CRED: Wrap task credential accesses in the NFS daemon

[linux-2.6-omap-h63xx.git] / fs / nfsd / vfs.c

diff --git a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
index 848a03e83a425270050f474d6031e0df9f4da933..890d9a68c8524af2e5345d07350ce1e7f2a9ae30 100644 (file)
--- a/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
+++ b/fs/nfsd/vfs.c
@@ -1169,7 +1169,7 @@ nfsd_create_setattr(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_fh *resfhp,
         * send along the gid on create when it tries to implement
         * setgid directories via NFS:
         */
-       if (current->fsuid != 0)
+       if (current_fsuid() != 0)
                iap->ia_valid &= ~(ATTR_UID|ATTR_GID);
        if (iap->ia_valid)
                return nfsd_setattr(rqstp, resfhp, iap, 0, (time_t)0);
@@ -2004,7 +2004,7 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp,
                IS_APPEND(inode)?       " append" : "",
                __mnt_is_readonly(exp->ex_path.mnt)?    " ro" : "");
        dprintk("      owner %d/%d user %d/%d\n",
-               inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, current->fsuid, current->fsgid);
+               inode->i_uid, inode->i_gid, current_fsuid(), current_fsgid());
 #endif
 
        /* Normally we reject any write/sattr etc access on a read-only file
@@ -2047,7 +2047,7 @@ nfsd_permission(struct svc_rqst *rqstp, struct svc_export *exp,
         * with NFSv3.
         */
        if ((acc & NFSD_MAY_OWNER_OVERRIDE) &&
-           inode->i_uid == current->fsuid)
+           inode->i_uid == current_fsuid())
                return 0;
 
        /* This assumes  NFSD_MAY_{READ,WRITE,EXEC} == MAY_{READ,WRITE,EXEC} */