2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
160 * initialise the security for the init task
162 static void cred_init_security(void)
164 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
167 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
171 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
172 cred->security = tsec;
176 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
180 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
182 tsec = cred->security;
187 * get the objective security ID of a task
189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
194 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
200 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
204 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
213 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
214 u32 sid = current_sid();
216 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
220 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
221 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
223 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
224 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
225 isec->task_sid = sid;
226 inode->i_security = isec;
231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
233 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
234 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
236 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
237 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
238 list_del_init(&isec->list);
239 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
241 inode->i_security = NULL;
242 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
248 u32 sid = current_sid();
250 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
255 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
256 file->f_security = fsec;
261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
263 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
264 file->f_security = NULL;
268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
270 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
272 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
276 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
278 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
279 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
281 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
283 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 sb->s_security = sbsec;
289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
291 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
293 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
294 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
295 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
296 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
298 sb->s_security = NULL;
302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
304 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
306 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
310 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sk->sk_security = ssec;
314 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
321 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
323 sk->sk_security = NULL;
324 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
328 /* The security server must be initialized before
329 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
330 extern int ss_initialized;
332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
336 "uses transition SIDs",
338 "uses genfs_contexts",
339 "not configured for labeling",
340 "uses mountpoint labeling",
343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
347 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
356 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
359 static const match_table_t tokens = {
360 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
364 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
368 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
370 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
372 const struct cred *cred)
374 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
377 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
378 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
382 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
383 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
387 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
388 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
389 const struct cred *cred)
391 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
393 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
394 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
398 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
399 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
403 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
405 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
406 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
407 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
410 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
411 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
412 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
413 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
414 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
415 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
416 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
417 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
418 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
422 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
423 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
424 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
425 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
426 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
427 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
429 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
430 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
431 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
436 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
438 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
439 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
440 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
442 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
443 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
444 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
446 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
448 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
449 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
450 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
452 /* Initialize the root inode. */
453 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
455 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
456 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
457 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
459 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
461 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
462 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
463 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
464 struct inode_security_struct, list);
465 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
466 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
467 inode = igrab(inode);
469 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
473 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
474 list_del_init(&isec->list);
477 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
483 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
484 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
485 * mount options, or whatever.
487 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
488 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
491 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
492 char *context = NULL;
496 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
498 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
504 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
505 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
506 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
508 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
511 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
512 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
513 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
515 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
516 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
521 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
522 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
528 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
529 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
532 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
533 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
535 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
536 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
539 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
542 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
543 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
546 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
547 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
549 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
550 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
551 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
553 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
556 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
557 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
559 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
560 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
561 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
564 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
569 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
573 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
574 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
576 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
578 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
579 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
580 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
581 (old_sid != new_sid))
584 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
585 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
587 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
588 if (mnt_flags & flag)
594 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
595 * labeling information.
597 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
598 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
600 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
602 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
603 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
604 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
605 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
606 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
607 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
608 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
609 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
610 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
612 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
614 if (!ss_initialized) {
616 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
617 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
618 server is ready to handle calls. */
619 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
620 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
621 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
622 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
626 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
627 "before the security server is initialized\n");
632 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
633 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
634 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
635 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
637 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
638 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
639 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
640 * will be used for both mounts)
642 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
647 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
648 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
649 * than once with different security options.
651 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
654 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
656 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
657 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
659 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
660 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
661 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
668 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
670 goto out_double_mount;
672 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
677 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
679 goto out_double_mount;
681 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
683 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
684 rootcontext_sid = sid;
686 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
688 goto out_double_mount;
690 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
694 defcontext_sid = sid;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
698 goto out_double_mount;
700 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
709 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
710 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
711 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
712 goto out_double_mount;
717 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
718 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
720 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
721 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
723 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
724 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
728 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
730 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
734 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
738 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
739 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
740 * the superblock context if not already set.
743 if (!fscontext_sid) {
744 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
748 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
750 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
755 if (!rootcontext_sid)
756 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
758 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
759 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
762 if (rootcontext_sid) {
763 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
768 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
769 root_isec->initialized = 1;
772 if (defcontext_sid) {
773 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
775 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
776 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
780 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
781 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
787 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
790 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
792 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
796 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
797 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
801 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
802 struct super_block *newsb)
804 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
805 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
807 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
809 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
812 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
813 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
816 if (!ss_initialized) {
817 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
818 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
819 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
820 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
824 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
825 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
827 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
828 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
831 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
833 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
835 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
836 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
837 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
840 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
844 if (!set_rootcontext) {
845 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
846 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
849 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
851 if (set_rootcontext) {
852 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
853 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
854 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
855 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
857 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
860 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
861 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
864 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
865 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
868 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
869 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
870 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
872 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
874 /* Standard string-based options. */
875 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
877 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
882 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
886 if (context || defcontext) {
888 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
891 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
901 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
904 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
911 case Opt_rootcontext:
914 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
917 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
925 if (context || defcontext) {
927 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
930 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
936 case Opt_labelsupport:
940 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
947 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
951 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
952 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
953 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
958 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
959 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
962 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
963 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
966 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
967 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
970 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
971 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
974 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
985 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
987 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
990 char *options = data;
991 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
993 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
998 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1000 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1005 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1008 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1012 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1013 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1018 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1021 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1022 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1026 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1028 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1031 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1033 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1034 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1036 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1037 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1039 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1041 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1046 /* we need a comma before each option */
1048 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1051 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1057 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1059 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1062 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1064 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1070 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1072 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1077 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1079 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1081 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1083 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1085 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1087 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1089 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1091 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1093 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1097 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1100 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1102 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1105 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1107 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1110 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1116 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1117 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1126 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1127 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1129 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1131 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1132 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1134 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1136 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1138 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1144 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1145 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1146 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1147 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1148 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1150 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1152 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1153 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1154 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1156 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1157 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1159 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1161 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1167 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1169 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1171 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1174 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1177 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1178 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1183 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1185 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1190 end = buffer+buflen;
1195 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1196 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1200 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1205 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1206 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1210 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1218 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1219 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1221 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1224 struct dentry *dentry;
1225 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1226 char *context = NULL;
1230 if (isec->initialized)
1233 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1234 if (isec->initialized)
1237 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1238 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1239 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1240 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1241 server is ready to handle calls. */
1242 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1243 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1244 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1245 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1249 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1250 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1251 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1252 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1256 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1259 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1262 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1266 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1267 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1272 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1273 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1279 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1281 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1282 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1283 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1291 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1297 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1303 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1304 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1305 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1306 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1310 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1311 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1314 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1318 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1319 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1320 __func__, context, -rc,
1321 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1323 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1331 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1332 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1334 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1335 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1336 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1338 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1339 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1340 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1348 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1349 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1352 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1353 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1355 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1356 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1358 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1359 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1370 isec->initialized = 1;
1373 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1375 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1376 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1380 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1381 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1387 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1388 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1391 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1392 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1395 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1396 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1399 /* All other signals. */
1400 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1408 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1409 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1411 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1412 const struct cred *target,
1415 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1417 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1421 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1422 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1423 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1424 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1426 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1427 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1430 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1434 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1435 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1437 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1441 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1442 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1443 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1444 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1446 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1451 sid = current_sid();
1452 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1453 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1456 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1457 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1460 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1461 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1462 const struct cred *cred,
1465 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1466 struct av_decision avd;
1468 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1469 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1472 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1476 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1478 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1481 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1485 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1489 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1490 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1491 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1495 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1496 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1499 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1501 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1502 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1505 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1506 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1507 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1508 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1509 struct inode *inode,
1511 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1513 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1514 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1517 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1520 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1521 isec = inode->i_security;
1525 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1526 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1529 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1532 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1533 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1534 pathname if needed. */
1535 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1536 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1537 struct dentry *dentry,
1540 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1541 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1543 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1544 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1545 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1546 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1549 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1550 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1551 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1552 check a particular permission to the file.
1553 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1554 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1555 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1556 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1557 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1561 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1562 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1563 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1564 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1567 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1568 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1570 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1571 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1579 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1582 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1588 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1589 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1590 struct dentry *dentry,
1593 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1594 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1595 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1596 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1598 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1601 dsec = dir->i_security;
1602 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1605 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1607 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1608 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1610 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1611 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1616 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1617 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1622 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1626 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1627 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1628 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1631 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1632 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1633 struct task_struct *ctx)
1635 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1637 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1641 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1644 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1645 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1646 struct dentry *dentry,
1650 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1651 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1652 u32 sid = current_sid();
1656 dsec = dir->i_security;
1657 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1659 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1660 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1663 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1664 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1679 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1684 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1688 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1689 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1690 struct inode *new_dir,
1691 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1693 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1694 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1695 u32 sid = current_sid();
1697 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1700 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1701 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1702 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1703 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1705 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1707 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1708 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1709 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1712 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1713 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1716 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1717 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1718 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1723 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1724 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1725 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1726 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1727 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1730 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1731 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1732 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1733 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1735 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1743 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1744 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1745 struct super_block *sb,
1747 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1749 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1750 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1752 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1753 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1756 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1757 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1761 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1762 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1763 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1764 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1767 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1769 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1773 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1775 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1777 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1784 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1785 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1789 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1791 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1792 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1799 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1808 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1811 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1813 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1815 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1816 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1818 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1822 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1823 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1824 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1825 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1826 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1827 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1828 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1831 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1832 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1837 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1839 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1844 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1848 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1849 u32 sid = current_sid();
1850 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1851 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1854 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1857 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1861 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1865 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1868 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1869 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1873 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1877 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1880 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1881 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1882 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1883 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1887 error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
1888 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1892 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1895 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1900 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1904 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1907 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1910 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1913 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1918 end = buffer+buflen;
1924 const char *name = table->procname;
1925 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1926 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1930 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1933 table = table->parent;
1939 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1941 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1943 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1948 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1955 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1959 sid = current_sid();
1961 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1962 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1964 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1965 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1968 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1969 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1971 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1972 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1980 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1981 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1987 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1989 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2001 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2006 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2009 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2015 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2017 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2019 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2022 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2026 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
2031 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2032 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2033 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2035 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2036 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2037 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2038 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2040 case 0: /* Close log */
2041 case 1: /* Open log */
2042 case 2: /* Read from log */
2043 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2044 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2046 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2053 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2054 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2055 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2057 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
2058 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
2059 * the capability is granted.
2061 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2062 * processes that allocate mappings.
2064 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2066 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2068 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2069 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2073 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2076 /* binprm security operations */
2078 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2080 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2081 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2082 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2083 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2084 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2087 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2091 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2092 * the script interpreter */
2093 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2096 old_tsec = current_security();
2097 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2098 isec = inode->i_security;
2100 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2101 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2102 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2104 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2105 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2106 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2107 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2109 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2110 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2111 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2112 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2114 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2115 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2116 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2121 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2122 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2124 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2125 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2127 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2128 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2129 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2133 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2134 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2135 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2139 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2140 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2144 /* Check for shared state */
2145 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2146 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2147 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2153 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2154 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2156 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2157 struct task_struct *tracer;
2158 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2162 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2163 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2164 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2170 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2172 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2178 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2179 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2185 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2187 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2188 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2196 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2197 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2198 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2199 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2201 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2204 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2207 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2208 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2210 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2211 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2212 struct files_struct *files)
2214 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2215 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2216 struct tty_struct *tty;
2217 struct fdtable *fdt;
2221 tty = get_current_tty();
2224 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2225 struct inode *inode;
2227 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2228 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2229 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2230 file may belong to another process and we are only
2231 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2232 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2233 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2234 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2235 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2242 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2246 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2248 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2250 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2252 unsigned long set, i;
2257 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2258 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2260 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2263 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2264 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2269 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2271 file_to_av(file))) {
2273 fd = get_unused_fd();
2283 devnull = dentry_open(
2285 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2287 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2294 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2299 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2302 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2306 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2308 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2310 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2311 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2314 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2315 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2318 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2319 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2321 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2322 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2324 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2325 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2326 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2328 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2329 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2330 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2331 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2332 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2334 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2335 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2337 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2338 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2339 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2340 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2342 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2347 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2350 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2352 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2353 struct itimerval itimer;
2354 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2357 unsigned long flags;
2365 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2366 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2367 * flush and unblock signals.
2369 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2370 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2372 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2374 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2375 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2376 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2377 flush_signals(current);
2378 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2379 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2380 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2381 recalc_sigpending();
2382 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2385 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2386 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2387 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2388 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2389 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2390 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2391 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2392 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2395 /* superblock security operations */
2397 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2399 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2402 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2404 superblock_free_security(sb);
2407 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2412 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2415 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2417 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2418 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2419 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2420 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2421 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2424 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2431 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2435 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2438 int current_size = 0;
2446 while (current_size < len) {
2456 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2458 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2459 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2460 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2466 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2474 in_save = in_end = orig;
2478 open_quote = !open_quote;
2479 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2481 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2483 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2484 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2486 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2488 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2490 } while (*in_end++);
2492 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2493 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2498 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2500 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2501 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2504 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2508 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2509 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2512 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2513 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2514 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2517 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2519 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2520 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2522 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2523 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2524 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2527 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2530 unsigned long flags,
2533 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2535 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2536 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2537 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2539 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2543 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2545 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2548 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2552 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2553 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2556 /* inode security operations */
2558 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2560 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2563 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2565 inode_free_security(inode);
2568 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2569 char **name, void **value,
2572 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2573 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2574 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2575 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2576 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2578 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2580 dsec = dir->i_security;
2581 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2584 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2586 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2587 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2588 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2591 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2592 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2595 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2600 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2601 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2602 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2603 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2605 isec->initialized = 1;
2608 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2612 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2619 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2631 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2633 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2636 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2640 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2643 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2646 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2650 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2653 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2656 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2658 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2661 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2663 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2666 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2668 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2671 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2675 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2679 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2682 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2683 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2685 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2688 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2690 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2692 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2695 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2697 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2700 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2703 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2706 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2708 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2711 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2716 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2720 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2721 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2724 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2726 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2729 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2733 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2736 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2737 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2738 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2740 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2743 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2745 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2747 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2750 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2752 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2754 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2755 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2756 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2757 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2759 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2760 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2761 Restrict to administrator. */
2766 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2767 ordinary setattr permission. */
2768 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2771 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2772 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2774 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2775 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2776 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2777 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2778 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2781 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2782 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2784 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2785 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2788 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2791 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2792 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2794 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2795 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2799 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2800 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2801 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2803 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2808 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2809 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2813 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2818 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2820 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2821 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2825 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2826 const void *value, size_t size,
2829 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2830 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2834 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2835 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2839 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2841 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2842 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2843 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2851 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2853 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2855 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2858 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2860 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2862 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2865 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2867 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2868 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2870 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2871 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2876 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2878 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2880 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2884 char *context = NULL;
2885 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2887 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2891 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2892 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2893 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2894 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2895 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2896 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2897 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2899 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2900 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2902 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2905 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2918 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2919 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2921 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2925 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2928 if (!value || !size)
2931 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2939 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2941 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2942 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2943 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2947 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2949 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2952 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2954 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2957 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2959 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2963 /* file security operations */
2965 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2967 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2969 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2972 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2976 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2977 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2980 rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2981 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2985 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2988 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2990 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2991 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2992 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2993 u32 sid = current_sid();
2996 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
3000 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
3001 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3002 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
3004 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3007 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3009 return file_alloc_security(file);
3012 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3014 file_free_security(file);
3017 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3020 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3023 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
3025 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
3030 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3033 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3035 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3038 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3039 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3041 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3042 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3043 * This has an additional check.
3045 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3052 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3053 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3055 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3056 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3059 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3060 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3062 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3069 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3070 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3071 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3074 u32 sid = current_sid();
3076 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3077 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3078 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3079 if (rc || addr_only)
3082 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3085 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3086 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3089 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3090 unsigned long reqprot,
3093 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3096 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3100 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3103 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3104 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3106 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3107 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3108 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3109 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3110 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3111 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3112 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3113 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3115 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3116 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3117 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3118 * modified content. This typically should only
3119 * occur for text relocations.
3121 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3128 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3131 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3133 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3135 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3138 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3141 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3146 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3151 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3152 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3161 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3162 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3167 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3172 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3176 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3183 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3185 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3187 fsec = file->f_security;
3188 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3193 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3194 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3197 u32 sid = current_sid();
3199 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3201 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3202 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3204 fsec = file->f_security;
3207 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3209 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3211 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3212 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3215 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3217 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3219 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3222 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3224 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3225 struct inode *inode;
3226 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3228 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3229 fsec = file->f_security;
3230 isec = inode->i_security;
3232 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3233 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3234 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3235 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3236 * struct as its SID.
3238 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3239 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3241 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3242 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3243 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3244 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3245 * new inode label or new policy.
3246 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3248 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3251 /* task security operations */
3253 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3257 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3261 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3265 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3267 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3269 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3270 cred->security = NULL;
3275 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3277 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3280 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3281 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3283 old_tsec = old->security;
3285 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3289 new->security = tsec;
3294 * commit new credentials
3296 static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3298 secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
3302 * set the security data for a kernel service
3303 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3305 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3307 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3308 u32 sid = current_sid();
3311 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3312 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3313 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3317 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3318 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3319 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3325 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3326 * objective context of the specified inode
3328 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3330 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3331 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3332 u32 sid = current_sid();
3335 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3336 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3337 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3341 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3345 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3347 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3348 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3349 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3350 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3351 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3356 static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3359 return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
3362 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3364 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3368 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3370 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3373 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3375 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3378 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3380 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3383 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3385 *secid = task_sid(p);
3388 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3390 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3394 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3398 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3402 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3405 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3409 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3413 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3416 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3418 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3421 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3423 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3426 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3430 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3431 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3432 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3433 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3434 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3435 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3440 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3444 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3448 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3451 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3453 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3456 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3458 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3461 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3467 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3472 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3474 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3476 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3477 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3479 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3483 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3489 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3490 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3491 the state of the current process. */
3492 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
3495 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3497 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3500 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3501 struct inode *inode)
3503 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3504 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3507 isec->initialized = 1;
3510 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3511 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3512 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3514 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3515 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3517 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3518 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3522 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3523 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3526 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3527 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3531 *proto = ih->protocol;
3533 switch (ih->protocol) {
3535 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3537 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3541 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3545 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3546 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3551 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3553 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3557 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3561 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3562 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3566 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3567 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3569 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3573 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3577 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3578 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3589 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3591 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3592 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3593 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3596 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3597 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3599 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3600 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3604 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3605 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3608 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3609 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3610 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3619 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3621 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3625 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3626 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3631 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3633 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3637 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3638 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3642 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3643 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3645 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3649 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3650 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3654 /* includes fragments */
3664 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3665 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3670 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3672 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3675 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3676 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3679 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3681 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3684 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3685 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3695 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3696 " unable to parse packet\n");
3706 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3708 * @family: protocol family
3709 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3712 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3713 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3714 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3715 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3716 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3720 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3727 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3728 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3730 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3731 if (unlikely(err)) {
3733 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3734 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3741 /* socket security operations */
3742 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3745 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3746 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3750 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3752 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3754 sid = task_sid(task);
3756 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3757 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3758 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3764 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3765 int protocol, int kern)
3767 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3768 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3777 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3779 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3780 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3786 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3787 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3789 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3790 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3791 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3792 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3797 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3799 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3802 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3808 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3809 isec->initialized = 1;
3812 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3813 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3814 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3815 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3821 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3822 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3823 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3825 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3830 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3835 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3836 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3837 * check the first address now.
3839 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3840 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3842 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3843 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3844 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3845 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3846 unsigned short snum;
3847 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3850 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3852 if (family == PF_INET) {
3853 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3854 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3855 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3857 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3858 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3859 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3865 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3867 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3868 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3872 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3873 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3874 ad.u.net.family = family;
3875 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3877 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3883 switch (isec->sclass) {
3884 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3885 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3888 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3889 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3892 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3893 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3897 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3901 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3905 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3906 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3907 ad.u.net.family = family;
3909 if (family == PF_INET)
3910 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3912 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3914 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3915 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3923 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3925 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3926 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3929 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3934 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3936 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3937 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3938 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3939 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3940 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3941 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3942 unsigned short snum;
3945 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3946 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3947 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3949 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3951 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3952 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3954 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3957 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3961 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3962 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3964 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3965 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3966 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3967 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3972 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3978 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3980 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3983 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3986 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3987 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3989 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3993 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3995 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3996 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3997 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3998 newisec->initialized = 1;
4003 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4008 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
4012 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
4015 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4016 int size, int flags)
4018 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
4021 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4023 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4026 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4028 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4031 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4035 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4039 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4042 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4045 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4048 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4050 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4053 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
4054 struct socket *other,
4057 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4058 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4059 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4060 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4063 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
4067 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4068 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4070 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4071 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4073 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4075 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4079 /* connecting socket */
4080 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4081 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
4083 /* server child socket */
4084 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
4085 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
4086 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
4091 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4092 struct socket *other)
4094 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4095 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4096 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4099 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4100 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4102 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4103 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4105 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4106 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4113 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4115 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4121 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4124 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4125 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4129 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4132 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4133 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4136 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4137 struct sk_buff *skb,
4138 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4143 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4145 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4146 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4148 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4149 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4152 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4153 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4154 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4155 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4157 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4158 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4159 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4160 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4162 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4163 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4164 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4165 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4168 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4169 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4174 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4177 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4181 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4184 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4190 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4191 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4192 if (unlikely(err)) {
4194 "SELinux: failure in"
4195 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4196 " network port label not found\n");
4199 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4202 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4206 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4208 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4209 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4212 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4213 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4214 ad.u.net.family = family;
4215 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4219 if (selinux_compat_net)
4220 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4222 else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4223 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4228 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4229 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4232 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4233 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4235 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4237 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4240 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4246 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4249 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4250 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4251 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4252 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4257 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4260 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4261 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4264 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4265 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4266 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4267 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4268 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4269 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4271 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4272 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4273 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4276 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4277 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4278 ad.u.net.family = family;
4279 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4283 if (peerlbl_active) {
4286 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4289 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4292 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4295 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4298 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4301 if (secmark_active) {
4302 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4311 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4312 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4317 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4318 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4319 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4321 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4323 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4324 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4325 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4326 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4328 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4333 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4338 if (scontext_len > len) {
4343 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4347 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4355 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4357 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4360 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4362 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4365 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4369 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4370 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4372 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4375 *secid = peer_secid;
4376 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4381 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4383 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4386 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4388 sk_free_security(sk);
4391 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4393 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4394 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4396 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4397 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4398 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4400 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4403 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4406 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4408 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4410 *secid = sksec->sid;
4414 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4416 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4417 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4419 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4420 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4421 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4422 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4425 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4426 struct request_sock *req)
4428 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4430 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4434 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4435 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4438 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4441 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4442 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4443 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4447 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4451 req->secid = newsid;
4452 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4456 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4457 const struct request_sock *req)
4459 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4461 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4462 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4463 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4464 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4465 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4466 time it will have been created and available. */
4468 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4469 * thread with access to newsksec */
4470 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4473 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4475 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4476 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4478 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4479 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4482 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4484 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4487 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4490 fl->secid = req->secid;
4493 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4497 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4498 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4499 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4501 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4505 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4507 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4509 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4510 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4511 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4512 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4513 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4514 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4524 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4529 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4531 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4537 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4542 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4545 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4546 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4547 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4548 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4551 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4554 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4555 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4556 ad.u.net.family = family;
4557 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4560 if (peerlbl_active) {
4561 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4564 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4570 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4571 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4575 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4576 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4577 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4579 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4585 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4586 struct sk_buff *skb,
4587 const struct net_device *in,
4588 const struct net_device *out,
4589 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4591 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4594 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4595 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4596 struct sk_buff *skb,
4597 const struct net_device *in,
4598 const struct net_device *out,
4599 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4601 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4605 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4610 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4613 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4614 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4615 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4617 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4620 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4621 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4627 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4628 struct sk_buff *skb,
4629 const struct net_device *in,
4630 const struct net_device *out,
4631 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4633 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4636 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4638 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4639 u16 family, char *addrp)
4642 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4644 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4645 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4647 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4648 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4651 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4652 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4653 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4654 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4656 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4657 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4658 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4659 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4661 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4662 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4663 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4664 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4667 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4668 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4673 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4676 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4679 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4682 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4689 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4690 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4691 if (unlikely(err)) {
4693 "SELinux: failure in"
4694 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4695 " network port label not found\n");
4698 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4701 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4705 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4706 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4707 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4713 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4715 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4716 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4717 ad.u.net.family = family;
4718 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4721 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4722 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4723 &ad, family, addrp))
4725 } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4726 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4727 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4731 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4732 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4738 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4744 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4749 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4750 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4751 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4752 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4753 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4754 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4756 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4757 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4758 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4759 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4760 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4761 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4762 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4765 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4766 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4767 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4770 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4771 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4772 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4773 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4778 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4779 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4781 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4784 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4785 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4787 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4792 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4793 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4796 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4798 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4799 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4800 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4803 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4804 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4805 ad.u.net.family = family;
4806 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4810 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4811 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4814 if (peerlbl_active) {
4818 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4820 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4821 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4824 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4826 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4827 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4834 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4835 struct sk_buff *skb,
4836 const struct net_device *in,
4837 const struct net_device *out,
4838 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4840 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4843 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4844 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4845 struct sk_buff *skb,
4846 const struct net_device *in,
4847 const struct net_device *out,
4848 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4850 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4854 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4856 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4860 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4864 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4865 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4870 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4873 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4875 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4879 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4880 ad.u.cap = capability;
4882 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4883 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4886 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4887 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4890 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4893 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4897 sid = task_sid(task);
4898 isec->sclass = sclass;
4900 perm->security = isec;
4905 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4907 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4908 perm->security = NULL;
4912 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4914 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4916 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4920 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4921 msg->security = msec;
4926 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4928 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4930 msg->security = NULL;
4934 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4937 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4938 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4939 u32 sid = current_sid();
4941 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4943 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4944 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4946 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4949 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4951 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4954 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4956 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4959 /* message queue security operations */
4960 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4962 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4963 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4964 u32 sid = current_sid();
4967 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4971 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4973 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4974 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4976 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4979 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4985 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4987 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4990 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4992 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4993 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4994 u32 sid = current_sid();
4996 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4998 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4999 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5001 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5002 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5005 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5013 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5014 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5017 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5020 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5023 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5029 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5033 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5035 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5036 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5037 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5038 u32 sid = current_sid();
5041 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5042 msec = msg->security;
5045 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5047 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5049 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5050 * message queue this message will be stored in
5052 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5058 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5059 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5061 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5062 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5065 /* Can this process send the message */
5066 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5069 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5070 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5071 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5076 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5077 struct task_struct *target,
5078 long type, int mode)
5080 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5081 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5082 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5083 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5086 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5087 msec = msg->security;
5089 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5090 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5092 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5093 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5095 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5096 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5100 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5101 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5103 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5104 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5105 u32 sid = current_sid();
5108 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5112 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5114 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5115 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5117 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5120 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5126 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5128 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5131 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5133 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5134 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5135 u32 sid = current_sid();
5137 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5139 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5140 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5142 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5143 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5146 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5147 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5155 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5156 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5159 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5162 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5169 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5175 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5179 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5180 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5185 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5189 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5192 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5194 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5197 /* Semaphore security operations */
5198 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5200 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5201 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5202 u32 sid = current_sid();
5205 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5209 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5211 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5212 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5214 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5217 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5223 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5225 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5228 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5230 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5231 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5232 u32 sid = current_sid();
5234 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5236 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5237 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5239 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5240 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5243 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5244 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5252 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5253 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5257 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5268 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5271 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5275 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5281 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5285 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5286 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5291 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5295 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5298 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5304 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5306 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5311 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5314 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5316 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5320 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5323 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5326 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5327 char *name, char **value)
5329 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5335 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5341 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5343 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5345 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5347 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5348 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5349 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5350 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5351 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5352 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5353 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5354 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5362 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5372 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5373 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5375 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5376 struct task_struct *tracer;
5383 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5384 security attributes. */
5389 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5390 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5391 * above restriction is ever removed.
5393 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5394 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5395 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5396 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5397 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5398 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5399 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5400 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5401 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5402 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5408 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5409 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5410 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5414 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5415 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5416 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5418 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5425 new = prepare_creds();
5429 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5430 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5431 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5432 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5433 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5434 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5435 tsec = new->security;
5436 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5437 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5438 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5439 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5440 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5441 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5444 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5445 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5446 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5447 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5452 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5454 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5455 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5460 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5461 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5462 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5466 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5467 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5470 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5472 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5476 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5477 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5496 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5498 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5501 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5503 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5506 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5513 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5514 unsigned long flags)
5516 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5517 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5519 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5523 tsec = cred->security;
5524 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5525 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5527 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5533 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5535 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5541 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5542 const struct cred *cred,
5546 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5549 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5550 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5551 appear to be created. */
5555 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5557 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5558 ksec = key->security;
5560 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5563 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5565 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5566 char *context = NULL;
5570 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5579 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5582 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5583 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5584 .capget = selinux_capget,
5585 .capset = selinux_capset,
5586 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5587 .capable = selinux_capable,
5588 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5589 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5590 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5591 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5593 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5594 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5596 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5597 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5598 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5599 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5601 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5602 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5603 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5604 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5605 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5606 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5607 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5608 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5609 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5610 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5611 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5614 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5615 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5616 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5617 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5618 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5619 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5620 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5621 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5622 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5623 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5624 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5625 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5626 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5627 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5628 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5629 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5630 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5631 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5632 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5633 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5634 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5635 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5636 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5637 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5638 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5639 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5640 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5642 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5643 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5644 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5645 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5646 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5647 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5648 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5649 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5650 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5651 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5652 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5654 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5656 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5657 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5658 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5659 .cred_commit = selinux_cred_commit,
5660 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5661 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5662 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5663 .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid,
5664 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5665 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5666 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5667 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5668 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5669 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5670 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5671 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5672 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5673 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5674 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5675 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5676 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5677 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5678 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5679 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5680 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5682 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5683 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5685 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5686 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5688 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5689 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5690 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5691 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5692 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5693 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5695 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5696 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5697 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5698 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5699 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5701 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5702 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5703 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5704 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5705 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5707 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5709 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5710 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5712 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5713 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5714 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5716 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5717 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5719 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5720 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5721 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5722 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5723 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5724 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5725 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5726 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5727 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5728 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5729 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5730 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5731 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5732 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5733 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5734 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5735 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5736 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5737 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5738 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5739 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5740 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5741 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5742 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5743 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5745 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5746 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5747 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5748 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5749 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5750 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5751 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5752 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5753 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5754 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5755 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5759 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5760 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5761 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5762 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5766 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5767 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5768 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5769 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5773 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5775 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5776 selinux_enabled = 0;
5780 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5781 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5785 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5787 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5788 cred_init_security();
5790 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5791 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5792 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5795 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5797 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5798 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5799 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5801 if (selinux_enforcing)
5802 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5804 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5809 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5811 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5813 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5814 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5815 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5816 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5818 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5819 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5820 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5821 struct superblock_security_struct,
5823 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5825 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5826 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5827 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5829 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5831 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5832 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5833 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5836 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5837 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5840 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5841 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5842 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5844 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5846 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5848 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5849 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5851 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5852 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5855 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5856 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5858 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5859 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5862 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5863 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5865 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5866 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5870 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5872 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5874 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5875 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5877 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5878 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5881 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5882 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5884 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5885 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5891 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5895 if (!selinux_enabled)
5898 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5900 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5902 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5904 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5905 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5907 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5914 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5916 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5917 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5919 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5921 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5922 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5923 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5928 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5930 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5931 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5934 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5936 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5937 static int selinux_disabled;
5939 int selinux_disable(void)
5941 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5943 if (ss_initialized) {
5944 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5948 if (selinux_disabled) {
5949 /* Only do this once. */
5953 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5955 selinux_disabled = 1;
5956 selinux_enabled = 0;
5958 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5959 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5961 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5962 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5964 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */