_domain" entry.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_domain_initializer_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
+ const bool is_delete)
+{
+ char *cp = strstr(data, " from ");
+
+ if (cp) {
+ *cp = '\0';
+ return tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(cp + 6, data,
+ is_not,
+ is_delete);
+ }
+ return tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(NULL, data, is_not,
+ is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_domain_initializer - Check whether the given program causes domainname reinitialization.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ * @program: The name of program.
+ * @last_name: The last component of @domainname.
+ *
+ * Returns true if executing @program reinitializes domain transition,
+ * false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_is_domain_initializer(const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+ domainname,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *program,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+ last_name)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_domain_initializer_entry *ptr;
+ bool flag = false;
+
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_initializer_list, list) {
+ if (ptr->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ if (ptr->domainname) {
+ if (!ptr->is_last_name) {
+ if (ptr->domainname != domainname)
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ if (tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->domainname, last_name))
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ if (tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->program, program))
+ continue;
+ if (ptr->is_not) {
+ flag = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ flag = true;
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_initializer_list_lock);
+ return flag;
+}
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_domain_keeper_list);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ * @program: The name of program. May be NULL.
+ * @is_not: True if it is "no_keep_domain" entry.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(const char *domainname,
+ const char *program,
+ const bool is_not,
+ const bool is_delete)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *new_entry;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_program = NULL;
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+ bool is_last_name = false;
+
+ if (!tomoyo_is_domain_def(domainname) &&
+ tomoyo_is_correct_path(domainname, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+ is_last_name = true;
+ else if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname, __func__))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (program) {
+ if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(program, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ saved_program = tomoyo_save_name(program);
+ if (!saved_program)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ saved_domainname = tomoyo_save_name(domainname);
+ if (!saved_domainname)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ down_write(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list, list) {
+ if (ptr->is_not != is_not ||
+ ptr->domainname != saved_domainname ||
+ ptr->program != saved_program)
+ continue;
+ ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+ error = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (is_delete) {
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+ if (!new_entry)
+ goto out;
+ new_entry->domainname = saved_domainname;
+ new_entry->program = saved_program;
+ new_entry->is_not = is_not;
+ new_entry->is_last_name = is_last_name;
+ list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list);
+ error = 0;
+ out:
+ up_write(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data: String to parse.
+ * @is_not: True if it is "no_keep_domain" entry.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_domain_keeper_policy(char *data, const bool is_not,
+ const bool is_delete)
+{
+ char *cp = strstr(data, " from ");
+
+ if (cp) {
+ *cp = '\0';
+ return tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(cp + 6, data, is_not,
+ is_delete);
+ }
+ return tomoyo_update_domain_keeper_entry(data, NULL, is_not, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_domain_keeper_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ struct list_head *pos;
+ bool done = true;
+
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2,
+ &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list) {
+ struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr;
+ const char *no;
+ const char *from = "";
+ const char *program = "";
+
+ ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry, list);
+ if (ptr->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ no = ptr->is_not ? "no_" : "";
+ if (ptr->program) {
+ from = " from ";
+ program = ptr->program->name;
+ }
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head,
+ "%s" TOMOYO_KEYWORD_KEEP_DOMAIN
+ "%s%s%s\n", no, program, from,
+ ptr->domainname->name)) {
+ done = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
+ return done;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_domain_keeper - Check whether the given program causes domain transition suppression.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ * @program: The name of program.
+ * @last_name: The last component of @domainname.
+ *
+ * Returns true if executing @program supresses domain transition,
+ * false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_is_domain_keeper(const struct tomoyo_path_info *domainname,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *program,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *last_name)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_domain_keeper_entry *ptr;
+ bool flag = false;
+
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_domain_keeper_list, list) {
+ if (ptr->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ if (!ptr->is_last_name) {
+ if (ptr->domainname != domainname)
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ if (tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->domainname, last_name))
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (ptr->program && tomoyo_pathcmp(ptr->program, program))
+ continue;
+ if (ptr->is_not) {
+ flag = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ flag = true;
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_keeper_list_lock);
+ return flag;
+}
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_alias_entry". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_alias_list);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_alias_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_alias_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @original_name: The original program's real name.
+ * @aliased_name: The symbolic program's symbolic link's name.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_alias_entry(const char *original_name,
+ const char *aliased_name,
+ const bool is_delete)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_alias_entry *new_entry;
+ struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_original_name;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_aliased_name;
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(original_name, 1, -1, -1, __func__) ||
+ !tomoyo_is_correct_path(aliased_name, 1, -1, -1, __func__))
+ return -EINVAL; /* No patterns allowed. */
+ saved_original_name = tomoyo_save_name(original_name);
+ saved_aliased_name = tomoyo_save_name(aliased_name);
+ if (!saved_original_name || !saved_aliased_name)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ down_write(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_alias_list, list) {
+ if (ptr->original_name != saved_original_name ||
+ ptr->aliased_name != saved_aliased_name)
+ continue;
+ ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+ error = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (is_delete) {
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+ if (!new_entry)
+ goto out;
+ new_entry->original_name = saved_original_name;
+ new_entry->aliased_name = saved_aliased_name;
+ list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_alias_list);
+ error = 0;
+ out:
+ up_write(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_alias_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_alias_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_alias_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ struct list_head *pos;
+ bool done = true;
+
+ down_read(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &tomoyo_alias_list) {
+ struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr;
+
+ ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_alias_entry, list);
+ if (ptr->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALIAS "%s %s\n",
+ ptr->original_name->name,
+ ptr->aliased_name->name)) {
+ done = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
+ return done;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_alias_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_alias_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data: String to parse.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_alias_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
+{
+ char *cp = strchr(data, ' ');
+
+ if (!cp)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *cp++ = '\0';
+ return tomoyo_update_alias_entry(data, cp, is_delete);
+}
+
+/* Domain create/delete/undelete handler. */
+
+/* #define TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE */
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_delete_domain - Delete a domain.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+int tomoyo_delete_domain(char *domainname)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+ struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+
+ name.name = domainname;
+ tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "tomoyo_delete_domain %s\n", domainname);
+ list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+ if (tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
+ continue;
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "List: %p %u\n", domain, domain->is_deleted);
+ }
+#endif
+ /* Is there an active domain? */
+ list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain2;
+ /* Never delete tomoyo_kernel_domain */
+ if (domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+ continue;
+ if (domain->is_deleted ||
+ tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
+ continue;
+ /* Mark already deleted domains as non undeletable. */
+ list_for_each_entry(domain2, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+ if (!domain2->is_deleted ||
+ tomoyo_pathcmp(domain2->domainname, &name))
+ continue;
+#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+ if (domain2->is_deleted != 255)
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG
+ "Marked %p as non undeletable\n",
+ domain2);
+#endif
+ domain2->is_deleted = 255;
+ }
+ /* Delete and mark active domain as undeletable. */
+ domain->is_deleted = 1;
+#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "Marked %p as undeletable\n", domain);
+#endif
+ break;
+ }
+ up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_undelete_domain - Undelete a domain.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_undelete_domain(const char *domainname)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain;
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *candidate_domain = NULL;
+ struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+
+ name.name = domainname;
+ tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "tomoyo_undelete_domain %s\n", domainname);
+ list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+ if (tomoyo_pathcmp(domain->domainname, &name))
+ continue;
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "List: %p %u\n", domain, domain->is_deleted);
+ }
+#endif
+ list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+ if (tomoyo_pathcmp(&name, domain->domainname))
+ continue;
+ if (!domain->is_deleted) {
+ /* This domain is active. I can't undelete. */
+ candidate_domain = NULL;
+#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "%p is active. I can't undelete.\n",
+ domain);
+#endif
+ break;
+ }
+ /* Is this domain undeletable? */
+ if (domain->is_deleted == 1)
+ candidate_domain = domain;
+ }
+ if (candidate_domain) {
+ candidate_domain->is_deleted = 0;
+#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "%p was undeleted.\n", candidate_domain);
+#endif
+ }
+ up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return candidate_domain;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain - Create a domain.
+ *
+ * @domainname: The name of domain.
+ * @profile: Profile number to assign if the domain was newly created.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(const char *
+ domainname,
+ const u8 profile)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_domainname;
+
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ down_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ domain = tomoyo_find_domain(domainname);
+ if (domain)
+ goto out;
+ if (!tomoyo_is_correct_domain(domainname, __func__))
+ goto out;
+ saved_domainname = tomoyo_save_name(domainname);
+ if (!saved_domainname)
+ goto out;
+ /* Can I reuse memory of deleted domain? */
+ list_for_each_entry(domain, &tomoyo_domain_list, list) {
+ struct task_struct *p;
+ struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+ bool flag;
+ if (!domain->is_deleted ||
+ domain->domainname != saved_domainname)
+ continue;
+ flag = false;
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ for_each_process(p) {
+ if (tomoyo_real_domain(p) != domain)
+ continue;
+ flag = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+ if (flag)
+ continue;
+#ifdef TOMOYO_DEBUG_DOMAIN_UNDELETE
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "Reusing %p %s\n", domain,
+ domain->domainname->name);
+#endif
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+ ptr->type |= TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED;
+ }
+ tomoyo_set_domain_flag(domain, true, domain->flags);
+ domain->profile = profile;
+ domain->quota_warned = false;
+ mb(); /* Avoid out-of-order execution. */
+ domain->is_deleted = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* No memory reusable. Create using new memory. */
+ domain = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*domain));
+ if (domain) {
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&domain->acl_info_list);
+ domain->domainname = saved_domainname;
+ domain->profile = profile;
+ list_add_tail(&domain->list, &tomoyo_domain_list);
+ }
+ out:
+ up_write(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return domain;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_find_next_domain - Find a domain.
+ *
+ * @bprm: Pointer to "struct linux_binprm".
+ * @next_domain: Pointer to pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **next_domain)
+{
+ /*
+ * This function assumes that the size of buffer returned by
+ * tomoyo_realpath() = TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN.
+ */
+ struct tomoyo_page_buffer *tmp = tomoyo_alloc(sizeof(*tmp));
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *old_domain = tomoyo_domain();
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = NULL;
+ const char *old_domain_name = old_domain->domainname->name;
+ const char *original_name = bprm->filename;
+ char *new_domain_name = NULL;
+ char *real_program_name = NULL;
+ char *symlink_program_name = NULL;
+ const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(old_domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+ const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+ int retval = -ENOMEM;
+ struct tomoyo_path_info r; /* real name */
+ struct tomoyo_path_info s; /* symlink name */
+ struct tomoyo_path_info l; /* last name */
+ static bool initialized;
+
+ if (!tmp)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (!initialized) {
+ /*
+ * Built-in initializers. This is needed because policies are
+ * not loaded until starting /sbin/init.
+ */
+ tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(NULL, "/sbin/hotplug",
+ false, false);
+ tomoyo_update_domain_initializer_entry(NULL, "/sbin/modprobe",
+ false, false);
+ initialized = true;
+ }
+
+ /* Get tomoyo_realpath of program. */
+ retval = -ENOENT;
+ /* I hope tomoyo_realpath() won't fail with -ENOMEM. */
+ real_program_name = tomoyo_realpath(original_name);
+ if (!real_program_name)
+ goto out;
+ /* Get tomoyo_realpath of symbolic link. */
+ symlink_program_name = tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(original_name);
+ if (!symlink_program_name)
+ goto out;
+
+ r.name = real_program_name;
+ tomoyo_fill_path_info(&r);
+ s.name = symlink_program_name;
+ tomoyo_fill_path_info(&s);
+ l.name = tomoyo_get_last_name(old_domain);
+ tomoyo_fill_path_info(&l);
+
+ /* Check 'alias' directive. */
+ if (tomoyo_pathcmp(&r, &s)) {
+ struct tomoyo_alias_entry *ptr;
+ /* Is this program allowed to be called via symbolic links? */
+ down_read(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_alias_list, list) {
+ if (ptr->is_deleted ||
+ tomoyo_pathcmp(&r, ptr->original_name) ||
+ tomoyo_pathcmp(&s, ptr->aliased_name))
+ continue;
+ memset(real_program_name, 0, TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN);
+ strncpy(real_program_name, ptr->aliased_name->name,
+ TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1);
+ tomoyo_fill_path_info(&r);
+ break;
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_alias_list_lock);
+ }
+
+ /* Check execute permission. */
+ retval = tomoyo_check_exec_perm(old_domain, &r, tmp);
+ if (retval < 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ new_domain_name = tmp->buffer;
+ if (tomoyo_is_domain_initializer(old_domain->domainname, &r, &l)) {
+ /* Transit to the child of tomoyo_kernel_domain domain. */
+ snprintf(new_domain_name, TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN + 1,
+ TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME " " "%s", real_program_name);
+ } else if (old_domain == &tomoyo_kernel_domain &&
+ !tomoyo_policy_loaded) {
+ /*
+ * Needn't to transit from kernel domain before starting
+ * /sbin/init. But transit from kernel domain if executing
+ * initializers because they might start before /sbin/init.
+ */
+ domain = old_domain;
+ } else if (tomoyo_is_domain_keeper(old_domain->domainname, &r, &l)) {
+ /* Keep current domain. */
+ domain = old_domain;
+ } else {
+ /* Normal domain transition. */
+ snprintf(new_domain_name, TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN + 1,
+ "%s %s", old_domain_name, real_program_name);
+ }
+ if (domain || strlen(new_domain_name) >= TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN)
+ goto done;
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ domain = tomoyo_find_domain(new_domain_name);
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ if (domain)
+ goto done;
+ if (is_enforce)
+ goto done;
+ domain = tomoyo_find_or_assign_new_domain(new_domain_name,
+ old_domain->profile);
+ done:
+ if (domain)
+ goto out;
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-ERROR: Domain '%s' not defined.\n",
+ new_domain_name);
+ if (is_enforce)
+ retval = -EPERM;
+ else
+ tomoyo_set_domain_flag(old_domain, false,
+ TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_TRANSITION_FAILED);
+ out:
+ tomoyo_free(real_program_name);
+ tomoyo_free(symlink_program_name);
+ *next_domain = domain ? domain : old_domain;
+ tomoyo_free(tmp);
+ return retval;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/file.c
+ *
+ * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tomoyo.h"
+#include "realpath.h"
+#define ACC_MODE(x) ("\000\004\002\006"[(x)&O_ACCMODE])
+
+/* Structure for "allow_read" keyword. */
+struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename;
+ bool is_deleted;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "file_pattern" keyword. */
+struct tomoyo_pattern_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern;
+ bool is_deleted;
+};
+
+/* Structure for "deny_rewrite" keyword. */
+struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern;
+ bool is_deleted;
+};
+
+/* Keyword array for single path operations. */
+static const char *tomoyo_sp_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION] = {
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL] = "read/write",
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL] = "execute",
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL] = "read",
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL] = "write",
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE_ACL] = "create",
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL] = "unlink",
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL] = "mkdir",
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL] = "rmdir",
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL] = "mkfifo",
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL] = "mksock",
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL] = "mkblock",
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL] = "mkchar",
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL] = "truncate",
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL] = "symlink",
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL] = "rewrite",
+};
+
+/* Keyword array for double path operations. */
+static const char *tomoyo_dp_keyword[TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION] = {
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK_ACL] = "link",
+ [TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME_ACL] = "rename",
+};
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_sp2keyword - Get the name of single path operation.
+ *
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ *
+ * Returns the name of single path operation.
+ */
+const char *tomoyo_sp2keyword(const u8 operation)
+{
+ return (operation < TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION)
+ ? tomoyo_sp_keyword[operation] : NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_dp2keyword - Get the name of double path operation.
+ *
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ *
+ * Returns the name of double path operation.
+ */
+const char *tomoyo_dp2keyword(const u8 operation)
+{
+ return (operation < TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION)
+ ? tomoyo_dp_keyword[operation] : NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_strendswith - Check whether the token ends with the given token.
+ *
+ * @name: The token to check.
+ * @tail: The token to find.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @name ends with @tail, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_strendswith(const char *name, const char *tail)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ if (!name || !tail)
+ return false;
+ len = strlen(name) - strlen(tail);
+ return len >= 0 && !strcmp(name + len, tail);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_path - Get realpath.
+ *
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+static struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_get_path(struct path *path)
+{
+ int error;
+ struct tomoyo_path_info_with_data *buf = tomoyo_alloc(sizeof(*buf));
+
+ if (!buf)
+ return NULL;
+ /* Reserve one byte for appending "/". */
+ error = tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(path, buf->body,
+ sizeof(buf->body) - 2);
+ if (!error) {
+ buf->head.name = buf->body;
+ tomoyo_fill_path_info(&buf->head);
+ return &buf->head;
+ }
+ tomoyo_free(buf);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Lock for domain->acl_info_list. */
+DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+
+static int tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1,
+ const char *filename2,
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *
+ const domain, const bool is_delete);
+static int tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename,
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *
+ const domain, const bool is_delete);
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_globally_readable_list);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @filename: Filename unconditionally permitted to open() for reading.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry(const char *filename,
+ const bool is_delete)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *new_entry;
+ struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename;
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename, 1, 0, -1, __func__))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ saved_filename = tomoyo_save_name(filename);
+ if (!saved_filename)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ down_write(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list, list) {
+ if (ptr->filename != saved_filename)
+ continue;
+ ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+ error = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (is_delete) {
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+ if (!new_entry)
+ goto out;
+ new_entry->filename = saved_filename;
+ list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list);
+ error = 0;
+ out:
+ up_write(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_globally_readable_file - Check if the file is unconditionnaly permitted to be open()ed for reading.
+ *
+ * @filename: The filename to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if any domain can open @filename for reading, false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_is_globally_readable_file(const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+ filename)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr;
+ bool found = false;
+ down_read(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_globally_readable_list, list) {
+ if (!ptr->is_deleted &&
+ tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename, ptr->filename)) {
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
+ return found;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data: String to parse.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_globally_readable_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
+{
+ return tomoyo_update_globally_readable_entry(data, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_globally_readable_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ struct list_head *pos;
+ bool done = true;
+
+ down_read(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2,
+ &tomoyo_globally_readable_list) {
+ struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry *ptr;
+ ptr = list_entry(pos,
+ struct tomoyo_globally_readable_file_entry,
+ list);
+ if (ptr->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_ALLOW_READ "%s\n",
+ ptr->filename->name)) {
+ done = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_globally_readable_list_lock);
+ return done;
+}
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_pattern_list);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @pattern: Pathname pattern.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry(const char *pattern,
+ const bool is_delete)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *new_entry;
+ struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_pattern;
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(pattern, 0, 1, 0, __func__))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ saved_pattern = tomoyo_save_name(pattern);
+ if (!saved_pattern)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ down_write(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_pattern_list, list) {
+ if (saved_pattern != ptr->pattern)
+ continue;
+ ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+ error = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (is_delete) {
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+ if (!new_entry)
+ goto out;
+ new_entry->pattern = saved_pattern;
+ list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_pattern_list);
+ error = 0;
+ out:
+ up_write(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_get_file_pattern - Get patterned pathname.
+ *
+ * @filename: The filename to find patterned pathname.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to pathname pattern if matched, @filename otherwise.
+ */
+static const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+tomoyo_get_file_pattern(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *pattern = NULL;
+
+ down_read(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_pattern_list, list) {
+ if (ptr->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename, ptr->pattern))
+ continue;
+ pattern = ptr->pattern;
+ if (tomoyo_strendswith(pattern->name, "/\\*")) {
+ /* Do nothing. Try to find the better match. */
+ } else {
+ /* This would be the better match. Use this. */
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
+ if (pattern)
+ filename = pattern;
+ return filename;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_pattern_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data: String to parse.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_pattern_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
+{
+ return tomoyo_update_file_pattern_entry(data, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_file_pattern - Read "struct tomoyo_pattern_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_file_pattern(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ struct list_head *pos;
+ bool done = true;
+
+ down_read(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &tomoyo_pattern_list) {
+ struct tomoyo_pattern_entry *ptr;
+ ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_pattern_entry, list);
+ if (ptr->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_FILE_PATTERN "%s\n",
+ ptr->pattern->name)) {
+ done = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_pattern_list_lock);
+ return done;
+}
+
+/* The list for "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry". */
+static LIST_HEAD(tomoyo_no_rewrite_list);
+static DECLARE_RWSEM(tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry - Update "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @pattern: Pathname pattern that are not rewritable by default.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry(const char *pattern,
+ const bool is_delete)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *new_entry, *ptr;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_pattern;
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(pattern, 0, 0, 0, __func__))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ saved_pattern = tomoyo_save_name(pattern);
+ if (!saved_pattern)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ down_write(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list, list) {
+ if (ptr->pattern != saved_pattern)
+ continue;
+ ptr->is_deleted = is_delete;
+ error = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (is_delete) {
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ new_entry = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*new_entry));
+ if (!new_entry)
+ goto out;
+ new_entry->pattern = saved_pattern;
+ list_add_tail(&new_entry->list, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list);
+ error = 0;
+ out:
+ up_write(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file - Check if the given pathname is not permitted to be rewrited.
+ *
+ * @filename: Filename to check.
+ *
+ * Returns true if @filename is specified by "deny_rewrite" directive,
+ * false otherwise.
+ */
+static bool tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr;
+ bool found = false;
+
+ down_read(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list, list) {
+ if (ptr->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename, ptr->pattern))
+ continue;
+ found = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
+ return found;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy - Write "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @data: String to parse.
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_no_rewrite_policy(char *data, const bool is_delete)
+{
+ return tomoyo_update_no_rewrite_entry(data, is_delete);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy - Read "struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry" list.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns true on success, false otherwise.
+ */
+bool tomoyo_read_no_rewrite_policy(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ struct list_head *pos;
+ bool done = true;
+
+ down_read(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_cookie(pos, head->read_var2, &tomoyo_no_rewrite_list) {
+ struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry *ptr;
+ ptr = list_entry(pos, struct tomoyo_no_rewrite_entry, list);
+ if (ptr->is_deleted)
+ continue;
+ if (!tomoyo_io_printf(head, TOMOYO_KEYWORD_DENY_REWRITE "%s\n",
+ ptr->pattern->name)) {
+ done = false;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_no_rewrite_list_lock);
+ return done;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_file_acl - Update file's read/write/execute ACL.
+ *
+ * @filename: Filename.
+ * @perm: Permission (between 1 to 7).
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * This is legacy support interface for older policy syntax.
+ * Current policy syntax uses "allow_read/write" instead of "6",
+ * "allow_read" instead of "4", "allow_write" instead of "2",
+ * "allow_execute" instead of "1".
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_file_acl(const char *filename, u8 perm,
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain,
+ const bool is_delete)
+{
+ if (perm > 7 || !perm) {
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s: Invalid permission '%d %s'\n",
+ __func__, perm, filename);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (filename[0] != '@' && tomoyo_strendswith(filename, "/"))
+ /*
+ * Only 'allow_mkdir' and 'allow_rmdir' are valid for
+ * directory permissions.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ if (perm & 4)
+ tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL, filename,
+ domain, is_delete);
+ if (perm & 2)
+ tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL, filename,
+ domain, is_delete);
+ if (perm & 1)
+ tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL,
+ filename, domain, is_delete);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_single_path_acl2 - Check permission for single path operation.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @filename: Filename to check.
+ * @perm: Permission.
+ * @may_use_pattern: True if patterned ACL is permitted.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_check_single_path_acl2(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *
+ domain,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+ filename,
+ const u16 perm,
+ const bool may_use_pattern)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+ int error = -EPERM;
+
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+ struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record *acl;
+ if (tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL)
+ continue;
+ acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record,
+ head);
+ if (!(acl->perm & perm))
+ continue;
+ if (may_use_pattern || !acl->filename->is_patterned) {
+ if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename,
+ acl->filename))
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ continue;
+ }
+ error = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_file_acl - Check permission for opening files.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @filename: Filename to check.
+ * @operation: Mode ("read" or "write" or "read/write" or "execute").
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_check_file_acl(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
+ const u8 operation)
+{
+ u16 perm = 0;
+
+ if (!tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE))
+ return 0;
+ if (operation == 6)
+ perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL;
+ else if (operation == 4)
+ perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL;
+ else if (operation == 2)
+ perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL;
+ else if (operation == 1)
+ perm = 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL;
+ else
+ BUG();
+ return tomoyo_check_single_path_acl2(domain, filename, perm,
+ operation != 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_file_perm2 - Check permission for opening files.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @filename: Filename to check.
+ * @perm: Mode ("read" or "write" or "read/write" or "execute").
+ * @operation: Operation name passed used for verbose mode.
+ * @mode: Access control mode.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_check_file_perm2(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
+ const u8 perm, const char *operation,
+ const u8 mode)
+{
+ const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+ const char *msg = "<unknown>";
+ int error = 0;
+
+ if (!filename)
+ return 0;
+ error = tomoyo_check_file_acl(domain, filename, perm);
+ if (error && perm == 4 &&
+ (domain->flags & TOMOYO_DOMAIN_FLAGS_IGNORE_GLOBAL_ALLOW_READ) == 0
+ && tomoyo_is_globally_readable_file(filename))
+ error = 0;
+ if (perm == 6)
+ msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL);
+ else if (perm == 4)
+ msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL);
+ else if (perm == 2)
+ msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL);
+ else if (perm == 1)
+ msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL);
+ else
+ BUG();
+ if (!error)
+ return 0;
+ if (tomoyo_verbose_mode(domain))
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-%s: Access '%s(%s) %s' denied "
+ "for %s\n", tomoyo_get_msg(is_enforce), msg, operation,
+ filename->name, tomoyo_get_last_name(domain));
+ if (is_enforce)
+ return error;
+ if (mode == 1 && tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(domain)) {
+ /* Don't use patterns for execute permission. */
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *patterned_file = (perm != 1) ?
+ tomoyo_get_file_pattern(filename) : filename;
+ tomoyo_update_file_acl(patterned_file->name, perm,
+ domain, false);
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_file_policy - Update file related list.
+ *
+ * @data: String to parse.
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_file_policy(char *data, struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const bool is_delete)
+{
+ char *filename = strchr(data, ' ');
+ char *filename2;
+ unsigned int perm;
+ u8 type;
+
+ if (!filename)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ *filename++ = '\0';
+ if (sscanf(data, "%u", &perm) == 1)
+ return tomoyo_update_file_acl(filename, (u8) perm, domain,
+ is_delete);
+ if (strncmp(data, "allow_", 6))
+ goto out;
+ data += 6;
+ for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION; type++) {
+ if (strcmp(data, tomoyo_sp_keyword[type]))
+ continue;
+ return tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(type, filename,
+ domain, is_delete);
+ }
+ filename2 = strchr(filename, ' ');
+ if (!filename2)
+ goto out;
+ *filename2++ = '\0';
+ for (type = 0; type < TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION; type++) {
+ if (strcmp(data, tomoyo_dp_keyword[type]))
+ continue;
+ return tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(type, filename, filename2,
+ domain, is_delete);
+ }
+ out:
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_single_path_acl - Update "struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record" list.
+ *
+ * @type: Type of operation.
+ * @filename: Filename.
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename,
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *
+ const domain, const bool is_delete)
+{
+ static const u16 rw_mask =
+ (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL) | (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL);
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename;
+ struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+ struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record *acl;
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+ const u16 perm = 1 << type;
+
+ if (!domain)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename, 0, 0, 0, __func__))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ saved_filename = tomoyo_save_name(filename);
+ if (!saved_filename)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ down_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+ if (is_delete)
+ goto delete;
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+ if (tomoyo_acl_type1(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL)
+ continue;
+ acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record,
+ head);
+ if (acl->filename != saved_filename)
+ continue;
+ /* Special case. Clear all bits if marked as deleted. */
+ if (ptr->type & TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED)
+ acl->perm = 0;
+ acl->perm |= perm;
+ if ((acl->perm & rw_mask) == rw_mask)
+ acl->perm |= 1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL;
+ else if (acl->perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL))
+ acl->perm |= rw_mask;
+ ptr->type &= ~TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED;
+ error = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Not found. Append it to the tail. */
+ acl = tomoyo_alloc_acl_element(TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL);
+ if (!acl)
+ goto out;
+ acl->perm = perm;
+ if (perm == (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL))
+ acl->perm |= rw_mask;
+ acl->filename = saved_filename;
+ list_add_tail(&acl->head.list, &domain->acl_info_list);
+ error = 0;
+ goto out;
+ delete:
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+ if (tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL)
+ continue;
+ acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_single_path_acl_record,
+ head);
+ if (acl->filename != saved_filename)
+ continue;
+ acl->perm &= ~perm;
+ if ((acl->perm & rw_mask) != rw_mask)
+ acl->perm &= ~(1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL);
+ else if (!(acl->perm & (1 << TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL)))
+ acl->perm &= ~rw_mask;
+ if (!acl->perm)
+ ptr->type |= TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED;
+ error = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ out:
+ up_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_update_double_path_acl - Update "struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record" list.
+ *
+ * @type: Type of operation.
+ * @filename1: First filename.
+ * @filename2: Second filename.
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @is_delete: True if it is a delete request.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(const u8 type, const char *filename1,
+ const char *filename2,
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *
+ const domain, const bool is_delete)
+{
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename1;
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *saved_filename2;
+ struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+ struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record *acl;
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+ const u8 perm = 1 << type;
+
+ if (!domain)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (!tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename1, 0, 0, 0, __func__) ||
+ !tomoyo_is_correct_path(filename2, 0, 0, 0, __func__))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ saved_filename1 = tomoyo_save_name(filename1);
+ saved_filename2 = tomoyo_save_name(filename2);
+ if (!saved_filename1 || !saved_filename2)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ down_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+ if (is_delete)
+ goto delete;
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+ if (tomoyo_acl_type1(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL)
+ continue;
+ acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record,
+ head);
+ if (acl->filename1 != saved_filename1 ||
+ acl->filename2 != saved_filename2)
+ continue;
+ /* Special case. Clear all bits if marked as deleted. */
+ if (ptr->type & TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED)
+ acl->perm = 0;
+ acl->perm |= perm;
+ ptr->type &= ~TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED;
+ error = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Not found. Append it to the tail. */
+ acl = tomoyo_alloc_acl_element(TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL);
+ if (!acl)
+ goto out;
+ acl->perm = perm;
+ acl->filename1 = saved_filename1;
+ acl->filename2 = saved_filename2;
+ list_add_tail(&acl->head.list, &domain->acl_info_list);
+ error = 0;
+ goto out;
+ delete:
+ error = -ENOENT;
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+ if (tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL)
+ continue;
+ acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record,
+ head);
+ if (acl->filename1 != saved_filename1 ||
+ acl->filename2 != saved_filename2)
+ continue;
+ acl->perm &= ~perm;
+ if (!acl->perm)
+ ptr->type |= TOMOYO_ACL_DELETED;
+ error = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ out:
+ up_write(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_single_path_acl - Check permission for single path operation.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @type: Type of operation.
+ * @filename: Filename to check.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_check_single_path_acl(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const u8 type,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename)
+{
+ if (!tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE))
+ return 0;
+ return tomoyo_check_single_path_acl2(domain, filename, 1 << type, 1);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_double_path_acl - Check permission for double path operation.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @type: Type of operation.
+ * @filename1: First filename to check.
+ * @filename2: Second filename to check.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_check_double_path_acl(const struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const u8 type,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+ filename1,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+ filename2)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_acl_info *ptr;
+ const u8 perm = 1 << type;
+ int error = -EPERM;
+
+ if (!tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE))
+ return 0;
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &domain->acl_info_list, list) {
+ struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record *acl;
+ if (tomoyo_acl_type2(ptr) != TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL)
+ continue;
+ acl = container_of(ptr, struct tomoyo_double_path_acl_record,
+ head);
+ if (!(acl->perm & perm))
+ continue;
+ if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename1, acl->filename1))
+ continue;
+ if (!tomoyo_path_matches_pattern(filename2, acl->filename2))
+ continue;
+ error = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_acl_info_list_lock);
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2 - Check permission for single path operation.
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ * @filename: Filename to check.
+ * @mode: Access control mode.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+static int tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2(struct tomoyo_domain_info *
+ const domain, u8 operation,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *
+ filename, const u8 mode)
+{
+ const char *msg;
+ int error;
+ const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+
+ if (!mode)
+ return 0;
+ next:
+ error = tomoyo_check_single_path_acl(domain, operation, filename);
+ msg = tomoyo_sp2keyword(operation);
+ if (!error)
+ goto ok;
+ if (tomoyo_verbose_mode(domain))
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-%s: Access '%s %s' denied for %s\n",
+ tomoyo_get_msg(is_enforce), msg, filename->name,
+ tomoyo_get_last_name(domain));
+ if (mode == 1 && tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(domain)) {
+ const char *name = tomoyo_get_file_pattern(filename)->name;
+ tomoyo_update_single_path_acl(operation, name, domain, false);
+ }
+ if (!is_enforce)
+ error = 0;
+ ok:
+ /*
+ * Since "allow_truncate" doesn't imply "allow_rewrite" permission,
+ * we need to check "allow_rewrite" permission if the filename is
+ * specified by "deny_rewrite" keyword.
+ */
+ if (!error && operation == TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL &&
+ tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(filename)) {
+ operation = TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL;
+ goto next;
+ }
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_file_perm - Check permission for sysctl()'s "read" and "write".
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @filename: Filename to check.
+ * @perm: Mode ("read" or "write" or "read/write").
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_check_file_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const char *filename, const u8 perm)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_path_info name;
+ const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+
+ if (!mode)
+ return 0;
+ name.name = filename;
+ tomoyo_fill_path_info(&name);
+ return tomoyo_check_file_perm2(domain, &name, perm, "sysctl", mode);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_exec_perm - Check permission for "execute".
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @filename: Check permission for "execute".
+ * @tmp: Buffer for temporary use.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negativevalue otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_check_exec_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
+ struct tomoyo_page_buffer *tmp)
+{
+ const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+
+ if (!mode)
+ return 0;
+ return tomoyo_check_file_perm2(domain, filename, 1, "do_execve", mode);
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_open_permission - Check permission for "read" and "write".
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @flag: Flags for open().
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ struct path *path, const int flag)
+{
+ const u8 acc_mode = ACC_MODE(flag);
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+ struct tomoyo_path_info *buf;
+ const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+ const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+
+ if (!mode || !path->mnt)
+ return 0;
+ if (acc_mode == 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (path->dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode))
+ /*
+ * I don't check directories here because mkdir() and rmdir()
+ * don't call me.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ buf = tomoyo_get_path(path);
+ if (!buf)
+ goto out;
+ error = 0;
+ /*
+ * If the filename is specified by "deny_rewrite" keyword,
+ * we need to check "allow_rewrite" permission when the filename is not
+ * opened for append mode or the filename is truncated at open time.
+ */
+ if ((acc_mode & MAY_WRITE) &&
+ ((flag & O_TRUNC) || !(flag & O_APPEND)) &&
+ (tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(buf))) {
+ error = tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2(domain,
+ TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL,
+ buf, mode);
+ }
+ if (!error)
+ error = tomoyo_check_file_perm2(domain, buf, acc_mode, "open",
+ mode);
+ if (!error && (flag & O_TRUNC))
+ error = tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2(domain,
+ TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL,
+ buf, mode);
+ out:
+ tomoyo_free(buf);
+ if (!is_enforce)
+ error = 0;
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_1path_perm - Check permission for "create", "unlink", "mkdir", "rmdir", "mkfifo", "mksock", "mkblock", "mkchar", "truncate" and "symlink".
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_check_1path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const u8 operation, struct path *path)
+{
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+ struct tomoyo_path_info *buf;
+ const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+ const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+
+ if (!mode || !path->mnt)
+ return 0;
+ buf = tomoyo_get_path(path);
+ if (!buf)
+ goto out;
+ switch (operation) {
+ case TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL:
+ case TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL:
+ if (!buf->is_dir) {
+ /*
+ * tomoyo_get_path() reserves space for appending "/."
+ */
+ strcat((char *) buf->name, "/");
+ tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf);
+ }
+ }
+ error = tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2(domain, operation, buf,
+ mode);
+ out:
+ tomoyo_free(buf);
+ if (!is_enforce)
+ error = 0;
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission - Check permission for "rewrite".
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @filp: Pointer to "struct file".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ struct file *filp)
+{
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+ const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+ const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+ struct tomoyo_path_info *buf;
+
+ if (!mode || !filp->f_path.mnt)
+ return 0;
+ buf = tomoyo_get_path(&filp->f_path);
+ if (!buf)
+ goto out;
+ if (!tomoyo_is_no_rewrite_file(buf)) {
+ error = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ error = tomoyo_check_single_path_permission2(domain,
+ TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL,
+ buf, mode);
+ out:
+ tomoyo_free(buf);
+ if (!is_enforce)
+ error = 0;
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_check_2path_perm - Check permission for "rename" and "link".
+ *
+ * @domain: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_domain_info".
+ * @operation: Type of operation.
+ * @path1: Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @path2: Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_check_2path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info * const domain,
+ const u8 operation, struct path *path1,
+ struct path *path2)
+{
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+ struct tomoyo_path_info *buf1, *buf2;
+ const u8 mode = tomoyo_check_flags(domain, TOMOYO_MAC_FOR_FILE);
+ const bool is_enforce = (mode == 3);
+ const char *msg;
+
+ if (!mode || !path1->mnt || !path2->mnt)
+ return 0;
+ buf1 = tomoyo_get_path(path1);
+ buf2 = tomoyo_get_path(path2);
+ if (!buf1 || !buf2)
+ goto out;
+ {
+ struct dentry *dentry = path1->dentry;
+ if (dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)) {
+ /*
+ * tomoyo_get_path() reserves space for appending "/."
+ */
+ if (!buf1->is_dir) {
+ strcat((char *) buf1->name, "/");
+ tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf1);
+ }
+ if (!buf2->is_dir) {
+ strcat((char *) buf2->name, "/");
+ tomoyo_fill_path_info(buf2);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ error = tomoyo_check_double_path_acl(domain, operation, buf1, buf2);
+ msg = tomoyo_dp2keyword(operation);
+ if (!error)
+ goto out;
+ if (tomoyo_verbose_mode(domain))
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "TOMOYO-%s: Access '%s %s %s' "
+ "denied for %s\n", tomoyo_get_msg(is_enforce),
+ msg, buf1->name, buf2->name,
+ tomoyo_get_last_name(domain));
+ if (mode == 1 && tomoyo_domain_quota_is_ok(domain)) {
+ const char *name1 = tomoyo_get_file_pattern(buf1)->name;
+ const char *name2 = tomoyo_get_file_pattern(buf2)->name;
+ tomoyo_update_double_path_acl(operation, name1, name2, domain,
+ false);
+ }
+ out:
+ tomoyo_free(buf1);
+ tomoyo_free(buf2);
+ if (!is_enforce)
+ error = 0;
+ return error;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/realpath.c
+ *
+ * Get the canonicalized absolute pathnames. The basis for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/mnt_namespace.h>
+#include "common.h"
+#include "realpath.h"
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_encode: Convert binary string to ascii string.
+ *
+ * @buffer: Buffer for ASCII string.
+ * @buflen: Size of @buffer.
+ * @str: Binary string.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM otherwise.
+ */
+int tomoyo_encode(char *buffer, int buflen, const char *str)
+{
+ while (1) {
+ const unsigned char c = *(unsigned char *) str++;
+
+ if (tomoyo_is_valid(c)) {
+ if (--buflen <= 0)
+ break;
+ *buffer++ = (char) c;
+ if (c != '\\')
+ continue;
+ if (--buflen <= 0)
+ break;
+ *buffer++ = (char) c;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!c) {
+ if (--buflen <= 0)
+ break;
+ *buffer = '\0';
+ return 0;
+ }
+ buflen -= 4;
+ if (buflen <= 0)
+ break;
+ *buffer++ = '\\';
+ *buffer++ = (c >> 6) + '0';
+ *buffer++ = ((c >> 3) & 7) + '0';
+ *buffer++ = (c & 7) + '0';
+ }
+ return -ENOMEM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_realpath_from_path2 - Returns realpath(3) of the given dentry but ignores chroot'ed root.
+ *
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ * @newname: Pointer to buffer to return value in.
+ * @newname_len: Size of @newname.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, negative value otherwise.
+ *
+ * If dentry is a directory, trailing '/' is appended.
+ * Characters out of 0x20 < c < 0x7F range are converted to
+ * \ooo style octal string.
+ * Character \ is converted to \\ string.
+ */
+int tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(struct path *path, char *newname,
+ int newname_len)
+{
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+ struct dentry *dentry = path->dentry;
+ char *sp;
+
+ if (!dentry || !path->mnt || !newname || newname_len <= 2048)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (dentry->d_op && dentry->d_op->d_dname) {
+ /* For "socket:[\$]" and "pipe:[\$]". */
+ static const int offset = 1536;
+ sp = dentry->d_op->d_dname(dentry, newname + offset,
+ newname_len - offset);
+ } else {
+ /* Taken from d_namespace_path(). */
+ struct path root;
+ struct path ns_root = { };
+ struct path tmp;
+
+ read_lock(¤t->fs->lock);
+ root = current->fs->root;
+ path_get(&root);
+ read_unlock(¤t->fs->lock);
+ spin_lock(&vfsmount_lock);
+ if (root.mnt && root.mnt->mnt_ns)
+ ns_root.mnt = mntget(root.mnt->mnt_ns->root);
+ if (ns_root.mnt)
+ ns_root.dentry = dget(ns_root.mnt->mnt_root);
+ spin_unlock(&vfsmount_lock);
+ spin_lock(&dcache_lock);
+ tmp = ns_root;
+ sp = __d_path(path, &tmp, newname, newname_len);
+ spin_unlock(&dcache_lock);
+ path_put(&root);
+ path_put(&ns_root);
+ }
+ if (IS_ERR(sp))
+ error = PTR_ERR(sp);
+ else
+ error = tomoyo_encode(newname, sp - newname, sp);
+ /* Append trailing '/' if dentry is a directory. */
+ if (!error && dentry->d_inode && S_ISDIR(dentry->d_inode->i_mode)
+ && *newname) {
+ sp = newname + strlen(newname);
+ if (*(sp - 1) != '/') {
+ if (sp < newname + newname_len - 4) {
+ *sp++ = '/';
+ *sp = '\0';
+ } else {
+ error = -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (error)
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "tomoyo_realpath: Pathname too long.\n");
+ return error;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_realpath_from_path - Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root.
+ *
+ * @path: Pointer to "struct path".
+ *
+ * Returns the realpath of the given @path on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * These functions use tomoyo_alloc(), so the caller must call tomoyo_free()
+ * if these functions didn't return NULL.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path)
+{
+ char *buf = tomoyo_alloc(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer));
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct tomoyo_page_buffer)
+ <= TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1);
+ if (!buf)
+ return NULL;
+ if (tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(path, buf,
+ TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN - 1) == 0)
+ return buf;
+ tomoyo_free(buf);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_realpath - Get realpath of a pathname.
+ *
+ * @pathname: The pathname to solve.
+ *
+ * Returns the realpath of @pathname on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_realpath(const char *pathname)
+{
+ struct nameidata nd;
+
+ if (pathname && path_lookup(pathname, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &nd) == 0) {
+ char *buf = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&nd.path);
+ path_put(&nd.path);
+ return buf;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_realpath_nofollow - Get realpath of a pathname.
+ *
+ * @pathname: The pathname to solve.
+ *
+ * Returns the realpath of @pathname on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname)
+{
+ struct nameidata nd;
+
+ if (pathname && path_lookup(pathname, 0, &nd) == 0) {
+ char *buf = tomoyo_realpath_from_path(&nd.path);
+ path_put(&nd.path);
+ return buf;
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Memory allocated for non-string data. */
+static unsigned int tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_elements;
+/* Quota for holding non-string data. */
+static unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_elements;
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_alloc_element - Allocate permanent memory for structures.
+ *
+ * @size: Size in bytes.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to allocated memory on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * Memory has to be zeroed.
+ * The RAM is chunked, so NEVER try to kfree() the returned pointer.
+ */
+void *tomoyo_alloc_element(const unsigned int size)
+{
+ static char *buf;
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+ static unsigned int buf_used_len = PATH_MAX;
+ char *ptr = NULL;
+ /*Assumes sizeof(void *) >= sizeof(long) is true. */
+ const unsigned int word_aligned_size
+ = roundup(size, max(sizeof(void *), sizeof(long)));
+ if (word_aligned_size > PATH_MAX)
+ return NULL;
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ mutex_lock(&lock);
+ if (buf_used_len + word_aligned_size > PATH_MAX) {
+ if (!tomoyo_quota_for_elements ||
+ tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_elements
+ + PATH_MAX <= tomoyo_quota_for_elements)
+ ptr = kzalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!ptr) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Out of memory "
+ "for tomoyo_alloc_element().\n");
+ if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+ panic("MAC Initialization failed.\n");
+ } else {
+ buf = ptr;
+ tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_elements += PATH_MAX;
+ buf_used_len = word_aligned_size;
+ ptr = buf;
+ }
+ } else if (word_aligned_size) {
+ int i;
+ ptr = buf + buf_used_len;
+ buf_used_len += word_aligned_size;
+ for (i = 0; i < word_aligned_size; i++) {
+ if (!ptr[i])
+ continue;
+ printk(KERN_ERR "WARNING: Reserved memory was tainted! "
+ "The system might go wrong.\n");
+ ptr[i] = '\0';
+ }
+ }
+ mutex_unlock(&lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return ptr;
+}
+
+/* Memory allocated for string data in bytes. */
+static unsigned int tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_savename;
+/* Quota for holding string data in bytes. */
+static unsigned int tomoyo_quota_for_savename;
+
+/*
+ * TOMOYO uses this hash only when appending a string into the string
+ * table. Frequency of appending strings is very low. So we don't need
+ * large (e.g. 64k) hash size. 256 will be sufficient.
+ */
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_HASH 256
+
+/* Structure for string data. */
+struct tomoyo_name_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct tomoyo_path_info entry;
+};
+
+/* Structure for available memory region. */
+struct tomoyo_free_memory_block_list {
+ struct list_head list;
+ char *ptr; /* Pointer to a free area. */
+ int len; /* Length of the area. */
+};
+
+/*
+ * The list for "struct tomoyo_name_entry".
+ *
+ * This list is updated only inside tomoyo_save_name(), thus
+ * no global mutex exists.
+ */
+static struct list_head tomoyo_name_list[TOMOYO_MAX_HASH];
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_save_name - Allocate permanent memory for string data.
+ *
+ * @name: The string to store into the permernent memory.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to "struct tomoyo_path_info" on success, NULL otherwise.
+ *
+ * The RAM is shared, so NEVER try to modify or kfree() the returned name.
+ */
+const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_save_name(const char *name)
+{
+ static LIST_HEAD(fmb_list);
+ static DEFINE_MUTEX(lock);
+ struct tomoyo_name_entry *ptr;
+ unsigned int hash;
+ /* fmb contains available size in bytes.
+ fmb is removed from the fmb_list when fmb->len becomes 0. */
+ struct tomoyo_free_memory_block_list *fmb;
+ int len;
+ char *cp;
+
+ if (!name)
+ return NULL;
+ len = strlen(name) + 1;
+ if (len > TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Name too long "
+ "for tomoyo_save_name().\n");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ hash = full_name_hash((const unsigned char *) name, len - 1);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION START *****/
+ mutex_lock(&lock);
+ list_for_each_entry(ptr, &tomoyo_name_list[hash % TOMOYO_MAX_HASH],
+ list) {
+ if (hash == ptr->entry.hash && !strcmp(name, ptr->entry.name))
+ goto out;
+ }
+ list_for_each_entry(fmb, &fmb_list, list) {
+ if (len <= fmb->len)
+ goto ready;
+ }
+ if (!tomoyo_quota_for_savename ||
+ tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_savename + PATH_MAX
+ <= tomoyo_quota_for_savename)
+ cp = kzalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+ else
+ cp = NULL;
+ fmb = kzalloc(sizeof(*fmb), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!cp || !fmb) {
+ kfree(cp);
+ kfree(fmb);
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "ERROR: Out of memory "
+ "for tomoyo_save_name().\n");
+ if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+ panic("MAC Initialization failed.\n");
+ ptr = NULL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_savename += PATH_MAX;
+ list_add(&fmb->list, &fmb_list);
+ fmb->ptr = cp;
+ fmb->len = PATH_MAX;
+ ready:
+ ptr = tomoyo_alloc_element(sizeof(*ptr));
+ if (!ptr)
+ goto out;
+ ptr->entry.name = fmb->ptr;
+ memmove(fmb->ptr, name, len);
+ tomoyo_fill_path_info(&ptr->entry);
+ fmb->ptr += len;
+ fmb->len -= len;
+ list_add_tail(&ptr->list, &tomoyo_name_list[hash % TOMOYO_MAX_HASH]);
+ if (fmb->len == 0) {
+ list_del(&fmb->list);
+ kfree(fmb);
+ }
+ out:
+ mutex_unlock(&lock);
+ /***** EXCLUSIVE SECTION END *****/
+ return ptr ? &ptr->entry : NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_realpath_init - Initialize realpath related code.
+ */
+void __init tomoyo_realpath_init(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN > PATH_MAX);
+ for (i = 0; i < TOMOYO_MAX_HASH; i++)
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_name_list[i]);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.acl_info_list);
+ tomoyo_kernel_domain.domainname = tomoyo_save_name(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME);
+ list_add_tail(&tomoyo_kernel_domain.list, &tomoyo_domain_list);
+ down_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+ if (tomoyo_find_domain(TOMOYO_ROOT_NAME) != &tomoyo_kernel_domain)
+ panic("Can't register tomoyo_kernel_domain");
+ up_read(&tomoyo_domain_list_lock);
+}
+
+/* Memory allocated for temporary purpose. */
+static atomic_t tomoyo_dynamic_memory_size;
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_alloc - Allocate memory for temporary purpose.
+ *
+ * @size: Size in bytes.
+ *
+ * Returns pointer to allocated memory on success, NULL otherwise.
+ */
+void *tomoyo_alloc(const size_t size)
+{
+ void *p = kzalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (p)
+ atomic_add(ksize(p), &tomoyo_dynamic_memory_size);
+ return p;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_free - Release memory allocated by tomoyo_alloc().
+ *
+ * @p: Pointer returned by tomoyo_alloc(). May be NULL.
+ *
+ * Returns nothing.
+ */
+void tomoyo_free(const void *p)
+{
+ if (p) {
+ atomic_sub(ksize(p), &tomoyo_dynamic_memory_size);
+ kfree(p);
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_read_memory_counter - Check for memory usage in bytes.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns memory usage.
+ */
+int tomoyo_read_memory_counter(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ if (!head->read_eof) {
+ const unsigned int shared
+ = tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_savename;
+ const unsigned int private
+ = tomoyo_allocated_memory_for_elements;
+ const unsigned int dynamic
+ = atomic_read(&tomoyo_dynamic_memory_size);
+ char buffer[64];
+
+ memset(buffer, 0, sizeof(buffer));
+ if (tomoyo_quota_for_savename)
+ snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1,
+ " (Quota: %10u)",
+ tomoyo_quota_for_savename);
+ else
+ buffer[0] = '\0';
+ tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Shared: %10u%s\n", shared, buffer);
+ if (tomoyo_quota_for_elements)
+ snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer) - 1,
+ " (Quota: %10u)",
+ tomoyo_quota_for_elements);
+ else
+ buffer[0] = '\0';
+ tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Private: %10u%s\n", private, buffer);
+ tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Dynamic: %10u\n", dynamic);
+ tomoyo_io_printf(head, "Total: %10u\n",
+ shared + private + dynamic);
+ head->read_eof = true;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_write_memory_quota - Set memory quota.
+ *
+ * @head: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_io_buffer".
+ *
+ * Returns 0.
+ */
+int tomoyo_write_memory_quota(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head)
+{
+ char *data = head->write_buf;
+ unsigned int size;
+
+ if (sscanf(data, "Shared: %u", &size) == 1)
+ tomoyo_quota_for_savename = size;
+ else if (sscanf(data, "Private: %u", &size) == 1)
+ tomoyo_quota_for_elements = size;
+ return 0;
+}
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/realpath.h
+ *
+ * Get the canonicalized absolute pathnames. The basis for TOMOYO.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_REALPATH_H
+#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_REALPATH_H
+
+struct path;
+struct tomoyo_path_info;
+struct tomoyo_io_buffer;
+
+/* Convert binary string to ascii string. */
+int tomoyo_encode(char *buffer, int buflen, const char *str);
+
+/* Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root. */
+int tomoyo_realpath_from_path2(struct path *path, char *newname,
+ int newname_len);
+
+/*
+ * Returns realpath(3) of the given pathname but ignores chroot'ed root.
+ * These functions use tomoyo_alloc(), so the caller must call tomoyo_free()
+ * if these functions didn't return NULL.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_realpath(const char *pathname);
+/*
+ * Same with tomoyo_realpath() except that it doesn't follow the final symlink.
+ */
+char *tomoyo_realpath_nofollow(const char *pathname);
+/* Same with tomoyo_realpath() except that the pathname is already solved. */
+char *tomoyo_realpath_from_path(struct path *path);
+
+/*
+ * Allocate memory for ACL entry.
+ * The RAM is chunked, so NEVER try to kfree() the returned pointer.
+ */
+void *tomoyo_alloc_element(const unsigned int size);
+
+/*
+ * Keep the given name on the RAM.
+ * The RAM is shared, so NEVER try to modify or kfree() the returned name.
+ */
+const struct tomoyo_path_info *tomoyo_save_name(const char *name);
+
+/* Allocate memory for temporary use (e.g. permission checks). */
+void *tomoyo_alloc(const size_t size);
+
+/* Free memory allocated by tomoyo_alloc(). */
+void tomoyo_free(const void *p);
+
+/* Check for memory usage. */
+int tomoyo_read_memory_counter(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+
+/* Set memory quota. */
+int tomoyo_write_memory_quota(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head);
+
+/* Initialize realpath related code. */
+void __init tomoyo_realpath_init(void);
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_REALPATH_H) */
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c
+ *
+ * LSM hooks for TOMOYO Linux.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include "common.h"
+#include "tomoyo.h"
+#include "realpath.h"
+
+static int tomoyo_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ /*
+ * Since "struct tomoyo_domain_info *" is a sharable pointer,
+ * we don't need to duplicate.
+ */
+ new->security = old->security;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ /*
+ * Do only if this function is called for the first time of an execve
+ * operation.
+ */
+ if (bprm->cred_prepared)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * Load policy if /sbin/tomoyo-init exists and /sbin/init is requested
+ * for the first time.
+ */
+ if (!tomoyo_policy_loaded)
+ tomoyo_load_policy(bprm->filename);
+ /*
+ * Tell tomoyo_bprm_check_security() is called for the first time of an
+ * execve operation.
+ */
+ bprm->cred->security = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = bprm->cred->security;
+
+ /*
+ * Execute permission is checked against pathname passed to do_execve()
+ * using current domain.
+ */
+ if (!domain) {
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *next_domain = NULL;
+ int retval = tomoyo_find_next_domain(bprm, &next_domain);
+
+ if (!retval)
+ bprm->cred->security = next_domain;
+ return retval;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Read permission is checked against interpreters using next domain.
+ * '1' is the result of open_to_namei_flags(O_RDONLY).
+ */
+ return tomoyo_check_open_permission(domain, &bprm->file->f_path, 1);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+
+static int tomoyo_prepend(char **buffer, int *buflen, const char *str)
+{
+ int namelen = strlen(str);
+
+ if (*buflen < namelen)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ *buflen -= namelen;
+ *buffer -= namelen;
+ memcpy(*buffer, str, namelen);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * tomoyo_sysctl_path - return the realpath of a ctl_table.
+ * @table: pointer to "struct ctl_table".
+ *
+ * Returns realpath(3) of the @table on success.
+ * Returns NULL on failure.
+ *
+ * This function uses tomoyo_alloc(), so the caller must call tomoyo_free()
+ * if this function didn't return NULL.
+ */
+static char *tomoyo_sysctl_path(struct ctl_table *table)
+{
+ int buflen = TOMOYO_MAX_PATHNAME_LEN;
+ char *buf = tomoyo_alloc(buflen);
+ char *end = buf + buflen;
+ int error = -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (!buf)
+ return NULL;
+
+ *--end = '\0';
+ buflen--;
+ while (table) {
+ char num[32];
+ const char *sp = table->procname;
+
+ if (!sp) {
+ memset(num, 0, sizeof(num));
+ snprintf(num, sizeof(num) - 1, "=%d=", table->ctl_name);
+ sp = num;
+ }
+ if (tomoyo_prepend(&end, &buflen, sp) ||
+ tomoyo_prepend(&end, &buflen, "/"))
+ goto out;
+ table = table->parent;
+ }
+ if (tomoyo_prepend(&end, &buflen, "/proc/sys"))
+ goto out;
+ error = tomoyo_encode(buf, end - buf, end);
+ out:
+ if (!error)
+ return buf;
+ tomoyo_free(buf);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_sysctl(struct ctl_table *table, int op)
+{
+ int error;
+ char *name;
+
+ op &= MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE;
+ if (!op)
+ return 0;
+ name = tomoyo_sysctl_path(table);
+ if (!name)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ error = tomoyo_check_file_perm(tomoyo_domain(), name, op);
+ tomoyo_free(name);
+ return error;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int tomoyo_path_truncate(struct path *path, loff_t length,
+ unsigned int time_attrs)
+{
+ return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+ TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL,
+ path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_unlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+ return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+ TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL,
+ &path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_mkdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode)
+{
+ struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+ return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+ TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL,
+ &path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_rmdir(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+ return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+ TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL,
+ &path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_symlink(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
+ const char *old_name)
+{
+ struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+ return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+ TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL,
+ &path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_mknod(struct path *parent, struct dentry *dentry,
+ int mode, unsigned int dev)
+{
+ struct path path = { parent->mnt, dentry };
+ int type = TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE_ACL;
+
+ switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
+ case S_IFCHR:
+ type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL;
+ break;
+ case S_IFBLK:
+ type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL;
+ break;
+ case S_IFIFO:
+ type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL;
+ break;
+ case S_IFSOCK:
+ type = TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL;
+ break;
+ }
+ return tomoyo_check_1path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+ type, &path);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct path *new_dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ struct path path1 = { new_dir->mnt, old_dentry };
+ struct path path2 = { new_dir->mnt, new_dentry };
+ return tomoyo_check_2path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+ TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK_ACL,
+ &path1, &path2);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_path_rename(struct path *old_parent,
+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct path *new_parent,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ struct path path1 = { old_parent->mnt, old_dentry };
+ struct path path2 = { new_parent->mnt, new_dentry };
+ return tomoyo_check_2path_perm(tomoyo_domain(),
+ TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME_ACL,
+ &path1, &path2);
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ if (cmd == F_SETFL && ((arg ^ file->f_flags) & O_APPEND))
+ return tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(tomoyo_domain(), file);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int tomoyo_dentry_open(struct file *f, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ int flags = f->f_flags;
+
+ if ((flags + 1) & O_ACCMODE)
+ flags++;
+ flags |= f->f_flags & (O_APPEND | O_TRUNC);
+ /* Don't check read permission here if called from do_execve(). */
+ if (current->in_execve)
+ return 0;
+ return tomoyo_check_open_permission(tomoyo_domain(), &f->f_path, flags);
+}
+
+static struct security_operations tomoyo_security_ops = {
+ .name = "tomoyo",
+ .cred_prepare = tomoyo_cred_prepare,
+ .bprm_set_creds = tomoyo_bprm_set_creds,
+ .bprm_check_security = tomoyo_bprm_check_security,
+#ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL
+ .sysctl = tomoyo_sysctl,
+#endif
+ .file_fcntl = tomoyo_file_fcntl,
+ .dentry_open = tomoyo_dentry_open,
+ .path_truncate = tomoyo_path_truncate,
+ .path_unlink = tomoyo_path_unlink,
+ .path_mkdir = tomoyo_path_mkdir,
+ .path_rmdir = tomoyo_path_rmdir,
+ .path_symlink = tomoyo_path_symlink,
+ .path_mknod = tomoyo_path_mknod,
+ .path_link = tomoyo_path_link,
+ .path_rename = tomoyo_path_rename,
+};
+
+static int __init tomoyo_init(void)
+{
+ struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current_cred();
+
+ if (!security_module_enable(&tomoyo_security_ops))
+ return 0;
+ /* register ourselves with the security framework */
+ if (register_security(&tomoyo_security_ops))
+ panic("Failure registering TOMOYO Linux");
+ printk(KERN_INFO "TOMOYO Linux initialized\n");
+ cred->security = &tomoyo_kernel_domain;
+ tomoyo_realpath_init();
+ return 0;
+}
+
+security_initcall(tomoyo_init);
--- /dev/null
+/*
+ * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.h
+ *
+ * Implementation of the Domain-Based Mandatory Access Control.
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2005-2009 NTT DATA CORPORATION
+ *
+ * Version: 2.2.0-pre 2009/02/01
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H
+#define _SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H
+
+struct tomoyo_path_info;
+struct path;
+struct inode;
+struct linux_binprm;
+struct pt_regs;
+struct tomoyo_page_buffer;
+
+int tomoyo_check_file_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const char *filename, const u8 perm);
+int tomoyo_check_exec_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const struct tomoyo_path_info *filename,
+ struct tomoyo_page_buffer *buf);
+int tomoyo_check_open_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ struct path *path, const int flag);
+int tomoyo_check_1path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const u8 operation, struct path *path);
+int tomoyo_check_2path_perm(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ const u8 operation, struct path *path1,
+ struct path *path2);
+int tomoyo_check_rewrite_permission(struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain,
+ struct file *filp);
+int tomoyo_find_next_domain(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info **next_domain);
+
+/* Index numbers for Access Controls. */
+
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_SINGLE_PATH_ACL 0
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_DOUBLE_PATH_ACL 1
+
+/* Index numbers for File Controls. */
+
+/*
+ * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is special. TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically set
+ * if both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are set. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and
+ * TYPE_WRITE_ACL are automatically set if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is set.
+ * TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is automatically cleared if either TYPE_READ_ACL or
+ * TYPE_WRITE_ACL is cleared. Both TYPE_READ_ACL and TYPE_WRITE_ACL are
+ * automatically cleared if TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL is cleared.
+ */
+
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_WRITE_ACL 0
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_EXECUTE_ACL 1
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_READ_ACL 2
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_WRITE_ACL 3
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_CREATE_ACL 4
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_UNLINK_ACL 5
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKDIR_ACL 6
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_RMDIR_ACL 7
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKFIFO_ACL 8
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKSOCK_ACL 9
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKBLOCK_ACL 10
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_MKCHAR_ACL 11
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_TRUNCATE_ACL 12
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_SYMLINK_ACL 13
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_REWRITE_ACL 14
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_SINGLE_PATH_OPERATION 15
+
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_LINK_ACL 0
+#define TOMOYO_TYPE_RENAME_ACL 1
+#define TOMOYO_MAX_DOUBLE_PATH_OPERATION 2
+
+#define TOMOYO_DOMAINPOLICY 0
+#define TOMOYO_EXCEPTIONPOLICY 1
+#define TOMOYO_DOMAIN_STATUS 2
+#define TOMOYO_PROCESS_STATUS 3
+#define TOMOYO_MEMINFO 4
+#define TOMOYO_SELFDOMAIN 5
+#define TOMOYO_VERSION 6
+#define TOMOYO_PROFILE 7
+#define TOMOYO_MANAGER 8
+
+extern struct tomoyo_domain_info tomoyo_kernel_domain;
+
+static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_domain(void)
+{
+ return current_cred()->security;
+}
+
+/* Caller holds tasklist_lock spinlock. */
+static inline struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_real_domain(struct task_struct
+ *task)
+{
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION START *****/
+ const struct cred *cred = get_task_cred(task);
+ struct tomoyo_domain_info *domain = cred->security;
+
+ put_cred(cred);
+ return domain;
+ /***** CRITICAL SECTION END *****/
+}
+
+#endif /* !defined(_SECURITY_TOMOYO_TOMOYO_H) */
projects / linux-2.6-omap-h63xx.git / commitdiff