I noticed that the moxa input checking security bug described by
CVE-2005-0504 appears to remain unfixed upstream.
The issue is described here:
http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2005-0504
Debian has been shipping the following patch from Andres Salomon.
(akpm: it's a privileged operation)
Signed-off-by: dann frazier <dannf@hp.com>
Signed-off-by: Andres Salomon <dilinger@debian.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
if(copy_from_user(&dltmp, argp, sizeof(struct dl_str)))
return -EFAULT;
if(copy_from_user(&dltmp, argp, sizeof(struct dl_str)))
return -EFAULT;
- if(dltmp.cardno < 0 || dltmp.cardno >= MAX_BOARDS)
+ if(dltmp.cardno < 0 || dltmp.cardno >= MAX_BOARDS || dltmp.len < 0)
return -EINVAL;
switch(cmd)
return -EINVAL;
switch(cmd)
void __iomem *baseAddr;
int i;
void __iomem *baseAddr;
int i;
+ if(len < 0 || len > sizeof(moxaBuff))
+ return -EINVAL;
if(copy_from_user(moxaBuff, tmp, len))
return -EFAULT;
baseAddr = moxa_boards[cardno].basemem;
if(copy_from_user(moxaBuff, tmp, len))
return -EFAULT;
baseAddr = moxa_boards[cardno].basemem;
void __iomem *baseAddr;
int i;
void __iomem *baseAddr;
int i;
- if(len > sizeof(moxaBuff))
+ if(len < 0 || len > sizeof(moxaBuff))
return -EINVAL;
if(copy_from_user(moxaBuff, tmp, len))
return -EFAULT;
return -EINVAL;
if(copy_from_user(moxaBuff, tmp, len))
return -EFAULT;
void __iomem *baseAddr, *ofsAddr;
int retval, port, i;
void __iomem *baseAddr, *ofsAddr;
int retval, port, i;
+ if(len < 0 || len > sizeof(moxaBuff))
+ return -EINVAL;
if(copy_from_user(moxaBuff, tmp, len))
return -EFAULT;
baseAddr = moxa_boards[cardno].basemem;
if(copy_from_user(moxaBuff, tmp, len))
return -EFAULT;
baseAddr = moxa_boards[cardno].basemem;