security/selinux/hooks.c

   1 /*
   2  *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
   3  *
   4  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
   5  *
   6  *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
   7  *            Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
   8  *            Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
   9  *            James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  10  *
  11  *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  12  *  Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  13  *                                         Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
  14  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  15  *                          <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
  16  *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  17  *              Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
  18  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
  19  *                     Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
  20  *
  21  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  22  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
  23  *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  24  */
  25
  26 #include <linux/init.h>
  27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
  29 #include <linux/errno.h>
  30 #include <linux/sched.h>
  31 #include <linux/security.h>
  32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  33 #include <linux/capability.h>
  34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
  35 #include <linux/mm.h>
  36 #include <linux/mman.h>
  37 #include <linux/slab.h>
  38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  39 #include <linux/swap.h>
  40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
  42 #include <linux/file.h>
  43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
  44 #include <linux/namei.h>
  45 #include <linux/mount.h>
  46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
  47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
  48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
  49 #include <linux/tty.h>
  50 #include <net/icmp.h>
  51 #include <net/ip.h>             /* for local_port_range[] */
  52 #include <net/tcp.h>            /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
  53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
  54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
  55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
  56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
  57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
  58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
  59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
  60 #include <linux/netdevice.h>    /* for network interface checks */
  61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
  62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
  63 #include <linux/udp.h>
  64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
  65 #include <linux/quota.h>
  66 #include <linux/un.h>           /* for Unix socket types */
  67 #include <net/af_unix.h>        /* for Unix socket types */
  68 #include <linux/parser.h>
  69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
  70 #include <net/ipv6.h>
  71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  72 #include <linux/personality.h>
  73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
  74 #include <linux/audit.h>
  75 #include <linux/string.h>
  76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
  77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
  78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
  79
  80 #include "avc.h"
  81 #include "objsec.h"
  82 #include "netif.h"
  83 #include "netnode.h"
  84 #include "netport.h"
  85 #include "xfrm.h"
  86 #include "netlabel.h"
  87 #include "audit.h"
  88
  89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
  90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
  91
  92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
  93
  94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
  95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
  96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
  97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
  98
  99 /* SECMARK reference count */
 100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 101
 102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
 103 int selinux_enforcing;
 104
 105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
 106 {
 107         unsigned long enforcing;
 108         if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
 109                 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
 110         return 1;
 111 }
 112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
 113 #endif
 114
 115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
 116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
 117
 118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 119 {
 120         unsigned long enabled;
 121         if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
 122                 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
 123         return 1;
 124 }
 125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 126 #else
 127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 128 #endif
 129
 130
 131 /*
 132  * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
 133  * just to allow the use of the capability module.
 134  */
 135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
 136
 137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
 138    before the policy was loaded. */
 139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
 140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
 141
 142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
 143
 144 /**
 145  * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
 146  *
 147  * Description:
 148  * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
 149  * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
 150  * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
 151  * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
 152  *
 153  */
 154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
 155 {
 156         return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
 157 }
 158
 159 /*
 160  * initialise the security for the init task
 161  */
 162 static void cred_init_security(void)
 163 {
 164         struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
 165         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 166
 167         tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 168         if (!tsec)
 169                 panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
 170
 171         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
 172         cred->security = tsec;
 173 }
 174
 175 /*
 176  * get the security ID of a set of credentials
 177  */
 178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
 179 {
 180         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 181
 182         tsec = cred->security;
 183         return tsec->sid;
 184 }
 185
 186 /*
 187  * get the objective security ID of a task
 188  */
 189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
 190 {
 191         u32 sid;
 192
 193         rcu_read_lock();
 194         sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
 195         rcu_read_unlock();
 196         return sid;
 197 }
 198
 199 /*
 200  * get the subjective security ID of the current task
 201  */
 202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
 203 {
 204         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
 205
 206         return tsec->sid;
 207 }
 208
 209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 210
 211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 212 {
 213         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 214         u32 sid = current_sid();
 215
 216         isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
 217         if (!isec)
 218                 return -ENOMEM;
 219
 220         mutex_init(&isec->lock);
 221         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
 222         isec->inode = inode;
 223         isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 224         isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
 225         isec->task_sid = sid;
 226         inode->i_security = isec;
 227
 228         return 0;
 229 }
 230
 231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 232 {
 233         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 234         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 235
 236         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 237         if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
 238                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 239         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 240
 241         inode->i_security = NULL;
 242         kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
 243 }
 244
 245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 246 {
 247         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
 248         u32 sid = current_sid();
 249
 250         fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 251         if (!fsec)
 252                 return -ENOMEM;
 253
 254         fsec->sid = sid;
 255         fsec->fown_sid = sid;
 256         file->f_security = fsec;
 257
 258         return 0;
 259 }
 260
 261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
 262 {
 263         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 264         file->f_security = NULL;
 265         kfree(fsec);
 266 }
 267
 268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 269 {
 270         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 271
 272         sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 273         if (!sbsec)
 274                 return -ENOMEM;
 275
 276         mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
 277         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
 278         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
 279         spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 280         sbsec->sb = sb;
 281         sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 282         sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
 283         sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 284         sb->s_security = sbsec;
 285
 286         return 0;
 287 }
 288
 289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 290 {
 291         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 292
 293         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 294         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 295                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
 296         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 297
 298         sb->s_security = NULL;
 299         kfree(sbsec);
 300 }
 301
 302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 303 {
 304         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 305
 306         ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
 307         if (!ssec)
 308                 return -ENOMEM;
 309
 310         ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 311         ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 312         sk->sk_security = ssec;
 313
 314         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
 315
 316         return 0;
 317 }
 318
 319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 320 {
 321         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
 322
 323         sk->sk_security = NULL;
 324         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
 325         kfree(ssec);
 326 }
 327
 328 /* The security server must be initialized before
 329    any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
 330 extern int ss_initialized;
 331
 332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
 333
 334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
 335         "uses xattr",
 336         "uses transition SIDs",
 337         "uses task SIDs",
 338         "uses genfs_contexts",
 339         "not configured for labeling",
 340         "uses mountpoint labeling",
 341 };
 342
 343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
 344
 345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
 346 {
 347         return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
 348 }
 349
 350 enum {
 351         Opt_error = -1,
 352         Opt_context = 1,
 353         Opt_fscontext = 2,
 354         Opt_defcontext = 3,
 355         Opt_rootcontext = 4,
 356         Opt_labelsupport = 5,
 357 };
 358
 359 static const match_table_t tokens = {
 360         {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 361         {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 362         {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 363         {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 364         {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
 365         {Opt_error, NULL},
 366 };
 367
 368 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
 369
 370 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
 371                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 372                         const struct cred *cred)
 373 {
 374         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 375         int rc;
 376
 377         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 378                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 379         if (rc)
 380                 return rc;
 381
 382         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 383                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
 384         return rc;
 385 }
 386
 387 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
 388                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 389                         const struct cred *cred)
 390 {
 391         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
 392         int rc;
 393         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 394                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 395         if (rc)
 396                 return rc;
 397
 398         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 399                           FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
 400         return rc;
 401 }
 402
 403 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 404 {
 405         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 406         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 407         struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
 408         int rc = 0;
 409
 410         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 411                 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
 412                    error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
 413                    the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
 414                    the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
 415                    assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
 416                 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
 417                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
 418                                "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 419                         rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 420                         goto out;
 421                 }
 422                 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
 423                 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
 424                         if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 425                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 426                                        "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
 427                                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 428                         else
 429                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 430                                        "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
 431                                        sb->s_type->name, -rc);
 432                         goto out;
 433                 }
 434         }
 435
 436         sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
 437
 438         if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
 439                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
 440                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 441         else
 442                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
 443                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
 444                        labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 445
 446         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
 447             sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
 448             sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
 449             sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
 450                 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
 451
 452         /* Initialize the root inode. */
 453         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 454
 455         /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
 456            inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
 457            during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
 458            populates itself. */
 459         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 460 next_inode:
 461         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
 462                 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
 463                                 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
 464                                            struct inode_security_struct, list);
 465                 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
 466                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 467                 inode = igrab(inode);
 468                 if (inode) {
 469                         if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
 470                                 inode_doinit(inode);
 471                         iput(inode);
 472                 }
 473                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 474                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 475                 goto next_inode;
 476         }
 477         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 478 out:
 479         return rc;
 480 }
 481
 482 /*
 483  * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
 484  * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
 485  * mount options, or whatever.
 486  */
 487 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 488                                 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 489 {
 490         int rc = 0, i;
 491         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 492         char *context = NULL;
 493         u32 len;
 494         char tmp;
 495
 496         security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
 497
 498         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 499                 return -EINVAL;
 500
 501         if (!ss_initialized)
 502                 return -EINVAL;
 503
 504         tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 505         /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
 506         for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
 507                 if (tmp & 0x01)
 508                         opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 509                 tmp >>= 1;
 510         }
 511         /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
 512         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
 513                 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 514
 515         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 516         if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
 517                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 518                 goto out_free;
 519         }
 520
 521         opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
 522         if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
 523                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 524                 goto out_free;
 525         }
 526
 527         i = 0;
 528         if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
 529                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
 530                 if (rc)
 531                         goto out_free;
 532                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 533                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 534         }
 535         if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
 536                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
 537                 if (rc)
 538                         goto out_free;
 539                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 540                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
 541         }
 542         if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
 543                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
 544                 if (rc)
 545                         goto out_free;
 546                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 547                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 548         }
 549         if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
 550                 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
 551                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
 552
 553                 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
 554                 if (rc)
 555                         goto out_free;
 556                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 557                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 558         }
 559         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
 560                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
 561                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
 562         }
 563
 564         BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
 565
 566         return 0;
 567
 568 out_free:
 569         security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
 570         return rc;
 571 }
 572
 573 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
 574                       u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 575 {
 576         char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
 577
 578         /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
 579         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
 580                 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
 581                     (old_sid != new_sid))
 582                         return 1;
 583
 584         /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
 585          * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
 586          */
 587         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
 588                 if (mnt_flags & flag)
 589                         return 1;
 590         return 0;
 591 }
 592
 593 /*
 594  * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
 595  * labeling information.
 596  */
 597 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 598                                 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 599 {
 600         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 601         int rc = 0, i;
 602         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 603         const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
 604         struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
 605         struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
 606         u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
 607         u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
 608         char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
 609         int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
 610         int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
 611
 612         mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 613
 614         if (!ss_initialized) {
 615                 if (!num_opts) {
 616                         /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 617                            after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 618                            server is ready to handle calls. */
 619                         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 620                         if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 621                                 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
 622                         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 623                         goto out;
 624                 }
 625                 rc = -EINVAL;
 626                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
 627                         "before the security server is initialized\n");
 628                 goto out;
 629         }
 630
 631         /*
 632          * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice.  Once
 633          * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
 634          * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
 635          * we need to skip the double mount verification.
 636          *
 637          * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
 638          * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
 639          * this sb does not set any security options.  (The first options
 640          * will be used for both mounts)
 641          */
 642         if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
 643             && (num_opts == 0))
 644                 goto out;
 645
 646         /*
 647          * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
 648          * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
 649          * than once with different security options.
 650          */
 651         for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
 652                 u32 sid;
 653
 654                 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
 655                         continue;
 656                 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
 657                                              strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
 658                 if (rc) {
 659                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 660                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 661                                mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
 662                         goto out;
 663                 }
 664                 switch (flags[i]) {
 665                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
 666                         fscontext_sid = sid;
 667
 668                         if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
 669                                         fscontext_sid))
 670                                 goto out_double_mount;
 671
 672                         sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 673                         break;
 674                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
 675                         context_sid = sid;
 676
 677                         if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
 678                                         context_sid))
 679                                 goto out_double_mount;
 680
 681                         sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
 682                         break;
 683                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
 684                         rootcontext_sid = sid;
 685
 686                         if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
 687                                         rootcontext_sid))
 688                                 goto out_double_mount;
 689
 690                         sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 691
 692                         break;
 693                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
 694                         defcontext_sid = sid;
 695
 696                         if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
 697                                         defcontext_sid))
 698                                 goto out_double_mount;
 699
 700                         sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 701
 702                         break;
 703                 default:
 704                         rc = -EINVAL;
 705                         goto out;
 706                 }
 707         }
 708
 709         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
 710                 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
 711                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
 712                         goto out_double_mount;
 713                 rc = 0;
 714                 goto out;
 715         }
 716
 717         if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
 718                 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
 719
 720         /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
 721         rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
 722         if (rc) {
 723                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 724                        __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
 725                 goto out;
 726         }
 727
 728         /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
 729         if (fscontext_sid) {
 730                 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
 731                 if (rc)
 732                         goto out;
 733
 734                 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
 735         }
 736
 737         /*
 738          * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
 739          * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
 740          * the superblock context if not already set.
 741          */
 742         if (context_sid) {
 743                 if (!fscontext_sid) {
 744                         rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 745                                                           cred);
 746                         if (rc)
 747                                 goto out;
 748                         sbsec->sid = context_sid;
 749                 } else {
 750                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
 751                                                              cred);
 752                         if (rc)
 753                                 goto out;
 754                 }
 755                 if (!rootcontext_sid)
 756                         rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
 757
 758                 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
 759                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 760         }
 761
 762         if (rootcontext_sid) {
 763                 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
 764                                                      cred);
 765                 if (rc)
 766                         goto out;
 767
 768                 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
 769                 root_isec->initialized = 1;
 770         }
 771
 772         if (defcontext_sid) {
 773                 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 774                         rc = -EINVAL;
 775                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
 776                                "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
 777                         goto out;
 778                 }
 779
 780                 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
 781                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
 782                                                              sbsec, cred);
 783                         if (rc)
 784                                 goto out;
 785                 }
 786
 787                 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
 788         }
 789
 790         rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
 791 out:
 792         mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
 793         return rc;
 794 out_double_mount:
 795         rc = -EINVAL;
 796         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different "
 797                "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
 798         goto out;
 799 }
 800
 801 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 802                                         struct super_block *newsb)
 803 {
 804         const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
 805         struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
 806
 807         int set_fscontext =     (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
 808         int set_context =       (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
 809         int set_rootcontext =   (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
 810
 811         /*
 812          * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
 813          * mount options.  thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
 814          * with it later
 815          */
 816         if (!ss_initialized) {
 817                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 818                 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
 819                         list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
 820                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 821                 return;
 822         }
 823
 824         /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
 825         BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
 826
 827         /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
 828         if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
 829                 return;
 830
 831         mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
 832
 833         newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
 834
 835         newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
 836         newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
 837         newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
 838
 839         if (set_context) {
 840                 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
 841
 842                 if (!set_fscontext)
 843                         newsbsec->sid = sid;
 844                 if (!set_rootcontext) {
 845                         struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
 846                         struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
 847                         newisec->sid = sid;
 848                 }
 849                 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
 850         }
 851         if (set_rootcontext) {
 852                 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
 853                 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
 854                 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
 855                 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
 856
 857                 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
 858         }
 859
 860         sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
 861         mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
 862 }
 863
 864 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
 865                                   struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 866 {
 867         char *p;
 868         char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
 869         char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
 870         int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
 871
 872         opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
 873
 874         /* Standard string-based options. */
 875         while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
 876                 int token;
 877                 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 878
 879                 if (!*p)
 880                         continue;
 881
 882                 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
 883
 884                 switch (token) {
 885                 case Opt_context:
 886                         if (context || defcontext) {
 887                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 888                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 889                                 goto out_err;
 890                         }
 891                         context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 892                         if (!context) {
 893                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 894                                 goto out_err;
 895                         }
 896                         break;
 897
 898                 case Opt_fscontext:
 899                         if (fscontext) {
 900                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 901                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 902                                 goto out_err;
 903                         }
 904                         fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 905                         if (!fscontext) {
 906                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 907                                 goto out_err;
 908                         }
 909                         break;
 910
 911                 case Opt_rootcontext:
 912                         if (rootcontext) {
 913                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 914                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 915                                 goto out_err;
 916                         }
 917                         rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 918                         if (!rootcontext) {
 919                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 920                                 goto out_err;
 921                         }
 922                         break;
 923
 924                 case Opt_defcontext:
 925                         if (context || defcontext) {
 926                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 927                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 928                                 goto out_err;
 929                         }
 930                         defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 931                         if (!defcontext) {
 932                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 933                                 goto out_err;
 934                         }
 935                         break;
 936                 case Opt_labelsupport:
 937                         break;
 938                 default:
 939                         rc = -EINVAL;
 940                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount option\n");
 941                         goto out_err;
 942
 943                 }
 944         }
 945
 946         rc = -ENOMEM;
 947         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 948         if (!opts->mnt_opts)
 949                 goto out_err;
 950
 951         opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
 952         if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
 953                 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
 954                 goto out_err;
 955         }
 956
 957         if (fscontext) {
 958                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
 959                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 960         }
 961         if (context) {
 962                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
 963                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
 964         }
 965         if (rootcontext) {
 966                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
 967                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 968         }
 969         if (defcontext) {
 970                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
 971                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 972         }
 973
 974         opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
 975         return 0;
 976
 977 out_err:
 978         kfree(context);
 979         kfree(defcontext);
 980         kfree(fscontext);
 981         kfree(rootcontext);
 982         return rc;
 983 }
 984 /*
 985  * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
 986  */
 987 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 988 {
 989         int rc = 0;
 990         char *options = data;
 991         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
 992
 993         security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
 994
 995         if (!data)
 996                 goto out;
 997
 998         BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
 999
1000         rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1001         if (rc)
1002                 goto out_err;
1003
1004 out:
1005         rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1006
1007 out_err:
1008         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1009         return rc;
1010 }
1011
1012 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1013                                struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1014 {
1015         int i;
1016         char *prefix;
1017
1018         for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1019                 char *has_comma;
1020
1021                 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1022                         has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1023                 else
1024                         has_comma = NULL;
1025
1026                 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1027                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
1028                         prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1029                         break;
1030                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
1031                         prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1032                         break;
1033                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1034                         prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1035                         break;
1036                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1037                         prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1038                         break;
1039                 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1040                         seq_putc(m, ',');
1041                         seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1042                         continue;
1043                 default:
1044                         BUG();
1045                 };
1046                 /* we need a comma before each option */
1047                 seq_putc(m, ',');
1048                 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1049                 if (has_comma)
1050                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1051                 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1052                 if (has_comma)
1053                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
1054         }
1055 }
1056
1057 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1058 {
1059         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1060         int rc;
1061
1062         rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1063         if (rc) {
1064                 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1065                 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1066                         rc = 0;
1067                 return rc;
1068         }
1069
1070         selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1071
1072         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1073
1074         return rc;
1075 }
1076
1077 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1078 {
1079         switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1080         case S_IFSOCK:
1081                 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1082         case S_IFLNK:
1083                 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1084         case S_IFREG:
1085                 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1086         case S_IFBLK:
1087                 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1088         case S_IFDIR:
1089                 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1090         case S_IFCHR:
1091                 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1092         case S_IFIFO:
1093                 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1094
1095         }
1096
1097         return SECCLASS_FILE;
1098 }
1099
1100 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1101 {
1102         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1103 }
1104
1105 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1106 {
1107         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1108 }
1109
1110 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1111 {
1112         switch (family) {
1113         case PF_UNIX:
1114                 switch (type) {
1115                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1116                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1117                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1118                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1119                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1120                 }
1121                 break;
1122         case PF_INET:
1123         case PF_INET6:
1124                 switch (type) {
1125                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1126                         if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1127                                 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1128                         else
1129                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1130                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1131                         if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1132                                 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1133                         else
1134                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1135                 case SOCK_DCCP:
1136                         return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1137                 default:
1138                         return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1139                 }
1140                 break;
1141         case PF_NETLINK:
1142                 switch (protocol) {
1143                 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1144                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1145                 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1146                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1147                 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1148                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1149                 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1150                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1151                 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1152                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1153                 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1154                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1155                 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1156                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1157                 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1158                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1159                 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1160                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1161                 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1162                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1163                 default:
1164                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1165                 }
1166         case PF_PACKET:
1167                 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1168         case PF_KEY:
1169                 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1170         case PF_APPLETALK:
1171                 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1172         }
1173
1174         return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1175 }
1176
1177 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1178 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1179                                 u16 tclass,
1180                                 u32 *sid)
1181 {
1182         int buflen, rc;
1183         char *buffer, *path, *end;
1184
1185         buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1186         if (!buffer)
1187                 return -ENOMEM;
1188
1189         buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1190         end = buffer+buflen;
1191         *--end = '\0';
1192         buflen--;
1193         path = end-1;
1194         *path = '/';
1195         while (de && de != de->parent) {
1196                 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1197                 if (buflen < 0)
1198                         break;
1199                 end -= de->namelen;
1200                 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1201                 *--end = '/';
1202                 path = end;
1203                 de = de->parent;
1204         }
1205         rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1206         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1207         return rc;
1208 }
1209 #else
1210 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1211                                 u16 tclass,
1212                                 u32 *sid)
1213 {
1214         return -EINVAL;
1215 }
1216 #endif
1217
1218 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1219 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1220 {
1221         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1222         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1223         u32 sid;
1224         struct dentry *dentry;
1225 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1226         char *context = NULL;
1227         unsigned len = 0;
1228         int rc = 0;
1229
1230         if (isec->initialized)
1231                 goto out;
1232
1233         mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1234         if (isec->initialized)
1235                 goto out_unlock;
1236
1237         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1238         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1239                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1240                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1241                    server is ready to handle calls. */
1242                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1243                 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1244                         list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1245                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1246                 goto out_unlock;
1247         }
1248
1249         switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1250         case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1251                 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1252                         isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1253                         break;
1254                 }
1255
1256                 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257                    Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1258                 if (opt_dentry) {
1259                         /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260                         dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1261                 } else {
1262                         /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263                         dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1264                 }
1265                 if (!dentry) {
1266                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  no dentry for dev=%s "
1267                                "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1268                                inode->i_ino);
1269                         goto out_unlock;
1270                 }
1271
1272                 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1273                 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1274                 if (!context) {
1275                         rc = -ENOMEM;
1276                         dput(dentry);
1277                         goto out_unlock;
1278                 }
1279                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1280                                            context, len);
1281                 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1282                         /* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
1283                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1284                                                    NULL, 0);
1285                         if (rc < 0) {
1286                                 dput(dentry);
1287                                 goto out_unlock;
1288                         }
1289                         kfree(context);
1290                         len = rc;
1291                         context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1292                         if (!context) {
1293                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1294                                 dput(dentry);
1295                                 goto out_unlock;
1296                         }
1297                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1298                                                    XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1299                                                    context, len);
1300                 }
1301                 dput(dentry);
1302                 if (rc < 0) {
1303                         if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1304                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  getxattr returned "
1305                                        "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1306                                        -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1307                                 kfree(context);
1308                                 goto out_unlock;
1309                         }
1310                         /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1311                         sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1312                         rc = 0;
1313                 } else {
1314                         rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1315                                                              sbsec->def_sid,
1316                                                              GFP_NOFS);
1317                         if (rc) {
1318                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
1319                                        "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1320                                        __func__, context, -rc,
1321                                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1322                                 kfree(context);
1323                                 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1324                                 rc = 0;
1325                                 break;
1326                         }
1327                 }
1328                 kfree(context);
1329                 isec->sid = sid;
1330                 break;
1331         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1332                 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1333                 break;
1334         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1335                 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1336                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1337
1338                 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1339                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1340                 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1341                                              sbsec->sid,
1342                                              isec->sclass,
1343                                              &sid);
1344                 if (rc)
1345                         goto out_unlock;
1346                 isec->sid = sid;
1347                 break;
1348         case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1349                 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1350                 break;
1351         default:
1352                 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1353                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1354
1355                 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1356                         struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1357                         if (proci->pde) {
1358                                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1359                                 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1360                                                           isec->sclass,
1361                                                           &sid);
1362                                 if (rc)
1363                                         goto out_unlock;
1364                                 isec->sid = sid;
1365                         }
1366                 }
1367                 break;
1368         }
1369
1370         isec->initialized = 1;
1371
1372 out_unlock:
1373         mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1374 out:
1375         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1376                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1377         return rc;
1378 }
1379
1380 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1381 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1382 {
1383         u32 perm = 0;
1384
1385         switch (sig) {
1386         case SIGCHLD:
1387                 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1388                 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1389                 break;
1390         case SIGKILL:
1391                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1392                 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1393                 break;
1394         case SIGSTOP:
1395                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1396                 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1397                 break;
1398         default:
1399                 /* All other signals. */
1400                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1401                 break;
1402         }
1403
1404         return perm;
1405 }
1406
1407 /*
1408  * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1409  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1410  */
1411 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1412                          const struct cred *target,
1413                          u32 perms)
1414 {
1415         u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1416
1417         return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1418 }
1419
1420 /*
1421  * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1422  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1423  * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1424  * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1425  */
1426 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1427                          const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1428                          u32 perms)
1429 {
1430         const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1431         u32 sid1, sid2;
1432
1433         rcu_read_lock();
1434         __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security;  sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1435         __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security;  sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1436         rcu_read_unlock();
1437         return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1438 }
1439
1440 /*
1441  * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1442  * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1443  * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1444  * - this uses current's subjective creds
1445  */
1446 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1447                             u32 perms)
1448 {
1449         u32 sid, tsid;
1450
1451         sid = current_sid();
1452         tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1453         return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1454 }
1455
1456 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1457 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1458 #endif
1459
1460 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1461 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1462                                const struct cred *cred,
1463                                int cap, int audit)
1464 {
1465         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1466         struct av_decision avd;
1467         u16 sclass;
1468         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1469         u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1470         int rc;
1471
1472         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1473         ad.tsk = tsk;
1474         ad.u.cap = cap;
1475
1476         switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1477         case 0:
1478                 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1479                 break;
1480         case 1:
1481                 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1482                 break;
1483         default:
1484                 printk(KERN_ERR
1485                        "SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1486                 BUG();
1487         }
1488
1489         rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1490         if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1491                 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1492         return rc;
1493 }
1494
1495 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1496 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1497                            u32 perms)
1498 {
1499         u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1500
1501         return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1502                             SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1503 }
1504
1505 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1506    The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1507    data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1508 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1509                           struct inode *inode,
1510                           u32 perms,
1511                           struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1512 {
1513         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1514         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1515         u32 sid;
1516
1517         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1518                 return 0;
1519
1520         sid = cred_sid(cred);
1521         isec = inode->i_security;
1522
1523         if (!adp) {
1524                 adp = &ad;
1525                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1526                 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1527         }
1528
1529         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1530 }
1531
1532 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1533    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1534    pathname if needed. */
1535 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1536                                   struct vfsmount *mnt,
1537                                   struct dentry *dentry,
1538                                   u32 av)
1539 {
1540         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1541         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1542
1543         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1544         ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1545         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1546         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1547 }
1548
1549 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1550    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
1551    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1552    check a particular permission to the file.
1553    Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1554    has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
1555    access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1556    where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1557 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1558                          struct file *file,
1559                          u32 av)
1560 {
1561         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1562         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1563         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1564         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1565         int rc;
1566
1567         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1568         ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1569
1570         if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1571                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1572                                   SECCLASS_FD,
1573                                   FD__USE,
1574                                   &ad);
1575                 if (rc)
1576                         goto out;
1577         }
1578
1579         /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1580         rc = 0;
1581         if (av)
1582                 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1583
1584 out:
1585         return rc;
1586 }
1587
1588 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1589 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1590                       struct dentry *dentry,
1591                       u16 tclass)
1592 {
1593         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1594         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1595         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1596         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1597         u32 sid, newsid;
1598         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1599         int rc;
1600
1601         dsec = dir->i_security;
1602         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1603
1604         sid = tsec->sid;
1605         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1606
1607         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1608         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1609
1610         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1611                           DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1612                           &ad);
1613         if (rc)
1614                 return rc;
1615
1616         if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1617                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1618                 if (rc)
1619                         return rc;
1620         }
1621
1622         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1623         if (rc)
1624                 return rc;
1625
1626         return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1627                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1628                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1629 }
1630
1631 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1632 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1633                           struct task_struct *ctx)
1634 {
1635         u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1636
1637         return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1638 }
1639
1640 #define MAY_LINK        0
1641 #define MAY_UNLINK      1
1642 #define MAY_RMDIR       2
1643
1644 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1645 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1646                     struct dentry *dentry,
1647                     int kind)
1648
1649 {
1650         struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1651         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1652         u32 sid = current_sid();
1653         u32 av;
1654         int rc;
1655
1656         dsec = dir->i_security;
1657         isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1658
1659         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1660         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1661
1662         av = DIR__SEARCH;
1663         av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1664         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1665         if (rc)
1666                 return rc;
1667
1668         switch (kind) {
1669         case MAY_LINK:
1670                 av = FILE__LINK;
1671                 break;
1672         case MAY_UNLINK:
1673                 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1674                 break;
1675         case MAY_RMDIR:
1676                 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1677                 break;
1678         default:
1679                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized kind %d\n",
1680                         __func__, kind);
1681                 return 0;
1682         }
1683
1684         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1685         return rc;
1686 }
1687
1688 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1689                              struct dentry *old_dentry,
1690                              struct inode *new_dir,
1691                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
1692 {
1693         struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1694         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1695         u32 sid = current_sid();
1696         u32 av;
1697         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1698         int rc;
1699
1700         old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1701         old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1702         old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1703         new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1704
1705         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1706
1707         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1708         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1709                           DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1710         if (rc)
1711                 return rc;
1712         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1713                           old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1714         if (rc)
1715                 return rc;
1716         if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1717                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1718                                   old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1719                 if (rc)
1720                         return rc;
1721         }
1722
1723         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1724         av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1725         if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1726                 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1727         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1728         if (rc)
1729                 return rc;
1730         if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1731                 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1732                 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1733                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1734                                   new_isec->sclass,
1735                                   (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1736                 if (rc)
1737                         return rc;
1738         }
1739
1740         return 0;
1741 }
1742
1743 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1744 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1745                                struct super_block *sb,
1746                                u32 perms,
1747                                struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1748 {
1749         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1750         u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1751
1752         sbsec = sb->s_security;
1753         return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1754 }
1755
1756 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1757 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1758 {
1759         u32 av = 0;
1760
1761         if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1762                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1763                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1764                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1765                         av |= FILE__READ;
1766
1767                 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1768                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1769                 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1770                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1771
1772         } else {
1773                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1774                         av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1775                 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1776                         av |= DIR__WRITE;
1777                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1778                         av |= DIR__READ;
1779         }
1780
1781         return av;
1782 }
1783
1784 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1785 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1786 {
1787         u32 av = 0;
1788
1789         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1790                 av |= FILE__READ;
1791         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1792                 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1793                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1794                 else
1795                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1796         }
1797         if (!av) {
1798                 /*
1799                  * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1800                  */
1801                 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1802         }
1803
1804         return av;
1805 }
1806
1807 /*
1808  * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1809  * open permission.
1810  */
1811 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1812 {
1813         u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1814
1815         if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1816                 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1817                 /*
1818                  * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1819                  */
1820                 if (S_ISREG(mode))
1821                         av |= FILE__OPEN;
1822                 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1823                         av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1824                 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1825                         av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1826                 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1827                         av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1828                 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1829                         av |= DIR__OPEN;
1830                 else
1831                         printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1832                                 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1833         }
1834         return av;
1835 }
1836
1837 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1838
1839 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1840                                      unsigned int mode)
1841 {
1842         int rc;
1843
1844         rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1845         if (rc)
1846                 return rc;
1847
1848         if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1849                 u32 sid = current_sid();
1850                 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1851                 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1852         }
1853
1854         return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1855 }
1856
1857 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1858 {
1859         int rc;
1860
1861         rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1862         if (rc)
1863                 return rc;
1864
1865         return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1866 }
1867
1868 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1869                           kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1870 {
1871         int error;
1872
1873         error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1874         if (error)
1875                 return error;
1876
1877         return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1878 }
1879
1880 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1881                           const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1882                           const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1883                           const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1884 {
1885         int error;
1886
1887         error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
1888                                       effective, inheritable, permitted);
1889         if (error)
1890                 return error;
1891
1892         return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1893 }
1894
1895 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1896                            int cap, int audit)
1897 {
1898         int rc;
1899
1900         rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1901         if (rc)
1902                 return rc;
1903
1904         return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1905 }
1906
1907 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1908 {
1909         int buflen, rc;
1910         char *buffer, *path, *end;
1911
1912         rc = -ENOMEM;
1913         buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1914         if (!buffer)
1915                 goto out;
1916
1917         buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1918         end = buffer+buflen;
1919         *--end = '\0';
1920         buflen--;
1921         path = end-1;
1922         *path = '/';
1923         while (table) {
1924                 const char *name = table->procname;
1925                 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1926                 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1927                 if (buflen < 0)
1928                         goto out_free;
1929                 end -= namelen;
1930                 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1931                 *--end = '/';
1932                 path = end;
1933                 table = table->parent;
1934         }
1935         buflen -= 4;
1936         if (buflen < 0)
1937                 goto out_free;
1938         end -= 4;
1939         memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1940         path = end;
1941         rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1942 out_free:
1943         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1944 out:
1945         return rc;
1946 }
1947
1948 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1949 {
1950         int error = 0;
1951         u32 av;
1952         u32 tsid, sid;
1953         int rc;
1954
1955         rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1956         if (rc)
1957                 return rc;
1958
1959         sid = current_sid();
1960
1961         rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1962                                     SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1963         if (rc) {
1964                 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1965                 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1966         }
1967
1968         /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1969          * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1970         if (op == 001) {
1971                 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1972                                      SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1973         } else {
1974                 av = 0;
1975                 if (op & 004)
1976                         av |= FILE__READ;
1977                 if (op & 002)
1978                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1979                 if (av)
1980                         error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1981                                              SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1982         }
1983
1984         return error;
1985 }
1986
1987 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1988 {
1989         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1990         int rc = 0;
1991
1992         if (!sb)
1993                 return 0;
1994
1995         switch (cmds) {
1996         case Q_SYNC:
1997         case Q_QUOTAON:
1998         case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1999         case Q_SETINFO:
2000         case Q_SETQUOTA:
2001                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2002                 break;
2003         case Q_GETFMT:
2004         case Q_GETINFO:
2005         case Q_GETQUOTA:
2006                 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2007                 break;
2008         default:
2009                 rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2010                 break;
2011         }
2012         return rc;
2013 }
2014
2015 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2016 {
2017         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2018
2019         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2020 }
2021
2022 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2023 {
2024         int rc;
2025
2026         rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
2027         if (rc)
2028                 return rc;
2029
2030         switch (type) {
2031         case 3:         /* Read last kernel messages */
2032         case 10:        /* Return size of the log buffer */
2033                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2034                 break;
2035         case 6:         /* Disable logging to console */
2036         case 7:         /* Enable logging to console */
2037         case 8:         /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2038                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2039                 break;
2040         case 0:         /* Close log */
2041         case 1:         /* Open log */
2042         case 2:         /* Read from log */
2043         case 4:         /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2044         case 5:         /* Clear ring buffer */
2045         default:
2046                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2047                 break;
2048         }
2049         return rc;
2050 }
2051
2052 /*
2053  * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2054  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2055  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2056  *
2057  * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
2058  * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
2059  * the capability is granted.
2060  *
2061  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2062  * processes that allocate mappings.
2063  */
2064 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2065 {
2066         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2067
2068         rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2069                              SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2070         if (rc == 0)
2071                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
2072
2073         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2074 }
2075
2076 /* binprm security operations */
2077
2078 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2079 {
2080         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2081         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2082         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2083         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2084         struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2085         int rc;
2086
2087         rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2088         if (rc)
2089                 return rc;
2090
2091         /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2092          * the script interpreter */
2093         if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2094                 return 0;
2095
2096         old_tsec = current_security();
2097         new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2098         isec = inode->i_security;
2099
2100         /* Default to the current task SID. */
2101         new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2102         new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2103
2104         /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2105         new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2106         new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2107         new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2108
2109         if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2110                 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2111                 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2112                 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2113         } else {
2114                 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2115                 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2116                                              SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2117                 if (rc)
2118                         return rc;
2119         }
2120
2121         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2122         ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2123
2124         if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2125                 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2126
2127         if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2128                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2129                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2130                 if (rc)
2131                         return rc;
2132         } else {
2133                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2134                 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2135                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2136                 if (rc)
2137                         return rc;
2138
2139                 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2140                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2141                 if (rc)
2142                         return rc;
2143
2144                 /* Check for shared state */
2145                 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2146                         rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2147                                           SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2148                                           NULL);
2149                         if (rc)
2150                                 return -EPERM;
2151                 }
2152
2153                 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2154                  * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2155                 if (bprm->unsafe &
2156                     (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2157                         struct task_struct *tracer;
2158                         struct task_security_struct *sec;
2159                         u32 ptsid = 0;
2160
2161                         rcu_read_lock();
2162                         tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2163                         if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2164                                 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2165                                 ptsid = sec->sid;
2166                         }
2167                         rcu_read_unlock();
2168
2169                         if (ptsid != 0) {
2170                                 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2171                                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2172                                                   PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2173                                 if (rc)
2174                                         return -EPERM;
2175                         }
2176                 }
2177
2178                 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2179                 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2180         }
2181
2182         return 0;
2183 }
2184
2185 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2186 {
2187         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2188         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2189         u32 sid, osid;
2190         int atsecure = 0;
2191
2192         sid = tsec->sid;
2193         osid = tsec->osid;
2194
2195         if (osid != sid) {
2196                 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2197                    the noatsecure permission is granted between
2198                    the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2199                 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2200                                         SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2201                                         PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2202         }
2203
2204         return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2205 }
2206
2207 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2208 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2209
2210 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2211 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2212                                             struct files_struct *files)
2213 {
2214         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2215         struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2216         struct tty_struct *tty;
2217         struct fdtable *fdt;
2218         long j = -1;
2219         int drop_tty = 0;
2220
2221         tty = get_current_tty();
2222         if (tty) {
2223                 file_list_lock();
2224                 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2225                         struct inode *inode;
2226
2227                         /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2228                            Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2229                            than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2230                            file may belong to another process and we are only
2231                            interested in the inode-based check here. */
2232                         file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2233                         inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2234                         if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2235                                            FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2236                                 drop_tty = 1;
2237                         }
2238                 }
2239                 file_list_unlock();
2240                 tty_kref_put(tty);
2241         }
2242         /* Reset controlling tty. */
2243         if (drop_tty)
2244                 no_tty();
2245
2246         /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2247
2248         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2249
2250         spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2251         for (;;) {
2252                 unsigned long set, i;
2253                 int fd;
2254
2255                 j++;
2256                 i = j * __NFDBITS;
2257                 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2258                 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2259                         break;
2260                 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2261                 if (!set)
2262                         continue;
2263                 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2264                 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2265                         if (set & 1) {
2266                                 file = fget(i);
2267                                 if (!file)
2268                                         continue;
2269                                 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2270                                                   file,
2271                                                   file_to_av(file))) {
2272                                         sys_close(i);
2273                                         fd = get_unused_fd();
2274                                         if (fd != i) {
2275                                                 if (fd >= 0)
2276                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
2277                                                 fput(file);
2278                                                 continue;
2279                                         }
2280                                         if (devnull) {
2281                                                 get_file(devnull);
2282                                         } else {
2283                                                 devnull = dentry_open(
2284                                                         dget(selinux_null),
2285                                                         mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2286                                                         O_RDWR, cred);
2287                                                 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2288                                                         devnull = NULL;
2289                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
2290                                                         fput(file);
2291                                                         continue;
2292                                                 }
2293                                         }
2294                                         fd_install(fd, devnull);
2295                                 }
2296                                 fput(file);
2297                         }
2298                 }
2299                 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2300
2301         }
2302         spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2303 }
2304
2305 /*
2306  * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2307  */
2308 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2309 {
2310         struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2311         struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2312         int rc, i;
2313
2314         secondary_ops->bprm_committing_creds(bprm);
2315
2316         new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2317         if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2318                 return;
2319
2320         /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2321         flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2322
2323         /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2324         current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2325
2326         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2327          * SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2328          * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2329          *
2330          * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2331          * controlled by the setrlimit check.  The inclusion of the init task's
2332          * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2333          * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2334          * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2335          */
2336         rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2337                           PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2338         if (rc) {
2339                 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2340                         rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2341                         initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2342                         rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2343                 }
2344                 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2345         }
2346 }
2347
2348 /*
2349  * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2350  * due to exec
2351  */
2352 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2353 {
2354         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2355         struct itimerval itimer;
2356         struct sighand_struct *psig;
2357         u32 osid, sid;
2358         int rc, i;
2359         unsigned long flags;
2360
2361         secondary_ops->bprm_committed_creds(bprm);
2362
2363         osid = tsec->osid;
2364         sid = tsec->sid;
2365
2366         if (sid == osid)
2367                 return;
2368
2369         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2370          * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2371          * flush and unblock signals.
2372          *
2373          * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2374          * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2375          */
2376         rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2377         if (rc) {
2378                 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2379                 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2380                         do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2381                 flush_signals(current);
2382                 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2383                 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2384                 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2385                 recalc_sigpending();
2386                 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2387         }
2388
2389         /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2390          * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2391         read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2392         psig = current->parent->sighand;
2393         spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2394         wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2395         spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2396         read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2397 }
2398
2399 /* superblock security operations */
2400
2401 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2402 {
2403         return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2404 }
2405
2406 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2407 {
2408         superblock_free_security(sb);
2409 }
2410
2411 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2412 {
2413         if (plen > olen)
2414                 return 0;
2415
2416         return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2417 }
2418
2419 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2420 {
2421         return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2422                 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2423                 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2424                 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2425                 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2426 }
2427
2428 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2429 {
2430         if (!*first) {
2431                 **to = ',';
2432                 *to += 1;
2433         } else
2434                 *first = 0;
2435         memcpy(*to, from, len);
2436         *to += len;
2437 }
2438
2439 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2440                                        int len)
2441 {
2442         int current_size = 0;
2443
2444         if (!*first) {
2445                 **to = '|';
2446                 *to += 1;
2447         } else
2448                 *first = 0;
2449
2450         while (current_size < len) {
2451                 if (*from != '"') {
2452                         **to = *from;
2453                         *to += 1;
2454                 }
2455                 from += 1;
2456                 current_size += 1;
2457         }
2458 }
2459
2460 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2461 {
2462         int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2463         char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2464         char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2465         int open_quote = 0;
2466
2467         in_curr = orig;
2468         sec_curr = copy;
2469
2470         nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2471         if (!nosec) {
2472                 rc = -ENOMEM;
2473                 goto out;
2474         }
2475
2476         nosec_save = nosec;
2477         fnosec = fsec = 1;
2478         in_save = in_end = orig;
2479
2480         do {
2481                 if (*in_end == '"')
2482                         open_quote = !open_quote;
2483                 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2484                                 *in_end == '\0') {
2485                         int len = in_end - in_curr;
2486
2487                         if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2488                                 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2489                         else
2490                                 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2491
2492                         in_curr = in_end + 1;
2493                 }
2494         } while (*in_end++);
2495
2496         strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2497         free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2498 out:
2499         return rc;
2500 }
2501
2502 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2503 {
2504         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2505         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2506         int rc;
2507
2508         rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2509         if (rc)
2510                 return rc;
2511
2512         /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2513         if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2514                 return 0;
2515
2516         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2517         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2518         return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2519 }
2520
2521 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2522 {
2523         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2524         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2525
2526         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2527         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2528         return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2529 }
2530
2531 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2532                          struct path *path,
2533                          char *type,
2534                          unsigned long flags,
2535                          void *data)
2536 {
2537         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2538         int rc;
2539
2540         rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2541         if (rc)
2542                 return rc;
2543
2544         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2545                 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2546                                            FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2547         else
2548                 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2549                                        FILE__MOUNTON);
2550 }
2551
2552 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2553 {
2554         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2555         int rc;
2556
2557         rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2558         if (rc)
2559                 return rc;
2560
2561         return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2562                                    FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2563 }
2564
2565 /* inode security operations */
2566
2567 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2568 {
2569         return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2570 }
2571
2572 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2573 {
2574         inode_free_security(inode);
2575 }
2576
2577 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2578                                        char **name, void **value,
2579                                        size_t *len)
2580 {
2581         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2582         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2583         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2584         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2585         u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2586         int rc;
2587         char *namep = NULL, *context;
2588
2589         dsec = dir->i_security;
2590         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2591
2592         sid = tsec->sid;
2593         newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2594
2595         if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2596                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2597                                              inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2598                                              &newsid);
2599                 if (rc) {
2600                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  "
2601                                "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2602                                "ino=%ld)\n",
2603                                __func__,
2604                                -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2605                         return rc;
2606                 }
2607         }
2608
2609         /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2610         if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2611                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2612                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2613                 isec->sid = newsid;
2614                 isec->initialized = 1;
2615         }
2616
2617         if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2618                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2619
2620         if (name) {
2621                 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2622                 if (!namep)
2623                         return -ENOMEM;
2624                 *name = namep;
2625         }
2626
2627         if (value && len) {
2628                 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2629                 if (rc) {
2630                         kfree(namep);
2631                         return rc;
2632                 }
2633                 *value = context;
2634                 *len = clen;
2635         }
2636
2637         return 0;
2638 }
2639
2640 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2641 {
2642         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2643 }
2644
2645 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2646 {
2647         int rc;
2648
2649         rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2650         if (rc)
2651                 return rc;
2652         return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2653 }
2654
2655 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2656 {
2657         int rc;
2658
2659         rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2660         if (rc)
2661                 return rc;
2662         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2663 }
2664
2665 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2666 {
2667         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2668 }
2669
2670 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2671 {
2672         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2673 }
2674
2675 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2676 {
2677         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2678 }
2679
2680 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2681 {
2682         int rc;
2683
2684         rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2685         if (rc)
2686                 return rc;
2687
2688         return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2689 }
2690
2691 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2692                                 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2693 {
2694         return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2695 }
2696
2697 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2698 {
2699         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2700
2701         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2702 }
2703
2704 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2705 {
2706         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2707         int rc;
2708
2709         rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2710         if (rc)
2711                 return rc;
2712         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2713 }
2714
2715 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2716 {
2717         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2718         int rc;
2719
2720         rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2721         if (rc)
2722                 return rc;
2723
2724         if (!mask) {
2725                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2726                 return 0;
2727         }
2728
2729         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2730                               file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2731 }
2732
2733 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2734 {
2735         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2736         int rc;
2737
2738         rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2739         if (rc)
2740                 return rc;
2741
2742         if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2743                 return 0;
2744
2745         if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2746                                ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2747                 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2748
2749         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2750 }
2751
2752 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2753 {
2754         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2755
2756         return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2757 }
2758
2759 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2760 {
2761         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2762
2763         if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2764                      sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2765                 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2766                         if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2767                                 return -EPERM;
2768                 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2769                         /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2770                            Restrict to administrator. */
2771                         return -EPERM;
2772                 }
2773         }
2774
2775         /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2776            ordinary setattr permission. */
2777         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2778 }
2779
2780 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2781                                   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2782 {
2783         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2784         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2785         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2786         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2787         u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2788         int rc = 0;
2789
2790         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2791                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2792
2793         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2794         if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2795                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2796
2797         if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2798                 return -EPERM;
2799
2800         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2801         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2802
2803         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2804                           FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2805         if (rc)
2806                 return rc;
2807
2808         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2809         if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2810                 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2811                         return rc;
2812                 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2813         }
2814         if (rc)
2815                 return rc;
2816
2817         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2818                           FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2819         if (rc)
2820                 return rc;
2821
2822         rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2823                                           isec->sclass);
2824         if (rc)
2825                 return rc;
2826
2827         return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2828                             sbsec->sid,
2829                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2830                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2831                             &ad);
2832 }
2833
2834 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2835                                         const void *value, size_t size,
2836                                         int flags)
2837 {
2838         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2839         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2840         u32 newsid;
2841         int rc;
2842
2843         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2844                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2845                 return;
2846         }
2847
2848         rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2849         if (rc) {
2850                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
2851                        "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2852                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2853                 return;
2854         }
2855
2856         isec->sid = newsid;
2857         return;
2858 }
2859
2860 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2861 {
2862         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2863
2864         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2865 }
2866
2867 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2868 {
2869         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2870
2871         return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2872 }
2873
2874 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2875 {
2876         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2877                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2878
2879         /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2880            You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2881         return -EACCES;
2882 }
2883
2884 /*
2885  * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2886  *
2887  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2888  */
2889 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2890 {
2891         u32 size;
2892         int error;
2893         char *context = NULL;
2894         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2895
2896         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2897                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2898
2899         /*
2900          * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2901          * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2902          * use the in-core value under current policy.
2903          * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2904          * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2905          * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2906          * in-core context value, not a denial.
2907          */
2908         error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2909                                 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2910         if (!error)
2911                 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2912                                                       &size);
2913         else
2914                 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2915         if (error)
2916                 return error;
2917         error = size;
2918         if (alloc) {
2919                 *buffer = context;
2920                 goto out_nofree;
2921         }
2922         kfree(context);
2923 out_nofree:
2924         return error;
2925 }
2926
2927 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2928                                      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2929 {
2930         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2931         u32 newsid;
2932         int rc;
2933
2934         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2935                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2936
2937         if (!value || !size)
2938                 return -EACCES;
2939
2940         rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2941         if (rc)
2942                 return rc;
2943
2944         isec->sid = newsid;
2945         return 0;
2946 }
2947
2948 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2949 {
2950         const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2951         if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2952                 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2953         return len;
2954 }
2955
2956 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2957 {
2958         return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2959 }
2960
2961 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2962 {
2963         return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2964 }
2965
2966 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2967 {
2968         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2969         *secid = isec->sid;
2970 }
2971
2972 /* file security operations */
2973
2974 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2975 {
2976         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2977         int rc;
2978         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2979
2980         if (!mask) {
2981                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2982                 return 0;
2983         }
2984
2985         /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2986         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2987                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2988
2989         rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2990                            file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2991         if (rc)
2992                 return rc;
2993
2994         return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2995 }
2996
2997 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2998 {
2999         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3000         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
3001         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3002         u32 sid = current_sid();
3003
3004         if (!mask) {
3005                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
3006                 return 0;
3007         }
3008
3009         if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
3010             && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
3011                 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
3012
3013         return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
3014 }
3015
3016 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
3017 {
3018         return file_alloc_security(file);
3019 }
3020
3021 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
3022 {
3023         file_free_security(file);
3024 }
3025
3026 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3027                               unsigned long arg)
3028 {
3029         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3030         u32 av = 0;
3031
3032         if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
3033                 av |= FILE__WRITE;
3034         if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
3035                 av |= FILE__READ;
3036         if (!av)
3037                 av = FILE__IOCTL;
3038
3039         return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3040 }
3041
3042 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3043 {
3044         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3045         int rc = 0;
3046
3047 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3048         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3049                 /*
3050                  * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3051                  * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3052                  * This has an additional check.
3053                  */
3054                 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3055                 if (rc)
3056                         goto error;
3057         }
3058 #endif
3059
3060         if (file) {
3061                 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3062                 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3063
3064                 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3065                 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3066                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
3067
3068                 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3069                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3070
3071                 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3072         }
3073
3074 error:
3075         return rc;
3076 }
3077
3078 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3079                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3080                              unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3081 {
3082         int rc = 0;
3083         u32 sid = current_sid();
3084
3085         if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3086                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3087                                   MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3088         if (rc || addr_only)
3089                 return rc;
3090
3091         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3092                 prot = reqprot;
3093
3094         return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3095                                    (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3096 }
3097
3098 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3099                                  unsigned long reqprot,
3100                                  unsigned long prot)
3101 {
3102         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3103         int rc;
3104
3105         rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3106         if (rc)
3107                 return rc;
3108
3109         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3110                 prot = reqprot;
3111
3112 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3113         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3114                 rc = 0;
3115                 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3116                     vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3117                         rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3118                 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3119                            vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3120                            vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3121                         rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3122                 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3123                         /*
3124                          * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3125                          * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3126                          * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3127                          * modified content.  This typically should only
3128                          * occur for text relocations.
3129                          */
3130                         rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3131                 }
3132                 if (rc)
3133                         return rc;
3134         }
3135 #endif
3136
3137         return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3138 }
3139
3140 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3141 {
3142         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3143
3144         return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3145 }
3146
3147 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3148                               unsigned long arg)
3149 {
3150         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3151         int err = 0;
3152
3153         switch (cmd) {
3154         case F_SETFL:
3155                 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3156                         err = -EINVAL;
3157                         break;
3158                 }
3159
3160                 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3161                         err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3162                         break;
3163                 }
3164                 /* fall through */
3165         case F_SETOWN:
3166         case F_SETSIG:
3167         case F_GETFL:
3168         case F_GETOWN:
3169         case F_GETSIG:
3170                 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3171                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3172                 break;
3173         case F_GETLK:
3174         case F_SETLK:
3175         case F_SETLKW:
3176 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3177         case F_GETLK64:
3178         case F_SETLK64:
3179         case F_SETLKW64:
3180 #endif
3181                 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3182                         err = -EINVAL;
3183                         break;
3184                 }
3185                 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3186                 break;
3187         }
3188
3189         return err;
3190 }
3191
3192 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3193 {
3194         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3195
3196         fsec = file->f_security;
3197         fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3198
3199         return 0;
3200 }
3201
3202 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3203                                        struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3204 {
3205         struct file *file;
3206         u32 sid = current_sid();
3207         u32 perm;
3208         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3209
3210         /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3211         file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3212
3213         fsec = file->f_security;
3214
3215         if (!signum)
3216                 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3217         else
3218                 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3219
3220         return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3221                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3222 }
3223
3224 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3225 {
3226         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3227
3228         return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3229 }
3230
3231 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3232 {
3233         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3234         struct inode *inode;
3235         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3236
3237         inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3238         fsec = file->f_security;
3239         isec = inode->i_security;
3240         /*
3241          * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3242          * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3243          * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3244          * Task label is already saved in the file security
3245          * struct as its SID.
3246          */
3247         fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3248         fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3249         /*
3250          * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3251          * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3252          * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3253          * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3254          * new inode label or new policy.
3255          * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3256          */
3257         return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3258 }
3259
3260 /* task security operations */
3261
3262 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3263 {
3264         int rc;
3265
3266         rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3267         if (rc)
3268                 return rc;
3269
3270         return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3271 }
3272
3273 /*
3274  * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3275  */
3276 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3277 {
3278         struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3279         cred->security = NULL;
3280         kfree(tsec);
3281 }
3282
3283 /*
3284  * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3285  */
3286 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3287                                 gfp_t gfp)
3288 {
3289         const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3290         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3291
3292         old_tsec = old->security;
3293
3294         tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3295         if (!tsec)
3296                 return -ENOMEM;
3297
3298         new->security = tsec;
3299         return 0;
3300 }
3301
3302 /*
3303  * commit new credentials
3304  */
3305 static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3306 {
3307         secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
3308 }
3309
3310 /*
3311  * set the security data for a kernel service
3312  * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3313  */
3314 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3315 {
3316         struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3317         u32 sid = current_sid();
3318         int ret;
3319
3320         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3321                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3322                            KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3323                            NULL);
3324         if (ret == 0) {
3325                 tsec->sid = secid;
3326                 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3327                 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3328                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3329         }
3330         return ret;
3331 }
3332
3333 /*
3334  * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3335  * objective context of the specified inode
3336  */
3337 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3338 {
3339         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3340         struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3341         u32 sid = current_sid();
3342         int ret;
3343
3344         ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3345                            SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3346                            KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3347                            NULL);
3348
3349         if (ret == 0)
3350                 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3351         return 0;
3352 }
3353
3354 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3355 {
3356         /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3357            since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3358            identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3359            this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use
3360            of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3361            capable hook. */
3362         return 0;
3363 }
3364
3365 static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3366                                    int flags)
3367 {
3368         return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
3369 }
3370
3371 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3372 {
3373         /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3374         return 0;
3375 }
3376
3377 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3378 {
3379         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3380 }
3381
3382 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3383 {
3384         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3385 }
3386
3387 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3388 {
3389         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3390 }
3391
3392 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3393 {
3394         *secid = task_sid(p);
3395 }
3396
3397 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3398 {
3399         /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3400         return 0;
3401 }
3402
3403 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3404 {
3405         int rc;
3406
3407         rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3408         if (rc)
3409                 return rc;
3410
3411         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3412 }
3413
3414 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3415 {
3416         int rc;
3417
3418         rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3419         if (rc)
3420                 return rc;
3421
3422         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3423 }
3424
3425 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3426 {
3427         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3428 }
3429
3430 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3431 {
3432         struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3433         int rc;
3434
3435         rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3436         if (rc)
3437                 return rc;
3438
3439         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3440            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3441            later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3442            upon context transitions.  See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3443         if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3444                 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3445
3446         return 0;
3447 }
3448
3449 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3450 {
3451         int rc;
3452
3453         rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3454         if (rc)
3455                 return rc;
3456
3457         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3458 }
3459
3460 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3461 {
3462         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3463 }
3464
3465 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3466 {
3467         return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3468 }
3469
3470 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3471                                 int sig, u32 secid)
3472 {
3473         u32 perm;
3474         int rc;
3475
3476         rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3477         if (rc)
3478                 return rc;
3479
3480         if (!sig)
3481                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3482         else
3483                 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3484         if (secid)
3485                 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3486                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3487         else
3488                 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3489         return rc;
3490 }
3491
3492 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3493                               unsigned long arg2,
3494                               unsigned long arg3,
3495                               unsigned long arg4,
3496                               unsigned long arg5)
3497 {
3498         /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3499            any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3500            the state of the current process. */
3501         return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
3502 }
3503
3504 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3505 {
3506         return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3507 }
3508
3509 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3510                                   struct inode *inode)
3511 {
3512         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3513         u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3514
3515         isec->sid = sid;
3516         isec->initialized = 1;
3517 }
3518
3519 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3520 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3521                         struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3522 {
3523         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3524         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3525
3526         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3527         ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3528         if (ih == NULL)
3529                 goto out;
3530
3531         ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3532         if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3533                 goto out;
3534
3535         ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3536         ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3537         ret = 0;
3538
3539         if (proto)
3540                 *proto = ih->protocol;
3541
3542         switch (ih->protocol) {
3543         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3544                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3545
3546                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3547                         break;
3548
3549                 offset += ihlen;
3550                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3551                 if (th == NULL)
3552                         break;
3553
3554                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3555                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3556                 break;
3557         }
3558
3559         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3560                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3561
3562                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3563                         break;
3564
3565                 offset += ihlen;
3566                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3567                 if (uh == NULL)
3568                         break;
3569
3570                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3571                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3572                 break;
3573         }
3574
3575         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3576                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3577
3578                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3579                         break;
3580
3581                 offset += ihlen;
3582                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3583                 if (dh == NULL)
3584                         break;
3585
3586                 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3587                 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3588                 break;
3589         }
3590
3591         default:
3592                 break;
3593         }
3594 out:
3595         return ret;
3596 }
3597
3598 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3599
3600 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3601 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3602                         struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3603 {
3604         u8 nexthdr;
3605         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3606         struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3607
3608         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3609         ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3610         if (ip6 == NULL)
3611                 goto out;
3612
3613         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3614         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3615         ret = 0;
3616
3617         nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3618         offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3619         offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3620         if (offset < 0)
3621                 goto out;
3622
3623         if (proto)
3624                 *proto = nexthdr;
3625
3626         switch (nexthdr) {
3627         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3628                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3629
3630                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3631                 if (th == NULL)
3632                         break;
3633
3634                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3635                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3636                 break;
3637         }
3638
3639         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3640                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3641
3642                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3643                 if (uh == NULL)
3644                         break;
3645
3646                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3647                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3648                 break;
3649         }
3650
3651         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3652                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3653
3654                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3655                 if (dh == NULL)
3656                         break;
3657
3658                 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3659                 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3660                 break;
3661         }
3662
3663         /* includes fragments */
3664         default:
3665                 break;
3666         }
3667 out:
3668         return ret;
3669 }
3670
3671 #endif /* IPV6 */
3672
3673 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3674                              char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3675 {
3676         char *addrp;
3677         int ret;
3678
3679         switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3680         case PF_INET:
3681                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3682                 if (ret)
3683                         goto parse_error;
3684                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3685                                        &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3686                 goto okay;
3687
3688 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3689         case PF_INET6:
3690                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3691                 if (ret)
3692                         goto parse_error;
3693                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3694                                        &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3695                 goto okay;
3696 #endif  /* IPV6 */
3697         default:
3698                 addrp = NULL;
3699                 goto okay;
3700         }
3701
3702 parse_error:
3703         printk(KERN_WARNING
3704                "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3705                " unable to parse packet\n");
3706         return ret;
3707
3708 okay:
3709         if (_addrp)
3710                 *_addrp = addrp;
3711         return 0;
3712 }
3713
3714 /**
3715  * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3716  * @skb: the packet
3717  * @family: protocol family
3718  * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3719  *
3720  * Description:
3721  * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3722  * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3723  * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp().  The function
3724  * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3725  * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3726  * peer labels.
3727  *
3728  */
3729 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3730 {
3731         int err;
3732         u32 xfrm_sid;
3733         u32 nlbl_sid;
3734         u32 nlbl_type;
3735
3736         selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3737         selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3738
3739         err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3740         if (unlikely(err)) {
3741                 printk(KERN_WARNING
3742                        "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3743                        " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3744                 return -EACCES;
3745         }
3746
3747         return 0;
3748 }
3749
3750 /* socket security operations */
3751 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3752                            u32 perms)
3753 {
3754         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3755         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3756         u32 sid;
3757         int err = 0;
3758
3759         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3760
3761         if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3762                 goto out;
3763         sid = task_sid(task);
3764
3765         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3766         ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3767         err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3768
3769 out:
3770         return err;
3771 }
3772
3773 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3774                                  int protocol, int kern)
3775 {
3776         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3777         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3778         u32 sid, newsid;
3779         u16 secclass;
3780         int err = 0;
3781
3782         if (kern)
3783                 goto out;
3784
3785         sid = tsec->sid;
3786         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3787
3788         secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3789         err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3790
3791 out:
3792         return err;
3793 }
3794
3795 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3796                                       int type, int protocol, int kern)
3797 {
3798         const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3799         const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3800         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3801         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3802         u32 sid, newsid;
3803         int err = 0;
3804
3805         sid = tsec->sid;
3806         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3807
3808         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3809
3810         if (kern)
3811                 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3812         else if (newsid)
3813                 isec->sid = newsid;
3814         else
3815                 isec->sid = sid;
3816
3817         isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3818         isec->initialized = 1;
3819
3820         if (sock->sk) {
3821                 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3822                 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3823                 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3824                 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3825         }
3826
3827         return err;
3828 }
3829
3830 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3831    Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3832    permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3833
3834 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3835 {
3836         u16 family;
3837         int err;
3838
3839         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3840         if (err)
3841                 goto out;
3842
3843         /*
3844          * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3845          * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3846          * check the first address now.
3847          */
3848         family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3849         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3850                 char *addrp;
3851                 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3852                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3853                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3854                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3855                 unsigned short snum;
3856                 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3857                 u32 sid, node_perm;
3858
3859                 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3860
3861                 if (family == PF_INET) {
3862                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3863                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3864                         addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3865                 } else {
3866                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3867                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3868                         addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3869                 }
3870
3871                 if (snum) {
3872                         int low, high;
3873
3874                         inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3875
3876                         if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3877                                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3878                                                       snum, &sid);
3879                                 if (err)
3880                                         goto out;
3881                                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3882                                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3883                                 ad.u.net.family = family;
3884                                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3885                                                    isec->sclass,
3886                                                    SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3887                                 if (err)
3888                                         goto out;
3889                         }
3890                 }
3891
3892                 switch (isec->sclass) {
3893                 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3894                         node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3895                         break;
3896
3897                 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3898                         node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3899                         break;
3900
3901                 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3902                         node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3903                         break;
3904
3905                 default:
3906                         node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3907                         break;
3908                 }
3909
3910                 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3911                 if (err)
3912                         goto out;
3913
3914                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3915                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3916                 ad.u.net.family = family;
3917
3918                 if (family == PF_INET)
3919                         ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3920                 else
3921                         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3922
3923                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3924                                    isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3925                 if (err)
3926                         goto out;
3927         }
3928 out:
3929         return err;
3930 }
3931
3932 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3933 {
3934         struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3935         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3936         int err;
3937
3938         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3939         if (err)
3940                 return err;
3941
3942         /*
3943          * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3944          */
3945         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3946         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3947             isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3948                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3949                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3950                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3951                 unsigned short snum;
3952                 u32 sid, perm;
3953
3954                 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3955                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3956                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3957                                 return -EINVAL;
3958                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3959                 } else {
3960                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3961                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3962                                 return -EINVAL;
3963                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3964                 }
3965
3966                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3967                 if (err)
3968                         goto out;
3969
3970                 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3971                        TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3972
3973                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3974                 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3975                 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3976                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3977                 if (err)
3978                         goto out;
3979         }
3980
3981         err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3982
3983 out:
3984         return err;
3985 }
3986
3987 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3988 {
3989         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3990 }
3991
3992 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3993 {
3994         int err;
3995         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3996         struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3997
3998         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3999         if (err)
4000                 return err;
4001
4002         newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
4003
4004         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4005         newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4006         newisec->sid = isec->sid;
4007         newisec->initialized = 1;
4008
4009         return 0;
4010 }
4011
4012 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4013                                   int size)
4014 {
4015         int rc;
4016
4017         rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
4018         if (rc)
4019                 return rc;
4020
4021         return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
4022 }
4023
4024 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
4025                                   int size, int flags)
4026 {
4027         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
4028 }
4029
4030 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
4031 {
4032         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4033 }
4034
4035 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
4036 {
4037         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4038 }
4039
4040 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4041 {
4042         int err;
4043
4044         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4045         if (err)
4046                 return err;
4047
4048         return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4049 }
4050
4051 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4052                                      int optname)
4053 {
4054         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4055 }
4056
4057 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4058 {
4059         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4060 }
4061
4062 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
4063                                               struct socket *other,
4064                                               struct sock *newsk)
4065 {
4066         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4067         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4068         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4069         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4070         int err;
4071
4072         err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
4073         if (err)
4074                 return err;
4075
4076         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4077         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4078
4079         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4080         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4081
4082         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4083                            isec->sclass,
4084                            UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4085         if (err)
4086                 return err;
4087
4088         /* connecting socket */
4089         ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4090         ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
4091
4092         /* server child socket */
4093         ssec = newsk->sk_security;
4094         ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
4095         err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
4096
4097         return err;
4098 }
4099
4100 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4101                                         struct socket *other)
4102 {
4103         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4104         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4105         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4106         int err;
4107
4108         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4109         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4110
4111         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4112         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4113
4114         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4115                            isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4116         if (err)
4117                 return err;
4118
4119         return 0;
4120 }
4121
4122 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4123                                     u32 peer_sid,
4124                                     struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4125 {
4126         int err;
4127         u32 if_sid;
4128         u32 node_sid;
4129
4130         err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4131         if (err)
4132                 return err;
4133         err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4134                            SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4135         if (err)
4136                 return err;
4137
4138         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4139         if (err)
4140                 return err;
4141         return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4142                             SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4143 }
4144
4145 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4146                                                 struct sk_buff *skb,
4147                                                 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4148                                                 u16 family,
4149                                                 char *addrp)
4150 {
4151         int err;
4152         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4153         u16 sk_class;
4154         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4155         u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4156
4157         sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4158         sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4159
4160         switch (sk_class) {
4161         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4162                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4163                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4164                 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4165                 break;
4166         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4167                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4168                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4169                 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4170                 break;
4171         case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4172                 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4173                 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4174                 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4175                 break;
4176         default:
4177                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4178                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4179                 recv_perm = 0;
4180                 break;
4181         }
4182
4183         err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4184         if (err)
4185                 return err;
4186         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4187         if (err)
4188                 return err;
4189
4190         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4191         if (err)
4192                 return err;
4193         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4194         if (err)
4195                 return err;
4196
4197         if (!recv_perm)
4198                 return 0;
4199         err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4200                               ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4201         if (unlikely(err)) {
4202                 printk(KERN_WARNING
4203                        "SELinux: failure in"
4204                        " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4205                        " network port label not found\n");
4206                 return err;
4207         }
4208         return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4209 }
4210
4211 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4212                                        u16 family)
4213 {
4214         int err = 0;
4215         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4216         u32 peer_sid;
4217         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4218         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4219         char *addrp;
4220
4221         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4222         ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4223         ad.u.net.family = family;
4224         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4225         if (err)
4226                 return err;
4227
4228         if (selinux_compat_net)
4229                 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4230                                                            family, addrp);
4231         else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4232                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4233                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4234         if (err)
4235                 return err;
4236
4237         if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4238                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4239                 if (err)
4240                         return err;
4241                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4242                                    SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4243                 if (err)
4244                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4245         } else {
4246                 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4247                 if (err)
4248                         return err;
4249                 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4250         }
4251
4252         return err;
4253 }
4254
4255 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4256 {
4257         int err;
4258         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4259         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4260         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4261         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4262         char *addrp;
4263         u8 secmark_active;
4264         u8 peerlbl_active;
4265
4266         if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4267                 return 0;
4268
4269         /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4270         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4271                 family = PF_INET;
4272
4273         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4274          * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4275          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4276          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4277         if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4278                 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4279
4280         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4281         peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4282         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4283                 return 0;
4284
4285         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4286         ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4287         ad.u.net.family = family;
4288         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4289         if (err)
4290                 return err;
4291
4292         if (peerlbl_active) {
4293                 u32 peer_sid;
4294
4295                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4296                 if (err)
4297                         return err;
4298                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4299                                                peer_sid, &ad);
4300                 if (err) {
4301                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4302                         return err;
4303                 }
4304                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4305                                    PEER__RECV, &ad);
4306                 if (err)
4307                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4308         }
4309
4310         if (secmark_active) {
4311                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4312                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4313                 if (err)
4314                         return err;
4315         }
4316
4317         return err;
4318 }
4319
4320 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4321                                             int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4322 {
4323         int err = 0;
4324         char *scontext;
4325         u32 scontext_len;
4326         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4327         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4328         u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4329
4330         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4331
4332         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4333             isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4334                 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4335                 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4336         }
4337         if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4338                 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
4339                 goto out;
4340         }
4341
4342         err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4343
4344         if (err)
4345                 goto out;
4346
4347         if (scontext_len > len) {
4348                 err = -ERANGE;
4349                 goto out_len;
4350         }
4351
4352         if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4353                 err = -EFAULT;
4354
4355 out_len:
4356         if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4357                 err = -EFAULT;
4358
4359         kfree(scontext);
4360 out:
4361         return err;
4362 }
4363
4364 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4365 {
4366         u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4367         u16 family;
4368
4369         if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4370                 family = PF_INET;
4371         else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4372                 family = PF_INET6;
4373         else if (sock)
4374                 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4375         else
4376                 goto out;
4377
4378         if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4379                 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4380         else if (skb)
4381                 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4382
4383 out:
4384         *secid = peer_secid;
4385         if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4386                 return -EINVAL;
4387         return 0;
4388 }
4389
4390 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4391 {
4392         return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4393 }
4394
4395 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4396 {
4397         sk_free_security(sk);
4398 }
4399
4400 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4401 {
4402         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4403         struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4404
4405         newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4406         newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4407         newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4408
4409         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4410 }
4411
4412 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4413 {
4414         if (!sk)
4415                 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4416         else {
4417                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4418
4419                 *secid = sksec->sid;
4420         }
4421 }
4422
4423 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4424 {
4425         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4426         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4427
4428         if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4429             sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4430                 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4431         sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4432 }
4433
4434 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4435                                      struct request_sock *req)
4436 {
4437         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4438         int err;
4439         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4440         u32 newsid;
4441         u32 peersid;
4442
4443         /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4444         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4445                 family = PF_INET;
4446
4447         err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4448         if (err)
4449                 return err;
4450         if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4451                 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4452                 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4453                 return 0;
4454         }
4455
4456         err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4457         if (err)
4458                 return err;
4459
4460         req->secid = newsid;
4461         req->peer_secid = peersid;
4462         return 0;
4463 }
4464
4465 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4466                                    const struct request_sock *req)
4467 {
4468         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4469
4470         newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4471         newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4472         /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4473            new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4474            So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4475            time it will have been created and available. */
4476
4477         /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4478          * thread with access to newsksec */
4479         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4480 }
4481
4482 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4483 {
4484         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4485         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4486
4487         /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4488         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4489                 family = PF_INET;
4490
4491         selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4492
4493         selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4494 }
4495
4496 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4497                                       struct flowi *fl)
4498 {
4499         fl->secid = req->secid;
4500 }
4501
4502 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4503 {
4504         int err = 0;
4505         u32 perm;
4506         struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4507         struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4508         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4509
4510         if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4511                 err = -EINVAL;
4512                 goto out;
4513         }
4514         nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4515
4516         err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4517         if (err) {
4518                 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4519                         audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4520                                   "SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message"
4521                                   " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4522                                   nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4523                         if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4524                                 err = 0;
4525                 }
4526
4527                 /* Ignore */
4528                 if (err == -ENOENT)
4529                         err = 0;
4530                 goto out;
4531         }
4532
4533         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4534 out:
4535         return err;
4536 }
4537
4538 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4539
4540 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4541                                        u16 family)
4542 {
4543         int err;
4544         char *addrp;
4545         u32 peer_sid;
4546         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4547         u8 secmark_active;
4548         u8 netlbl_active;
4549         u8 peerlbl_active;
4550
4551         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4552                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4553
4554         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4555         netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4556         peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4557         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4558                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4559
4560         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4561                 return NF_DROP;
4562
4563         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4564         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4565         ad.u.net.family = family;
4566         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4567                 return NF_DROP;
4568
4569         if (peerlbl_active) {
4570                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4571                                                peer_sid, &ad);
4572                 if (err) {
4573                         selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4574                         return NF_DROP;
4575                 }
4576         }
4577
4578         if (secmark_active)
4579                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4580                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4581                         return NF_DROP;
4582
4583         if (netlbl_active)
4584                 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4585                  * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4586                  * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4587                  * protection */
4588                 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4589                         return NF_DROP;
4590
4591         return NF_ACCEPT;
4592 }
4593
4594 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4595                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
4596                                          const struct net_device *in,
4597                                          const struct net_device *out,
4598                                          int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4599 {
4600         return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4601 }
4602
4603 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4604 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4605                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
4606                                          const struct net_device *in,
4607                                          const struct net_device *out,
4608                                          int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4609 {
4610         return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4611 }
4612 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4613
4614 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4615                                       u16 family)
4616 {
4617         u32 sid;
4618
4619         if (!netlbl_enabled())
4620                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4621
4622         /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4623          * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4624          * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4625         if (skb->sk) {
4626                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4627                 sid = sksec->sid;
4628         } else
4629                 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4630         if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4631                 return NF_DROP;
4632
4633         return NF_ACCEPT;
4634 }
4635
4636 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4637                                         struct sk_buff *skb,
4638                                         const struct net_device *in,
4639                                         const struct net_device *out,
4640                                         int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4641 {
4642         return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4643 }
4644
4645 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4646                                                 int ifindex,
4647                                                 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4648                                                 u16 family, char *addrp)
4649 {
4650         int err;
4651         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4652         u16 sk_class;
4653         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4654         u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4655
4656         sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4657         sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4658
4659         switch (sk_class) {
4660         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4661                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4662                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4663                 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4664                 break;
4665         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4666                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4667                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4668                 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4669                 break;
4670         case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4671                 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4672                 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4673                 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4674                 break;
4675         default:
4676                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4677                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4678                 send_perm = 0;
4679                 break;
4680         }
4681
4682         err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4683         if (err)
4684                 return err;
4685         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4686                 return err;
4687
4688         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4689         if (err)
4690                 return err;
4691         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4692         if (err)
4693                 return err;
4694
4695         if (send_perm != 0)
4696                 return 0;
4697
4698         err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4699                               ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4700         if (unlikely(err)) {
4701                 printk(KERN_WARNING
4702                        "SELinux: failure in"
4703                        " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4704                        " network port label not found\n");
4705                 return err;
4706         }
4707         return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4708 }
4709
4710 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4711                                                 int ifindex,
4712                                                 u16 family)
4713 {
4714         struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4715         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4716         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4717         char *addrp;
4718         u8 proto;
4719
4720         if (sk == NULL)
4721                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4722         sksec = sk->sk_security;
4723
4724         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4725         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4726         ad.u.net.family = family;
4727         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4728                 return NF_DROP;
4729
4730         if (selinux_compat_net) {
4731                 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4732                                                          &ad, family, addrp))
4733                         return NF_DROP;
4734         } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4735                 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4736                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4737                         return NF_DROP;
4738         }
4739
4740         if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4741                 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4742                         return NF_DROP;
4743
4744         return NF_ACCEPT;
4745 }
4746
4747 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4748                                          u16 family)
4749 {
4750         u32 secmark_perm;
4751         u32 peer_sid;
4752         struct sock *sk;
4753         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4754         char *addrp;
4755         u8 secmark_active;
4756         u8 peerlbl_active;
4757
4758         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4759          * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4760          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4761          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4762         if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4763                 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4764 #ifdef CONFIG_XFRM
4765         /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4766          * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4767          * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4768          * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4769          * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4770          *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4771         if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4772                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4773 #endif
4774         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4775         peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4776         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4777                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4778
4779         /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4780          * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4781          * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4782          * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4783         sk = skb->sk;
4784         if (sk == NULL) {
4785                 switch (family) {
4786                 case PF_INET:
4787                         if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4788                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4789                         else
4790                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4791                         break;
4792                 case PF_INET6:
4793                         if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4794                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4795                         else
4796                                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4797                         break;
4798                 default:
4799                         return NF_DROP;
4800                 }
4801                 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4802                         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4803                                 return NF_DROP;
4804                 } else
4805                         peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4806         } else {
4807                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4808                 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4809                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4810         }
4811
4812         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4813         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4814         ad.u.net.family = family;
4815         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4816                 return NF_DROP;
4817
4818         if (secmark_active)
4819                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4820                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4821                         return NF_DROP;
4822
4823         if (peerlbl_active) {
4824                 u32 if_sid;
4825                 u32 node_sid;
4826
4827                 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4828                         return NF_DROP;
4829                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4830                                  SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4831                         return NF_DROP;
4832
4833                 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4834                         return NF_DROP;
4835                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4836                                  SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4837                         return NF_DROP;
4838         }
4839
4840         return NF_ACCEPT;
4841 }
4842
4843 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4844                                            struct sk_buff *skb,
4845                                            const struct net_device *in,
4846                                            const struct net_device *out,
4847                                            int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4848 {
4849         return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4850 }
4851
4852 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4853 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4854                                            struct sk_buff *skb,
4855                                            const struct net_device *in,
4856                                            const struct net_device *out,
4857                                            int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4858 {
4859         return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4860 }
4861 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4862
4863 #endif  /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4864
4865 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4866 {
4867         int err;
4868
4869         err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4870         if (err)
4871                 return err;
4872
4873         if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4874                 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4875
4876         return err;
4877 }
4878
4879 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4880 {
4881         int err;
4882         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4883
4884         err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4885         if (err)
4886                 return err;
4887
4888         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4889         ad.u.cap = capability;
4890
4891         return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4892                             SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4893 }
4894
4895 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4896                               struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4897                               u16 sclass)
4898 {
4899         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4900         u32 sid;
4901
4902         isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4903         if (!isec)
4904                 return -ENOMEM;
4905
4906         sid = task_sid(task);
4907         isec->sclass = sclass;
4908         isec->sid = sid;
4909         perm->security = isec;
4910
4911         return 0;
4912 }
4913
4914 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4915 {
4916         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4917         perm->security = NULL;
4918         kfree(isec);
4919 }
4920
4921 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4922 {
4923         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4924
4925         msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4926         if (!msec)
4927                 return -ENOMEM;
4928
4929         msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4930         msg->security = msec;
4931
4932         return 0;
4933 }
4934
4935 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4936 {
4937         struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4938
4939         msg->security = NULL;
4940         kfree(msec);
4941 }
4942
4943 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4944                         u32 perms)
4945 {
4946         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4947         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4948         u32 sid = current_sid();
4949
4950         isec = ipc_perms->security;
4951
4952         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4953         ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4954
4955         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4956 }
4957
4958 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4959 {
4960         return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4961 }
4962
4963 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4964 {
4965         msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4966 }
4967
4968 /* message queue security operations */
4969 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4970 {
4971         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4972         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4973         u32 sid = current_sid();
4974         int rc;
4975
4976         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4977         if (rc)
4978                 return rc;
4979
4980         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4981
4982         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4983         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4984
4985         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4986                           MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4987         if (rc) {
4988                 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4989                 return rc;
4990         }
4991         return 0;
4992 }
4993
4994 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4995 {
4996         ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4997 }
4998
4999 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
5000 {
5001         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5002         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5003         u32 sid = current_sid();
5004
5005         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5006
5007         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5008         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5009
5010         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5011                             MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5012 }
5013
5014 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
5015 {
5016         int err;
5017         int perms;
5018
5019         switch (cmd) {
5020         case IPC_INFO:
5021         case MSG_INFO:
5022                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5023                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5024         case IPC_STAT:
5025         case MSG_STAT:
5026                 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
5027                 break;
5028         case IPC_SET:
5029                 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
5030                 break;
5031         case IPC_RMID:
5032                 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
5033                 break;
5034         default:
5035                 return 0;
5036         }
5037
5038         err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5039         return err;
5040 }
5041
5042 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5043 {
5044         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5045         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5046         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5047         u32 sid = current_sid();
5048         int rc;
5049
5050         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5051         msec = msg->security;
5052
5053         /*
5054          * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5055          */
5056         if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5057                 /*
5058                  * Compute new sid based on current process and
5059                  * message queue this message will be stored in
5060                  */
5061                 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5062                                              &msec->sid);
5063                 if (rc)
5064                         return rc;
5065         }
5066
5067         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5068         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5069
5070         /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5071         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5072                           MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
5073         if (!rc)
5074                 /* Can this process send the message */
5075                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5076                                   MSG__SEND, &ad);
5077         if (!rc)
5078                 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5079                 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5080                                   MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5081
5082         return rc;
5083 }
5084
5085 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5086                                     struct task_struct *target,
5087                                     long type, int mode)
5088 {
5089         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5090         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5091         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5092         u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5093         int rc;
5094
5095         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5096         msec = msg->security;
5097
5098         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5099         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5100
5101         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5102                           SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5103         if (!rc)
5104                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5105                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5106         return rc;
5107 }
5108
5109 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5110 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5111 {
5112         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5113         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5114         u32 sid = current_sid();
5115         int rc;
5116
5117         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5118         if (rc)
5119                 return rc;
5120
5121         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5122
5123         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5124         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5125
5126         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5127                           SHM__CREATE, &ad);
5128         if (rc) {
5129                 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5130                 return rc;
5131         }
5132         return 0;
5133 }
5134
5135 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5136 {
5137         ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5138 }
5139
5140 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5141 {
5142         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5143         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5144         u32 sid = current_sid();
5145
5146         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5147
5148         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5149         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5150
5151         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5152                             SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5153 }
5154
5155 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5156 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5157 {
5158         int perms;
5159         int err;
5160
5161         switch (cmd) {
5162         case IPC_INFO:
5163         case SHM_INFO:
5164                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5165                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5166         case IPC_STAT:
5167         case SHM_STAT:
5168                 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5169                 break;
5170         case IPC_SET:
5171                 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5172                 break;
5173         case SHM_LOCK:
5174         case SHM_UNLOCK:
5175                 perms = SHM__LOCK;
5176                 break;
5177         case IPC_RMID:
5178                 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5179                 break;
5180         default:
5181                 return 0;
5182         }
5183
5184         err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5185         return err;
5186 }
5187
5188 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5189                              char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5190 {
5191         u32 perms;
5192         int rc;
5193
5194         rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5195         if (rc)
5196                 return rc;
5197
5198         if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5199                 perms = SHM__READ;
5200         else
5201                 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5202
5203         return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5204 }
5205
5206 /* Semaphore security operations */
5207 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5208 {
5209         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5210         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5211         u32 sid = current_sid();
5212         int rc;
5213
5214         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5215         if (rc)
5216                 return rc;
5217
5218         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5219
5220         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5221         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5222
5223         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5224                           SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5225         if (rc) {
5226                 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5227                 return rc;
5228         }
5229         return 0;
5230 }
5231
5232 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5233 {
5234         ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5235 }
5236
5237 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5238 {
5239         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5240         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5241         u32 sid = current_sid();
5242
5243         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5244
5245         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5246         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5247
5248         return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5249                             SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5250 }
5251
5252 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5253 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5254 {
5255         int err;
5256         u32 perms;
5257
5258         switch (cmd) {
5259         case IPC_INFO:
5260         case SEM_INFO:
5261                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5262                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5263         case GETPID:
5264         case GETNCNT:
5265         case GETZCNT:
5266                 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5267                 break;
5268         case GETVAL:
5269         case GETALL:
5270                 perms = SEM__READ;
5271                 break;
5272         case SETVAL:
5273         case SETALL:
5274                 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5275                 break;
5276         case IPC_RMID:
5277                 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5278                 break;
5279         case IPC_SET:
5280                 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5281                 break;
5282         case IPC_STAT:
5283         case SEM_STAT:
5284                 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5285                 break;
5286         default:
5287                 return 0;
5288         }
5289
5290         err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5291         return err;
5292 }
5293
5294 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5295                              struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5296 {
5297         u32 perms;
5298
5299         if (alter)
5300                 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5301         else
5302                 perms = SEM__READ;
5303
5304         return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5305 }
5306
5307 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5308 {
5309         u32 av = 0;
5310
5311         av = 0;
5312         if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5313                 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5314         if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5315                 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5316
5317         if (av == 0)
5318                 return 0;
5319
5320         return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5321 }
5322
5323 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5324 {
5325         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5326         *secid = isec->sid;
5327 }
5328
5329 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5330 {
5331         if (inode)
5332                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5333 }
5334
5335 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5336                                char *name, char **value)
5337 {
5338         const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5339         u32 sid;
5340         int error;
5341         unsigned len;
5342
5343         if (current != p) {
5344                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5345                 if (error)
5346                         return error;
5347         }
5348
5349         rcu_read_lock();
5350         __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5351
5352         if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5353                 sid = __tsec->sid;
5354         else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5355                 sid = __tsec->osid;
5356         else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5357                 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5358         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5359                 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5360         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5361                 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5362         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5363                 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5364         else
5365                 goto invalid;
5366         rcu_read_unlock();
5367
5368         if (!sid)
5369                 return 0;
5370
5371         error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5372         if (error)
5373                 return error;
5374         return len;
5375
5376 invalid:
5377         rcu_read_unlock();
5378         return -EINVAL;
5379 }
5380
5381 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5382                                char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5383 {
5384         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5385         struct task_struct *tracer;
5386         struct cred *new;
5387         u32 sid = 0, ptsid;
5388         int error;
5389         char *str = value;
5390
5391         if (current != p) {
5392                 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5393                    security attributes. */
5394                 return -EACCES;
5395         }
5396
5397         /*
5398          * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5399          * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5400          * above restriction is ever removed.
5401          */
5402         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5403                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5404         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5405                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5406         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5407                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5408         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5409                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5410         else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5411                 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5412         else
5413                 error = -EINVAL;
5414         if (error)
5415                 return error;
5416
5417         /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5418         if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5419                 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5420                         str[size-1] = 0;
5421                         size--;
5422                 }
5423                 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5424                 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5425                         if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5426                                 return error;
5427                         error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5428                                                               &sid);
5429                 }
5430                 if (error)
5431                         return error;
5432         }
5433
5434         new = prepare_creds();
5435         if (!new)
5436                 return -ENOMEM;
5437
5438         /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5439            performed during the actual operation (execve,
5440            open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5441            operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5442            checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5443            operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5444         tsec = new->security;
5445         if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5446                 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5447         } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5448                 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5449         } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5450                 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5451                 if (error)
5452                         goto abort_change;
5453                 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5454         } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5455                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5456         } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5457                 error = -EINVAL;
5458                 if (sid == 0)
5459                         goto abort_change;
5460
5461                 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5462                 error = -EPERM;
5463                 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5464                         error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5465                         if (error)
5466                                 goto abort_change;
5467                 }
5468
5469                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5470                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5471                                      PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5472                 if (error)
5473                         goto abort_change;
5474
5475                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5476                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5477                 ptsid = 0;
5478                 task_lock(p);
5479                 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5480                 if (tracer)
5481                         ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5482                 task_unlock(p);
5483
5484                 if (tracer) {
5485                         error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5486                                              PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5487                         if (error)
5488                                 goto abort_change;
5489                 }
5490
5491                 tsec->sid = sid;
5492         } else {
5493                 error = -EINVAL;
5494                 goto abort_change;
5495         }
5496
5497         commit_creds(new);
5498         return size;
5499
5500 abort_change:
5501         abort_creds(new);
5502         return error;
5503 }
5504
5505 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5506 {
5507         return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5508 }
5509
5510 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5511 {
5512         return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5513 }
5514
5515 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5516 {
5517         kfree(secdata);
5518 }
5519
5520 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5521
5522 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5523                              unsigned long flags)
5524 {
5525         const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5526         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5527
5528         ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5529         if (!ksec)
5530                 return -ENOMEM;
5531
5532         tsec = cred->security;
5533         if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5534                 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5535         else
5536                 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5537
5538         k->security = ksec;
5539         return 0;
5540 }
5541
5542 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5543 {
5544         struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5545
5546         k->security = NULL;
5547         kfree(ksec);
5548 }
5549
5550 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5551                                   const struct cred *cred,
5552                                   key_perm_t perm)
5553 {
5554         struct key *key;
5555         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5556         u32 sid;
5557
5558         /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5559            permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5560            appear to be created. */
5561         if (perm == 0)
5562                 return 0;
5563
5564         sid = cred_sid(cred);
5565
5566         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5567         ksec = key->security;
5568
5569         return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5570 }
5571
5572 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5573 {
5574         struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5575         char *context = NULL;
5576         unsigned len;
5577         int rc;
5578
5579         rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5580         if (!rc)
5581                 rc = len;
5582         *_buffer = context;
5583         return rc;
5584 }
5585
5586 #endif
5587
5588 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5589         .name =                         "selinux",
5590
5591         .ptrace_may_access =            selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5592         .ptrace_traceme =               selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5593         .capget =                       selinux_capget,
5594         .capset =                       selinux_capset,
5595         .sysctl =                       selinux_sysctl,
5596         .capable =                      selinux_capable,
5597         .quotactl =                     selinux_quotactl,
5598         .quota_on =                     selinux_quota_on,
5599         .syslog =                       selinux_syslog,
5600         .vm_enough_memory =             selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5601
5602         .netlink_send =                 selinux_netlink_send,
5603         .netlink_recv =                 selinux_netlink_recv,
5604
5605         .bprm_set_creds =               selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5606         .bprm_committing_creds =        selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5607         .bprm_committed_creds =         selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5608         .bprm_secureexec =              selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5609
5610         .sb_alloc_security =            selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5611         .sb_free_security =             selinux_sb_free_security,
5612         .sb_copy_data =                 selinux_sb_copy_data,
5613         .sb_kern_mount =                selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5614         .sb_show_options =              selinux_sb_show_options,
5615         .sb_statfs =                    selinux_sb_statfs,
5616         .sb_mount =                     selinux_mount,
5617         .sb_umount =                    selinux_umount,
5618         .sb_set_mnt_opts =              selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5619         .sb_clone_mnt_opts =            selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5620         .sb_parse_opts_str =            selinux_parse_opts_str,
5621
5622
5623         .inode_alloc_security =         selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5624         .inode_free_security =          selinux_inode_free_security,
5625         .inode_init_security =          selinux_inode_init_security,
5626         .inode_create =                 selinux_inode_create,
5627         .inode_link =                   selinux_inode_link,
5628         .inode_unlink =                 selinux_inode_unlink,
5629         .inode_symlink =                selinux_inode_symlink,
5630         .inode_mkdir =                  selinux_inode_mkdir,
5631         .inode_rmdir =                  selinux_inode_rmdir,
5632         .inode_mknod =                  selinux_inode_mknod,
5633         .inode_rename =                 selinux_inode_rename,
5634         .inode_readlink =               selinux_inode_readlink,
5635         .inode_follow_link =            selinux_inode_follow_link,
5636         .inode_permission =             selinux_inode_permission,
5637         .inode_setattr =                selinux_inode_setattr,
5638         .inode_getattr =                selinux_inode_getattr,
5639         .inode_setxattr =               selinux_inode_setxattr,
5640         .inode_post_setxattr =          selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5641         .inode_getxattr =               selinux_inode_getxattr,
5642         .inode_listxattr =              selinux_inode_listxattr,
5643         .inode_removexattr =            selinux_inode_removexattr,
5644         .inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5645         .inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5646         .inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5647         .inode_need_killpriv =          selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5648         .inode_killpriv =               selinux_inode_killpriv,
5649         .inode_getsecid =               selinux_inode_getsecid,
5650
5651         .file_permission =              selinux_file_permission,
5652         .file_alloc_security =          selinux_file_alloc_security,
5653         .file_free_security =           selinux_file_free_security,
5654         .file_ioctl =                   selinux_file_ioctl,
5655         .file_mmap =                    selinux_file_mmap,
5656         .file_mprotect =                selinux_file_mprotect,
5657         .file_lock =                    selinux_file_lock,
5658         .file_fcntl =                   selinux_file_fcntl,
5659         .file_set_fowner =              selinux_file_set_fowner,
5660         .file_send_sigiotask =          selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5661         .file_receive =                 selinux_file_receive,
5662
5663         .dentry_open =                  selinux_dentry_open,
5664
5665         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
5666         .cred_free =                    selinux_cred_free,
5667         .cred_prepare =                 selinux_cred_prepare,
5668         .cred_commit =                  selinux_cred_commit,
5669         .kernel_act_as =                selinux_kernel_act_as,
5670         .kernel_create_files_as =       selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5671         .task_setuid =                  selinux_task_setuid,
5672         .task_fix_setuid =              selinux_task_fix_setuid,
5673         .task_setgid =                  selinux_task_setgid,
5674         .task_setpgid =                 selinux_task_setpgid,
5675         .task_getpgid =                 selinux_task_getpgid,
5676         .task_getsid =                  selinux_task_getsid,
5677         .task_getsecid =                selinux_task_getsecid,
5678         .task_setgroups =               selinux_task_setgroups,
5679         .task_setnice =                 selinux_task_setnice,
5680         .task_setioprio =               selinux_task_setioprio,
5681         .task_getioprio =               selinux_task_getioprio,
5682         .task_setrlimit =               selinux_task_setrlimit,
5683         .task_setscheduler =            selinux_task_setscheduler,
5684         .task_getscheduler =            selinux_task_getscheduler,
5685         .task_movememory =              selinux_task_movememory,
5686         .task_kill =                    selinux_task_kill,
5687         .task_wait =                    selinux_task_wait,
5688         .task_prctl =                   selinux_task_prctl,
5689         .task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
5690
5691         .ipc_permission =               selinux_ipc_permission,
5692         .ipc_getsecid =                 selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5693
5694         .msg_msg_alloc_security =       selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5695         .msg_msg_free_security =        selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5696
5697         .msg_queue_alloc_security =     selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5698         .msg_queue_free_security =      selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5699         .msg_queue_associate =          selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5700         .msg_queue_msgctl =             selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5701         .msg_queue_msgsnd =             selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5702         .msg_queue_msgrcv =             selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5703
5704         .shm_alloc_security =           selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5705         .shm_free_security =            selinux_shm_free_security,
5706         .shm_associate =                selinux_shm_associate,
5707         .shm_shmctl =                   selinux_shm_shmctl,
5708         .shm_shmat =                    selinux_shm_shmat,
5709
5710         .sem_alloc_security =           selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5711         .sem_free_security =            selinux_sem_free_security,
5712         .sem_associate =                selinux_sem_associate,
5713         .sem_semctl =                   selinux_sem_semctl,
5714         .sem_semop =                    selinux_sem_semop,
5715
5716         .d_instantiate =                selinux_d_instantiate,
5717
5718         .getprocattr =                  selinux_getprocattr,
5719         .setprocattr =                  selinux_setprocattr,
5720
5721         .secid_to_secctx =              selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5722         .secctx_to_secid =              selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5723         .release_secctx =               selinux_release_secctx,
5724
5725         .unix_stream_connect =          selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5726         .unix_may_send =                selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5727
5728         .socket_create =                selinux_socket_create,
5729         .socket_post_create =           selinux_socket_post_create,
5730         .socket_bind =                  selinux_socket_bind,
5731         .socket_connect =               selinux_socket_connect,
5732         .socket_listen =                selinux_socket_listen,
5733         .socket_accept =                selinux_socket_accept,
5734         .socket_sendmsg =               selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5735         .socket_recvmsg =               selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5736         .socket_getsockname =           selinux_socket_getsockname,
5737         .socket_getpeername =           selinux_socket_getpeername,
5738         .socket_getsockopt =            selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5739         .socket_setsockopt =            selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5740         .socket_shutdown =              selinux_socket_shutdown,
5741         .socket_sock_rcv_skb =          selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5742         .socket_getpeersec_stream =     selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5743         .socket_getpeersec_dgram =      selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5744         .sk_alloc_security =            selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5745         .sk_free_security =             selinux_sk_free_security,
5746         .sk_clone_security =            selinux_sk_clone_security,
5747         .sk_getsecid =                  selinux_sk_getsecid,
5748         .sock_graft =                   selinux_sock_graft,
5749         .inet_conn_request =            selinux_inet_conn_request,
5750         .inet_csk_clone =               selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5751         .inet_conn_established =        selinux_inet_conn_established,
5752         .req_classify_flow =            selinux_req_classify_flow,
5753
5754 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5755         .xfrm_policy_alloc_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5756         .xfrm_policy_clone_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5757         .xfrm_policy_free_security =    selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5758         .xfrm_policy_delete_security =  selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5759         .xfrm_state_alloc_security =    selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5760         .xfrm_state_free_security =     selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5761         .xfrm_state_delete_security =   selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5762         .xfrm_policy_lookup =           selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5763         .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =    selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5764         .xfrm_decode_session =          selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5765 #endif
5766
5767 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5768         .key_alloc =                    selinux_key_alloc,
5769         .key_free =                     selinux_key_free,
5770         .key_permission =               selinux_key_permission,
5771         .key_getsecurity =              selinux_key_getsecurity,
5772 #endif
5773
5774 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5775         .audit_rule_init =              selinux_audit_rule_init,
5776         .audit_rule_known =             selinux_audit_rule_known,
5777         .audit_rule_match =             selinux_audit_rule_match,
5778         .audit_rule_free =              selinux_audit_rule_free,
5779 #endif
5780 };
5781
5782 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5783 {
5784         if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5785                 selinux_enabled = 0;
5786                 return 0;
5787         }
5788
5789         if (!selinux_enabled) {
5790                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at boot.\n");
5791                 return 0;
5792         }
5793
5794         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
5795
5796         /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5797         cred_init_security();
5798
5799         sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5800                                             sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5801                                             0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5802         avc_init();
5803
5804         secondary_ops = security_ops;
5805         if (!secondary_ops)
5806                 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5807         if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5808                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5809
5810         if (selinux_enforcing)
5811                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5812         else
5813                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
5814
5815         return 0;
5816 }
5817
5818 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5819 {
5820         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
5821
5822         /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5823         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5824         spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5825         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5826 next_sb:
5827         if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5828                 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5829                                 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5830                                            struct superblock_security_struct,
5831                                            list);
5832                 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5833                 sb->s_count++;
5834                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5835                 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5836                 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5837                 if (sb->s_root)
5838                         superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5839                 drop_super(sb);
5840                 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5841                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5842                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5843                 goto next_sb;
5844         }
5845         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5846         spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5847 }
5848
5849 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5850    all processes and objects when they are created. */
5851 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5852
5853 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5854
5855 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5856         {
5857                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5858                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5859                 .pf =           PF_INET,
5860                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5861                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5862         },
5863         {
5864                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_forward,
5865                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5866                 .pf =           PF_INET,
5867                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
5868                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5869         },
5870         {
5871                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_output,
5872                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5873                 .pf =           PF_INET,
5874                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5875                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5876         }
5877 };
5878
5879 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5880
5881 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5882         {
5883                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5884                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5885                 .pf =           PF_INET6,
5886                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5887                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5888         },
5889         {
5890                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_forward,
5891                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5892                 .pf =           PF_INET6,
5893                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
5894                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5895         }
5896 };
5897
5898 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5899
5900 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5901 {
5902         int err = 0;
5903
5904         if (!selinux_enabled)
5905                 goto out;
5906
5907         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5908
5909         err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5910         if (err)
5911                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5912
5913 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5914         err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5915         if (err)
5916                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5917 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5918
5919 out:
5920         return err;
5921 }
5922
5923 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5924
5925 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5926 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5927 {
5928         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5929
5930         nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5931 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5932         nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5933 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5934 }
5935 #endif
5936
5937 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5938
5939 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5940 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5941 #endif
5942
5943 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5944
5945 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5946 static int selinux_disabled;
5947
5948 int selinux_disable(void)
5949 {
5950         extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5951
5952         if (ss_initialized) {
5953                 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5954                 return -EINVAL;
5955         }
5956
5957         if (selinux_disabled) {
5958                 /* Only do this once. */
5959                 return -EINVAL;
5960         }
5961
5962         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
5963
5964         selinux_disabled = 1;
5965         selinux_enabled = 0;
5966
5967         /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5968         security_ops = secondary_ops;
5969
5970         /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5971         selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5972
5973         /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5974         exit_sel_fs();
5975
5976         return 0;
5977 }
5978 #endif