--- /dev/null
+/*
+ *************************************************************************
+ * Ralink Tech Inc.
+ * 5F., No.36, Taiyuan St., Jhubei City,
+ * Hsinchu County 302,
+ * Taiwan, R.O.C.
+ *
+ * (c) Copyright 2002-2007, Ralink Technology, Inc.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify *
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by *
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or *
+ * (at your option) any later version. *
+ * *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, *
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of *
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the *
+ * GNU General Public License for more details. *
+ * *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License *
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the *
+ * Free Software Foundation, Inc., *
+ * 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307, USA. *
+ * *
+ *************************************************************************
+
+ Module Name:
+ wpa.c
+
+ Abstract:
+
+ Revision History:
+ Who When What
+ -------- ---------- ----------------------------------------------
+ Jan Lee 03-07-22 Initial
+ Paul Lin 03-11-28 Modify for supplicant
+*/
+#include "../rt_config.h"
+// WPA OUI
+UCHAR OUI_WPA_NONE_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x00};
+UCHAR OUI_WPA_VERSION[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x01};
+UCHAR OUI_WPA_TKIP[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x02};
+UCHAR OUI_WPA_CCMP[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x04};
+UCHAR OUI_WPA_8021X_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x01};
+UCHAR OUI_WPA_PSK_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x50, 0xF2, 0x02};
+// WPA2 OUI
+UCHAR OUI_WPA2_WEP40[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x01};
+UCHAR OUI_WPA2_TKIP[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x02};
+UCHAR OUI_WPA2_CCMP[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x04};
+UCHAR OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x01};
+UCHAR OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x02};
+// MSA OUI
+UCHAR OUI_MSA_8021X_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x05}; // Not yet final - IEEE 802.11s-D1.06
+UCHAR OUI_MSA_PSK_AKM[4] = {0x00, 0x0F, 0xAC, 0x06}; // Not yet final - IEEE 802.11s-D1.06
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ The pseudo-random function(PRF) that hashes various inputs to
+ derive a pseudo-random value. To add liveness to the pseudo-random
+ value, a nonce should be one of the inputs.
+
+ It is used to generate PTK, GTK or some specific random value.
+
+ Arguments:
+ UCHAR *key, - the key material for HMAC_SHA1 use
+ INT key_len - the length of key
+ UCHAR *prefix - a prefix label
+ INT prefix_len - the length of the label
+ UCHAR *data - a specific data with variable length
+ INT data_len - the length of a specific data
+ INT len - the output lenght
+
+ Return Value:
+ UCHAR *output - the calculated result
+
+ Note:
+ 802.11i-2004 Annex H.3
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID PRF(
+ IN UCHAR *key,
+ IN INT key_len,
+ IN UCHAR *prefix,
+ IN INT prefix_len,
+ IN UCHAR *data,
+ IN INT data_len,
+ OUT UCHAR *output,
+ IN INT len)
+{
+ INT i;
+ UCHAR *input;
+ INT currentindex = 0;
+ INT total_len;
+
+ // Allocate memory for input
+ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&input, 1024);
+
+ if (input == NULL)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!PRF: no memory!!!\n"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Generate concatenation input
+ NdisMoveMemory(input, prefix, prefix_len);
+
+ // Concatenate a single octet containing 0
+ input[prefix_len] = 0;
+
+ // Concatenate specific data
+ NdisMoveMemory(&input[prefix_len + 1], data, data_len);
+ total_len = prefix_len + 1 + data_len;
+
+ // Concatenate a single octet containing 0
+ // This octet shall be update later
+ input[total_len] = 0;
+ total_len++;
+
+ // Iterate to calculate the result by hmac-sha-1
+ // Then concatenate to last result
+ for (i = 0; i < (len + 19) / 20; i++)
+ {
+ HMAC_SHA1(input, total_len, key, key_len, &output[currentindex]);
+ currentindex += 20;
+
+ // update the last octet
+ input[total_len - 1]++;
+ }
+ os_free_mem(NULL, input);
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ It utilizes PRF-384 or PRF-512 to derive session-specific keys from a PMK.
+ It shall be called by 4-way handshake processing.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ PMK - pointer to PMK
+ ANonce - pointer to ANonce
+ AA - pointer to Authenticator Address
+ SNonce - pointer to SNonce
+ SA - pointer to Supplicant Address
+ len - indicate the length of PTK (octet)
+
+ Return Value:
+ Output pointer to the PTK
+
+ Note:
+ Refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 8.5.1.2
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID WpaCountPTK(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR *PMK,
+ IN UCHAR *ANonce,
+ IN UCHAR *AA,
+ IN UCHAR *SNonce,
+ IN UCHAR *SA,
+ OUT UCHAR *output,
+ IN UINT len)
+{
+ UCHAR concatenation[76];
+ UINT CurrPos = 0;
+ UCHAR temp[32];
+ UCHAR Prefix[] = {'P', 'a', 'i', 'r', 'w', 'i', 's', 'e', ' ', 'k', 'e', 'y', ' ',
+ 'e', 'x', 'p', 'a', 'n', 's', 'i', 'o', 'n'};
+
+ // initiate the concatenation input
+ NdisZeroMemory(temp, sizeof(temp));
+ NdisZeroMemory(concatenation, 76);
+
+ // Get smaller address
+ if (RTMPCompareMemory(SA, AA, 6) == 1)
+ NdisMoveMemory(concatenation, AA, 6);
+ else
+ NdisMoveMemory(concatenation, SA, 6);
+ CurrPos += 6;
+
+ // Get larger address
+ if (RTMPCompareMemory(SA, AA, 6) == 1)
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SA, 6);
+ else
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], AA, 6);
+
+ // store the larger mac address for backward compatible of
+ // ralink proprietary STA-key issue
+ NdisMoveMemory(temp, &concatenation[CurrPos], MAC_ADDR_LEN);
+ CurrPos += 6;
+
+ // Get smaller Nonce
+ if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 0)
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], temp, 32); // patch for ralink proprietary STA-key issue
+ else if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 1)
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SNonce, 32);
+ else
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], ANonce, 32);
+ CurrPos += 32;
+
+ // Get larger Nonce
+ if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 0)
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], temp, 32); // patch for ralink proprietary STA-key issue
+ else if (RTMPCompareMemory(ANonce, SNonce, 32) == 1)
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], ANonce, 32);
+ else
+ NdisMoveMemory(&concatenation[CurrPos], SNonce, 32);
+ CurrPos += 32;
+
+ hex_dump("concatenation=", concatenation, 76);
+
+ // Use PRF to generate PTK
+ PRF(PMK, LEN_MASTER_KEY, Prefix, 22, concatenation, 76, output, len);
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Generate random number by software.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ macAddr - pointer to local MAC address
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ Note:
+ 802.1ii-2004 Annex H.5
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID GenRandom(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR *macAddr,
+ OUT UCHAR *random)
+{
+ INT i, curr;
+ UCHAR local[80], KeyCounter[32];
+ UCHAR result[80];
+ ULONG CurrentTime;
+ UCHAR prefix[] = {'I', 'n', 'i', 't', ' ', 'C', 'o', 'u', 'n', 't', 'e', 'r'};
+
+ // Zero the related information
+ NdisZeroMemory(result, 80);
+ NdisZeroMemory(local, 80);
+ NdisZeroMemory(KeyCounter, 32);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < 32; i++)
+ {
+ // copy the local MAC address
+ COPY_MAC_ADDR(local, macAddr);
+ curr = MAC_ADDR_LEN;
+
+ // concatenate the current time
+ NdisGetSystemUpTime(&CurrentTime);
+ NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], &CurrentTime, sizeof(CurrentTime));
+ curr += sizeof(CurrentTime);
+
+ // concatenate the last result
+ NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], result, 32);
+ curr += 32;
+
+ // concatenate a variable
+ NdisMoveMemory(&local[curr], &i, 2);
+ curr += 2;
+
+ // calculate the result
+ PRF(KeyCounter, 32, prefix,12, local, curr, result, 32);
+ }
+
+ NdisMoveMemory(random, result, 32);
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Build cipher suite in RSN-IE.
+ It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
+ WepStatus - indicate the encryption type
+ bMixCipher - a boolean to indicate the pairwise cipher and group
+ cipher are the same or not
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR ElementID,
+ IN UINT WepStatus,
+ IN BOOLEAN bMixCipher,
+ IN UCHAR FlexibleCipher,
+ OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe,
+ OUT UCHAR *rsn_len)
+{
+ UCHAR PairwiseCnt;
+
+ *rsn_len = 0;
+
+ // decide WPA2 or WPA1
+ if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie)
+ {
+ RSNIE2 *pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE2*)pRsnIe;
+
+ // Assign the verson as 1
+ pRsnie_cipher->version = 1;
+
+ switch (WepStatus)
+ {
+ // TKIP mode
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2);
+ break;
+
+ // AES mode
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled:
+ if (bMixCipher)
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+ else
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2);
+ break;
+
+ // TKIP-AES mix mode
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+
+ PairwiseCnt = 1;
+ // Insert WPA2 TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
+ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher))
+ {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_TKIP, 4);
+ // Insert WPA2 AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
+ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA2_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher))
+ {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+ PairwiseCnt = 2;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // Insert WPA2 AES as the first pairwise cipher
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_CCMP, 4);
+ }
+
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt;
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE2) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ // swap for big-endian platform
+ pRsnie_cipher->version = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->version);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ RSNIE *pRsnie_cipher = (RSNIE*)pRsnIe;
+
+ // Assign OUI and version
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->oui, OUI_WPA_VERSION, 4);
+ pRsnie_cipher->version = 1;
+
+ switch (WepStatus)
+ {
+ // TKIP mode
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE);
+ break;
+
+ // AES mode
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled:
+ if (bMixCipher)
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+ else
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE);
+ break;
+
+ // TKIP-AES mix mode
+ case Ndis802_11Encryption4Enabled:
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->mcast, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+
+ PairwiseCnt = 1;
+ // Insert WPA TKIP as the first pairwise cipher
+ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_TKIP_ON(FlexibleCipher))
+ {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_TKIP, 4);
+ // Insert WPA AES as the secondary pairwise cipher
+ if (MIX_CIPHER_WPA_AES_ON(FlexibleCipher))
+ {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui + 4, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+ PairwiseCnt = 2;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // Insert WPA AES as the first pairwise cipher
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_cipher->ucast[0].oui, OUI_WPA_CCMP, 4);
+ }
+
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = PairwiseCnt;
+ *rsn_len = sizeof(RSNIE) + (4 * (PairwiseCnt - 1));
+ break;
+ }
+
+ // swap for big-endian platform
+ pRsnie_cipher->version = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->version);
+ pRsnie_cipher->ucount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_cipher->ucount);
+ }
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Build AKM suite in RSN-IE.
+ It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
+ AuthMode - indicate the authentication mode
+ apidx - indicate the interface index
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR ElementID,
+ IN UINT AuthMode,
+ IN UCHAR apidx,
+ OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe,
+ OUT UCHAR *rsn_len)
+{
+ RSNIE_AUTH *pRsnie_auth;
+
+ pRsnie_auth = (RSNIE_AUTH*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
+
+ // decide WPA2 or WPA1
+ if (ElementID == Wpa2Ie)
+ {
+ switch (AuthMode)
+ {
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2:
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
+ pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_8021X_AKM, 4);
+ break;
+
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK:
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
+ pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA2_PSK_AKM, 4);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ switch (AuthMode)
+ {
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA:
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2:
+ pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_8021X_AKM, 4);
+ break;
+
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK:
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK:
+ pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_PSK_AKM, 4);
+ break;
+
+ case Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone:
+ pRsnie_auth->acount = 1;
+ NdisMoveMemory(pRsnie_auth->auth[0].oui, OUI_WPA_NONE_AKM, 4);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pRsnie_auth->acount = cpu2le16(pRsnie_auth->acount);
+
+ (*rsn_len) += sizeof(RSNIE_AUTH); // update current RSNIE length
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Build capability in RSN-IE.
+ It only shall be called by RTMPMakeRSNIE.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ ElementID - indicate the WPA1 or WPA2
+ apidx - indicate the interface index
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+static VOID RTMPInsertRsnIeCap(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR ElementID,
+ IN UCHAR apidx,
+ OUT PUCHAR pRsnIe,
+ OUT UCHAR *rsn_len)
+{
+ RSN_CAPABILITIES *pRSN_Cap;
+
+ // it could be ignored in WPA1 mode
+ if (ElementID == WpaIe)
+ return;
+
+ pRSN_Cap = (RSN_CAPABILITIES*)(pRsnIe + (*rsn_len));
+
+
+ pRSN_Cap->word = cpu2le16(pRSN_Cap->word);
+
+ (*rsn_len) += sizeof(RSN_CAPABILITIES); // update current RSNIE length
+
+}
+
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Build RSN IE context. It is not included element-ID and length.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ AuthMode - indicate the authentication mode
+ WepStatus - indicate the encryption type
+ apidx - indicate the interface index
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID RTMPMakeRSNIE(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UINT AuthMode,
+ IN UINT WepStatus,
+ IN UCHAR apidx)
+{
+ PUCHAR pRsnIe = NULL; // primary RSNIE
+ UCHAR *rsnielen_cur_p = 0; // the length of the primary RSNIE
+ UCHAR *rsnielen_ex_cur_p = 0; // the length of the secondary RSNIE
+ UCHAR PrimaryRsnie;
+ BOOLEAN bMixCipher = FALSE; // indicate the pairwise and group cipher are different
+ UCHAR p_offset;
+ WPA_MIX_PAIR_CIPHER FlexibleCipher = MIX_CIPHER_NOTUSE; // it provide the more flexible cipher combination in WPA-WPA2 and TKIPAES mode
+
+ rsnielen_cur_p = NULL;
+ rsnielen_ex_cur_p = NULL;
+
+ {
+#ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT
+ IF_DEV_CONFIG_OPMODE_ON_STA(pAd)
+ {
+#ifdef WPA_SUPPLICANT_SUPPORT
+ if (pAd->StaCfg.WpaSupplicantUP != WPA_SUPPLICANT_DISABLE)
+ {
+ if (AuthMode < Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA)
+ return;
+ }
+ else
+#endif // WPA_SUPPLICANT_SUPPORT //
+ {
+ // Support WPAPSK or WPA2PSK in STA-Infra mode
+ // Support WPANone in STA-Adhoc mode
+ if ((AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) &&
+ (AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) &&
+ (AuthMode != Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone)
+ )
+ return;
+ }
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("==> RTMPMakeRSNIE(STA)\n"));
+
+ // Zero RSNIE context
+ pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len = 0;
+ NdisZeroMemory(pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE, MAX_LEN_OF_RSNIE);
+
+ // Pointer to RSNIE
+ rsnielen_cur_p = &pAd->StaCfg.RSNIE_Len;
+ pRsnIe = pAd->StaCfg.RSN_IE;
+
+ bMixCipher = pAd->StaCfg.bMixCipher;
+ }
+#endif // CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT //
+ }
+
+ // indicate primary RSNIE as WPA or WPA2
+ if ((AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA) ||
+ (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) ||
+ (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPANone) ||
+ (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1WPA2) ||
+ (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA1PSKWPA2PSK))
+ PrimaryRsnie = WpaIe;
+ else
+ PrimaryRsnie = Wpa2Ie;
+
+ {
+ // Build the primary RSNIE
+ // 1. insert cipher suite
+ RTMPInsertRsnIeCipher(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, WepStatus, bMixCipher, FlexibleCipher, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+
+ // 2. insert AKM
+ RTMPInsertRsnIeAKM(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, AuthMode, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+
+ // 3. insert capability
+ RTMPInsertRsnIeCap(pAd, PrimaryRsnie, apidx, pRsnIe, &p_offset);
+ }
+
+ // 4. update the RSNIE length
+ *rsnielen_cur_p = p_offset;
+
+ hex_dump("The primary RSNIE", pRsnIe, (*rsnielen_cur_p));
+
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ Check whether the received frame is EAP frame.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ pEntry - pointer to active entry
+ pData - the received frame
+ DataByteCount - the received frame's length
+ FromWhichBSSID - indicate the interface index
+
+ Return:
+ TRUE - This frame is EAP frame
+ FALSE - otherwise
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+BOOLEAN RTMPCheckWPAframe(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN PMAC_TABLE_ENTRY pEntry,
+ IN PUCHAR pData,
+ IN ULONG DataByteCount,
+ IN UCHAR FromWhichBSSID)
+{
+ ULONG Body_len;
+ BOOLEAN Cancelled;
+
+
+ if(DataByteCount < (LENGTH_802_1_H + LENGTH_EAPOL_H))
+ return FALSE;
+
+
+ // Skip LLC header
+ if (NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_802_1H, pData, 6) ||
+ // Cisco 1200 AP may send packet with SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL
+ NdisEqualMemory(SNAP_BRIDGE_TUNNEL, pData, 6))
+ {
+ pData += 6;
+ }
+ // Skip 2-bytes EAPoL type
+ if (NdisEqualMemory(EAPOL, pData, 2))
+ {
+ pData += 2;
+ }
+ else
+ return FALSE;
+
+ switch (*(pData+1))
+ {
+ case EAPPacket:
+ Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3));
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAP-Packet frame, TYPE = 0, Length = %ld\n", Body_len));
+ break;
+ case EAPOLStart:
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Start frame, TYPE = 1 \n"));
+ if (pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning != EAPOL_START_DISABLE)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Cancel the EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning \n"));
+ RTMPCancelTimer(&pEntry->EnqueueStartForPSKTimer, &Cancelled);
+ pEntry->EnqueueEapolStartTimerRunning = EAPOL_START_DISABLE;
+ }
+ break;
+ case EAPOLLogoff:
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLLogoff frame, TYPE = 2 \n"));
+ break;
+ case EAPOLKey:
+ Body_len = (*(pData+2)<<8) | (*(pData+3));
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOL-Key frame, TYPE = 3, Length = %ld\n", Body_len));
+ break;
+ case EAPOLASFAlert:
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("Receive EAPOLASFAlert frame, TYPE = 4 \n"));
+ break;
+ default:
+ return FALSE;
+
+ }
+ return TRUE;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ ENCRYPT AES GTK before sending in EAPOL frame.
+ AES GTK length = 128 bit, so fix blocks for aes-key-wrap as 2 in this function.
+ This function references to RFC 3394 for aes key wrap algorithm.
+ Return:
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+VOID AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP(
+ IN UCHAR *key,
+ IN UCHAR *plaintext,
+ IN UCHAR p_len,
+ OUT UCHAR *ciphertext)
+{
+ UCHAR A[8], BIN[16], BOUT[16];
+ UCHAR R[512];
+ INT num_blocks = p_len/8; // unit:64bits
+ INT i, j;
+ aes_context aesctx;
+ UCHAR xor;
+
+ rtmp_aes_set_key(&aesctx, key, 128);
+
+ // Init IA
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
+ A[i] = 0xa6;
+
+ //Input plaintext
+ for (i = 0; i < num_blocks; i++)
+ {
+ for (j = 0 ; j < 8; j++)
+ R[8 * (i + 1) + j] = plaintext[8 * i + j];
+ }
+
+ // Key Mix
+ for (j = 0; j < 6; j++)
+ {
+ for(i = 1; i <= num_blocks; i++)
+ {
+ //phase 1
+ NdisMoveMemory(BIN, A, 8);
+ NdisMoveMemory(&BIN[8], &R[8 * i], 8);
+ rtmp_aes_encrypt(&aesctx, BIN, BOUT);
+
+ NdisMoveMemory(A, &BOUT[0], 8);
+ xor = num_blocks * j + i;
+ A[7] = BOUT[7] ^ xor;
+ NdisMoveMemory(&R[8 * i], &BOUT[8], 8);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Output ciphertext
+ NdisMoveMemory(ciphertext, A, 8);
+
+ for (i = 1; i <= num_blocks; i++)
+ {
+ for (j = 0 ; j < 8; j++)
+ ciphertext[8 * i + j] = R[8 * i + j];
+ }
+}
+
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Misc function to decrypt AES body
+
+ Arguments:
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ Note:
+ This function references to RFC 3394 for aes key unwrap algorithm.
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP(
+ IN UCHAR *key,
+ OUT UCHAR *plaintext,
+ IN UCHAR c_len,
+ IN UCHAR *ciphertext)
+
+{
+ UCHAR A[8], BIN[16], BOUT[16];
+ UCHAR xor;
+ INT i, j;
+ aes_context aesctx;
+ UCHAR *R;
+ INT num_blocks = c_len/8; // unit:64bits
+
+
+ os_alloc_mem(NULL, (PUCHAR *)&R, 512);
+
+ if (R == NULL)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!AES_GTK_KEY_UNWRAP: no memory!!!\n"));
+ return;
+ } /* End of if */
+
+ // Initialize
+ NdisMoveMemory(A, ciphertext, 8);
+ //Input plaintext
+ for(i = 0; i < (c_len-8); i++)
+ {
+ R[ i] = ciphertext[i + 8];
+ }
+
+ rtmp_aes_set_key(&aesctx, key, 128);
+
+ for(j = 5; j >= 0; j--)
+ {
+ for(i = (num_blocks-1); i > 0; i--)
+ {
+ xor = (num_blocks -1 )* j + i;
+ NdisMoveMemory(BIN, A, 8);
+ BIN[7] = A[7] ^ xor;
+ NdisMoveMemory(&BIN[8], &R[(i-1)*8], 8);
+ rtmp_aes_decrypt(&aesctx, BIN, BOUT);
+ NdisMoveMemory(A, &BOUT[0], 8);
+ NdisMoveMemory(&R[(i-1)*8], &BOUT[8], 8);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // OUTPUT
+ for(i = 0; i < c_len; i++)
+ {
+ plaintext[i] = R[i];
+ }
+
+
+ os_free_mem(NULL, R);
+}
+
+/*
+ ==========================================================================
+ Description:
+ Report the EAP message type
+
+ Arguments:
+ msg - EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1
+ EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2
+ EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3
+ EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4
+ EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1
+ EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2
+
+ Return:
+ message type string
+
+ ==========================================================================
+*/
+CHAR *GetEapolMsgType(CHAR msg)
+{
+ if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
+ return "Pairwise Message 1";
+ else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2)
+ return "Pairwise Message 2";
+ else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+ return "Pairwise Message 3";
+ else if(msg == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4)
+ return "Pairwise Message 4";
+ else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+ return "Group Message 1";
+ else if(msg == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
+ return "Group Message 2";
+ else
+ return "Invalid Message";
+}
+
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Check Sanity RSN IE of EAPoL message
+
+ Arguments:
+
+ Return Value:
+
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+BOOLEAN RTMPCheckRSNIE(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN PUCHAR pData,
+ IN UCHAR DataLen,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry,
+ OUT UCHAR *Offset)
+{
+ PUCHAR pVIE;
+ UCHAR len;
+ PEID_STRUCT pEid;
+ BOOLEAN result = FALSE;
+
+ pVIE = pData;
+ len = DataLen;
+ *Offset = 0;
+
+ while (len > sizeof(RSNIE2))
+ {
+ pEid = (PEID_STRUCT) pVIE;
+ // WPA RSN IE
+ if ((pEid->Eid == IE_WPA) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet, WPA_OUI, 4)))
+ {
+ if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPAPSK) &&
+ (NdisEqualMemory(pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len)) &&
+ (pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2)))
+ {
+ result = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ *Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
+ }
+ // WPA2 RSN IE
+ else if ((pEid->Eid == IE_RSN) && (NdisEqualMemory(pEid->Octet + 2, RSN_OUI, 3)))
+ {
+ if ((pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2 || pEntry->AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK) &&
+ (NdisEqualMemory(pVIE, pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len)) &&
+ (pEntry->RSNIE_Len == (pEid->Len + 2))/* ToDo-AlbertY for mesh*/)
+ {
+ result = TRUE;
+ }
+
+ *Offset += (pEid->Len + 2);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ break;
+ }
+
+ pVIE += (pEid->Len + 2);
+ len -= (pEid->Len + 2);
+ }
+
+
+ return result;
+
+}
+
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Parse KEYDATA field. KEYDATA[] May contain 2 RSN IE and optionally GTK.
+ GTK is encaptulated in KDE format at p.83 802.11i D10
+
+ Arguments:
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ Note:
+ 802.11i D10
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+BOOLEAN RTMPParseEapolKeyData(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN PUCHAR pKeyData,
+ IN UCHAR KeyDataLen,
+ IN UCHAR GroupKeyIndex,
+ IN UCHAR MsgType,
+ IN BOOLEAN bWPA2,
+ IN MAC_TABLE_ENTRY *pEntry)
+{
+ PKDE_ENCAP pKDE = NULL;
+ PUCHAR pMyKeyData = pKeyData;
+ UCHAR KeyDataLength = KeyDataLen;
+ UCHAR GTKLEN = 0;
+ UCHAR DefaultIdx = 0;
+ UCHAR skip_offset;
+
+ // Verify The RSN IE contained in pairewise_msg_2 && pairewise_msg_3 and skip it
+ if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+ {
+ // Check RSN IE whether it is WPA2/WPA2PSK
+ if (!RTMPCheckRSNIE(pAd, pKeyData, KeyDataLen, pEntry, &skip_offset))
+ {
+ // send wireless event - for RSN IE different
+ if (pAd->CommonCfg.bWirelessEvent)
+ RTMPSendWirelessEvent(pAd, IW_RSNIE_DIFF_EVENT_FLAG, pEntry->Addr, pEntry->apidx, 0);
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("RSN_IE Different in msg %d of 4-way handshake!\n", MsgType));
+ hex_dump("Receive RSN_IE ", pKeyData, KeyDataLen);
+ hex_dump("Desired RSN_IE ", pEntry->RSN_IE, pEntry->RSNIE_Len);
+
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ if (bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+ {
+ // skip RSN IE
+ pMyKeyData += skip_offset;
+ KeyDataLength -= skip_offset;
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> WPA2/WPA2PSK RSN IE matched in Msg 3, Length(%d) \n", skip_offset));
+ }
+ else
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE,("RTMPParseEapolKeyData ==> KeyDataLength %d without RSN_IE \n", KeyDataLength));
+
+ // Parse EKD format in pairwise_msg_3_WPA2 && group_msg_1_WPA2
+ if (bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+ {
+ if (KeyDataLength >= 8) // KDE format exclude GTK length
+ {
+ pKDE = (PKDE_ENCAP) pMyKeyData;
+
+
+ DefaultIdx = pKDE->GTKEncap.Kid;
+
+ // Sanity check - KED length
+ if (KeyDataLength < (pKDE->Len + 2))
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: The len from KDE is too short \n"));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ // Get GTK length - refer to IEEE 802.11i-2004 p.82
+ GTKLEN = pKDE->Len -6;
+ if (GTKLEN < LEN_AES_KEY)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key length is too short (%d) \n", GTKLEN));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: KDE format length is too short \n"));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK in KDE format ,DefaultKeyID=%d, KeyLen=%d \n", DefaultIdx, GTKLEN));
+ // skip it
+ pMyKeyData += 8;
+ KeyDataLength -= 8;
+
+ }
+ else if (!bWPA2 && MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+ {
+ DefaultIdx = GroupKeyIndex;
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("GTK DefaultKeyID=%d \n", DefaultIdx));
+ }
+
+ // Sanity check - shared key index must be 1 ~ 3
+ if (DefaultIdx < 1 || DefaultIdx > 3)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR: GTK Key index(%d) is invalid in %s %s \n", DefaultIdx, ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
+ return FALSE;
+ }
+
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT
+ // Todo
+#endif // CONFIG_STA_SUPPORT //
+
+ return TRUE;
+
+}
+
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Construct EAPoL message for WPA handshaking
+ Its format is below,
+
+ +--------------------+
+ | Protocol Version | 1 octet
+ +--------------------+
+ | Protocol Type | 1 octet
+ +--------------------+
+ | Body Length | 2 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Descriptor Type | 1 octet
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Information | 2 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Length | 1 octet
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Repaly Counter | 8 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Nonce | 32 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key IV | 16 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key RSC | 8 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key ID or Reserved | 8 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key MIC | 16 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Data Length | 2 octets
+ +--------------------+
+ | Key Data | n octets
+ +--------------------+
+
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd Pointer to our adapter
+
+ Return Value:
+ None
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID ConstructEapolMsg(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR AuthMode,
+ IN UCHAR WepStatus,
+ IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
+ IN UCHAR MsgType,
+ IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
+ IN UCHAR *ReplayCounter,
+ IN UCHAR *KeyNonce,
+ IN UCHAR *TxRSC,
+ IN UCHAR *PTK,
+ IN UCHAR *GTK,
+ IN UCHAR *RSNIE,
+ IN UCHAR RSNIE_Len,
+ OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
+{
+ BOOLEAN bWPA2 = FALSE;
+
+ // Choose WPA2 or not
+ if ((AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2) || (AuthMode == Ndis802_11AuthModeWPA2PSK))
+ bWPA2 = TRUE;
+
+ // Init Packet and Fill header
+ pMsg->ProVer = EAPOL_VER;
+ pMsg->ProType = EAPOLKey;
+
+ // Default 95 bytes, the EAPoL-Key descriptor exclude Key-data field
+ pMsg->Body_Len[1] = LEN_EAPOL_KEY_MSG;
+
+ // Fill in EAPoL descriptor
+ if (bWPA2)
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA2_KEY_DESC;
+ else
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.Type = WPA1_KEY_DESC;
+
+ // Fill in Key information, refer to IEEE Std 802.11i-2004 page 78
+ // When either the pairwise or the group cipher is AES, the DESC_TYPE_AES(2) shall be used.
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyDescVer =
+ (((WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled) || (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)) ? (DESC_TYPE_AES) : (DESC_TYPE_TKIP));
+
+ // Specify Key Type as Group(0) or Pairwise(1)
+ if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = GROUPKEY;
+ else
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyType = PAIRWISEKEY;
+
+ // Specify Key Index, only group_msg1_WPA1
+ if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyIndex = DefaultKeyIdx;
+
+ if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Install = 1;
+
+ if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyAck = 1;
+
+ if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.KeyMic = 1;
+
+ if ((bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)) || (!bWPA2 && (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
+ {
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.Secure = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (bWPA2 && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
+ {
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo.EKD_DL = 1;
+ }
+
+ // key Information element has done.
+ *(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo) = cpu2le16(*(USHORT *)(&pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyInfo));
+
+ // Fill in Key Length
+ {
+ if (MsgType >= EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)
+ {
+ // the length of group key cipher
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? TKIP_GTK_LENGTH : LEN_AES_KEY);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // the length of pairwise key cipher
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1] = ((WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled) ? LEN_TKIP_KEY : LEN_AES_KEY);
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Fill in replay counter
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.ReplayCounter, ReplayCounter, LEN_KEY_DESC_REPLAY);
+
+ // Fill Key Nonce field
+ // ANonce : pairwise_msg1 & pairwise_msg3
+ // SNonce : pairwise_msg2
+ // GNonce : group_msg1_wpa1
+ if ((MsgType <= EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || ((!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))))
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyNonce, KeyNonce, LEN_KEY_DESC_NONCE);
+
+ // Fill key IV - WPA2 as 0, WPA1 as random
+ if (!bWPA2 && (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+ {
+ // Suggest IV be random number plus some number,
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, &KeyNonce[16], LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv[15] += 2;
+ }
+
+ // Fill Key RSC field
+ // It contains the RSC for the GTK being installed.
+ if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+ {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyRsc, TxRSC, 6);
+ }
+
+ // Clear Key MIC field for MIC calculation later
+ NdisZeroMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
+
+ ConstructEapolKeyData(pAd,
+ AuthMode,
+ WepStatus,
+ GroupKeyWepStatus,
+ MsgType,
+ DefaultKeyIdx,
+ bWPA2,
+ PTK,
+ GTK,
+ RSNIE,
+ RSNIE_Len,
+ pMsg);
+
+ // Calculate MIC and fill in KeyMic Field except Pairwise Msg 1.
+ if (MsgType != EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1)
+ {
+ CalculateMIC(pAd, WepStatus, PTK, pMsg);
+ }
+
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, ("===> ConstructEapolMsg for %s %s\n", ((bWPA2) ? "WPA2" : "WPA"), GetEapolMsgType(MsgType)));
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" Body length = %d \n", pMsg->Body_Len[1]));
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_TRACE, (" Key length = %d \n", pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyLength[1]));
+
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Construct the Key Data field of EAPoL message
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd Pointer to our adapter
+ Elem Message body
+
+ Return Value:
+ None
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID ConstructEapolKeyData(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR AuthMode,
+ IN UCHAR WepStatus,
+ IN UCHAR GroupKeyWepStatus,
+ IN UCHAR MsgType,
+ IN UCHAR DefaultKeyIdx,
+ IN BOOLEAN bWPA2Capable,
+ IN UCHAR *PTK,
+ IN UCHAR *GTK,
+ IN UCHAR *RSNIE,
+ IN UCHAR RSNIE_LEN,
+ OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
+{
+ UCHAR *mpool, *Key_Data, *Rc4GTK;
+ UCHAR ekey[(LEN_KEY_DESC_IV+LEN_EAP_EK)];
+ UCHAR data_offset;
+
+
+ if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_1 || MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_4 || MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_2)
+ return;
+
+ // allocate memory pool
+ os_alloc_mem(pAd, (PUCHAR *)&mpool, 1500);
+
+ if (mpool == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ /* Rc4GTK Len = 512 */
+ Rc4GTK = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(mpool, 4);
+ /* Key_Data Len = 512 */
+ Key_Data = (UCHAR *) ROUND_UP(Rc4GTK + 512, 4);
+
+ NdisZeroMemory(Key_Data, 512);
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1] = 0;
+ data_offset = 0;
+
+ // Encapsulate RSNIE in pairwise_msg2 & pairwise_msg3
+ if (RSNIE_LEN && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_2) || (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3)))
+ {
+ if (bWPA2Capable)
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = IE_WPA2;
+ else
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = IE_WPA;
+
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = RSNIE_LEN;
+ NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset + 2], RSNIE, RSNIE_LEN);
+ data_offset += (2 + RSNIE_LEN);
+ }
+
+ // Encapsulate KDE format in pairwise_msg3_WPA2 & group_msg1_WPA2
+ if (bWPA2Capable && ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1)))
+ {
+ // Key Data Encapsulation (KDE) format - 802.11i-2004 Figure-43w and Table-20h
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
+
+ if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ {
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x16;// 4+2+16(OUI+DataType+DataField)
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0x26;// 4+2+32(OUI+DataType+DataField)
+ }
+
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 2] = 0x00;
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 3] = 0x0F;
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 4] = 0xAC;
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 5] = 0x01;
+
+ // GTK KDE format - 802.11i-2004 Figure-43x
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 6] = (DefaultKeyIdx & 0x03);
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 7] = 0x00; // Reserved Byte
+
+ data_offset += 8;
+ }
+
+
+ // Encapsulate GTK and encrypt the key-data field with KEK.
+ // Only for pairwise_msg3_WPA2 and group_msg1
+ if ((MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2Capable) || (MsgType == EAPOL_GROUP_MSG_1))
+ {
+ // Fill in GTK
+ if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ {
+ NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK, LEN_AES_KEY);
+ data_offset += LEN_AES_KEY;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ NdisMoveMemory(&Key_Data[data_offset], GTK, TKIP_GTK_LENGTH);
+ data_offset += TKIP_GTK_LENGTH;
+ }
+
+ // Still dont know why, but if not append will occur "GTK not include in MSG3"
+ // Patch for compatibility between zero config and funk
+ if (MsgType == EAPOL_PAIR_MSG_3 && bWPA2Capable)
+ {
+ if (GroupKeyWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ {
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0;
+ data_offset += 2;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 0] = 0xDD;
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 1] = 0;
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 2] = 0;
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 3] = 0;
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 4] = 0;
+ Key_Data[data_offset + 5] = 0;
+ data_offset += 6;
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Encrypt the data material in key data field
+ if (WepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ {
+ AES_GTK_KEY_WRAP(&PTK[16], Key_Data, data_offset, Rc4GTK);
+ // AES wrap function will grow 8 bytes in length
+ data_offset += 8;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // PREPARE Encrypted "Key DATA" field. (Encrypt GTK with RC4, usinf PTK[16]->[31] as Key, IV-field as IV)
+ // put TxTsc in Key RSC field
+ pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 = PPPINITFCS32; //Init crc32.
+
+ // ekey is the contanetion of IV-field, and PTK[16]->PTK[31]
+ NdisMoveMemory(ekey, pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyIv, LEN_KEY_DESC_IV);
+ NdisMoveMemory(&ekey[LEN_KEY_DESC_IV], &PTK[16], LEN_EAP_EK);
+ ARCFOUR_INIT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, ekey, sizeof(ekey)); //INIT SBOX, KEYLEN+3(IV)
+ pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32 = RTMP_CALC_FCS32(pAd->PrivateInfo.FCSCRC32, Key_Data, data_offset);
+ WPAARCFOUR_ENCRYPT(&pAd->PrivateInfo.WEPCONTEXT, Rc4GTK, Key_Data, data_offset);
+ }
+
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Rc4GTK, data_offset);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyData, Key_Data, data_offset);
+ }
+
+ // set key data length field and total length
+ pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyDataLen[1] = data_offset;
+ pMsg->Body_Len[1] += data_offset;
+
+ os_free_mem(pAd, mpool);
+
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Calcaulate MIC. It is used during 4-ways handsharking.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ PeerWepStatus - indicate the encryption type
+
+ Return Value:
+
+ Note:
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+VOID CalculateMIC(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN UCHAR PeerWepStatus,
+ IN UCHAR *PTK,
+ OUT PEAPOL_PACKET pMsg)
+{
+ UCHAR *OutBuffer;
+ ULONG FrameLen = 0;
+ UCHAR mic[LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC];
+ UCHAR digest[80];
+
+ // allocate memory for MIC calculation
+ os_alloc_mem(pAd, (PUCHAR *)&OutBuffer, 512);
+
+ if (OutBuffer == NULL)
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("!!!CalculateMIC: no memory!!!\n"));
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // make a frame for calculating MIC.
+ MakeOutgoingFrame(OutBuffer, &FrameLen,
+ pMsg->Body_Len[1] + 4, pMsg,
+ END_OF_ARGS);
+
+ NdisZeroMemory(mic, sizeof(mic));
+
+ // Calculate MIC
+ if (PeerWepStatus == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ {
+ HMAC_SHA1(OutBuffer, FrameLen, PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, digest);
+ NdisMoveMemory(mic, digest, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ hmac_md5(PTK, LEN_EAP_MICK, OutBuffer, FrameLen, mic);
+ }
+
+ // store the calculated MIC
+ NdisMoveMemory(pMsg->KeyDesc.KeyMic, mic, LEN_KEY_DESC_MIC);
+
+ os_free_mem(pAd, OutBuffer);
+}
+
+/*
+ ========================================================================
+
+ Routine Description:
+ Some received frames can't decrypt by Asic, so decrypt them by software.
+
+ Arguments:
+ pAd - pointer to our pAdapter context
+ PeerWepStatus - indicate the encryption type
+
+ Return Value:
+ NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS - decryption successful
+ NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE - decryption failure
+
+ ========================================================================
+*/
+NDIS_STATUS RTMPSoftDecryptBroadCastData(
+ IN PRTMP_ADAPTER pAd,
+ IN RX_BLK *pRxBlk,
+ IN NDIS_802_11_ENCRYPTION_STATUS GroupCipher,
+ IN PCIPHER_KEY pShard_key)
+{
+ PRXWI_STRUC pRxWI = pRxBlk->pRxWI;
+
+
+
+ // handle WEP decryption
+ if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption1Enabled)
+ {
+ if (RTMPSoftDecryptWEP(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount, pShard_key))
+ {
+
+ //Minus IV[4] & ICV[4]
+ pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 8;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : Software decrypt WEP data fails.\n"));
+ // give up this frame
+ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+ // handle TKIP decryption
+ else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption2Enabled)
+ {
+ if (RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount, 0, pShard_key))
+ {
+
+ //Minus 8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV, 4 bytes ICV
+ pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 20;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptTKIP Failed\n"));
+ // give up this frame
+ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+ // handle AES decryption
+ else if (GroupCipher == Ndis802_11Encryption3Enabled)
+ {
+ if (RTMPSoftDecryptAES(pAd, pRxBlk->pData, pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount , pShard_key))
+ {
+
+ //8 bytes MIC, 8 bytes IV/EIV (CCMP Header)
+ pRxWI->MPDUtotalByteCount -= 16;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ DBGPRINT(RT_DEBUG_ERROR, ("ERROR : RTMPSoftDecryptAES Failed\n"));
+ // give up this frame
+ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+ }
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ // give up this frame
+ return NDIS_STATUS_FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ return NDIS_STATUS_SUCCESS;
+
+}
+
projects / linux-2.6-omap-h63xx.git / blobdiff