security/selinux/hooks.c

   1 /*
   2  *  NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
   3  *
   4  *  This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
   5  *
   6  *  Authors:  Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
   7  *            Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
   8  *            Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
   9  *            James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  10  *
  11  *  Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
  12  *  Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
  13  *                                         Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
  14  *  Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
  15  *                          <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
  16  *  Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
  17  *              Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
  18  *  Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
  19  *                     Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
  20  *
  21  *      This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
  22  *      it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
  23  *      as published by the Free Software Foundation.
  24  */
  25
  26 #include <linux/init.h>
  27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
  28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
  29 #include <linux/errno.h>
  30 #include <linux/sched.h>
  31 #include <linux/security.h>
  32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
  33 #include <linux/capability.h>
  34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
  35 #include <linux/mm.h>
  36 #include <linux/mman.h>
  37 #include <linux/slab.h>
  38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
  39 #include <linux/swap.h>
  40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
  42 #include <linux/file.h>
  43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
  44 #include <linux/namei.h>
  45 #include <linux/mount.h>
  46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
  47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
  48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
  49 #include <linux/tty.h>
  50 #include <net/icmp.h>
  51 #include <net/ip.h>             /* for local_port_range[] */
  52 #include <net/tcp.h>            /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
  53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
  54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
  55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
  56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
  57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
  58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
  59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
  60 #include <linux/netdevice.h>    /* for network interface checks */
  61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
  62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
  63 #include <linux/udp.h>
  64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
  65 #include <linux/quota.h>
  66 #include <linux/un.h>           /* for Unix socket types */
  67 #include <net/af_unix.h>        /* for Unix socket types */
  68 #include <linux/parser.h>
  69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
  70 #include <net/ipv6.h>
  71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
  72 #include <linux/personality.h>
  73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
  74 #include <linux/audit.h>
  75 #include <linux/string.h>
  76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
  77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
  78
  79 #include "avc.h"
  80 #include "objsec.h"
  81 #include "netif.h"
  82 #include "netnode.h"
  83 #include "netport.h"
  84 #include "xfrm.h"
  85 #include "netlabel.h"
  86 #include "audit.h"
  87
  88 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
  89 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
  90
  91 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
  92
  93 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
  94 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
  95 extern int selinux_compat_net;
  96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
  97
  98 /* SECMARK reference count */
  99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
 100
 101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
 102 int selinux_enforcing;
 103
 104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
 105 {
 106         unsigned long enforcing;
 107         if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
 108                 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
 109         return 1;
 110 }
 111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
 112 #endif
 113
 114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
 115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
 116
 117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
 118 {
 119         unsigned long enabled;
 120         if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
 121                 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
 122         return 1;
 123 }
 124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
 125 #else
 126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
 127 #endif
 128
 129
 130 /*
 131  * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
 132  * just to allow the use of the capability module.
 133  */
 134 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
 135
 136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
 137    before the policy was loaded. */
 138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
 139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
 140
 141 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
 142
 143 /**
 144  * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
 145  *
 146  * Description:
 147  * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
 148  * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
 149  * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled.  Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
 150  * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
 151  *
 152  */
 153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
 154 {
 155         return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
 156 }
 157
 158 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
 159
 160 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
 161 {
 162         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
 163
 164         tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 165         if (!tsec)
 166                 return -ENOMEM;
 167
 168         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 169         task->security = tsec;
 170
 171         return 0;
 172 }
 173
 174 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
 175 {
 176         struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
 177         task->security = NULL;
 178         kfree(tsec);
 179 }
 180
 181 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
 182 {
 183         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 184         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
 185
 186         isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
 187         if (!isec)
 188                 return -ENOMEM;
 189
 190         mutex_init(&isec->lock);
 191         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
 192         isec->inode = inode;
 193         isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 194         isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
 195         isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
 196         inode->i_security = isec;
 197
 198         return 0;
 199 }
 200
 201 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
 202 {
 203         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
 204         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
 205
 206         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 207         if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
 208                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 209         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 210
 211         inode->i_security = NULL;
 212         kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
 213 }
 214
 215 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
 216 {
 217         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 218         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
 219
 220         fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 221         if (!fsec)
 222                 return -ENOMEM;
 223
 224         fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
 225         fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
 226         file->f_security = fsec;
 227
 228         return 0;
 229 }
 230
 231 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
 232 {
 233         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
 234         file->f_security = NULL;
 235         kfree(fsec);
 236 }
 237
 238 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
 239 {
 240         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
 241
 242         sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
 243         if (!sbsec)
 244                 return -ENOMEM;
 245
 246         mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
 247         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
 248         INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
 249         spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 250         sbsec->sb = sb;
 251         sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 252         sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
 253         sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 254         sb->s_security = sbsec;
 255
 256         return 0;
 257 }
 258
 259 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
 260 {
 261         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 262
 263         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 264         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 265                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
 266         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 267
 268         sb->s_security = NULL;
 269         kfree(sbsec);
 270 }
 271
 272 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
 273 {
 274         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
 275
 276         ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
 277         if (!ssec)
 278                 return -ENOMEM;
 279
 280         ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 281         ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
 282         sk->sk_security = ssec;
 283
 284         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
 285
 286         return 0;
 287 }
 288
 289 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
 290 {
 291         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
 292
 293         sk->sk_security = NULL;
 294         kfree(ssec);
 295 }
 296
 297 /* The security server must be initialized before
 298    any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
 299 extern int ss_initialized;
 300
 301 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
 302
 303 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
 304         "uses xattr",
 305         "uses transition SIDs",
 306         "uses task SIDs",
 307         "uses genfs_contexts",
 308         "not configured for labeling",
 309         "uses mountpoint labeling",
 310 };
 311
 312 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
 313
 314 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
 315 {
 316         return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
 317 }
 318
 319 enum {
 320         Opt_error = -1,
 321         Opt_context = 1,
 322         Opt_fscontext = 2,
 323         Opt_defcontext = 3,
 324         Opt_rootcontext = 4,
 325 };
 326
 327 static match_table_t tokens = {
 328         {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 329         {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 330         {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 331         {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
 332         {Opt_error, NULL},
 333 };
 334
 335 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux:  duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
 336
 337 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
 338                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 339                         struct task_security_struct *tsec)
 340 {
 341         int rc;
 342
 343         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 344                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 345         if (rc)
 346                 return rc;
 347
 348         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 349                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
 350         return rc;
 351 }
 352
 353 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
 354                         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
 355                         struct task_security_struct *tsec)
 356 {
 357         int rc;
 358         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 359                           FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
 360         if (rc)
 361                 return rc;
 362
 363         rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
 364                           FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
 365         return rc;
 366 }
 367
 368 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
 369 {
 370         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 371         struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
 372         struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
 373         int rc = 0;
 374
 375         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 376                 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
 377                    error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
 378                    the root directory.  -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
 379                    the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
 380                    assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
 381                 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
 382                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
 383                                "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 384                         rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 385                         goto out;
 386                 }
 387                 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
 388                 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
 389                         if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
 390                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 391                                        "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
 392                                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 393                         else
 394                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
 395                                        "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
 396                                        sb->s_type->name, -rc);
 397                         goto out;
 398                 }
 399         }
 400
 401         sbsec->initialized = 1;
 402
 403         if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
 404                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
 405                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
 406         else
 407                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
 408                        sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
 409                        labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
 410
 411         /* Initialize the root inode. */
 412         rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
 413
 414         /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
 415            inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
 416            during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
 417            populates itself. */
 418         spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 419 next_inode:
 420         if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
 421                 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
 422                                 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
 423                                            struct inode_security_struct, list);
 424                 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
 425                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 426                 inode = igrab(inode);
 427                 if (inode) {
 428                         if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
 429                                 inode_doinit(inode);
 430                         iput(inode);
 431                 }
 432                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 433                 list_del_init(&isec->list);
 434                 goto next_inode;
 435         }
 436         spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
 437 out:
 438         return rc;
 439 }
 440
 441 /*
 442  * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
 443  * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
 444  * mount options, or whatever.
 445  */
 446 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
 447                                 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 448 {
 449         int rc = 0, i;
 450         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 451         char *context = NULL;
 452         u32 len;
 453         char tmp;
 454
 455         security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
 456
 457         if (!sbsec->initialized)
 458                 return -EINVAL;
 459
 460         if (!ss_initialized)
 461                 return -EINVAL;
 462
 463         /*
 464          * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
 465          * settings this is going to need a mask
 466          */
 467         tmp = sbsec->flags;
 468         /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
 469         for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
 470                 if (tmp & 0x01)
 471                         opts->num_mnt_opts++;
 472                 tmp >>= 1;
 473         }
 474
 475         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 476         if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
 477                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 478                 goto out_free;
 479         }
 480
 481         opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
 482         if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
 483                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 484                 goto out_free;
 485         }
 486
 487         i = 0;
 488         if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
 489                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
 490                 if (rc)
 491                         goto out_free;
 492                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 493                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 494         }
 495         if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
 496                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
 497                 if (rc)
 498                         goto out_free;
 499                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 500                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
 501         }
 502         if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
 503                 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
 504                 if (rc)
 505                         goto out_free;
 506                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 507                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 508         }
 509         if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
 510                 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
 511                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
 512
 513                 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
 514                 if (rc)
 515                         goto out_free;
 516                 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
 517                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 518         }
 519
 520         BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
 521
 522         return 0;
 523
 524 out_free:
 525         security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
 526         return rc;
 527 }
 528
 529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
 530                       u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
 531 {
 532         /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
 533         if (sbsec->initialized)
 534                 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
 535                     (old_sid != new_sid))
 536                         return 1;
 537
 538         /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
 539          * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
 540          */
 541         if (!sbsec->initialized)
 542                 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
 543                         return 1;
 544         return 0;
 545 }
 546
 547 /*
 548  * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
 549  * labeling information.
 550  */
 551 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
 552                                 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 553 {
 554         int rc = 0, i;
 555         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
 556         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
 557         const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
 558         struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
 559         struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
 560         u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
 561         u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
 562         char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
 563         int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
 564         int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
 565
 566         mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
 567
 568         if (!ss_initialized) {
 569                 if (!num_opts) {
 570                         /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
 571                            after the initial policy is loaded and the security
 572                            server is ready to handle calls. */
 573                         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 574                         if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
 575                                 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
 576                         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 577                         goto out;
 578                 }
 579                 rc = -EINVAL;
 580                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
 581                         "before the security server is initialized\n");
 582                 goto out;
 583         }
 584
 585         /*
 586          * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice.  Once
 587          * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
 588          * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
 589          * we need to skip the double mount verification.
 590          *
 591          * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
 592          * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
 593          * this sb does not set any security options.  (The first options
 594          * will be used for both mounts)
 595          */
 596         if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
 597             && (num_opts == 0))
 598                 goto out;
 599
 600         /*
 601          * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
 602          * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
 603          * than once with different security options.
 604          */
 605         for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
 606                 u32 sid;
 607                 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
 608                                              strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
 609                 if (rc) {
 610                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
 611                                "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
 612                                mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
 613                         goto out;
 614                 }
 615                 switch (flags[i]) {
 616                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
 617                         fscontext_sid = sid;
 618
 619                         if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
 620                                         fscontext_sid))
 621                                 goto out_double_mount;
 622
 623                         sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 624                         break;
 625                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
 626                         context_sid = sid;
 627
 628                         if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
 629                                         context_sid))
 630                                 goto out_double_mount;
 631
 632                         sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
 633                         break;
 634                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
 635                         rootcontext_sid = sid;
 636
 637                         if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
 638                                         rootcontext_sid))
 639                                 goto out_double_mount;
 640
 641                         sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 642
 643                         break;
 644                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
 645                         defcontext_sid = sid;
 646
 647                         if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
 648                                         defcontext_sid))
 649                                 goto out_double_mount;
 650
 651                         sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 652
 653                         break;
 654                 default:
 655                         rc = -EINVAL;
 656                         goto out;
 657                 }
 658         }
 659
 660         if (sbsec->initialized) {
 661                 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
 662                 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
 663                         goto out_double_mount;
 664                 rc = 0;
 665                 goto out;
 666         }
 667
 668         if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
 669                 sbsec->proc = 1;
 670
 671         /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
 672         rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
 673         if (rc) {
 674                 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
 675                        __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
 676                 goto out;
 677         }
 678
 679         /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
 680         if (fscontext_sid) {
 681
 682                 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
 683                 if (rc)
 684                         goto out;
 685
 686                 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
 687         }
 688
 689         /*
 690          * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
 691          * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
 692          * the superblock context if not already set.
 693          */
 694         if (context_sid) {
 695                 if (!fscontext_sid) {
 696                         rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
 697                         if (rc)
 698                                 goto out;
 699                         sbsec->sid = context_sid;
 700                 } else {
 701                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
 702                         if (rc)
 703                                 goto out;
 704                 }
 705                 if (!rootcontext_sid)
 706                         rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
 707
 708                 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
 709                 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
 710         }
 711
 712         if (rootcontext_sid) {
 713                 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
 714                 if (rc)
 715                         goto out;
 716
 717                 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
 718                 root_isec->initialized = 1;
 719         }
 720
 721         if (defcontext_sid) {
 722                 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
 723                         rc = -EINVAL;
 724                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
 725                                "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
 726                         goto out;
 727                 }
 728
 729                 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
 730                         rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
 731                                                              sbsec, tsec);
 732                         if (rc)
 733                                 goto out;
 734                 }
 735
 736                 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
 737         }
 738
 739         rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
 740 out:
 741         mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
 742         return rc;
 743 out_double_mount:
 744         rc = -EINVAL;
 745         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid.  Same superblock, different "
 746                "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
 747         goto out;
 748 }
 749
 750 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
 751                                         struct super_block *newsb)
 752 {
 753         const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
 754         struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
 755
 756         int set_fscontext =     (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
 757         int set_context =       (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
 758         int set_rootcontext =   (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
 759
 760         /*
 761          * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
 762          * mount options.  thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
 763          * with it later
 764          */
 765         if (!ss_initialized) {
 766                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
 767                 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
 768                         list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
 769                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
 770                 return;
 771         }
 772
 773         /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
 774         BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
 775
 776         /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
 777         if (newsbsec->initialized)
 778                 return;
 779
 780         mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
 781
 782         newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
 783
 784         newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
 785         newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
 786         newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
 787
 788         if (set_context) {
 789                 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
 790
 791                 if (!set_fscontext)
 792                         newsbsec->sid = sid;
 793                 if (!set_rootcontext) {
 794                         struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
 795                         struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
 796                         newisec->sid = sid;
 797                 }
 798                 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
 799         }
 800         if (set_rootcontext) {
 801                 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
 802                 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
 803                 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
 804                 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
 805
 806                 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
 807         }
 808
 809         sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
 810         mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
 811 }
 812
 813 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
 814                                   struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 815 {
 816         char *p;
 817         char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
 818         char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
 819         int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
 820
 821         opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
 822
 823         /* Standard string-based options. */
 824         while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
 825                 int token;
 826                 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
 827
 828                 if (!*p)
 829                         continue;
 830
 831                 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
 832
 833                 switch (token) {
 834                 case Opt_context:
 835                         if (context || defcontext) {
 836                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 837                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 838                                 goto out_err;
 839                         }
 840                         context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 841                         if (!context) {
 842                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 843                                 goto out_err;
 844                         }
 845                         break;
 846
 847                 case Opt_fscontext:
 848                         if (fscontext) {
 849                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 850                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 851                                 goto out_err;
 852                         }
 853                         fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 854                         if (!fscontext) {
 855                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 856                                 goto out_err;
 857                         }
 858                         break;
 859
 860                 case Opt_rootcontext:
 861                         if (rootcontext) {
 862                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 863                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 864                                 goto out_err;
 865                         }
 866                         rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 867                         if (!rootcontext) {
 868                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 869                                 goto out_err;
 870                         }
 871                         break;
 872
 873                 case Opt_defcontext:
 874                         if (context || defcontext) {
 875                                 rc = -EINVAL;
 876                                 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
 877                                 goto out_err;
 878                         }
 879                         defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
 880                         if (!defcontext) {
 881                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
 882                                 goto out_err;
 883                         }
 884                         break;
 885
 886                 default:
 887                         rc = -EINVAL;
 888                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux:  unknown mount option\n");
 889                         goto out_err;
 890
 891                 }
 892         }
 893
 894         rc = -ENOMEM;
 895         opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
 896         if (!opts->mnt_opts)
 897                 goto out_err;
 898
 899         opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
 900         if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
 901                 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
 902                 goto out_err;
 903         }
 904
 905         if (fscontext) {
 906                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
 907                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
 908         }
 909         if (context) {
 910                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
 911                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
 912         }
 913         if (rootcontext) {
 914                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
 915                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
 916         }
 917         if (defcontext) {
 918                 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
 919                 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
 920         }
 921
 922         opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
 923         return 0;
 924
 925 out_err:
 926         kfree(context);
 927         kfree(defcontext);
 928         kfree(fscontext);
 929         kfree(rootcontext);
 930         return rc;
 931 }
 932 /*
 933  * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
 934  */
 935 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
 936 {
 937         int rc = 0;
 938         char *options = data;
 939         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
 940
 941         security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
 942
 943         if (!data)
 944                 goto out;
 945
 946         BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
 947
 948         rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
 949         if (rc)
 950                 goto out_err;
 951
 952 out:
 953         rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
 954
 955 out_err:
 956         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
 957         return rc;
 958 }
 959
 960 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
 961                                struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
 962 {
 963         int i;
 964         char *prefix;
 965
 966         for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
 967                 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
 968
 969                 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
 970                 case CONTEXT_MNT:
 971                         prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
 972                         break;
 973                 case FSCONTEXT_MNT:
 974                         prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
 975                         break;
 976                 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
 977                         prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
 978                         break;
 979                 case DEFCONTEXT_MNT:
 980                         prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
 981                         break;
 982                 default:
 983                         BUG();
 984                 };
 985                 /* we need a comma before each option */
 986                 seq_putc(m, ',');
 987                 seq_puts(m, prefix);
 988                 if (has_comma)
 989                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
 990                 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
 991                 if (has_comma)
 992                         seq_putc(m, '\"');
 993         }
 994 }
 995
 996 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
 997 {
 998         struct security_mnt_opts opts;
 999         int rc;
1000
1001         rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1002         if (rc) {
1003                 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1004                 if (rc == -EINVAL)
1005                         rc = 0;
1006                 return rc;
1007         }
1008
1009         selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1010
1011         security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1012
1013         return rc;
1014 }
1015
1016 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1017 {
1018         switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1019         case S_IFSOCK:
1020                 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1021         case S_IFLNK:
1022                 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1023         case S_IFREG:
1024                 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1025         case S_IFBLK:
1026                 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1027         case S_IFDIR:
1028                 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1029         case S_IFCHR:
1030                 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1031         case S_IFIFO:
1032                 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1033
1034         }
1035
1036         return SECCLASS_FILE;
1037 }
1038
1039 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1040 {
1041         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1042 }
1043
1044 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1045 {
1046         return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1047 }
1048
1049 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1050 {
1051         switch (family) {
1052         case PF_UNIX:
1053                 switch (type) {
1054                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1055                 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1056                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1057                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1058                         return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1059                 }
1060                 break;
1061         case PF_INET:
1062         case PF_INET6:
1063                 switch (type) {
1064                 case SOCK_STREAM:
1065                         if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1066                                 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1067                         else
1068                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1069                 case SOCK_DGRAM:
1070                         if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1071                                 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1072                         else
1073                                 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1074                 case SOCK_DCCP:
1075                         return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1076                 default:
1077                         return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1078                 }
1079                 break;
1080         case PF_NETLINK:
1081                 switch (protocol) {
1082                 case NETLINK_ROUTE:
1083                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1084                 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1085                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1086                 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1087                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1088                 case NETLINK_NFLOG:
1089                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1090                 case NETLINK_XFRM:
1091                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1092                 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1093                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1094                 case NETLINK_AUDIT:
1095                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1096                 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1097                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1098                 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1099                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1100                 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1101                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1102                 default:
1103                         return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1104                 }
1105         case PF_PACKET:
1106                 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1107         case PF_KEY:
1108                 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1109         case PF_APPLETALK:
1110                 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1111         }
1112
1113         return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1114 }
1115
1116 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1117 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1118                                 u16 tclass,
1119                                 u32 *sid)
1120 {
1121         int buflen, rc;
1122         char *buffer, *path, *end;
1123
1124         buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1125         if (!buffer)
1126                 return -ENOMEM;
1127
1128         buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1129         end = buffer+buflen;
1130         *--end = '\0';
1131         buflen--;
1132         path = end-1;
1133         *path = '/';
1134         while (de && de != de->parent) {
1135                 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1136                 if (buflen < 0)
1137                         break;
1138                 end -= de->namelen;
1139                 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1140                 *--end = '/';
1141                 path = end;
1142                 de = de->parent;
1143         }
1144         rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1145         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1146         return rc;
1147 }
1148 #else
1149 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1150                                 u16 tclass,
1151                                 u32 *sid)
1152 {
1153         return -EINVAL;
1154 }
1155 #endif
1156
1157 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1158 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1159 {
1160         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1161         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1162         u32 sid;
1163         struct dentry *dentry;
1164 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1165         char *context = NULL;
1166         unsigned len = 0;
1167         int rc = 0;
1168
1169         if (isec->initialized)
1170                 goto out;
1171
1172         mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1173         if (isec->initialized)
1174                 goto out_unlock;
1175
1176         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1177         if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1178                 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1179                    after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1180                    server is ready to handle calls. */
1181                 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1182                 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1183                         list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1184                 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1185                 goto out_unlock;
1186         }
1187
1188         switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1189         case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1190                 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1191                         isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1192                         break;
1193                 }
1194
1195                 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1196                    Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1197                 if (opt_dentry) {
1198                         /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1199                         dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1200                 } else {
1201                         /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1202                         dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1203                 }
1204                 if (!dentry) {
1205                         printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  no dentry for dev=%s "
1206                                "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1207                                inode->i_ino);
1208                         goto out_unlock;
1209                 }
1210
1211                 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1212                 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1213                 if (!context) {
1214                         rc = -ENOMEM;
1215                         dput(dentry);
1216                         goto out_unlock;
1217                 }
1218                 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1219                                            context, len);
1220                 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1221                         /* Need a larger buffer.  Query for the right size. */
1222                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1223                                                    NULL, 0);
1224                         if (rc < 0) {
1225                                 dput(dentry);
1226                                 goto out_unlock;
1227                         }
1228                         kfree(context);
1229                         len = rc;
1230                         context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1231                         if (!context) {
1232                                 rc = -ENOMEM;
1233                                 dput(dentry);
1234                                 goto out_unlock;
1235                         }
1236                         rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1237                                                    XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1238                                                    context, len);
1239                 }
1240                 dput(dentry);
1241                 if (rc < 0) {
1242                         if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1243                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  getxattr returned "
1244                                        "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1245                                        -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1246                                 kfree(context);
1247                                 goto out_unlock;
1248                         }
1249                         /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1250                         sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1251                         rc = 0;
1252                 } else {
1253                         rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1254                                                              sbsec->def_sid,
1255                                                              GFP_NOFS);
1256                         if (rc) {
1257                                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  context_to_sid(%s) "
1258                                        "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1259                                        __func__, context, -rc,
1260                                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1261                                 kfree(context);
1262                                 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1263                                 rc = 0;
1264                                 break;
1265                         }
1266                 }
1267                 kfree(context);
1268                 isec->sid = sid;
1269                 break;
1270         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1271                 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1272                 break;
1273         case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1274                 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1275                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1276
1277                 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1278                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1279                 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1280                                              sbsec->sid,
1281                                              isec->sclass,
1282                                              &sid);
1283                 if (rc)
1284                         goto out_unlock;
1285                 isec->sid = sid;
1286                 break;
1287         case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1288                 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1289                 break;
1290         default:
1291                 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1292                 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1293
1294                 if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1295                         struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1296                         if (proci->pde) {
1297                                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1298                                 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1299                                                           isec->sclass,
1300                                                           &sid);
1301                                 if (rc)
1302                                         goto out_unlock;
1303                                 isec->sid = sid;
1304                         }
1305                 }
1306                 break;
1307         }
1308
1309         isec->initialized = 1;
1310
1311 out_unlock:
1312         mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1313 out:
1314         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1315                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1316         return rc;
1317 }
1318
1319 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1320 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1321 {
1322         u32 perm = 0;
1323
1324         switch (sig) {
1325         case SIGCHLD:
1326                 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1327                 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1328                 break;
1329         case SIGKILL:
1330                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1331                 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1332                 break;
1333         case SIGSTOP:
1334                 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1335                 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1336                 break;
1337         default:
1338                 /* All other signals. */
1339                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1340                 break;
1341         }
1342
1343         return perm;
1344 }
1345
1346 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1347    fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1348 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1349                          struct task_struct *tsk2,
1350                          u32 perms)
1351 {
1352         struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1353
1354         tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1355         tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1356         return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1357                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1358 }
1359
1360 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1361 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1362 #endif
1363
1364 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1365 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1366                                int cap)
1367 {
1368         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1369         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1370         u16 sclass;
1371         u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1372
1373         tsec = tsk->security;
1374
1375         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1376         ad.tsk = tsk;
1377         ad.u.cap = cap;
1378
1379         switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1380         case 0:
1381                 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1382                 break;
1383         case 1:
1384                 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1385                 break;
1386         default:
1387                 printk(KERN_ERR
1388                        "SELinux:  out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1389                 BUG();
1390         }
1391         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1392 }
1393
1394 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1395 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1396                            u32 perms)
1397 {
1398         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1399
1400         tsec = tsk->security;
1401
1402         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1403                             SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1404 }
1405
1406 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1407    The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1408    data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1409 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1410                           struct inode *inode,
1411                           u32 perms,
1412                           struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1413 {
1414         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1415         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1416         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1417
1418         if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1419                 return 0;
1420
1421         tsec = tsk->security;
1422         isec = inode->i_security;
1423
1424         if (!adp) {
1425                 adp = &ad;
1426                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1427                 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1428         }
1429
1430         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1431 }
1432
1433 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1434    the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1435    pathname if needed. */
1436 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1437                                   struct vfsmount *mnt,
1438                                   struct dentry *dentry,
1439                                   u32 av)
1440 {
1441         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1442         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1443         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1444         ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1445         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1446         return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1447 }
1448
1449 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1450    access an inode in a given way.  Check access to the
1451    descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1452    check a particular permission to the file.
1453    Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1454    has the same SID as the process.  If av is zero, then
1455    access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1456    where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1457 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1458                                 struct file *file,
1459                                 u32 av)
1460 {
1461         struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1462         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1463         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1464         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1465         int rc;
1466
1467         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1468         ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1469
1470         if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1471                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1472                                   SECCLASS_FD,
1473                                   FD__USE,
1474                                   &ad);
1475                 if (rc)
1476                         return rc;
1477         }
1478
1479         /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1480         if (av)
1481                 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1482
1483         return 0;
1484 }
1485
1486 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1487 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1488                       struct dentry *dentry,
1489                       u16 tclass)
1490 {
1491         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1492         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1493         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1494         u32 newsid;
1495         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1496         int rc;
1497
1498         tsec = current->security;
1499         dsec = dir->i_security;
1500         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1501
1502         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1503         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1504
1505         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1506                           DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1507                           &ad);
1508         if (rc)
1509                 return rc;
1510
1511         if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1512                 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1513         } else {
1514                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1515                                              &newsid);
1516                 if (rc)
1517                         return rc;
1518         }
1519
1520         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1521         if (rc)
1522                 return rc;
1523
1524         return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1525                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1526                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1527 }
1528
1529 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1530 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1531                           struct task_struct *ctx)
1532 {
1533         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1534
1535         tsec = ctx->security;
1536
1537         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1538 }
1539
1540 #define MAY_LINK        0
1541 #define MAY_UNLINK      1
1542 #define MAY_RMDIR       2
1543
1544 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1545 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1546                     struct dentry *dentry,
1547                     int kind)
1548
1549 {
1550         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1551         struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1552         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1553         u32 av;
1554         int rc;
1555
1556         tsec = current->security;
1557         dsec = dir->i_security;
1558         isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1559
1560         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1561         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1562
1563         av = DIR__SEARCH;
1564         av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1565         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1566         if (rc)
1567                 return rc;
1568
1569         switch (kind) {
1570         case MAY_LINK:
1571                 av = FILE__LINK;
1572                 break;
1573         case MAY_UNLINK:
1574                 av = FILE__UNLINK;
1575                 break;
1576         case MAY_RMDIR:
1577                 av = DIR__RMDIR;
1578                 break;
1579         default:
1580                 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s:  unrecognized kind %d\n",
1581                         __func__, kind);
1582                 return 0;
1583         }
1584
1585         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1586         return rc;
1587 }
1588
1589 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1590                              struct dentry *old_dentry,
1591                              struct inode *new_dir,
1592                              struct dentry *new_dentry)
1593 {
1594         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1595         struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1596         struct avc_audit_data ad;
1597         u32 av;
1598         int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1599         int rc;
1600
1601         tsec = current->security;
1602         old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1603         old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1604         old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1605         new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1606
1607         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1608
1609         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1610         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1611                           DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1612         if (rc)
1613                 return rc;
1614         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1615                           old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1616         if (rc)
1617                 return rc;
1618         if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1619                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1620                                   old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1621                 if (rc)
1622                         return rc;
1623         }
1624
1625         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1626         av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1627         if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1628                 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1629         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1630         if (rc)
1631                 return rc;
1632         if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1633                 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1634                 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1635                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1636                                   new_isec->sclass,
1637                                   (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1638                 if (rc)
1639                         return rc;
1640         }
1641
1642         return 0;
1643 }
1644
1645 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1646 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1647                                struct super_block *sb,
1648                                u32 perms,
1649                                struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1650 {
1651         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1652         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1653
1654         tsec = tsk->security;
1655         sbsec = sb->s_security;
1656         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1657                             perms, ad);
1658 }
1659
1660 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1661 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1662 {
1663         u32 av = 0;
1664
1665         if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1666                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1667                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1668                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1669                         av |= FILE__READ;
1670
1671                 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1672                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1673                 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1674                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1675
1676         } else {
1677                 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1678                         av |= DIR__SEARCH;
1679                 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1680                         av |= DIR__WRITE;
1681                 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1682                         av |= DIR__READ;
1683         }
1684
1685         return av;
1686 }
1687
1688 /*
1689  * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1690  * open permission.
1691  */
1692 static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1693 {
1694         u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1695
1696         if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1697                 /*
1698                  * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1699                  */
1700                 if (S_ISREG(mode))
1701                         av |= FILE__OPEN;
1702                 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1703                         av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1704                 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1705                         av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1706                 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1707                         av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1708                 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1709                         av |= DIR__OPEN;
1710                 else
1711                         printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1712                                 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
1713         }
1714         return av;
1715 }
1716
1717 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1718 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1719 {
1720         u32 av = 0;
1721
1722         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1723                 av |= FILE__READ;
1724         if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1725                 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1726                         av |= FILE__APPEND;
1727                 else
1728                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1729         }
1730         if (!av) {
1731                 /*
1732                  * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1733                  */
1734                 av = FILE__IOCTL;
1735         }
1736
1737         return av;
1738 }
1739
1740 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1741
1742 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1743                                      unsigned int mode)
1744 {
1745         int rc;
1746
1747         rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1748         if (rc)
1749                 return rc;
1750
1751         if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1752                 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1753                 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1754                 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1755                                     SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1756         }
1757
1758         return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1759 }
1760
1761 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1762 {
1763         int rc;
1764
1765         rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1766         if (rc)
1767                 return rc;
1768
1769         return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1770 }
1771
1772 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1773                           kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1774 {
1775         int error;
1776
1777         error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1778         if (error)
1779                 return error;
1780
1781         return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1782 }
1783
1784 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1785                                 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1786 {
1787         int error;
1788
1789         error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1790         if (error)
1791                 return error;
1792
1793         return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1794 }
1795
1796 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1797                                kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1798 {
1799         secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1800 }
1801
1802 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1803 {
1804         int rc;
1805
1806         rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1807         if (rc)
1808                 return rc;
1809
1810         return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1811 }
1812
1813 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1814 {
1815         int buflen, rc;
1816         char *buffer, *path, *end;
1817
1818         rc = -ENOMEM;
1819         buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1820         if (!buffer)
1821                 goto out;
1822
1823         buflen = PAGE_SIZE;
1824         end = buffer+buflen;
1825         *--end = '\0';
1826         buflen--;
1827         path = end-1;
1828         *path = '/';
1829         while (table) {
1830                 const char *name = table->procname;
1831                 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1832                 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1833                 if (buflen < 0)
1834                         goto out_free;
1835                 end -= namelen;
1836                 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1837                 *--end = '/';
1838                 path = end;
1839                 table = table->parent;
1840         }
1841         buflen -= 4;
1842         if (buflen < 0)
1843                 goto out_free;
1844         end -= 4;
1845         memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1846         path = end;
1847         rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1848 out_free:
1849         free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1850 out:
1851         return rc;
1852 }
1853
1854 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1855 {
1856         int error = 0;
1857         u32 av;
1858         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1859         u32 tsid;
1860         int rc;
1861
1862         rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1863         if (rc)
1864                 return rc;
1865
1866         tsec = current->security;
1867
1868         rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1869                                     SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1870         if (rc) {
1871                 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1872                 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1873         }
1874
1875         /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1876          * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1877         if (op == 001) {
1878                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1879                                      SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1880         } else {
1881                 av = 0;
1882                 if (op & 004)
1883                         av |= FILE__READ;
1884                 if (op & 002)
1885                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
1886                 if (av)
1887                         error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1888                                              SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1889         }
1890
1891         return error;
1892 }
1893
1894 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1895 {
1896         int rc = 0;
1897
1898         if (!sb)
1899                 return 0;
1900
1901         switch (cmds) {
1902         case Q_SYNC:
1903         case Q_QUOTAON:
1904         case Q_QUOTAOFF:
1905         case Q_SETINFO:
1906         case Q_SETQUOTA:
1907                 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1908                                          NULL);
1909                 break;
1910         case Q_GETFMT:
1911         case Q_GETINFO:
1912         case Q_GETQUOTA:
1913                 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1914                                          NULL);
1915                 break;
1916         default:
1917                 rc = 0;  /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1918                 break;
1919         }
1920         return rc;
1921 }
1922
1923 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1924 {
1925         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1926 }
1927
1928 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1929 {
1930         int rc;
1931
1932         rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1933         if (rc)
1934                 return rc;
1935
1936         switch (type) {
1937         case 3:         /* Read last kernel messages */
1938         case 10:        /* Return size of the log buffer */
1939                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1940                 break;
1941         case 6:         /* Disable logging to console */
1942         case 7:         /* Enable logging to console */
1943         case 8:         /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1944                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1945                 break;
1946         case 0:         /* Close log */
1947         case 1:         /* Open log */
1948         case 2:         /* Read from log */
1949         case 4:         /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1950         case 5:         /* Clear ring buffer */
1951         default:
1952                 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1953                 break;
1954         }
1955         return rc;
1956 }
1957
1958 /*
1959  * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1960  * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1961  * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1962  *
1963  * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1964  * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1965  * the capability is granted.
1966  *
1967  * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1968  * processes that allocate mappings.
1969  */
1970 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1971 {
1972         int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1973         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1974
1975         rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1976         if (rc == 0)
1977                 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1978                                           SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1979                                           CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1980                                           0,
1981                                           NULL);
1982
1983         if (rc == 0)
1984                 cap_sys_admin = 1;
1985
1986         return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1987 }
1988
1989 /* binprm security operations */
1990
1991 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1992 {
1993         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1994
1995         bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1996         if (!bsec)
1997                 return -ENOMEM;
1998
1999         bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2000         bsec->set = 0;
2001
2002         bprm->security = bsec;
2003         return 0;
2004 }
2005
2006 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2007 {
2008         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2009         struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2010         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2011         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2012         u32 newsid;
2013         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2014         int rc;
2015
2016         rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2017         if (rc)
2018                 return rc;
2019
2020         bsec = bprm->security;
2021
2022         if (bsec->set)
2023                 return 0;
2024
2025         tsec = current->security;
2026         isec = inode->i_security;
2027
2028         /* Default to the current task SID. */
2029         bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2030
2031         /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2032         tsec->create_sid = 0;
2033         tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2034         tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2035
2036         if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2037                 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2038                 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2039                 tsec->exec_sid = 0;
2040         } else {
2041                 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2042                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2043                                              SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
2044                 if (rc)
2045                         return rc;
2046         }
2047
2048         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2049         ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2050
2051         if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2052                 newsid = tsec->sid;
2053
2054         if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2055                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2056                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2057                 if (rc)
2058                         return rc;
2059         } else {
2060                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2061                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2062                                   SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2063                 if (rc)
2064                         return rc;
2065
2066                 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2067                                   SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2068                 if (rc)
2069                         return rc;
2070
2071                 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2072                 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2073
2074                 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2075                 bsec->sid = newsid;
2076         }
2077
2078         bsec->set = 1;
2079         return 0;
2080 }
2081
2082 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2083 {
2084         return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2085 }
2086
2087
2088 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2089 {
2090         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2091         int atsecure = 0;
2092
2093         if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2094                 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2095                    the noatsecure permission is granted between
2096                    the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2097                 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2098                                          SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2099                                          PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2100         }
2101
2102         return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2103 }
2104
2105 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2106 {
2107         kfree(bprm->security);
2108         bprm->security = NULL;
2109 }
2110
2111 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2112 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2113
2114 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2115 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2116 {
2117         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2118         struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2119         struct tty_struct *tty;
2120         struct fdtable *fdt;
2121         long j = -1;
2122         int drop_tty = 0;
2123
2124         mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
2125         tty = get_current_tty();
2126         mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2127         if (tty) {
2128                 file_list_lock();
2129                 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2130                 if (file) {
2131                         /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2132                            Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2133                            than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2134                            file may belong to another process and we are only
2135                            interested in the inode-based check here. */
2136                         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2137                         if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2138                                            FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2139                                 drop_tty = 1;
2140                         }
2141                 }
2142                 file_list_unlock();
2143                 tty_kref_put(tty);
2144         }
2145         /* Reset controlling tty. */
2146         if (drop_tty)
2147                 no_tty();
2148
2149         /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2150
2151         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2152
2153         spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2154         for (;;) {
2155                 unsigned long set, i;
2156                 int fd;
2157
2158                 j++;
2159                 i = j * __NFDBITS;
2160                 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2161                 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2162                         break;
2163                 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2164                 if (!set)
2165                         continue;
2166                 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2167                 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2168                         if (set & 1) {
2169                                 file = fget(i);
2170                                 if (!file)
2171                                         continue;
2172                                 if (file_has_perm(current,
2173                                                   file,
2174                                                   file_to_av(file))) {
2175                                         sys_close(i);
2176                                         fd = get_unused_fd();
2177                                         if (fd != i) {
2178                                                 if (fd >= 0)
2179                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
2180                                                 fput(file);
2181                                                 continue;
2182                                         }
2183                                         if (devnull) {
2184                                                 get_file(devnull);
2185                                         } else {
2186                                                 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2187                                                 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2188                                                         devnull = NULL;
2189                                                         put_unused_fd(fd);
2190                                                         fput(file);
2191                                                         continue;
2192                                                 }
2193                                         }
2194                                         fd_install(fd, devnull);
2195                                 }
2196                                 fput(file);
2197                         }
2198                 }
2199                 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2200
2201         }
2202         spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2203 }
2204
2205 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2206 {
2207         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2208         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2209         u32 sid;
2210         int rc;
2211
2212         secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2213
2214         tsec = current->security;
2215
2216         bsec = bprm->security;
2217         sid = bsec->sid;
2218
2219         tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2220         bsec->unsafe = 0;
2221         if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2222                 /* Check for shared state.  If not ok, leave SID
2223                    unchanged and kill. */
2224                 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2225                         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2226                                         PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2227                         if (rc) {
2228                                 bsec->unsafe = 1;
2229                                 return;
2230                         }
2231                 }
2232
2233                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2234                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2235                 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2236                         struct task_struct *tracer;
2237                         struct task_security_struct *sec;
2238                         u32 ptsid = 0;
2239
2240                         rcu_read_lock();
2241                         tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2242                         if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2243                                 sec = tracer->security;
2244                                 ptsid = sec->sid;
2245                         }
2246                         rcu_read_unlock();
2247
2248                         if (ptsid != 0) {
2249                                 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2250                                                   PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2251                                 if (rc) {
2252                                         bsec->unsafe = 1;
2253                                         return;
2254                                 }
2255                         }
2256                 }
2257                 tsec->sid = sid;
2258         }
2259 }
2260
2261 /*
2262  * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2263  */
2264 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2265 {
2266         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2267         struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2268         struct itimerval itimer;
2269         struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2270         int rc, i;
2271
2272         tsec = current->security;
2273         bsec = bprm->security;
2274
2275         if (bsec->unsafe) {
2276                 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2277                 return;
2278         }
2279         if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2280                 return;
2281
2282         /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2283         flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2284
2285         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2286            from the old SID.  If not, clear itimers to avoid
2287            subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2288            signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2289           been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2290           will be checked against the new SID. */
2291         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2292                           PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2293         if (rc) {
2294                 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2295                 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2296                         do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2297                 flush_signals(current);
2298                 spin_lock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2299                 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2300                 sigemptyset(&current->blocked);
2301                 recalc_sigpending();
2302                 spin_unlock_irq(&current->sighand->siglock);
2303         }
2304
2305         /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2306         current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2307
2308         /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2309            from the old SID.  If not, reset all soft limits to
2310            the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2311            task's soft limit.  Note that the setting of hard limits
2312            (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2313            check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2314            the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2315            than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2316            is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2317            RLIMIT_STACK.*/
2318         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2319                           PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2320         if (rc) {
2321                 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2322                         rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2323                         initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2324                         rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2325                 }
2326                 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2327                         /*
2328                          * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2329                          * to be refigured.
2330                          */
2331                         current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2332                 }
2333         }
2334
2335         /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2336            recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2337         wake_up_interruptible(&current->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2338 }
2339
2340 /* superblock security operations */
2341
2342 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2343 {
2344         return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2345 }
2346
2347 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2348 {
2349         superblock_free_security(sb);
2350 }
2351
2352 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2353 {
2354         if (plen > olen)
2355                 return 0;
2356
2357         return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2358 }
2359
2360 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2361 {
2362         return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2363                 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2364                 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2365                 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2366 }
2367
2368 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2369 {
2370         if (!*first) {
2371                 **to = ',';
2372                 *to += 1;
2373         } else
2374                 *first = 0;
2375         memcpy(*to, from, len);
2376         *to += len;
2377 }
2378
2379 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2380                                        int len)
2381 {
2382         int current_size = 0;
2383
2384         if (!*first) {
2385                 **to = '|';
2386                 *to += 1;
2387         } else
2388                 *first = 0;
2389
2390         while (current_size < len) {
2391                 if (*from != '"') {
2392                         **to = *from;
2393                         *to += 1;
2394                 }
2395                 from += 1;
2396                 current_size += 1;
2397         }
2398 }
2399
2400 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2401 {
2402         int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2403         char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2404         char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2405         int open_quote = 0;
2406
2407         in_curr = orig;
2408         sec_curr = copy;
2409
2410         nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2411         if (!nosec) {
2412                 rc = -ENOMEM;
2413                 goto out;
2414         }
2415
2416         nosec_save = nosec;
2417         fnosec = fsec = 1;
2418         in_save = in_end = orig;
2419
2420         do {
2421                 if (*in_end == '"')
2422                         open_quote = !open_quote;
2423                 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2424                                 *in_end == '\0') {
2425                         int len = in_end - in_curr;
2426
2427                         if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2428                                 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2429                         else
2430                                 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2431
2432                         in_curr = in_end + 1;
2433                 }
2434         } while (*in_end++);
2435
2436         strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2437         free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2438 out:
2439         return rc;
2440 }
2441
2442 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2443 {
2444         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2445         int rc;
2446
2447         rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2448         if (rc)
2449                 return rc;
2450
2451         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2452         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2453         return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2454 }
2455
2456 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2457 {
2458         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2459
2460         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2461         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2462         return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2463 }
2464
2465 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2466                          struct path *path,
2467                          char *type,
2468                          unsigned long flags,
2469                          void *data)
2470 {
2471         int rc;
2472
2473         rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2474         if (rc)
2475                 return rc;
2476
2477         if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2478                 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2479                                            FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2480         else
2481                 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2482                                        FILE__MOUNTON);
2483 }
2484
2485 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2486 {
2487         int rc;
2488
2489         rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2490         if (rc)
2491                 return rc;
2492
2493         return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2494                                    FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2495 }
2496
2497 /* inode security operations */
2498
2499 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2500 {
2501         return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2502 }
2503
2504 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2505 {
2506         inode_free_security(inode);
2507 }
2508
2509 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2510                                        char **name, void **value,
2511                                        size_t *len)
2512 {
2513         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2514         struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2515         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2516         u32 newsid, clen;
2517         int rc;
2518         char *namep = NULL, *context;
2519
2520         tsec = current->security;
2521         dsec = dir->i_security;
2522         sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2523
2524         if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2525                 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2526         } else {
2527                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2528                                              inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2529                                              &newsid);
2530                 if (rc) {
2531                         printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:  "
2532                                "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2533                                "ino=%ld)\n",
2534                                __func__,
2535                                -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2536                         return rc;
2537                 }
2538         }
2539
2540         /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2541         if (sbsec->initialized) {
2542                 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2543                 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2544                 isec->sid = newsid;
2545                 isec->initialized = 1;
2546         }
2547
2548         if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2549                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2550
2551         if (name) {
2552                 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2553                 if (!namep)
2554                         return -ENOMEM;
2555                 *name = namep;
2556         }
2557
2558         if (value && len) {
2559                 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2560                 if (rc) {
2561                         kfree(namep);
2562                         return rc;
2563                 }
2564                 *value = context;
2565                 *len = clen;
2566         }
2567
2568         return 0;
2569 }
2570
2571 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2572 {
2573         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2574 }
2575
2576 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2577 {
2578         int rc;
2579
2580         rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2581         if (rc)
2582                 return rc;
2583         return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2584 }
2585
2586 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2587 {
2588         int rc;
2589
2590         rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2591         if (rc)
2592                 return rc;
2593         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2594 }
2595
2596 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2597 {
2598         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2599 }
2600
2601 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2602 {
2603         return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2604 }
2605
2606 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2607 {
2608         return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2609 }
2610
2611 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2612 {
2613         int rc;
2614
2615         rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2616         if (rc)
2617                 return rc;
2618
2619         return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2620 }
2621
2622 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2623                                 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2624 {
2625         return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2626 }
2627
2628 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2629 {
2630         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2631 }
2632
2633 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2634 {
2635         int rc;
2636
2637         rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2638         if (rc)
2639                 return rc;
2640         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2641 }
2642
2643 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2644 {
2645         int rc;
2646
2647         rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2648         if (rc)
2649                 return rc;
2650
2651         if (!mask) {
2652                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2653                 return 0;
2654         }
2655
2656         return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2657                                open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2658 }
2659
2660 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2661 {
2662         int rc;
2663
2664         rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2665         if (rc)
2666                 return rc;
2667
2668         if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2669                 return 0;
2670
2671         if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2672                                ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2673                 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2674
2675         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2676 }
2677
2678 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2679 {
2680         return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2681 }
2682
2683 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2684 {
2685         if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2686                      sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2687                 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2688                         if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2689                                 return -EPERM;
2690                 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2691                         /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2692                            Restrict to administrator. */
2693                         return -EPERM;
2694                 }
2695         }
2696
2697         /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2698            ordinary setattr permission. */
2699         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2700 }
2701
2702 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2703                                   const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2704 {
2705         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2706         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2707         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2708         struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2709         struct avc_audit_data ad;
2710         u32 newsid;
2711         int rc = 0;
2712
2713         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2714                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2715
2716         sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2717         if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2718                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2719
2720         if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2721                 return -EPERM;
2722
2723         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2724         ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2725
2726         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2727                           FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2728         if (rc)
2729                 return rc;
2730
2731         rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2732         if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2733                 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2734                         return rc;
2735                 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2736         }
2737         if (rc)
2738                 return rc;
2739
2740         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2741                           FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2742         if (rc)
2743                 return rc;
2744
2745         rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2746                                           isec->sclass);
2747         if (rc)
2748                 return rc;
2749
2750         return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2751                             sbsec->sid,
2752                             SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2753                             FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2754                             &ad);
2755 }
2756
2757 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2758                                         const void *value, size_t size,
2759                                         int flags)
2760 {
2761         struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2762         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2763         u32 newsid;
2764         int rc;
2765
2766         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2767                 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2768                 return;
2769         }
2770
2771         rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2772         if (rc) {
2773                 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux:  unable to map context to SID"
2774                        "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2775                        inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2776                 return;
2777         }
2778
2779         isec->sid = newsid;
2780         return;
2781 }
2782
2783 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2784 {
2785         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2786 }
2787
2788 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2789 {
2790         return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2791 }
2792
2793 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2794 {
2795         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2796                 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2797
2798         /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2799            You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2800         return -EACCES;
2801 }
2802
2803 /*
2804  * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2805  *
2806  * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2807  */
2808 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2809 {
2810         u32 size;
2811         int error;
2812         char *context = NULL;
2813         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2814         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2815
2816         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2817                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2818
2819         /*
2820          * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2821          * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2822          * use the in-core value under current policy.
2823          * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2824          * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2825          * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2826          * in-core context value, not a denial.
2827          */
2828         error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
2829         if (!error)
2830                 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2831                                              SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
2832                                              CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
2833                                              0,
2834                                              NULL);
2835         if (!error)
2836                 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2837                                                       &size);
2838         else
2839                 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2840         if (error)
2841                 return error;
2842         error = size;
2843         if (alloc) {
2844                 *buffer = context;
2845                 goto out_nofree;
2846         }
2847         kfree(context);
2848 out_nofree:
2849         return error;
2850 }
2851
2852 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2853                                      const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2854 {
2855         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2856         u32 newsid;
2857         int rc;
2858
2859         if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2860                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
2861
2862         if (!value || !size)
2863                 return -EACCES;
2864
2865         rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2866         if (rc)
2867                 return rc;
2868
2869         isec->sid = newsid;
2870         return 0;
2871 }
2872
2873 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2874 {
2875         const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2876         if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2877                 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2878         return len;
2879 }
2880
2881 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2882 {
2883         return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2884 }
2885
2886 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2887 {
2888         return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2889 }
2890
2891 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2892 {
2893         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2894         *secid = isec->sid;
2895 }
2896
2897 /* file security operations */
2898
2899 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2900 {
2901         int rc;
2902         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2903
2904         if (!mask) {
2905                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2906                 return 0;
2907         }
2908
2909         /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2910         if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2911                 mask |= MAY_APPEND;
2912
2913         rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2914                            file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2915         if (rc)
2916                 return rc;
2917
2918         return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2919 }
2920
2921 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2922 {
2923         struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2924         struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2925         struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2926         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2927
2928         if (!mask) {
2929                 /* No permission to check.  Existence test. */
2930                 return 0;
2931         }
2932
2933         if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2934             && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2935                 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2936
2937         return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2938 }
2939
2940 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2941 {
2942         return file_alloc_security(file);
2943 }
2944
2945 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2946 {
2947         file_free_security(file);
2948 }
2949
2950 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2951                               unsigned long arg)
2952 {
2953         u32 av = 0;
2954
2955         if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2956                 av |= FILE__WRITE;
2957         if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2958                 av |= FILE__READ;
2959         if (!av)
2960                 av = FILE__IOCTL;
2961
2962         return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2963 }
2964
2965 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2966 {
2967 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2968         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2969                 /*
2970                  * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2971                  * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2972                  * This has an additional check.
2973                  */
2974                 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2975                 if (rc)
2976                         return rc;
2977         }
2978 #endif
2979
2980         if (file) {
2981                 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2982                 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2983
2984                 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2985                 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2986                         av |= FILE__WRITE;
2987
2988                 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2989                         av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2990
2991                 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2992         }
2993         return 0;
2994 }
2995
2996 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2997                              unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2998                              unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
2999 {
3000         int rc = 0;
3001         u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
3002
3003         if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3004                 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3005                                   MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3006         if (rc || addr_only)
3007                 return rc;
3008
3009         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3010                 prot = reqprot;
3011
3012         return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3013                                    (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3014 }
3015
3016 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3017                                  unsigned long reqprot,
3018                                  unsigned long prot)
3019 {
3020         int rc;
3021
3022         rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3023         if (rc)
3024                 return rc;
3025
3026         if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3027                 prot = reqprot;
3028
3029 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3030         if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3031                 rc = 0;
3032                 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3033                     vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3034                         rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
3035                                            PROCESS__EXECHEAP);
3036                 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3037                            vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3038                            vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3039                         rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3040                 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3041                         /*
3042                          * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3043                          * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3044                          * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3045                          * modified content.  This typically should only
3046                          * occur for text relocations.
3047                          */
3048                         rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3049                                            FILE__EXECMOD);
3050                 }
3051                 if (rc)
3052                         return rc;
3053         }
3054 #endif
3055
3056         return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3057 }
3058
3059 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3060 {
3061         return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3062 }
3063
3064 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3065                               unsigned long arg)
3066 {
3067         int err = 0;
3068
3069         switch (cmd) {
3070         case F_SETFL:
3071                 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3072                         err = -EINVAL;
3073                         break;
3074                 }
3075
3076                 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3077                         err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3078                         break;
3079                 }
3080                 /* fall through */
3081         case F_SETOWN:
3082         case F_SETSIG:
3083         case F_GETFL:
3084         case F_GETOWN:
3085         case F_GETSIG:
3086                 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3087                 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3088                 break;
3089         case F_GETLK:
3090         case F_SETLK:
3091         case F_SETLKW:
3092 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3093         case F_GETLK64:
3094         case F_SETLK64:
3095         case F_SETLKW64:
3096 #endif
3097                 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3098                         err = -EINVAL;
3099                         break;
3100                 }
3101                 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3102                 break;
3103         }
3104
3105         return err;
3106 }
3107
3108 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3109 {
3110         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3111         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3112
3113         tsec = current->security;
3114         fsec = file->f_security;
3115         fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3116
3117         return 0;
3118 }
3119
3120 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3121                                        struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3122 {
3123         struct file *file;
3124         u32 perm;
3125         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3126         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3127
3128         /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3129         file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3130
3131         tsec = tsk->security;
3132         fsec = file->f_security;
3133
3134         if (!signum)
3135                 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3136         else
3137                 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3138
3139         return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3140                             SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3141 }
3142
3143 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3144 {
3145         return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3146 }
3147
3148 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3149 {
3150         struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3151         struct inode *inode;
3152         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3153         inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3154         fsec = file->f_security;
3155         isec = inode->i_security;
3156         /*
3157          * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3158          * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3159          * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3160          * Task label is already saved in the file security
3161          * struct as its SID.
3162          */
3163         fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3164         fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3165         /*
3166          * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3167          * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3168          * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3169          * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3170          * new inode label or new policy.
3171          * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3172          */
3173         return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3174 }
3175
3176 /* task security operations */
3177
3178 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3179 {
3180         int rc;
3181
3182         rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3183         if (rc)
3184                 return rc;
3185
3186         return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3187 }
3188
3189 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3190 {
3191         struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3192         int rc;
3193
3194         tsec1 = current->security;
3195
3196         rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3197         if (rc)
3198                 return rc;
3199         tsec2 = tsk->security;
3200
3201         tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3202         tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3203
3204         /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3205         tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3206         tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3207         tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3208         tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3209
3210         return 0;
3211 }
3212
3213 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3214 {
3215         task_free_security(tsk);
3216 }
3217
3218 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3219 {
3220         /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3221            since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3222            identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3223            this operation.  However, SELinux does control the use
3224            of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3225            capable hook. */
3226         return 0;
3227 }
3228
3229 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3230 {
3231         return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3232 }
3233
3234 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3235 {
3236         /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3237         return 0;
3238 }
3239
3240 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3241 {
3242         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3243 }
3244
3245 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3246 {
3247         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3248 }
3249
3250 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3251 {
3252         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3253 }
3254
3255 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3256 {
3257         struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3258         *secid = tsec->sid;
3259 }
3260
3261 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3262 {
3263         /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3264         return 0;
3265 }
3266
3267 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3268 {
3269         int rc;
3270
3271         rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3272         if (rc)
3273                 return rc;
3274
3275         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3276 }
3277
3278 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3279 {
3280         int rc;
3281
3282         rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3283         if (rc)
3284                 return rc;
3285
3286         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3287 }
3288
3289 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3290 {
3291         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3292 }
3293
3294 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3295 {
3296         struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3297         int rc;
3298
3299         rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3300         if (rc)
3301                 return rc;
3302
3303         /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3304            lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3305            later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3306            upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3307         if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3308                 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3309
3310         return 0;
3311 }
3312
3313 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3314 {
3315         int rc;
3316
3317         rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3318         if (rc)
3319                 return rc;
3320
3321         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3322 }
3323
3324 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3325 {
3326         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3327 }
3328
3329 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3330 {
3331         return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3332 }
3333
3334 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3335                                 int sig, u32 secid)
3336 {
3337         u32 perm;
3338         int rc;
3339         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3340
3341         rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3342         if (rc)
3343                 return rc;
3344
3345         if (!sig)
3346                 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3347         else
3348                 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3349         tsec = p->security;
3350         if (secid)
3351                 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3352         else
3353                 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3354         return rc;
3355 }
3356
3357 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3358                               unsigned long arg2,
3359                               unsigned long arg3,
3360                               unsigned long arg4,
3361                               unsigned long arg5,
3362                               long *rc_p)
3363 {
3364         /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3365            any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3366            the state of the current process. */
3367         return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3368 }
3369
3370 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3371 {
3372         return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3373 }
3374
3375 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3376 {
3377         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3378
3379         secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3380
3381         tsec = p->security;
3382         tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3383         tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3384         return;
3385 }
3386
3387 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3388                                   struct inode *inode)
3389 {
3390         struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3391         struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3392
3393         isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3394         isec->initialized = 1;
3395         return;
3396 }
3397
3398 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3399 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3400                         struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3401 {
3402         int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3403         struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3404
3405         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3406         ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3407         if (ih == NULL)
3408                 goto out;
3409
3410         ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3411         if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3412                 goto out;
3413
3414         ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3415         ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3416         ret = 0;
3417
3418         if (proto)
3419                 *proto = ih->protocol;
3420
3421         switch (ih->protocol) {
3422         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3423                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3424
3425                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3426                         break;
3427
3428                 offset += ihlen;
3429                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3430                 if (th == NULL)
3431                         break;
3432
3433                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3434                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3435                 break;
3436         }
3437
3438         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3439                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3440
3441                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3442                         break;
3443
3444                 offset += ihlen;
3445                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3446                 if (uh == NULL)
3447                         break;
3448
3449                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3450                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3451                 break;
3452         }
3453
3454         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3455                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3456
3457                 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3458                         break;
3459
3460                 offset += ihlen;
3461                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3462                 if (dh == NULL)
3463                         break;
3464
3465                 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3466                 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3467                 break;
3468         }
3469
3470         default:
3471                 break;
3472         }
3473 out:
3474         return ret;
3475 }
3476
3477 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3478
3479 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3480 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3481                         struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3482 {
3483         u8 nexthdr;
3484         int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3485         struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3486
3487         offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3488         ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3489         if (ip6 == NULL)
3490                 goto out;
3491
3492         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3493         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3494         ret = 0;
3495
3496         nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3497         offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3498         offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3499         if (offset < 0)
3500                 goto out;
3501
3502         if (proto)
3503                 *proto = nexthdr;
3504
3505         switch (nexthdr) {
3506         case IPPROTO_TCP: {
3507                 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3508
3509                 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3510                 if (th == NULL)
3511                         break;
3512
3513                 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3514                 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3515                 break;
3516         }
3517
3518         case IPPROTO_UDP: {
3519                 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3520
3521                 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3522                 if (uh == NULL)
3523                         break;
3524
3525                 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3526                 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3527                 break;
3528         }
3529
3530         case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3531                 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3532
3533                 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3534                 if (dh == NULL)
3535                         break;
3536
3537                 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3538                 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3539                 break;
3540         }
3541
3542         /* includes fragments */
3543         default:
3544                 break;
3545         }
3546 out:
3547         return ret;
3548 }
3549
3550 #endif /* IPV6 */
3551
3552 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3553                              char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3554 {
3555         char *addrp;
3556         int ret;
3557
3558         switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3559         case PF_INET:
3560                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3561                 if (ret)
3562                         goto parse_error;
3563                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3564                                        &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3565                 goto okay;
3566
3567 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3568         case PF_INET6:
3569                 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3570                 if (ret)
3571                         goto parse_error;
3572                 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3573                                        &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3574                 goto okay;
3575 #endif  /* IPV6 */
3576         default:
3577                 addrp = NULL;
3578                 goto okay;
3579         }
3580
3581 parse_error:
3582         printk(KERN_WARNING
3583                "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3584                " unable to parse packet\n");
3585         return ret;
3586
3587 okay:
3588         if (_addrp)
3589                 *_addrp = addrp;
3590         return 0;
3591 }
3592
3593 /**
3594  * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3595  * @skb: the packet
3596  * @family: protocol family
3597  * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3598  *
3599  * Description:
3600  * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3601  * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3602  * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp().  The function
3603  * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3604  * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3605  * peer labels.
3606  *
3607  */
3608 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3609 {
3610         int err;
3611         u32 xfrm_sid;
3612         u32 nlbl_sid;
3613         u32 nlbl_type;
3614
3615         selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3616         selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3617
3618         err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3619         if (unlikely(err)) {
3620                 printk(KERN_WARNING
3621                        "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3622                        " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3623                 return -EACCES;
3624         }
3625
3626         return 0;
3627 }
3628
3629 /* socket security operations */
3630 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3631                            u32 perms)
3632 {
3633         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3634         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3635         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3636         int err = 0;
3637
3638         tsec = task->security;
3639         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3640
3641         if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3642                 goto out;
3643
3644         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3645         ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3646         err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3647
3648 out:
3649         return err;
3650 }
3651
3652 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3653                                  int protocol, int kern)
3654 {
3655         int err = 0;
3656         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3657         u32 newsid;
3658
3659         if (kern)
3660                 goto out;
3661
3662         tsec = current->security;
3663         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3664         err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3665                            socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3666                            protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3667
3668 out:
3669         return err;
3670 }
3671
3672 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3673                                       int type, int protocol, int kern)
3674 {
3675         int err = 0;
3676         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3677         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3678         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3679         u32 newsid;
3680
3681         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3682
3683         tsec = current->security;
3684         newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3685         isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3686         isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3687         isec->initialized = 1;
3688
3689         if (sock->sk) {
3690                 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3691                 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3692                 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3693                 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3694         }
3695
3696         return err;
3697 }
3698
3699 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3700    Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3701    permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3702
3703 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3704 {
3705         u16 family;
3706         int err;
3707
3708         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3709         if (err)
3710                 goto out;
3711
3712         /*
3713          * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3714          * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3715          * check the first address now.
3716          */
3717         family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3718         if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3719                 char *addrp;
3720                 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3721                 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3722                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3723                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3724                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3725                 unsigned short snum;
3726                 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3727                 u32 sid, node_perm;
3728
3729                 tsec = current->security;
3730                 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3731
3732                 if (family == PF_INET) {
3733                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3734                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3735                         addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3736                 } else {
3737                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3738                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3739                         addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3740                 }
3741
3742                 if (snum) {
3743                         int low, high;
3744
3745                         inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3746
3747                         if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3748                                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3749                                                       snum, &sid);
3750                                 if (err)
3751                                         goto out;
3752                                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3753                                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3754                                 ad.u.net.family = family;
3755                                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3756                                                    isec->sclass,
3757                                                    SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3758                                 if (err)
3759                                         goto out;
3760                         }
3761                 }
3762
3763                 switch (isec->sclass) {
3764                 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3765                         node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3766                         break;
3767
3768                 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3769                         node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3770                         break;
3771
3772                 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3773                         node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3774                         break;
3775
3776                 default:
3777                         node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3778                         break;
3779                 }
3780
3781                 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3782                 if (err)
3783                         goto out;
3784
3785                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3786                 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3787                 ad.u.net.family = family;
3788
3789                 if (family == PF_INET)
3790                         ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3791                 else
3792                         ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3793
3794                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3795                                    isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3796                 if (err)
3797                         goto out;
3798         }
3799 out:
3800         return err;
3801 }
3802
3803 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3804 {
3805         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3806         int err;
3807
3808         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3809         if (err)
3810                 return err;
3811
3812         /*
3813          * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3814          */
3815         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3816         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3817             isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3818                 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3819                 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3820                 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3821                 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3822                 unsigned short snum;
3823                 u32 sid, perm;
3824
3825                 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3826                         addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3827                         if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3828                                 return -EINVAL;
3829                         snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3830                 } else {
3831                         addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3832                         if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3833                                 return -EINVAL;
3834                         snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3835                 }
3836
3837                 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3838                 if (err)
3839                         goto out;
3840
3841                 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3842                        TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3843
3844                 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3845                 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3846                 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3847                 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3848                 if (err)
3849                         goto out;
3850         }
3851
3852 out:
3853         return err;
3854 }
3855
3856 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3857 {
3858         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3859 }
3860
3861 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3862 {
3863         int err;
3864         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3865         struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3866
3867         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3868         if (err)
3869                 return err;
3870
3871         newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3872
3873         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3874         newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3875         newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3876         newisec->initialized = 1;
3877
3878         return 0;
3879 }
3880
3881 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3882                                   int size)
3883 {
3884         int rc;
3885
3886         rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3887         if (rc)
3888                 return rc;
3889
3890         return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3891 }
3892
3893 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3894                                   int size, int flags)
3895 {
3896         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3897 }
3898
3899 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3900 {
3901         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3902 }
3903
3904 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3905 {
3906         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3907 }
3908
3909 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3910 {
3911         int err;
3912
3913         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3914         if (err)
3915                 return err;
3916
3917         return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3918 }
3919
3920 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3921                                      int optname)
3922 {
3923         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3924 }
3925
3926 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3927 {
3928         return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3929 }
3930
3931 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3932                                               struct socket *other,
3933                                               struct sock *newsk)
3934 {
3935         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3936         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3937         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3938         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3939         int err;
3940
3941         err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3942         if (err)
3943                 return err;
3944
3945         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3946         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3947
3948         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3949         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3950
3951         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3952                            isec->sclass,
3953                            UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3954         if (err)
3955                 return err;
3956
3957         /* connecting socket */
3958         ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3959         ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3960
3961         /* server child socket */
3962         ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3963         ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3964         err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3965
3966         return err;
3967 }
3968
3969 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3970                                         struct socket *other)
3971 {
3972         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3973         struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3974         struct avc_audit_data ad;
3975         int err;
3976
3977         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3978         other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3979
3980         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3981         ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3982
3983         err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3984                            isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3985         if (err)
3986                 return err;
3987
3988         return 0;
3989 }
3990
3991 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3992                                     u32 peer_sid,
3993                                     struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3994 {
3995         int err;
3996         u32 if_sid;
3997         u32 node_sid;
3998
3999         err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4000         if (err)
4001                 return err;
4002         err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4003                            SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4004         if (err)
4005                 return err;
4006
4007         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4008         if (err)
4009                 return err;
4010         return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4011                             SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4012 }
4013
4014 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4015                                                 struct sk_buff *skb,
4016                                                 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4017                                                 u16 family,
4018                                                 char *addrp)
4019 {
4020         int err;
4021         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4022         u16 sk_class;
4023         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4024         u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4025
4026         sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4027         sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4028
4029         switch (sk_class) {
4030         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4031                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4032                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4033                 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4034                 break;
4035         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4036                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4037                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4038                 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4039                 break;
4040         case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4041                 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4042                 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4043                 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4044                 break;
4045         default:
4046                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4047                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4048                 recv_perm = 0;
4049                 break;
4050         }
4051
4052         err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4053         if (err)
4054                 return err;
4055         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4056         if (err)
4057                 return err;
4058
4059         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4060         if (err)
4061                 return err;
4062         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4063         if (err)
4064                 return err;
4065
4066         if (!recv_perm)
4067                 return 0;
4068         err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4069                               ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4070         if (unlikely(err)) {
4071                 printk(KERN_WARNING
4072                        "SELinux: failure in"
4073                        " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4074                        " network port label not found\n");
4075                 return err;
4076         }
4077         return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4078 }
4079
4080 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4081                                        struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4082                                        u16 family, char *addrp)
4083 {
4084         int err;
4085         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4086         u32 peer_sid;
4087         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4088
4089         if (selinux_compat_net)
4090                 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
4091                                                            family, addrp);
4092         else
4093                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4094                                    PACKET__RECV, ad);
4095         if (err)
4096                 return err;
4097
4098         if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4099                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4100                 if (err)
4101                         return err;
4102                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4103                                    SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
4104         } else {
4105                 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
4106                 if (err)
4107                         return err;
4108                 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
4109         }
4110
4111         return err;
4112 }
4113
4114 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4115 {
4116         int err;
4117         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4118         u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4119         u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4120         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4121         char *addrp;
4122
4123         if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4124                 return 0;
4125
4126         /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4127         if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4128                 family = PF_INET;
4129
4130         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4131         ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4132         ad.u.net.family = family;
4133         err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4134         if (err)
4135                 return err;
4136
4137         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4138          * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4139          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4140          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4141         if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4142                 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4143                                                    family, addrp);
4144
4145         if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
4146                 u32 peer_sid;
4147
4148                 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4149                 if (err)
4150                         return err;
4151                 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4152                                                peer_sid, &ad);
4153                 if (err)
4154                         return err;
4155                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4156                                    PEER__RECV, &ad);
4157         }
4158
4159         if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4160                 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4161                                    PACKET__RECV, &ad);
4162                 if (err)
4163                         return err;
4164         }
4165
4166         return err;
4167 }
4168
4169 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4170                                             int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4171 {
4172         int err = 0;
4173         char *scontext;
4174         u32 scontext_len;
4175         struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4176         struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4177         u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4178
4179         isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4180
4181         if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4182             isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4183                 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4184                 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4185         }
4186         if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4187                 err = -ENOPROTOOPT;
4188                 goto out;
4189         }
4190
4191         err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4192
4193         if (err)
4194                 goto out;
4195
4196         if (scontext_len > len) {
4197                 err = -ERANGE;
4198                 goto out_len;
4199         }
4200
4201         if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4202                 err = -EFAULT;
4203
4204 out_len:
4205         if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4206                 err = -EFAULT;
4207
4208         kfree(scontext);
4209 out:
4210         return err;
4211 }
4212
4213 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4214 {
4215         u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4216         u16 family;
4217
4218         if (sock)
4219                 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4220         else if (skb && skb->sk)
4221                 family = skb->sk->sk_family;
4222         else
4223                 goto out;
4224
4225         if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4226                 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4227         else if (skb)
4228                 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4229
4230 out:
4231         *secid = peer_secid;
4232         if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4233                 return -EINVAL;
4234         return 0;
4235 }
4236
4237 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4238 {
4239         return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4240 }
4241
4242 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4243 {
4244         sk_free_security(sk);
4245 }
4246
4247 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4248 {
4249         struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4250         struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4251
4252         newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4253         newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4254         newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4255
4256         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4257 }
4258
4259 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4260 {
4261         if (!sk)
4262                 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4263         else {
4264                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4265
4266                 *secid = sksec->sid;
4267         }
4268 }
4269
4270 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4271 {
4272         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4273         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4274
4275         if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4276             sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4277                 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4278         sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4279
4280         selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
4281 }
4282
4283 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4284                                      struct request_sock *req)
4285 {
4286         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4287         int err;
4288         u32 newsid;
4289         u32 peersid;
4290
4291         err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
4292         if (err)
4293                 return err;
4294         if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4295                 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4296                 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4297                 return 0;
4298         }
4299
4300         err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4301         if (err)
4302                 return err;
4303
4304         req->secid = newsid;
4305         req->peer_secid = peersid;
4306         return 0;
4307 }
4308
4309 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4310                                    const struct request_sock *req)
4311 {
4312         struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4313
4314         newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4315         newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4316         /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4317            new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4318            So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4319            time it will have been created and available. */
4320
4321         /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4322          * thread with access to newsksec */
4323         selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4324 }
4325
4326 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
4327                                 struct sk_buff *skb)
4328 {
4329         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4330
4331         selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4332 }
4333
4334 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4335                                       struct flowi *fl)
4336 {
4337         fl->secid = req->secid;
4338 }
4339
4340 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4341 {
4342         int err = 0;
4343         u32 perm;
4344         struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4345         struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4346         struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4347
4348         if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4349                 err = -EINVAL;
4350                 goto out;
4351         }
4352         nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4353
4354         err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4355         if (err) {
4356                 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4357                         audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4358                                   "SELinux:  unrecognized netlink message"
4359                                   " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4360                                   nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4361                         if (!selinux_enforcing)
4362                                 err = 0;
4363                 }
4364
4365                 /* Ignore */
4366                 if (err == -ENOENT)
4367                         err = 0;
4368                 goto out;
4369         }
4370
4371         err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4372 out:
4373         return err;
4374 }
4375
4376 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4377
4378 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4379                                        u16 family)
4380 {
4381         char *addrp;
4382         u32 peer_sid;
4383         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4384         u8 secmark_active;
4385         u8 peerlbl_active;
4386
4387         if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4388                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4389
4390         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4391         peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4392         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4393                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4394
4395         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4396         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4397         ad.u.net.family = family;
4398         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4399                 return NF_DROP;
4400
4401         if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4402                 return NF_DROP;
4403
4404         if (peerlbl_active)
4405                 if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4406                                              peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
4407                         return NF_DROP;
4408
4409         if (secmark_active)
4410                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4411                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4412                         return NF_DROP;
4413
4414         return NF_ACCEPT;
4415 }
4416
4417 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4418                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
4419                                          const struct net_device *in,
4420                                          const struct net_device *out,
4421                                          int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4422 {
4423         return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4424 }
4425
4426 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4427 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4428                                          struct sk_buff *skb,
4429                                          const struct net_device *in,
4430                                          const struct net_device *out,
4431                                          int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4432 {
4433         return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4434 }
4435 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4436
4437 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4438                                                 int ifindex,
4439                                                 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4440                                                 u16 family, char *addrp)
4441 {
4442         int err;
4443         struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4444         u16 sk_class;
4445         u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4446         u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4447
4448         sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4449         sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4450
4451         switch (sk_class) {
4452         case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4453                 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4454                 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4455                 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4456                 break;
4457         case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4458                 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4459                 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4460                 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4461                 break;
4462         case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4463                 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4464                 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4465                 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4466                 break;
4467         default:
4468                 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4469                 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4470                 send_perm = 0;
4471                 break;
4472         }
4473
4474         err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4475         if (err)
4476                 return err;
4477         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4478                 return err;
4479
4480         err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4481         if (err)
4482                 return err;
4483         err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4484         if (err)
4485                 return err;
4486
4487         if (send_perm != 0)
4488                 return 0;
4489
4490         err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4491                               ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4492         if (unlikely(err)) {
4493                 printk(KERN_WARNING
4494                        "SELinux: failure in"
4495                        " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4496                        " network port label not found\n");
4497                 return err;
4498         }
4499         return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4500 }
4501
4502 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4503                                                 int ifindex,
4504                                                 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4505                                                 u16 family,
4506                                                 char *addrp,
4507                                                 u8 proto)
4508 {
4509         struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4510         struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4511
4512         if (sk == NULL)
4513                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4514         sksec = sk->sk_security;
4515
4516         if (selinux_compat_net) {
4517                 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4518                                                          ad, family, addrp))
4519                         return NF_DROP;
4520         } else {
4521                 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4522                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad))
4523                         return NF_DROP;
4524         }
4525
4526         if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4527                 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto))
4528                         return NF_DROP;
4529
4530         return NF_ACCEPT;
4531 }
4532
4533 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4534                                          u16 family)
4535 {
4536         u32 secmark_perm;
4537         u32 peer_sid;
4538         struct sock *sk;
4539         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4540         char *addrp;
4541         u8 proto;
4542         u8 secmark_active;
4543         u8 peerlbl_active;
4544
4545         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4546         ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4547         ad.u.net.family = family;
4548         if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4549                 return NF_DROP;
4550
4551         /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4552          * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4553          * special handling.  We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4554          * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4555         if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4556                 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad,
4557                                                    family, addrp, proto);
4558
4559         /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4560          * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4561          * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4562          * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4563          * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4564          *       is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4565         if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4566                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4567
4568         secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4569         peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4570         if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4571                 return NF_ACCEPT;
4572
4573         /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the
4574          * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being
4575          * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label
4576          * directly from the packet */
4577         sk = skb->sk;
4578         if (sk) {
4579                 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4580                 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4581                 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4582         } else {
4583                 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4584                                 return NF_DROP;
4585                 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4586         }
4587
4588         if (secmark_active)
4589                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4590                                  SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4591                         return NF_DROP;
4592
4593         if (peerlbl_active) {
4594                 u32 if_sid;
4595                 u32 node_sid;
4596
4597                 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4598                         return NF_DROP;
4599                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4600                                  SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4601                         return NF_DROP;
4602
4603                 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4604                         return NF_DROP;
4605                 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4606                                  SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4607                         return NF_DROP;
4608         }
4609
4610         return NF_ACCEPT;
4611 }
4612
4613 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4614                                            struct sk_buff *skb,
4615                                            const struct net_device *in,
4616                                            const struct net_device *out,
4617                                            int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4618 {
4619         return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4620 }
4621
4622 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4623 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4624                                            struct sk_buff *skb,
4625                                            const struct net_device *in,
4626                                            const struct net_device *out,
4627                                            int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4628 {
4629         return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4630 }
4631 #endif  /* IPV6 */
4632
4633 #endif  /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4634
4635 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4636 {
4637         int err;
4638
4639         err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4640         if (err)
4641                 return err;
4642
4643         if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4644                 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4645
4646         return err;
4647 }
4648
4649 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4650 {
4651         int err;
4652         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4653
4654         err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4655         if (err)
4656                 return err;
4657
4658         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4659         ad.u.cap = capability;
4660
4661         return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4662                             SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4663 }
4664
4665 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4666                               struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4667                               u16 sclass)
4668 {
4669         struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4670         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4671
4672         isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4673         if (!isec)
4674                 return -ENOMEM;
4675
4676         isec->sclass = sclass;
4677         isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4678         perm->security = isec;
4679
4680         return 0;
4681 }
4682
4683 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4684 {
4685         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4686         perm->security = NULL;
4687         kfree(isec);
4688 }
4689
4690 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4691 {
4692         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4693
4694         msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4695         if (!msec)
4696                 return -ENOMEM;
4697
4698         msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4699         msg->security = msec;
4700
4701         return 0;
4702 }
4703
4704 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4705 {
4706         struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4707
4708         msg->security = NULL;
4709         kfree(msec);
4710 }
4711
4712 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4713                         u32 perms)
4714 {
4715         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4716         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4717         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4718
4719         tsec = current->security;
4720         isec = ipc_perms->security;
4721
4722         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4723         ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4724
4725         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4726 }
4727
4728 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4729 {
4730         return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4731 }
4732
4733 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4734 {
4735         msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4736 }
4737
4738 /* message queue security operations */
4739 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4740 {
4741         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4742         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4743         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4744         int rc;
4745
4746         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4747         if (rc)
4748                 return rc;
4749
4750         tsec = current->security;
4751         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4752
4753         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4754         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4755
4756         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4757                           MSGQ__CREATE, &ad);
4758         if (rc) {
4759                 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4760                 return rc;
4761         }
4762         return 0;
4763 }
4764
4765 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4766 {
4767         ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4768 }
4769
4770 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4771 {
4772         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4773         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4774         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4775
4776         tsec = current->security;
4777         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4778
4779         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4780         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4781
4782         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4783                             MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4784 }
4785
4786 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4787 {
4788         int err;
4789         int perms;
4790
4791         switch (cmd) {
4792         case IPC_INFO:
4793         case MSG_INFO:
4794                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4795                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4796         case IPC_STAT:
4797         case MSG_STAT:
4798                 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4799                 break;
4800         case IPC_SET:
4801                 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4802                 break;
4803         case IPC_RMID:
4804                 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4805                 break;
4806         default:
4807                 return 0;
4808         }
4809
4810         err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4811         return err;
4812 }
4813
4814 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4815 {
4816         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4817         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4818         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4819         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4820         int rc;
4821
4822         tsec = current->security;
4823         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4824         msec = msg->security;
4825
4826         /*
4827          * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4828          */
4829         if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4830                 /*
4831                  * Compute new sid based on current process and
4832                  * message queue this message will be stored in
4833                  */
4834                 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4835                                              isec->sid,
4836                                              SECCLASS_MSG,
4837                                              &msec->sid);
4838                 if (rc)
4839                         return rc;
4840         }
4841
4842         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4843         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4844
4845         /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4846         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4847                           MSGQ__WRITE, &ad);
4848         if (!rc)
4849                 /* Can this process send the message */
4850                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4851                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4852         if (!rc)
4853                 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4854                 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4855                                   SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4856
4857         return rc;
4858 }
4859
4860 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4861                                     struct task_struct *target,
4862                                     long type, int mode)
4863 {
4864         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4865         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4866         struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4867         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4868         int rc;
4869
4870         tsec = target->security;
4871         isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4872         msec = msg->security;
4873
4874         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4875         ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4876
4877         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4878                           SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4879         if (!rc)
4880                 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4881                                   SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4882         return rc;
4883 }
4884
4885 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4886 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4887 {
4888         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4889         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4890         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4891         int rc;
4892
4893         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4894         if (rc)
4895                 return rc;
4896
4897         tsec = current->security;
4898         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4899
4900         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4901         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4902
4903         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4904                           SHM__CREATE, &ad);
4905         if (rc) {
4906                 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4907                 return rc;
4908         }
4909         return 0;
4910 }
4911
4912 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4913 {
4914         ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4915 }
4916
4917 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4918 {
4919         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4920         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4921         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4922
4923         tsec = current->security;
4924         isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4925
4926         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4927         ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4928
4929         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4930                             SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4931 }
4932
4933 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4934 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4935 {
4936         int perms;
4937         int err;
4938
4939         switch (cmd) {
4940         case IPC_INFO:
4941         case SHM_INFO:
4942                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4943                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4944         case IPC_STAT:
4945         case SHM_STAT:
4946                 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4947                 break;
4948         case IPC_SET:
4949                 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4950                 break;
4951         case SHM_LOCK:
4952         case SHM_UNLOCK:
4953                 perms = SHM__LOCK;
4954                 break;
4955         case IPC_RMID:
4956                 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4957                 break;
4958         default:
4959                 return 0;
4960         }
4961
4962         err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4963         return err;
4964 }
4965
4966 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4967                              char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4968 {
4969         u32 perms;
4970         int rc;
4971
4972         rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4973         if (rc)
4974                 return rc;
4975
4976         if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4977                 perms = SHM__READ;
4978         else
4979                 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4980
4981         return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4982 }
4983
4984 /* Semaphore security operations */
4985 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4986 {
4987         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4988         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4989         struct avc_audit_data ad;
4990         int rc;
4991
4992         rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4993         if (rc)
4994                 return rc;
4995
4996         tsec = current->security;
4997         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4998
4999         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5000         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5001
5002         rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5003                           SEM__CREATE, &ad);
5004         if (rc) {
5005                 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5006                 return rc;
5007         }
5008         return 0;
5009 }
5010
5011 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5012 {
5013         ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5014 }
5015
5016 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5017 {
5018         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5019         struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5020         struct avc_audit_data ad;
5021
5022         tsec = current->security;
5023         isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5024
5025         AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5026         ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5027
5028         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5029                             SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5030 }
5031
5032 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5033 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5034 {
5035         int err;
5036         u32 perms;
5037
5038         switch (cmd) {
5039         case IPC_INFO:
5040         case SEM_INFO:
5041                 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5042                 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5043         case GETPID:
5044         case GETNCNT:
5045         case GETZCNT:
5046                 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5047                 break;
5048         case GETVAL:
5049         case GETALL:
5050                 perms = SEM__READ;
5051                 break;
5052         case SETVAL:
5053         case SETALL:
5054                 perms = SEM__WRITE;
5055                 break;
5056         case IPC_RMID:
5057                 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5058                 break;
5059         case IPC_SET:
5060                 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5061                 break;
5062         case IPC_STAT:
5063         case SEM_STAT:
5064                 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5065                 break;
5066         default:
5067                 return 0;
5068         }
5069
5070         err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5071         return err;
5072 }
5073
5074 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5075                              struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5076 {
5077         u32 perms;
5078
5079         if (alter)
5080                 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5081         else
5082                 perms = SEM__READ;
5083
5084         return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5085 }
5086
5087 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5088 {
5089         u32 av = 0;
5090
5091         av = 0;
5092         if (flag & S_IRUGO)
5093                 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5094         if (flag & S_IWUGO)
5095                 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5096
5097         if (av == 0)
5098                 return 0;
5099
5100         return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5101 }
5102
5103 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5104 {
5105         struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5106         *secid = isec->sid;
5107 }
5108
5109 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5110 {
5111         if (inode)
5112                 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5113 }
5114
5115 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5116                                char *name, char **value)
5117 {
5118         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5119         u32 sid;
5120         int error;
5121         unsigned len;
5122
5123         if (current != p) {
5124                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5125                 if (error)
5126                         return error;
5127         }
5128
5129         tsec = p->security;
5130
5131         if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5132                 sid = tsec->sid;
5133         else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5134                 sid = tsec->osid;
5135         else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5136                 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5137         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5138                 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5139         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5140                 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5141         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5142                 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5143         else
5144                 return -EINVAL;
5145
5146         if (!sid)
5147                 return 0;
5148
5149         error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5150         if (error)
5151                 return error;
5152         return len;
5153 }
5154
5155 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5156                                char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5157 {
5158         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5159         struct task_struct *tracer;
5160         u32 sid = 0;
5161         int error;
5162         char *str = value;
5163
5164         if (current != p) {
5165                 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5166                    security attributes. */
5167                 return -EACCES;
5168         }
5169
5170         /*
5171          * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5172          * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5173          * above restriction is ever removed.
5174          */
5175         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5176                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5177         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5178                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5179         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5180                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5181         else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5182                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5183         else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5184                 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5185         else
5186                 error = -EINVAL;
5187         if (error)
5188                 return error;
5189
5190         /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5191         if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5192                 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5193                         str[size-1] = 0;
5194                         size--;
5195                 }
5196                 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5197                 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5198                         if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5199                                 return error;
5200                         error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5201                                                               &sid);
5202                 }
5203                 if (error)
5204                         return error;
5205         }
5206
5207         /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5208            performed during the actual operation (execve,
5209            open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5210            operation.  See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5211            checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5212            operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5213         tsec = p->security;
5214         if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5215                 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5216         else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5217                 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5218         else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5219                 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5220                 if (error)
5221                         return error;
5222                 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5223         } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5224                 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5225         else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5226                 struct av_decision avd;
5227
5228                 if (sid == 0)
5229                         return -EINVAL;
5230                 /*
5231                  * SELinux allows to change context in the following case only.
5232                  *  - Single threaded processes.
5233                  *  - Multi threaded processes intend to change its context into
5234                  *    more restricted domain (defined by TYPEBOUNDS statement).
5235                  */
5236                 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5237                         struct task_struct *g, *t;
5238                         struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5239                         read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5240                         do_each_thread(g, t) {
5241                                 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5242                                         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5243                                         error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5244                                         if (!error)
5245                                                 goto boundary_ok;
5246
5247                                         return error;
5248                                 }
5249                         } while_each_thread(g, t);
5250                         read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5251                 }
5252 boundary_ok:
5253
5254                 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5255                 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5256                                      PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5257                 if (error)
5258                         return error;
5259
5260                 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5261                    Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5262                 task_lock(p);
5263                 rcu_read_lock();
5264                 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5265                 if (tracer != NULL) {
5266                         struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5267                         u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5268                         rcu_read_unlock();
5269                         error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5270                                                      SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5271                                                      PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5272                         if (!error)
5273                                 tsec->sid = sid;
5274                         task_unlock(p);
5275                         avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5276                                   PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5277                         if (error)
5278                                 return error;
5279                 } else {
5280                         rcu_read_unlock();
5281                         tsec->sid = sid;
5282                         task_unlock(p);
5283                 }
5284         } else
5285                 return -EINVAL;
5286
5287         return size;
5288 }
5289
5290 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5291 {
5292         return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5293 }
5294
5295 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5296 {
5297         return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5298 }
5299
5300 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5301 {
5302         kfree(secdata);
5303 }
5304
5305 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5306
5307 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5308                              unsigned long flags)
5309 {
5310         struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5311         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5312
5313         ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5314         if (!ksec)
5315                 return -ENOMEM;
5316
5317         if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5318                 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5319         else
5320                 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5321         k->security = ksec;
5322
5323         return 0;
5324 }
5325
5326 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5327 {
5328         struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5329
5330         k->security = NULL;
5331         kfree(ksec);
5332 }
5333
5334 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5335                             struct task_struct *ctx,
5336                             key_perm_t perm)
5337 {
5338         struct key *key;
5339         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5340         struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5341
5342         key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5343
5344         tsec = ctx->security;
5345         ksec = key->security;
5346
5347         /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5348            permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5349            appear to be created. */
5350         if (perm == 0)
5351                 return 0;
5352
5353         return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5354                             SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5355 }
5356
5357 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5358 {
5359         struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5360         char *context = NULL;
5361         unsigned len;
5362         int rc;
5363
5364         rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5365         if (!rc)
5366                 rc = len;
5367         *_buffer = context;
5368         return rc;
5369 }
5370
5371 #endif
5372
5373 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5374         .name =                         "selinux",
5375
5376         .ptrace_may_access =            selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5377         .ptrace_traceme =               selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5378         .capget =                       selinux_capget,
5379         .capset_check =                 selinux_capset_check,
5380         .capset_set =                   selinux_capset_set,
5381         .sysctl =                       selinux_sysctl,
5382         .capable =                      selinux_capable,
5383         .quotactl =                     selinux_quotactl,
5384         .quota_on =                     selinux_quota_on,
5385         .syslog =                       selinux_syslog,
5386         .vm_enough_memory =             selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5387
5388         .netlink_send =                 selinux_netlink_send,
5389         .netlink_recv =                 selinux_netlink_recv,
5390
5391         .bprm_alloc_security =          selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5392         .bprm_free_security =           selinux_bprm_free_security,
5393         .bprm_apply_creds =             selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5394         .bprm_post_apply_creds =        selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5395         .bprm_set_security =            selinux_bprm_set_security,
5396         .bprm_check_security =          selinux_bprm_check_security,
5397         .bprm_secureexec =              selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5398
5399         .sb_alloc_security =            selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5400         .sb_free_security =             selinux_sb_free_security,
5401         .sb_copy_data =                 selinux_sb_copy_data,
5402         .sb_kern_mount =                selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5403         .sb_show_options =              selinux_sb_show_options,
5404         .sb_statfs =                    selinux_sb_statfs,
5405         .sb_mount =                     selinux_mount,
5406         .sb_umount =                    selinux_umount,
5407         .sb_set_mnt_opts =              selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5408         .sb_clone_mnt_opts =            selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5409         .sb_parse_opts_str =            selinux_parse_opts_str,
5410
5411
5412         .inode_alloc_security =         selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5413         .inode_free_security =          selinux_inode_free_security,
5414         .inode_init_security =          selinux_inode_init_security,
5415         .inode_create =                 selinux_inode_create,
5416         .inode_link =                   selinux_inode_link,
5417         .inode_unlink =                 selinux_inode_unlink,
5418         .inode_symlink =                selinux_inode_symlink,
5419         .inode_mkdir =                  selinux_inode_mkdir,
5420         .inode_rmdir =                  selinux_inode_rmdir,
5421         .inode_mknod =                  selinux_inode_mknod,
5422         .inode_rename =                 selinux_inode_rename,
5423         .inode_readlink =               selinux_inode_readlink,
5424         .inode_follow_link =            selinux_inode_follow_link,
5425         .inode_permission =             selinux_inode_permission,
5426         .inode_setattr =                selinux_inode_setattr,
5427         .inode_getattr =                selinux_inode_getattr,
5428         .inode_setxattr =               selinux_inode_setxattr,
5429         .inode_post_setxattr =          selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5430         .inode_getxattr =               selinux_inode_getxattr,
5431         .inode_listxattr =              selinux_inode_listxattr,
5432         .inode_removexattr =            selinux_inode_removexattr,
5433         .inode_getsecurity =            selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5434         .inode_setsecurity =            selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5435         .inode_listsecurity =           selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5436         .inode_need_killpriv =          selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5437         .inode_killpriv =               selinux_inode_killpriv,
5438         .inode_getsecid =               selinux_inode_getsecid,
5439
5440         .file_permission =              selinux_file_permission,
5441         .file_alloc_security =          selinux_file_alloc_security,
5442         .file_free_security =           selinux_file_free_security,
5443         .file_ioctl =                   selinux_file_ioctl,
5444         .file_mmap =                    selinux_file_mmap,
5445         .file_mprotect =                selinux_file_mprotect,
5446         .file_lock =                    selinux_file_lock,
5447         .file_fcntl =                   selinux_file_fcntl,
5448         .file_set_fowner =              selinux_file_set_fowner,
5449         .file_send_sigiotask =          selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5450         .file_receive =                 selinux_file_receive,
5451
5452         .dentry_open =                  selinux_dentry_open,
5453
5454         .task_create =                  selinux_task_create,
5455         .task_alloc_security =          selinux_task_alloc_security,
5456         .task_free_security =           selinux_task_free_security,
5457         .task_setuid =                  selinux_task_setuid,
5458         .task_post_setuid =             selinux_task_post_setuid,
5459         .task_setgid =                  selinux_task_setgid,
5460         .task_setpgid =                 selinux_task_setpgid,
5461         .task_getpgid =                 selinux_task_getpgid,
5462         .task_getsid =                  selinux_task_getsid,
5463         .task_getsecid =                selinux_task_getsecid,
5464         .task_setgroups =               selinux_task_setgroups,
5465         .task_setnice =                 selinux_task_setnice,
5466         .task_setioprio =               selinux_task_setioprio,
5467         .task_getioprio =               selinux_task_getioprio,
5468         .task_setrlimit =               selinux_task_setrlimit,
5469         .task_setscheduler =            selinux_task_setscheduler,
5470         .task_getscheduler =            selinux_task_getscheduler,
5471         .task_movememory =              selinux_task_movememory,
5472         .task_kill =                    selinux_task_kill,
5473         .task_wait =                    selinux_task_wait,
5474         .task_prctl =                   selinux_task_prctl,
5475         .task_reparent_to_init =        selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5476         .task_to_inode =                selinux_task_to_inode,
5477
5478         .ipc_permission =               selinux_ipc_permission,
5479         .ipc_getsecid =                 selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5480
5481         .msg_msg_alloc_security =       selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5482         .msg_msg_free_security =        selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5483
5484         .msg_queue_alloc_security =     selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5485         .msg_queue_free_security =      selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5486         .msg_queue_associate =          selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5487         .msg_queue_msgctl =             selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5488         .msg_queue_msgsnd =             selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5489         .msg_queue_msgrcv =             selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5490
5491         .shm_alloc_security =           selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5492         .shm_free_security =            selinux_shm_free_security,
5493         .shm_associate =                selinux_shm_associate,
5494         .shm_shmctl =                   selinux_shm_shmctl,
5495         .shm_shmat =                    selinux_shm_shmat,
5496
5497         .sem_alloc_security =           selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5498         .sem_free_security =            selinux_sem_free_security,
5499         .sem_associate =                selinux_sem_associate,
5500         .sem_semctl =                   selinux_sem_semctl,
5501         .sem_semop =                    selinux_sem_semop,
5502
5503         .d_instantiate =                selinux_d_instantiate,
5504
5505         .getprocattr =                  selinux_getprocattr,
5506         .setprocattr =                  selinux_setprocattr,
5507
5508         .secid_to_secctx =              selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5509         .secctx_to_secid =              selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5510         .release_secctx =               selinux_release_secctx,
5511
5512         .unix_stream_connect =          selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5513         .unix_may_send =                selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5514
5515         .socket_create =                selinux_socket_create,
5516         .socket_post_create =           selinux_socket_post_create,
5517         .socket_bind =                  selinux_socket_bind,
5518         .socket_connect =               selinux_socket_connect,
5519         .socket_listen =                selinux_socket_listen,
5520         .socket_accept =                selinux_socket_accept,
5521         .socket_sendmsg =               selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5522         .socket_recvmsg =               selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5523         .socket_getsockname =           selinux_socket_getsockname,
5524         .socket_getpeername =           selinux_socket_getpeername,
5525         .socket_getsockopt =            selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5526         .socket_setsockopt =            selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5527         .socket_shutdown =              selinux_socket_shutdown,
5528         .socket_sock_rcv_skb =          selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5529         .socket_getpeersec_stream =     selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5530         .socket_getpeersec_dgram =      selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5531         .sk_alloc_security =            selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5532         .sk_free_security =             selinux_sk_free_security,
5533         .sk_clone_security =            selinux_sk_clone_security,
5534         .sk_getsecid =                  selinux_sk_getsecid,
5535         .sock_graft =                   selinux_sock_graft,
5536         .inet_conn_request =            selinux_inet_conn_request,
5537         .inet_csk_clone =               selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5538         .inet_conn_established =        selinux_inet_conn_established,
5539         .req_classify_flow =            selinux_req_classify_flow,
5540
5541 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5542         .xfrm_policy_alloc_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5543         .xfrm_policy_clone_security =   selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5544         .xfrm_policy_free_security =    selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5545         .xfrm_policy_delete_security =  selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5546         .xfrm_state_alloc_security =    selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5547         .xfrm_state_free_security =     selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5548         .xfrm_state_delete_security =   selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5549         .xfrm_policy_lookup =           selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5550         .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match =    selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5551         .xfrm_decode_session =          selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5552 #endif
5553
5554 #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
5555         .key_alloc =                    selinux_key_alloc,
5556         .key_free =                     selinux_key_free,
5557         .key_permission =               selinux_key_permission,
5558         .key_getsecurity =              selinux_key_getsecurity,
5559 #endif
5560
5561 #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
5562         .audit_rule_init =              selinux_audit_rule_init,
5563         .audit_rule_known =             selinux_audit_rule_known,
5564         .audit_rule_match =             selinux_audit_rule_match,
5565         .audit_rule_free =              selinux_audit_rule_free,
5566 #endif
5567 };
5568
5569 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5570 {
5571         struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5572
5573         if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5574                 selinux_enabled = 0;
5575                 return 0;
5576         }
5577
5578         if (!selinux_enabled) {
5579                 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at boot.\n");
5580                 return 0;
5581         }
5582
5583         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Initializing.\n");
5584
5585         /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5586         if (task_alloc_security(current))
5587                 panic("SELinux:  Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5588         tsec = current->security;
5589         tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5590
5591         sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5592                                             sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5593                                             0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5594         avc_init();
5595
5596         secondary_ops = security_ops;
5597         if (!secondary_ops)
5598                 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5599         if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5600                 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5601
5602         if (selinux_enforcing)
5603                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5604         else
5605                 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Starting in permissive mode\n");
5606
5607         return 0;
5608 }
5609
5610 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5611 {
5612         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Completing initialization.\n");
5613
5614         /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5615         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5616         spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5617         spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5618 next_sb:
5619         if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5620                 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5621                                 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5622                                            struct superblock_security_struct,
5623                                            list);
5624                 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5625                 sb->s_count++;
5626                 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5627                 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5628                 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5629                 if (sb->s_root)
5630                         superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5631                 drop_super(sb);
5632                 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5633                 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5634                 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5635                 goto next_sb;
5636         }
5637         spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5638         spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5639 }
5640
5641 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5642    all processes and objects when they are created. */
5643 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5644
5645 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5646
5647 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5648         {
5649                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5650                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5651                 .pf =           PF_INET,
5652                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5653                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5654         },
5655         {
5656                 .hook =         selinux_ipv4_forward,
5657                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5658                 .pf =           PF_INET,
5659                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
5660                 .priority =     NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5661         }
5662 };
5663
5664 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5665
5666 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5667         {
5668                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5669                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5670                 .pf =           PF_INET6,
5671                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5672                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5673         },
5674         {
5675                 .hook =         selinux_ipv6_forward,
5676                 .owner =        THIS_MODULE,
5677                 .pf =           PF_INET6,
5678                 .hooknum =      NF_INET_FORWARD,
5679                 .priority =     NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5680         }
5681 };
5682
5683 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5684
5685 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5686 {
5687         int err = 0;
5688
5689         if (!selinux_enabled)
5690                 goto out;
5691
5692         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5693
5694         err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5695         if (err)
5696                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5697
5698 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5699         err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5700         if (err)
5701                 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5702 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5703
5704 out:
5705         return err;
5706 }
5707
5708 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5709
5710 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5711 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5712 {
5713         printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux:  Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5714
5715         nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5716 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5717         nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5718 #endif  /* IPV6 */
5719 }
5720 #endif
5721
5722 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5723
5724 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5725 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5726 #endif
5727
5728 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5729
5730 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5731 static int selinux_disabled;
5732
5733 int selinux_disable(void)
5734 {
5735         extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5736
5737         if (ss_initialized) {
5738                 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5739                 return -EINVAL;
5740         }
5741
5742         if (selinux_disabled) {
5743                 /* Only do this once. */
5744                 return -EINVAL;
5745         }
5746
5747         printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux:  Disabled at runtime.\n");
5748
5749         selinux_disabled = 1;
5750         selinux_enabled = 0;
5751
5752         /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5753         security_ops = secondary_ops;
5754
5755         /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5756         selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5757
5758         /* Unregister selinuxfs. */
5759         exit_sel_fs();
5760
5761         return 0;
5762 }
5763 #endif