2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
78 #include <linux/posix-timers.h>
89 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
90 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
92 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 5
94 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
95 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
96 extern int selinux_compat_net;
97 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
99 /* SECMARK reference count */
100 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
102 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
103 int selinux_enforcing;
105 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
107 unsigned long enforcing;
108 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
109 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
112 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
115 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
116 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
118 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
120 unsigned long enabled;
121 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
122 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
125 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
127 int selinux_enabled = 1;
132 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
133 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
135 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
137 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
138 before the policy was loaded. */
139 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
140 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
142 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
145 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
148 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
149 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
150 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
151 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
154 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
156 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
160 * initialise the security for the init task
162 static void cred_init_security(void)
164 struct cred *cred = (struct cred *) current->real_cred;
165 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
167 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
169 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
171 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
172 cred->security = tsec;
176 * get the security ID of a set of credentials
178 static inline u32 cred_sid(const struct cred *cred)
180 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
182 tsec = cred->security;
187 * get the objective security ID of a task
189 static inline u32 task_sid(const struct task_struct *task)
194 sid = cred_sid(__task_cred(task));
200 * get the subjective security ID of the current task
202 static inline u32 current_sid(void)
204 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_cred()->security;
209 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
211 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
213 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
214 u32 sid = current_sid();
216 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
220 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
221 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
223 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
224 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
225 isec->task_sid = sid;
226 inode->i_security = isec;
231 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
233 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
234 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
236 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
237 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
238 list_del_init(&isec->list);
239 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
241 inode->i_security = NULL;
242 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
245 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
247 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
248 u32 sid = current_sid();
250 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
255 fsec->fown_sid = sid;
256 file->f_security = fsec;
261 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
263 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
264 file->f_security = NULL;
268 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
270 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
272 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
276 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
277 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
278 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
279 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
281 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
283 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
284 sb->s_security = sbsec;
289 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
291 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
293 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
294 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
295 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
296 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
298 sb->s_security = NULL;
302 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
304 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
306 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
310 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
311 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
312 sk->sk_security = ssec;
314 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
319 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
321 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
323 sk->sk_security = NULL;
324 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(ssec);
328 /* The security server must be initialized before
329 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
330 extern int ss_initialized;
332 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
334 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
336 "uses transition SIDs",
338 "uses genfs_contexts",
339 "not configured for labeling",
340 "uses mountpoint labeling",
343 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
345 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
347 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
356 Opt_labelsupport = 5,
359 static const match_table_t tokens = {
360 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
361 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
362 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
363 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
364 {Opt_labelsupport, LABELSUPP_STR},
368 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
370 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
371 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
372 const struct cred *cred)
374 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
377 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
378 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
382 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
383 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
387 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
388 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
389 const struct cred *cred)
391 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
393 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
394 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
398 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
399 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
403 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
405 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
406 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
407 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
410 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
411 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
412 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
413 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
414 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
415 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
416 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
417 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
418 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
422 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
423 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
424 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
425 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
426 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
427 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
429 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
430 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
431 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
436 sbsec->flags |= (SE_SBINITIALIZED | SE_SBLABELSUPP);
438 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
439 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
440 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
442 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
443 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
444 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
446 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_GENFS ||
447 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT ||
448 sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_NONE ||
449 sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
450 sbsec->flags &= ~SE_SBLABELSUPP;
452 /* Initialize the root inode. */
453 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
455 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
456 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
457 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
459 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
461 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
462 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
463 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
464 struct inode_security_struct, list);
465 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
466 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
467 inode = igrab(inode);
469 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
473 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
474 list_del_init(&isec->list);
477 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
483 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
484 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
485 * mount options, or whatever.
487 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
488 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
491 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
492 char *context = NULL;
496 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
498 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
504 tmp = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
505 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
506 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
508 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
511 /* Check if the Label support flag is set */
512 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)
513 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
515 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
516 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
521 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
522 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
528 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
529 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
532 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
533 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
535 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
536 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
539 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
540 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
542 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
543 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
546 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
547 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
549 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
550 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
551 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
553 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
556 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
557 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
559 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP) {
560 opts->mnt_opts[i] = NULL;
561 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = SE_SBLABELSUPP;
564 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
569 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
573 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
574 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
576 char mnt_flags = sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK;
578 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
579 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
580 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
581 (old_sid != new_sid))
584 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
585 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
587 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED))
588 if (mnt_flags & flag)
594 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
595 * labeling information.
597 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
598 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
600 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
602 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
603 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
604 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
605 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
606 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
607 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
608 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
609 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
610 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
612 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
614 if (!ss_initialized) {
616 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
617 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
618 server is ready to handle calls. */
619 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
620 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
621 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
622 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
626 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
627 "before the security server is initialized\n");
632 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
633 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
634 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
635 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
637 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
638 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
639 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
640 * will be used for both mounts)
642 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
647 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
648 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
649 * than once with different security options.
651 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
654 if (flags[i] == SE_SBLABELSUPP)
656 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
657 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
659 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
660 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
661 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
668 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
670 goto out_double_mount;
672 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
677 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
679 goto out_double_mount;
681 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
683 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
684 rootcontext_sid = sid;
686 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
688 goto out_double_mount;
690 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
694 defcontext_sid = sid;
696 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
698 goto out_double_mount;
700 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
709 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
710 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
711 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_MNTMASK) && !num_opts)
712 goto out_double_mount;
717 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
718 sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC;
720 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
721 rc = security_fs_use((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) ? "proc" : sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
723 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
724 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
728 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
730 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, cred);
734 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
738 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
739 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
740 * the superblock context if not already set.
743 if (!fscontext_sid) {
744 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
748 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
750 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec,
755 if (!rootcontext_sid)
756 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
758 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
759 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
762 if (rootcontext_sid) {
763 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec,
768 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
769 root_isec->initialized = 1;
772 if (defcontext_sid) {
773 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
775 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
776 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
780 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
781 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
787 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
790 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
792 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
796 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
797 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
801 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
802 struct super_block *newsb)
804 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
805 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
807 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
808 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
809 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
812 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
813 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
816 if (!ss_initialized) {
817 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
818 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
819 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
820 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
824 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
825 BUG_ON(!(oldsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED));
827 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
828 if (newsbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)
831 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
833 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
835 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
836 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
837 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
840 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
844 if (!set_rootcontext) {
845 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
846 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
849 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
851 if (set_rootcontext) {
852 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
853 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
854 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
855 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
857 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
860 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
861 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
864 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
865 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
868 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
869 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
870 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
872 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
874 /* Standard string-based options. */
875 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
877 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
882 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
886 if (context || defcontext) {
888 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
891 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
901 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
904 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
911 case Opt_rootcontext:
914 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
917 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
925 if (context || defcontext) {
927 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
930 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
936 case Opt_labelsupport:
940 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
947 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
951 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
952 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
953 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
958 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
959 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
962 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
963 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
966 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
967 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
970 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
971 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
974 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
985 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
987 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
990 char *options = data;
991 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
993 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
998 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
1000 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
1005 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1008 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1012 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
1013 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
1018 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
1021 if (opts->mnt_opts[i])
1022 has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
1026 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
1028 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
1031 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
1033 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
1034 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
1036 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
1037 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
1039 case SE_SBLABELSUPP:
1041 seq_puts(m, LABELSUPP_STR);
1046 /* we need a comma before each option */
1048 seq_puts(m, prefix);
1051 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
1057 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
1059 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1062 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1064 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1070 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1072 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1077 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1079 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1081 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1083 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1085 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1087 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1089 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1091 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1093 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1097 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1100 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1102 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1105 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1107 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1110 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1116 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1117 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1119 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1126 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1127 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1129 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1131 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1132 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1134 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1136 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1138 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1144 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1145 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1146 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1147 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1148 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1150 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1152 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1153 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1154 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1156 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1157 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1158 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1159 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1160 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1161 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1162 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1164 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1167 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1169 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1171 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1174 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1177 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1178 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1183 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1185 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1190 end = buffer+buflen;
1195 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1196 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1200 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1205 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1206 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1210 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1218 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1219 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1221 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1222 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1224 struct dentry *dentry;
1225 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1226 char *context = NULL;
1230 if (isec->initialized)
1233 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1234 if (isec->initialized)
1237 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1238 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED)) {
1239 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1240 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1241 server is ready to handle calls. */
1242 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1243 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1244 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1245 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1249 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1250 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1251 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1252 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1256 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1257 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1259 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1260 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1262 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1263 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1266 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1267 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1272 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1273 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1279 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1281 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1282 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1283 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1291 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1297 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1303 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1304 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1305 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1306 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1310 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1311 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1314 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1318 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1319 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1320 __func__, context, -rc,
1321 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1323 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1331 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1332 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1334 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1335 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1336 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1338 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1339 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1340 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1348 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1349 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1352 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1353 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1355 if ((sbsec->flags & SE_SBPROC) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1356 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1358 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1359 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1370 isec->initialized = 1;
1373 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1375 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1376 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1380 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1381 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1387 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1388 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1391 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1392 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1395 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1396 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1399 /* All other signals. */
1400 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1408 * Check permission between a pair of credentials
1409 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1411 static int cred_has_perm(const struct cred *actor,
1412 const struct cred *target,
1415 u32 asid = cred_sid(actor), tsid = cred_sid(target);
1417 return avc_has_perm(asid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1421 * Check permission between a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1422 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1423 * tsk1 is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1424 * - this uses the default subjective creds of tsk1
1426 static int task_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk1,
1427 const struct task_struct *tsk2,
1430 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec1, *__tsec2;
1434 __tsec1 = __task_cred(tsk1)->security; sid1 = __tsec1->sid;
1435 __tsec2 = __task_cred(tsk2)->security; sid2 = __tsec2->sid;
1437 return avc_has_perm(sid1, sid2, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1441 * Check permission between current and another task, e.g. signal checks,
1442 * fork check, ptrace check, etc.
1443 * current is the actor and tsk2 is the target
1444 * - this uses current's subjective creds
1446 static int current_has_perm(const struct task_struct *tsk,
1451 sid = current_sid();
1452 tsid = task_sid(tsk);
1453 return avc_has_perm(sid, tsid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1456 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1457 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1460 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1461 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1462 const struct cred *cred,
1465 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1466 struct av_decision avd;
1468 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1469 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1472 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1476 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1478 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1481 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1485 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1489 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, &avd);
1490 if (audit == SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT)
1491 avc_audit(sid, sid, sclass, av, &avd, rc, &ad);
1495 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1496 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1499 u32 sid = task_sid(tsk);
1501 return avc_has_perm(sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1502 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1505 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1506 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1507 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1508 static int inode_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1509 struct inode *inode,
1511 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1513 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1514 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1517 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1520 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1521 isec = inode->i_security;
1525 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1526 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1529 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1532 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1533 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1534 pathname if needed. */
1535 static inline int dentry_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1536 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1537 struct dentry *dentry,
1540 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1541 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1543 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1544 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1545 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1546 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1549 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1550 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1551 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1552 check a particular permission to the file.
1553 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1554 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1555 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1556 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1557 static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1561 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1562 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1563 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1564 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1567 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1568 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1570 if (sid != fsec->sid) {
1571 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, fsec->sid,
1579 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1582 rc = inode_has_perm(cred, inode, av, &ad);
1588 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1589 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1590 struct dentry *dentry,
1593 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
1594 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
1595 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1596 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1598 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1601 dsec = dir->i_security;
1602 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1605 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1607 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1608 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1610 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1611 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1616 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
1617 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid, tclass, &newsid);
1622 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1626 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1627 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1628 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1631 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1632 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1633 struct task_struct *ctx)
1635 u32 sid = task_sid(ctx);
1637 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1641 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1644 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1645 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1646 struct dentry *dentry,
1650 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1651 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1652 u32 sid = current_sid();
1656 dsec = dir->i_security;
1657 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1659 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1660 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1663 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1664 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1679 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1684 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1688 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1689 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1690 struct inode *new_dir,
1691 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1693 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1694 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1695 u32 sid = current_sid();
1697 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1700 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1701 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1702 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1703 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1705 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1707 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1708 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1709 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1712 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1713 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1716 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1717 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, old_isec->sid,
1718 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1723 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1724 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1725 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1726 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1727 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1730 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1731 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1732 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1733 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, new_isec->sid,
1735 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1743 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1744 static int superblock_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
1745 struct super_block *sb,
1747 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1749 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1750 u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
1752 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1753 return avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM, perms, ad);
1756 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1757 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1761 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1762 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1763 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1764 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1767 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1769 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1773 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1775 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1777 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1784 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1785 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1789 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1791 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1792 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1799 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1808 * Convert a file to an access vector and include the correct open
1811 static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
1813 u32 av = file_to_av(file);
1815 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1816 mode_t mode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_mode;
1818 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1822 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1823 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1824 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1825 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1826 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1827 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1828 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1831 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1832 "unknown mode:%o\n", __func__, mode);
1837 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1839 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1844 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1848 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1849 u32 sid = current_sid();
1850 u32 csid = task_sid(child);
1851 return avc_has_perm(sid, csid, SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1854 return current_has_perm(child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1857 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1861 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1865 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1868 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1869 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1873 error = current_has_perm(target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1877 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1880 static int selinux_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
1881 const kernel_cap_t *effective,
1882 const kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
1883 const kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1887 error = secondary_ops->capset(new, old,
1888 effective, inheritable, permitted);
1892 return cred_has_perm(old, new, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1895 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, const struct cred *cred,
1900 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1904 return task_has_capability(tsk, cred, cap, audit);
1907 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1910 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1913 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1918 end = buffer+buflen;
1924 const char *name = table->procname;
1925 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1926 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1930 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1933 table = table->parent;
1939 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1941 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1943 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1948 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1955 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1959 sid = current_sid();
1961 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1962 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1964 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1965 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1968 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1969 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1971 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1972 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1980 error = avc_has_perm(sid, tsid,
1981 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1987 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1989 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2001 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD, NULL);
2006 rc = superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET, NULL);
2009 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
2015 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
2017 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2019 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
2022 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
2026 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
2031 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
2032 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
2033 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
2035 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
2036 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
2037 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
2038 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
2040 case 0: /* Close log */
2041 case 1: /* Open log */
2042 case 2: /* Read from log */
2043 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
2044 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
2046 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
2053 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
2054 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
2055 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
2057 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
2058 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
2059 * the capability is granted.
2061 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
2062 * processes that allocate mappings.
2064 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
2066 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
2068 rc = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
2069 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2073 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
2076 /* binprm security operations */
2078 static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2080 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
2081 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2082 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2083 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2084 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2087 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_creds(bprm);
2091 /* SELinux context only depends on initial program or script and not
2092 * the script interpreter */
2093 if (bprm->cred_prepared)
2096 old_tsec = current_security();
2097 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2098 isec = inode->i_security;
2100 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2101 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2102 new_tsec->osid = old_tsec->sid;
2104 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2105 new_tsec->create_sid = 0;
2106 new_tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2107 new_tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2109 if (old_tsec->exec_sid) {
2110 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->exec_sid;
2111 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2112 new_tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2114 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2115 rc = security_transition_sid(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2116 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &new_tsec->sid);
2121 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2122 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2124 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2125 new_tsec->sid = old_tsec->sid;
2127 if (new_tsec->sid == old_tsec->sid) {
2128 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2129 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2133 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2134 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2135 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2139 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2140 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2144 /* Check for shared state */
2145 if (bprm->unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2146 rc = avc_has_perm(old_tsec->sid, new_tsec->sid,
2147 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SHARE,
2153 /* Make sure that anyone attempting to ptrace over a task that
2154 * changes its SID has the appropriate permit */
2156 (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2157 struct task_struct *tracer;
2158 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2162 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2163 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2164 sec = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
2170 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, new_tsec->sid,
2172 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2178 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2179 bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2185 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2187 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2188 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2196 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2197 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2198 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2199 atsecure = avc_has_perm(osid, sid,
2201 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2204 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2207 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2208 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2210 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2211 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(const struct cred *cred,
2212 struct files_struct *files)
2214 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2215 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2216 struct tty_struct *tty;
2217 struct fdtable *fdt;
2221 tty = get_current_tty();
2224 if (!list_empty(&tty->tty_files)) {
2225 struct inode *inode;
2227 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2228 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2229 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2230 file may belong to another process and we are only
2231 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2232 file = list_first_entry(&tty->tty_files, struct file, f_u.fu_list);
2233 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2234 if (inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2235 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2242 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2246 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2248 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2250 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2252 unsigned long set, i;
2257 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2258 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2260 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2263 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2264 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2269 if (file_has_perm(cred,
2271 file_to_av(file))) {
2273 fd = get_unused_fd();
2283 devnull = dentry_open(
2285 mntget(selinuxfs_mount),
2287 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2294 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2299 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2302 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2306 * Prepare a process for imminent new credential changes due to exec
2308 static void selinux_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2310 struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
2311 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2314 new_tsec = bprm->cred->security;
2315 if (new_tsec->sid == new_tsec->osid)
2318 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2319 flush_unauthorized_files(bprm->cred, current->files);
2321 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2322 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2324 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits from the old
2325 * SID. If not, reset all soft limits to the lower of the current
2326 * task's hard limit and the init task's soft limit.
2328 * Note that the setting of hard limits (even to lower them) can be
2329 * controlled by the setrlimit check. The inclusion of the init task's
2330 * soft limit into the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits
2331 * higher than the default soft limit for cases where the default is
2332 * lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or RLIMIT_STACK.
2334 rc = avc_has_perm(new_tsec->osid, new_tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2335 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2337 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2338 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2339 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim + i;
2340 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2342 update_rlimit_cpu(rlim->rlim_cur);
2347 * Clean up the process immediately after the installation of new credentials
2350 static void selinux_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2352 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
2353 struct itimerval itimer;
2354 struct sighand_struct *psig;
2357 unsigned long flags;
2365 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state from the old SID.
2366 * If not, clear itimers to avoid subsequent signal generation and
2367 * flush and unblock signals.
2369 * This must occur _after_ the task SID has been updated so that any
2370 * kill done after the flush will be checked against the new SID.
2372 rc = avc_has_perm(osid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2374 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2375 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2376 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2377 flush_signals(current);
2378 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2379 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2380 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2381 recalc_sigpending();
2382 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2385 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can recheck
2386 * wait permission to the new task SID. */
2387 read_lock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2388 psig = current->parent->sighand;
2389 spin_lock_irqsave(&psig->siglock, flags);
2390 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2391 spin_unlock_irqrestore(&psig->siglock, flags);
2392 read_unlock_irq(&tasklist_lock);
2395 /* superblock security operations */
2397 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2399 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2402 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2404 superblock_free_security(sb);
2407 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2412 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2415 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2417 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2418 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2419 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2420 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2421 match_prefix(LABELSUPP_STR, sizeof(LABELSUPP_STR)-1, option, len));
2424 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2431 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2435 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2438 int current_size = 0;
2446 while (current_size < len) {
2456 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2458 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2459 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2460 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2466 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2474 in_save = in_end = orig;
2478 open_quote = !open_quote;
2479 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2481 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2483 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2484 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2486 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2488 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2490 } while (*in_end++);
2492 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2493 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2498 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
2500 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2501 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2504 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2508 /* Allow all mounts performed by the kernel */
2509 if (flags & MS_KERNMOUNT)
2512 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2513 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2514 return superblock_has_perm(cred, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2517 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2519 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2520 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2522 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2523 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2524 return superblock_has_perm(cred, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2527 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2530 unsigned long flags,
2533 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2535 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2536 return superblock_has_perm(cred, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2537 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2539 return dentry_has_perm(cred, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2543 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2545 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2547 return superblock_has_perm(cred, mnt->mnt_sb,
2548 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2551 /* inode security operations */
2553 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2555 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2558 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2560 inode_free_security(inode);
2563 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2564 char **name, void **value,
2567 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2568 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
2569 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2570 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2571 u32 sid, newsid, clen;
2573 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2575 dsec = dir->i_security;
2576 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2579 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2581 if (!newsid || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP)) {
2582 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, dsec->sid,
2583 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2586 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2587 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2590 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2595 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2596 if (sbsec->flags & SE_SBINITIALIZED) {
2597 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2598 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2600 isec->initialized = 1;
2603 if (!ss_initialized || !(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2607 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2614 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2626 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2628 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2631 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2633 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2636 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2638 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2641 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2643 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2646 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2648 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2651 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2653 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2656 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2658 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2661 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2662 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2664 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2667 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2669 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2671 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2674 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2676 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2678 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2681 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2683 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2686 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2690 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode,
2691 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2694 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2696 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2699 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2703 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2706 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2707 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2708 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2710 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2713 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2715 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2717 return dentry_has_perm(cred, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2720 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2722 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2724 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2725 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2726 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2727 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2729 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2730 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2731 Restrict to administrator. */
2736 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2737 ordinary setattr permission. */
2738 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2741 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2742 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2744 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2745 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2746 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2747 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2748 u32 newsid, sid = current_sid();
2751 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2752 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2754 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2755 if (!(sbsec->flags & SE_SBLABELSUPP))
2758 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2761 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2762 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2764 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2765 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2769 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2770 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2771 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2773 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2778 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2779 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2783 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, sid,
2788 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2790 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2791 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2795 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2796 const void *value, size_t size,
2799 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2800 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2804 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2805 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2809 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2811 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2812 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2813 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2821 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2823 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2825 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2828 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2830 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2832 return dentry_has_perm(cred, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2835 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2837 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2838 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2840 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2841 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2846 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2848 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2850 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2854 char *context = NULL;
2855 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2857 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2861 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2862 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2863 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2864 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2865 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2866 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2867 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2869 error = selinux_capable(current, current_cred(), CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
2870 SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT);
2872 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2875 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2888 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2889 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2891 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2895 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2898 if (!value || !size)
2901 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2909 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2911 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2912 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2913 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2917 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2919 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2922 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2924 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2927 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2929 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2933 /* file security operations */
2935 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2937 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2939 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2942 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2946 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2947 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2950 rc = file_has_perm(cred, file,
2951 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2955 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2958 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2960 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2961 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2962 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2963 u32 sid = current_sid();
2966 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2970 if (sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2971 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2972 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2974 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2977 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2979 return file_alloc_security(file);
2982 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2984 file_free_security(file);
2987 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2990 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
2993 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2995 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
3000 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3003 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
3005 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3008 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3009 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
3011 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
3012 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
3013 * This has an additional check.
3015 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
3022 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
3023 u32 av = FILE__READ;
3025 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
3026 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
3029 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
3030 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
3032 return file_has_perm(cred, file, av);
3039 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
3040 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
3041 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3044 u32 sid = current_sid();
3046 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3047 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3048 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3049 if (rc || addr_only)
3052 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3055 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3056 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3059 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3060 unsigned long reqprot,
3063 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3066 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3070 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3073 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3074 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3076 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3077 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3078 rc = cred_has_perm(cred, cred, PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3079 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3080 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3081 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3082 rc = current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3083 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3085 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3086 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3087 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3088 * modified content. This typically should only
3089 * occur for text relocations.
3091 rc = file_has_perm(cred, vma->vm_file, FILE__EXECMOD);
3098 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3101 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3103 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3105 return file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3108 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3111 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3116 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3121 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3122 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__WRITE);
3131 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3132 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, 0);
3137 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3142 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3146 err = file_has_perm(cred, file, FILE__LOCK);
3153 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3155 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3157 fsec = file->f_security;
3158 fsec->fown_sid = current_sid();
3163 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3164 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3167 u32 sid = current_sid();
3169 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3171 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3172 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3174 fsec = file->f_security;
3177 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3179 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3181 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, sid,
3182 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3185 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3187 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3189 return file_has_perm(cred, file, file_to_av(file));
3192 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
3194 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3195 struct inode *inode;
3196 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3198 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3199 fsec = file->f_security;
3200 isec = inode->i_security;
3202 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3203 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3204 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3205 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3206 * struct as its SID.
3208 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3209 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3211 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3212 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3213 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3214 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3215 * new inode label or new policy.
3216 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3218 return inode_has_perm(cred, inode, open_file_to_av(file), NULL);
3221 /* task security operations */
3223 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3227 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3231 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__FORK);
3235 * detach and free the LSM part of a set of credentials
3237 static void selinux_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
3239 struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3240 cred->security = NULL;
3245 * prepare a new set of credentials for modification
3247 static int selinux_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3250 const struct task_security_struct *old_tsec;
3251 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3253 old_tsec = old->security;
3255 tsec = kmemdup(old_tsec, sizeof(struct task_security_struct), gfp);
3259 new->security = tsec;
3264 * commit new credentials
3266 static void selinux_cred_commit(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
3268 secondary_ops->cred_commit(new, old);
3272 * set the security data for a kernel service
3273 * - all the creation contexts are set to unlabelled
3275 static int selinux_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
3277 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3278 u32 sid = current_sid();
3281 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, secid,
3282 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3283 KERNEL_SERVICE__USE_AS_OVERRIDE,
3287 tsec->create_sid = 0;
3288 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
3289 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
3295 * set the file creation context in a security record to the same as the
3296 * objective context of the specified inode
3298 static int selinux_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
3300 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3301 struct task_security_struct *tsec = new->security;
3302 u32 sid = current_sid();
3305 ret = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
3306 SECCLASS_KERNEL_SERVICE,
3307 KERNEL_SERVICE__CREATE_FILES_AS,
3311 tsec->create_sid = isec->sid;
3315 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3317 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3318 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3319 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3320 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3321 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3326 static int selinux_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
3329 return secondary_ops->task_fix_setuid(new, old, flags);
3332 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3334 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3338 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3340 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3343 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3345 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3348 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3350 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3353 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3355 *secid = task_sid(p);
3358 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3360 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3364 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3368 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3372 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3375 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3379 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3383 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3386 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3388 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3391 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3393 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3396 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3400 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3401 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3402 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3403 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_committing_creds. */
3404 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3405 return current_has_perm(current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3410 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3414 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3418 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3421 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3423 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3426 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3428 return current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3431 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3437 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3442 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3444 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3446 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, task_sid(p),
3447 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3449 rc = current_has_perm(p, perm);
3453 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3459 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3460 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3461 the state of the current process. */
3462 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5);
3465 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3467 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3470 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3471 struct inode *inode)
3473 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3474 u32 sid = task_sid(p);
3477 isec->initialized = 1;
3480 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3481 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3482 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3484 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3485 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3487 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3488 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3492 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3493 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3496 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3497 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3501 *proto = ih->protocol;
3503 switch (ih->protocol) {
3505 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3507 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3511 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3515 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3516 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3521 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3523 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3527 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3531 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3532 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3536 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3537 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3539 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3543 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3547 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3548 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3559 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3561 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3562 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3563 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3566 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3567 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3569 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3570 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3574 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3575 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3578 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3579 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3580 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3589 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3591 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3595 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3596 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3601 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3603 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3607 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3608 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3612 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3613 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3615 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3619 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3620 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3624 /* includes fragments */
3634 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3635 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3640 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3642 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3645 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3646 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3649 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3651 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3654 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3655 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3665 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3666 " unable to parse packet\n");
3676 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3678 * @family: protocol family
3679 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3682 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3683 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3684 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3685 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3686 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3690 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3697 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3698 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3700 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3701 if (unlikely(err)) {
3703 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3704 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3711 /* socket security operations */
3712 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3715 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3716 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3720 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3722 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3724 sid = task_sid(task);
3726 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3727 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3728 err = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3734 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3735 int protocol, int kern)
3737 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3738 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3747 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ?: sid;
3749 secclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3750 err = avc_has_perm(sid, newsid, secclass, SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3756 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3757 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3759 const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
3760 const struct task_security_struct *tsec = cred->security;
3761 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3762 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3767 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
3769 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3772 isec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3778 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3779 isec->initialized = 1;
3782 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3783 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3784 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3785 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3791 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3792 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3793 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3795 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3800 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3805 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3806 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3807 * check the first address now.
3809 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3810 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3812 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3813 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3814 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3815 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3816 unsigned short snum;
3817 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3820 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3822 if (family == PF_INET) {
3823 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3824 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3825 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3827 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3828 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3829 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3835 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3837 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3838 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3842 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3843 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3844 ad.u.net.family = family;
3845 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3847 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3853 switch (isec->sclass) {
3854 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3855 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3858 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3859 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3862 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3863 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3867 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3871 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3875 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3876 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3877 ad.u.net.family = family;
3879 if (family == PF_INET)
3880 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3882 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3884 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3885 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3893 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3895 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3896 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3899 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3904 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3906 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3907 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3908 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3909 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3910 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3911 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3912 unsigned short snum;
3915 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3916 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3917 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3919 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3921 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3922 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3924 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3927 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3931 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3932 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3934 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3935 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3936 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3937 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3942 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_connect(sk, address);
3948 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3950 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3953 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3956 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3957 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3959 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3963 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3965 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3966 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3967 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3968 newisec->initialized = 1;
3973 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3978 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3982 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3985 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3986 int size, int flags)
3988 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3991 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3993 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3996 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3998 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
4001 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
4005 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
4009 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
4012 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
4015 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
4018 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
4020 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
4023 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
4024 struct socket *other,
4027 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4028 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4029 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4030 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4033 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
4037 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4038 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4040 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4041 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4043 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4045 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
4049 /* connecting socket */
4050 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4051 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
4053 /* server child socket */
4054 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
4055 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
4056 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
4061 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
4062 struct socket *other)
4064 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4065 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
4066 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4069 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4070 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
4072 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4073 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
4075 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
4076 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
4083 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
4085 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
4091 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4094 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4095 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4099 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4102 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4103 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4106 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4107 struct sk_buff *skb,
4108 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4113 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4115 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4116 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4118 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4119 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4122 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4123 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4124 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4125 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4127 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4128 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4129 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4130 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4132 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4133 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4134 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4135 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4138 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4139 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4144 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4147 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4151 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4154 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4160 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4161 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4162 if (unlikely(err)) {
4164 "SELinux: failure in"
4165 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4166 " network port label not found\n");
4169 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4172 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4176 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4178 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4179 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4182 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4183 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4184 ad.u.net.family = family;
4185 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4189 if (selinux_compat_net)
4190 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4192 else if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
4193 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4198 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4199 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4202 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4203 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, &ad);
4205 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4207 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, &ad);
4210 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, &ad);
4216 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4219 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4220 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4221 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4222 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4227 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4230 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4231 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4234 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4235 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4236 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4237 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4238 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4239 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, family);
4241 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4242 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4243 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4246 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4247 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4248 ad.u.net.family = family;
4249 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4253 if (peerlbl_active) {
4256 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4259 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4262 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4265 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4268 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 0);
4271 if (secmark_active) {
4272 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4281 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4282 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4287 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4288 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4289 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4291 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4293 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4294 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4295 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4296 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4298 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4303 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4308 if (scontext_len > len) {
4313 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4317 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4325 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4327 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4330 if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4332 else if (skb && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
4335 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4339 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4340 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4342 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4345 *secid = peer_secid;
4346 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4351 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4353 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4356 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4358 sk_free_security(sk);
4361 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4363 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4364 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4366 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4367 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4368 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4370 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4373 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4376 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4378 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4380 *secid = sksec->sid;
4384 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4386 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4387 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4389 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4390 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4391 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4392 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4395 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4396 struct request_sock *req)
4398 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4400 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4404 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4405 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4408 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peersid);
4411 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4412 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4413 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4417 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4421 req->secid = newsid;
4422 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4426 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4427 const struct request_sock *req)
4429 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4431 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4432 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4433 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4434 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4435 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4436 time it will have been created and available. */
4438 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4439 * thread with access to newsksec */
4440 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4443 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4445 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4446 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4448 /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4449 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4452 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4454 selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_established(sk, family);
4457 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4460 fl->secid = req->secid;
4463 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4467 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4468 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4469 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4471 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4475 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4477 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4479 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4480 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4481 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4482 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4483 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4484 if (!selinux_enforcing || security_get_allow_unknown())
4494 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4499 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4501 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4507 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4512 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4515 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4516 netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
4517 peerlbl_active = netlbl_active || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4518 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4521 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4524 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4525 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4526 ad.u.net.family = family;
4527 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4530 if (peerlbl_active) {
4531 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4534 selinux_netlbl_err(skb, err, 1);
4540 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4541 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4545 /* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
4546 * path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
4547 * labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
4549 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, peer_sid) != 0)
4555 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4556 struct sk_buff *skb,
4557 const struct net_device *in,
4558 const struct net_device *out,
4559 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4561 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4564 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4565 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4566 struct sk_buff *skb,
4567 const struct net_device *in,
4568 const struct net_device *out,
4569 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4571 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4575 static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
4580 if (!netlbl_enabled())
4583 /* we do this in the LOCAL_OUT path and not the POST_ROUTING path
4584 * because we want to make sure we apply the necessary labeling
4585 * before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH protection */
4587 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = skb->sk->sk_security;
4590 sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4591 if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
4597 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(unsigned int hooknum,
4598 struct sk_buff *skb,
4599 const struct net_device *in,
4600 const struct net_device *out,
4601 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4603 return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
4606 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4608 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4609 u16 family, char *addrp)
4612 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4614 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4615 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4617 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4618 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4621 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4622 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4623 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4624 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4626 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4627 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4628 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4629 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4631 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4632 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4633 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4634 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4637 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4638 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4643 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4646 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4649 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4652 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4659 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4660 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4661 if (unlikely(err)) {
4663 "SELinux: failure in"
4664 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4665 " network port label not found\n");
4668 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4671 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4675 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4676 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4677 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4683 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4685 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4686 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4687 ad.u.net.family = family;
4688 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4691 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4692 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4693 &ad, family, addrp))
4695 } else if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4696 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4697 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, &ad))
4701 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4702 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, &ad, proto))
4708 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4714 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4719 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4720 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4721 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4722 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4723 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4724 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
4726 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4727 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4728 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4729 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4730 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4731 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4732 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4735 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4736 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4737 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4740 /* if the packet is being forwarded then get the peer label from the
4741 * packet itself; otherwise check to see if it is from a local
4742 * application or the kernel, if from an application get the peer label
4743 * from the sending socket, otherwise use the kernel's sid */
4748 if (IPCB(skb)->flags & IPSKB_FORWARDED)
4749 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4751 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4754 if (IP6CB(skb)->flags & IP6SKB_FORWARDED)
4755 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4757 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4762 if (secmark_perm == PACKET__FORWARD_OUT) {
4763 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4766 peer_sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
4768 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4769 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4770 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4773 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4774 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4775 ad.u.net.family = family;
4776 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, NULL))
4780 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4781 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4784 if (peerlbl_active) {
4788 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4790 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4791 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4794 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4796 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4797 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4804 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4805 struct sk_buff *skb,
4806 const struct net_device *in,
4807 const struct net_device *out,
4808 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4810 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4813 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4814 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4815 struct sk_buff *skb,
4816 const struct net_device *in,
4817 const struct net_device *out,
4818 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4820 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4824 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4826 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4830 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4834 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4835 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4840 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4843 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4845 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4849 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4850 ad.u.cap = capability;
4852 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4853 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4856 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4857 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4860 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4863 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4867 sid = task_sid(task);
4868 isec->sclass = sclass;
4870 perm->security = isec;
4875 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4877 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4878 perm->security = NULL;
4882 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4884 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4886 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4890 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4891 msg->security = msec;
4896 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4898 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4900 msg->security = NULL;
4904 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4907 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4908 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4909 u32 sid = current_sid();
4911 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4913 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4914 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4916 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4919 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4921 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4924 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4926 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4929 /* message queue security operations */
4930 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4932 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4933 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4934 u32 sid = current_sid();
4937 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4941 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4943 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4944 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4946 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4949 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4955 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4957 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4960 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4962 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4963 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4964 u32 sid = current_sid();
4966 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4968 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4969 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4971 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4972 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4975 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4983 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4984 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4987 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4990 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4993 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4999 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
5003 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
5005 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5006 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5007 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5008 u32 sid = current_sid();
5011 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5012 msec = msg->security;
5015 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
5017 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
5019 * Compute new sid based on current process and
5020 * message queue this message will be stored in
5022 rc = security_transition_sid(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5028 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5029 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5031 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
5032 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5035 /* Can this process send the message */
5036 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid, SECCLASS_MSG,
5039 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
5040 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
5041 MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
5046 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
5047 struct task_struct *target,
5048 long type, int mode)
5050 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5051 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
5052 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5053 u32 sid = task_sid(target);
5056 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
5057 msec = msg->security;
5059 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5060 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
5062 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid,
5063 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
5065 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, msec->sid,
5066 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
5070 /* Shared Memory security operations */
5071 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5073 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5074 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5075 u32 sid = current_sid();
5078 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
5082 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5084 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5085 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5087 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5090 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5096 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
5098 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
5101 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
5103 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5104 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5105 u32 sid = current_sid();
5107 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
5109 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5110 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
5112 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
5113 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5116 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
5117 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
5125 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5126 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5129 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
5132 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
5139 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
5145 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5149 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
5150 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
5155 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
5159 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
5162 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
5164 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
5167 /* Semaphore security operations */
5168 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5170 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5171 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5172 u32 sid = current_sid();
5175 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
5179 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5181 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5182 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5184 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5187 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5193 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5195 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5198 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5200 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5201 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5202 u32 sid = current_sid();
5204 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5206 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5207 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5209 return avc_has_perm(sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5210 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5213 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5214 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5222 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5223 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5227 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5238 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5241 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5245 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5251 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5255 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5256 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5261 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5265 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5268 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5274 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5276 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5281 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5284 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5286 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5290 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5293 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5296 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5297 char *name, char **value)
5299 const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
5305 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5311 __tsec = __task_cred(p)->security;
5313 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5315 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5317 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5318 sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
5319 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5320 sid = __tsec->create_sid;
5321 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5322 sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
5323 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5324 sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5332 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5342 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5343 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5345 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5346 struct task_struct *tracer;
5353 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5354 security attributes. */
5359 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5360 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5361 * above restriction is ever removed.
5363 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5364 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5365 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5366 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5367 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5368 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5369 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5370 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5371 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5372 error = current_has_perm(p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5378 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5379 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5380 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5384 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5385 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5386 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5388 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5395 new = prepare_creds();
5399 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5400 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5401 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5402 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_creds for the execve
5403 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5404 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5405 tsec = new->security;
5406 if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
5407 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5408 } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5409 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5410 } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5411 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5414 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5415 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
5416 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5417 } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5422 /* Only allow single threaded processes to change context */
5424 if (!is_single_threaded(p)) {
5425 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5430 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5431 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5432 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5436 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5437 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5440 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5442 ptsid = task_sid(tracer);
5446 error = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5447 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
5466 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5468 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5471 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5473 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5476 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5483 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred,
5484 unsigned long flags)
5486 const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5487 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5489 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5493 tsec = cred->security;
5494 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5495 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5497 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5503 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5505 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5511 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5512 const struct cred *cred,
5516 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5519 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5520 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5521 appear to be created. */
5525 sid = cred_sid(cred);
5527 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5528 ksec = key->security;
5530 return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5533 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5535 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5536 char *context = NULL;
5540 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5549 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5552 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5553 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5554 .capget = selinux_capget,
5555 .capset = selinux_capset,
5556 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5557 .capable = selinux_capable,
5558 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5559 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5560 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5561 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5563 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5564 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5566 .bprm_set_creds = selinux_bprm_set_creds,
5567 .bprm_committing_creds = selinux_bprm_committing_creds,
5568 .bprm_committed_creds = selinux_bprm_committed_creds,
5569 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5571 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5572 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5573 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5574 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5575 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5576 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5577 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5578 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5579 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5580 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5581 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5584 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5585 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5586 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5587 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5588 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5589 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5590 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5591 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5592 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5593 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5594 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5595 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5596 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5597 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5598 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5599 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5600 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5601 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5602 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5603 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5604 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5605 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5606 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5607 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5608 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5609 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5610 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5612 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5613 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5614 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5615 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5616 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5617 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5618 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5619 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5620 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5621 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5622 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5624 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5626 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5627 .cred_free = selinux_cred_free,
5628 .cred_prepare = selinux_cred_prepare,
5629 .cred_commit = selinux_cred_commit,
5630 .kernel_act_as = selinux_kernel_act_as,
5631 .kernel_create_files_as = selinux_kernel_create_files_as,
5632 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5633 .task_fix_setuid = selinux_task_fix_setuid,
5634 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5635 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5636 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5637 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5638 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5639 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5640 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5641 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5642 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5643 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5644 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5645 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5646 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5647 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5648 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5649 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5650 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5652 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5653 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5655 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5656 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5658 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5659 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5660 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5661 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5662 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5663 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5665 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5666 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5667 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5668 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5669 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5671 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5672 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5673 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5674 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5675 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5677 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5679 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5680 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5682 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5683 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5684 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5686 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5687 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5689 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5690 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5691 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5692 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5693 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5694 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5695 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5696 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5697 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5698 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5699 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5700 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5701 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5702 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5703 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5704 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5705 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5706 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5707 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5708 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5709 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5710 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5711 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5712 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5713 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5715 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5716 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5717 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5718 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5719 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5720 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5721 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5722 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5723 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5724 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5725 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5729 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5730 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5731 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5732 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5736 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5737 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5738 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5739 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5743 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5745 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5746 selinux_enabled = 0;
5750 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5751 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5755 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5757 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5758 cred_init_security();
5760 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5761 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5762 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5765 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5767 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5768 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5769 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5771 if (selinux_enforcing)
5772 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5774 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5779 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5781 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5783 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5784 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5785 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5786 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5788 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5789 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5790 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5791 struct superblock_security_struct,
5793 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5795 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5796 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5797 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5799 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5801 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5802 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5803 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5806 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5807 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5810 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5811 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5812 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5814 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5816 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5818 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5819 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5821 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5822 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5825 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5826 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5828 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5829 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5832 .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
5833 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5835 .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
5836 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5840 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5842 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5844 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5845 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5847 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5848 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5851 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5852 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5854 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5855 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5861 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5865 if (!selinux_enabled)
5868 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5870 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5872 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5874 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5875 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5877 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5884 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5886 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5887 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5889 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5891 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5892 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5893 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5898 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5900 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5901 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5904 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5906 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5907 static int selinux_disabled;
5909 int selinux_disable(void)
5911 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5913 if (ss_initialized) {
5914 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5918 if (selinux_disabled) {
5919 /* Only do this once. */
5923 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5925 selinux_disabled = 1;
5926 selinux_enabled = 0;
5928 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5929 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5931 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5932 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5934 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */