2 * NSA Security-Enhanced Linux (SELinux) security module
4 * This file contains the SELinux hook function implementations.
6 * Authors: Stephen Smalley, <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
7 * Chris Vance, <cvance@nai.com>
8 * Wayne Salamon, <wsalamon@nai.com>
9 * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
11 * Copyright (C) 2001,2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
12 * Copyright (C) 2003-2008 Red Hat, Inc., James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
13 * Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>
14 * Copyright (C) 2004-2005 Trusted Computer Solutions, Inc.
15 * <dgoeddel@trustedcs.com>
16 * Copyright (C) 2006, 2007 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
17 * Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
18 * Copyright (C) 2007 Hitachi Software Engineering Co., Ltd.
19 * Yuichi Nakamura <ynakam@hitachisoft.jp>
21 * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
22 * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
23 * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
26 #include <linux/init.h>
27 #include <linux/kernel.h>
28 #include <linux/tracehook.h>
29 #include <linux/errno.h>
30 #include <linux/sched.h>
31 #include <linux/security.h>
32 #include <linux/xattr.h>
33 #include <linux/capability.h>
34 #include <linux/unistd.h>
36 #include <linux/mman.h>
37 #include <linux/slab.h>
38 #include <linux/pagemap.h>
39 #include <linux/swap.h>
40 #include <linux/spinlock.h>
41 #include <linux/syscalls.h>
42 #include <linux/file.h>
43 #include <linux/fdtable.h>
44 #include <linux/namei.h>
45 #include <linux/mount.h>
46 #include <linux/proc_fs.h>
47 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
48 #include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
49 #include <linux/tty.h>
51 #include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
52 #include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
53 #include <net/net_namespace.h>
54 #include <net/netlabel.h>
55 #include <linux/uaccess.h>
56 #include <asm/ioctls.h>
57 #include <asm/atomic.h>
58 #include <linux/bitops.h>
59 #include <linux/interrupt.h>
60 #include <linux/netdevice.h> /* for network interface checks */
61 #include <linux/netlink.h>
62 #include <linux/tcp.h>
63 #include <linux/udp.h>
64 #include <linux/dccp.h>
65 #include <linux/quota.h>
66 #include <linux/un.h> /* for Unix socket types */
67 #include <net/af_unix.h> /* for Unix socket types */
68 #include <linux/parser.h>
69 #include <linux/nfs_mount.h>
71 #include <linux/hugetlb.h>
72 #include <linux/personality.h>
73 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
74 #include <linux/audit.h>
75 #include <linux/string.h>
76 #include <linux/selinux.h>
77 #include <linux/mutex.h>
88 #define XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX "selinux"
89 #define XATTR_NAME_SELINUX XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX
91 #define NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS 4
93 extern unsigned int policydb_loaded_version;
94 extern int selinux_nlmsg_lookup(u16 sclass, u16 nlmsg_type, u32 *perm);
95 extern int selinux_compat_net;
96 extern struct security_operations *security_ops;
98 /* SECMARK reference count */
99 atomic_t selinux_secmark_refcount = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
101 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DEVELOP
102 int selinux_enforcing;
104 static int __init enforcing_setup(char *str)
106 unsigned long enforcing;
107 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enforcing))
108 selinux_enforcing = enforcing ? 1 : 0;
111 __setup("enforcing=", enforcing_setup);
114 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM
115 int selinux_enabled = CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_BOOTPARAM_VALUE;
117 static int __init selinux_enabled_setup(char *str)
119 unsigned long enabled;
120 if (!strict_strtoul(str, 0, &enabled))
121 selinux_enabled = enabled ? 1 : 0;
124 __setup("selinux=", selinux_enabled_setup);
126 int selinux_enabled = 1;
131 * Minimal support for a secondary security module,
132 * just to allow the use of the capability module.
134 static struct security_operations *secondary_ops;
136 /* Lists of inode and superblock security structures initialized
137 before the policy was loaded. */
138 static LIST_HEAD(superblock_security_head);
139 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(sb_security_lock);
141 static struct kmem_cache *sel_inode_cache;
144 * selinux_secmark_enabled - Check to see if SECMARK is currently enabled
147 * This function checks the SECMARK reference counter to see if any SECMARK
148 * targets are currently configured, if the reference counter is greater than
149 * zero SECMARK is considered to be enabled. Returns true (1) if SECMARK is
150 * enabled, false (0) if SECMARK is disabled.
153 static int selinux_secmark_enabled(void)
155 return (atomic_read(&selinux_secmark_refcount) > 0);
158 /* Allocate and free functions for each kind of security blob. */
160 static int task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task)
162 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
164 tsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
168 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
169 task->security = tsec;
174 static void task_free_security(struct task_struct *task)
176 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
177 task->security = NULL;
181 static int inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
183 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
184 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
186 isec = kmem_cache_zalloc(sel_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
190 mutex_init(&isec->lock);
191 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&isec->list);
193 isec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
194 isec->sclass = SECCLASS_FILE;
195 isec->task_sid = tsec->sid;
196 inode->i_security = isec;
201 static void inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
203 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
204 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
206 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
207 if (!list_empty(&isec->list))
208 list_del_init(&isec->list);
209 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
211 inode->i_security = NULL;
212 kmem_cache_free(sel_inode_cache, isec);
215 static int file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
217 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
218 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
220 fsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct file_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
224 fsec->sid = tsec->sid;
225 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
226 file->f_security = fsec;
231 static void file_free_security(struct file *file)
233 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
234 file->f_security = NULL;
238 static int superblock_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
240 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
242 sbsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
246 mutex_init(&sbsec->lock);
247 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->list);
248 INIT_LIST_HEAD(&sbsec->isec_head);
249 spin_lock_init(&sbsec->isec_lock);
251 sbsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
252 sbsec->def_sid = SECINITSID_FILE;
253 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
254 sb->s_security = sbsec;
259 static void superblock_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
261 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
263 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
264 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->list))
265 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
266 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
268 sb->s_security = NULL;
272 static int sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
274 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
276 ssec = kzalloc(sizeof(*ssec), priority);
280 ssec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
281 ssec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
282 sk->sk_security = ssec;
284 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(ssec, family);
289 static void sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
291 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
293 sk->sk_security = NULL;
297 /* The security server must be initialized before
298 any labeling or access decisions can be provided. */
299 extern int ss_initialized;
301 /* The file system's label must be initialized prior to use. */
303 static char *labeling_behaviors[6] = {
305 "uses transition SIDs",
307 "uses genfs_contexts",
308 "not configured for labeling",
309 "uses mountpoint labeling",
312 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
314 static inline int inode_doinit(struct inode *inode)
316 return inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, NULL);
327 static match_table_t tokens = {
328 {Opt_context, CONTEXT_STR "%s"},
329 {Opt_fscontext, FSCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
330 {Opt_defcontext, DEFCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
331 {Opt_rootcontext, ROOTCONTEXT_STR "%s"},
335 #define SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG "SELinux: duplicate or incompatible mount options\n"
337 static int may_context_mount_sb_relabel(u32 sid,
338 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
339 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
343 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
344 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
348 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
349 FILESYSTEM__RELABELTO, NULL);
353 static int may_context_mount_inode_relabel(u32 sid,
354 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec,
355 struct task_security_struct *tsec)
358 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
359 FILESYSTEM__RELABELFROM, NULL);
363 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
364 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, NULL);
368 static int sb_finish_set_opts(struct super_block *sb)
370 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
371 struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
372 struct inode *root_inode = root->d_inode;
375 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
376 /* Make sure that the xattr handler exists and that no
377 error other than -ENODATA is returned by getxattr on
378 the root directory. -ENODATA is ok, as this may be
379 the first boot of the SELinux kernel before we have
380 assigned xattr values to the filesystem. */
381 if (!root_inode->i_op->getxattr) {
382 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type %s) has no "
383 "xattr support\n", sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
387 rc = root_inode->i_op->getxattr(root, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, NULL, 0);
388 if (rc < 0 && rc != -ENODATA) {
389 if (rc == -EOPNOTSUPP)
390 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
391 "%s) has no security xattr handler\n",
392 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
394 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: (dev %s, type "
395 "%s) getxattr errno %d\n", sb->s_id,
396 sb->s_type->name, -rc);
401 sbsec->initialized = 1;
403 if (sbsec->behavior > ARRAY_SIZE(labeling_behaviors))
404 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), unknown behavior\n",
405 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name);
407 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: initialized (dev %s, type %s), %s\n",
408 sb->s_id, sb->s_type->name,
409 labeling_behaviors[sbsec->behavior-1]);
411 /* Initialize the root inode. */
412 rc = inode_doinit_with_dentry(root_inode, root);
414 /* Initialize any other inodes associated with the superblock, e.g.
415 inodes created prior to initial policy load or inodes created
416 during get_sb by a pseudo filesystem that directly
418 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
420 if (!list_empty(&sbsec->isec_head)) {
421 struct inode_security_struct *isec =
422 list_entry(sbsec->isec_head.next,
423 struct inode_security_struct, list);
424 struct inode *inode = isec->inode;
425 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
426 inode = igrab(inode);
428 if (!IS_PRIVATE(inode))
432 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
433 list_del_init(&isec->list);
436 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
442 * This function should allow an FS to ask what it's mount security
443 * options were so it can use those later for submounts, displaying
444 * mount options, or whatever.
446 static int selinux_get_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *sb,
447 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
450 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
451 char *context = NULL;
455 security_init_mnt_opts(opts);
457 if (!sbsec->initialized)
464 * if we ever use sbsec flags for anything other than tracking mount
465 * settings this is going to need a mask
468 /* count the number of mount options for this sb */
469 for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
471 opts->num_mnt_opts++;
475 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
476 if (!opts->mnt_opts) {
481 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(opts->num_mnt_opts, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
482 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
488 if (sbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT) {
489 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->sid, &context, &len);
492 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
493 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
495 if (sbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT) {
496 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->mntpoint_sid, &context, &len);
499 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
500 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
502 if (sbsec->flags & DEFCONTEXT_MNT) {
503 rc = security_sid_to_context(sbsec->def_sid, &context, &len);
506 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
507 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
509 if (sbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT) {
510 struct inode *root = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
511 struct inode_security_struct *isec = root->i_security;
513 rc = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &len);
516 opts->mnt_opts[i] = context;
517 opts->mnt_opts_flags[i++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
520 BUG_ON(i != opts->num_mnt_opts);
525 security_free_mnt_opts(opts);
529 static int bad_option(struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec, char flag,
530 u32 old_sid, u32 new_sid)
532 /* check if the old mount command had the same options */
533 if (sbsec->initialized)
534 if (!(sbsec->flags & flag) ||
535 (old_sid != new_sid))
538 /* check if we were passed the same options twice,
539 * aka someone passed context=a,context=b
541 if (!sbsec->initialized)
542 if (sbsec->flags & flag)
548 * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set mount point
549 * labeling information.
551 static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
552 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
555 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
556 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = sb->s_security;
557 const char *name = sb->s_type->name;
558 struct inode *inode = sbsec->sb->s_root->d_inode;
559 struct inode_security_struct *root_isec = inode->i_security;
560 u32 fscontext_sid = 0, context_sid = 0, rootcontext_sid = 0;
561 u32 defcontext_sid = 0;
562 char **mount_options = opts->mnt_opts;
563 int *flags = opts->mnt_opts_flags;
564 int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
566 mutex_lock(&sbsec->lock);
568 if (!ss_initialized) {
570 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
571 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
572 server is ready to handle calls. */
573 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
574 if (list_empty(&sbsec->list))
575 list_add(&sbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
576 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
580 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: Unable to set superblock options "
581 "before the security server is initialized\n");
586 * Binary mount data FS will come through this function twice. Once
587 * from an explicit call and once from the generic calls from the vfs.
588 * Since the generic VFS calls will not contain any security mount data
589 * we need to skip the double mount verification.
591 * This does open a hole in which we will not notice if the first
592 * mount using this sb set explict options and a second mount using
593 * this sb does not set any security options. (The first options
594 * will be used for both mounts)
596 if (sbsec->initialized && (sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA)
601 * parse the mount options, check if they are valid sids.
602 * also check if someone is trying to mount the same sb more
603 * than once with different security options.
605 for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
607 rc = security_context_to_sid(mount_options[i],
608 strlen(mount_options[i]), &sid);
610 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: security_context_to_sid"
611 "(%s) failed for (dev %s, type %s) errno=%d\n",
612 mount_options[i], sb->s_id, name, rc);
619 if (bad_option(sbsec, FSCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->sid,
621 goto out_double_mount;
623 sbsec->flags |= FSCONTEXT_MNT;
628 if (bad_option(sbsec, CONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->mntpoint_sid,
630 goto out_double_mount;
632 sbsec->flags |= CONTEXT_MNT;
634 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
635 rootcontext_sid = sid;
637 if (bad_option(sbsec, ROOTCONTEXT_MNT, root_isec->sid,
639 goto out_double_mount;
641 sbsec->flags |= ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
645 defcontext_sid = sid;
647 if (bad_option(sbsec, DEFCONTEXT_MNT, sbsec->def_sid,
649 goto out_double_mount;
651 sbsec->flags |= DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
660 if (sbsec->initialized) {
661 /* previously mounted with options, but not on this attempt? */
662 if (sbsec->flags && !num_opts)
663 goto out_double_mount;
668 if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0)
671 /* Determine the labeling behavior to use for this filesystem type. */
672 rc = security_fs_use(sb->s_type->name, &sbsec->behavior, &sbsec->sid);
674 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: security_fs_use(%s) returned %d\n",
675 __func__, sb->s_type->name, rc);
679 /* sets the context of the superblock for the fs being mounted. */
682 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(fscontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
686 sbsec->sid = fscontext_sid;
690 * Switch to using mount point labeling behavior.
691 * sets the label used on all file below the mountpoint, and will set
692 * the superblock context if not already set.
695 if (!fscontext_sid) {
696 rc = may_context_mount_sb_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
699 sbsec->sid = context_sid;
701 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(context_sid, sbsec, tsec);
705 if (!rootcontext_sid)
706 rootcontext_sid = context_sid;
708 sbsec->mntpoint_sid = context_sid;
709 sbsec->behavior = SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT;
712 if (rootcontext_sid) {
713 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(rootcontext_sid, sbsec, tsec);
717 root_isec->sid = rootcontext_sid;
718 root_isec->initialized = 1;
721 if (defcontext_sid) {
722 if (sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR) {
724 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: defcontext option is "
725 "invalid for this filesystem type\n");
729 if (defcontext_sid != sbsec->def_sid) {
730 rc = may_context_mount_inode_relabel(defcontext_sid,
736 sbsec->def_sid = defcontext_sid;
739 rc = sb_finish_set_opts(sb);
741 mutex_unlock(&sbsec->lock);
745 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: mount invalid. Same superblock, different "
746 "security settings for (dev %s, type %s)\n", sb->s_id, name);
750 static void selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts(const struct super_block *oldsb,
751 struct super_block *newsb)
753 const struct superblock_security_struct *oldsbsec = oldsb->s_security;
754 struct superblock_security_struct *newsbsec = newsb->s_security;
756 int set_fscontext = (oldsbsec->flags & FSCONTEXT_MNT);
757 int set_context = (oldsbsec->flags & CONTEXT_MNT);
758 int set_rootcontext = (oldsbsec->flags & ROOTCONTEXT_MNT);
761 * if the parent was able to be mounted it clearly had no special lsm
762 * mount options. thus we can safely put this sb on the list and deal
765 if (!ss_initialized) {
766 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
767 if (list_empty(&newsbsec->list))
768 list_add(&newsbsec->list, &superblock_security_head);
769 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
773 /* how can we clone if the old one wasn't set up?? */
774 BUG_ON(!oldsbsec->initialized);
776 /* if fs is reusing a sb, just let its options stand... */
777 if (newsbsec->initialized)
780 mutex_lock(&newsbsec->lock);
782 newsbsec->flags = oldsbsec->flags;
784 newsbsec->sid = oldsbsec->sid;
785 newsbsec->def_sid = oldsbsec->def_sid;
786 newsbsec->behavior = oldsbsec->behavior;
789 u32 sid = oldsbsec->mntpoint_sid;
793 if (!set_rootcontext) {
794 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
795 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
798 newsbsec->mntpoint_sid = sid;
800 if (set_rootcontext) {
801 const struct inode *oldinode = oldsb->s_root->d_inode;
802 const struct inode_security_struct *oldisec = oldinode->i_security;
803 struct inode *newinode = newsb->s_root->d_inode;
804 struct inode_security_struct *newisec = newinode->i_security;
806 newisec->sid = oldisec->sid;
809 sb_finish_set_opts(newsb);
810 mutex_unlock(&newsbsec->lock);
813 static int selinux_parse_opts_str(char *options,
814 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
817 char *context = NULL, *defcontext = NULL;
818 char *fscontext = NULL, *rootcontext = NULL;
819 int rc, num_mnt_opts = 0;
821 opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
823 /* Standard string-based options. */
824 while ((p = strsep(&options, "|")) != NULL) {
826 substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
831 token = match_token(p, tokens, args);
835 if (context || defcontext) {
837 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
840 context = match_strdup(&args[0]);
850 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
853 fscontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
860 case Opt_rootcontext:
863 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
866 rootcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
874 if (context || defcontext) {
876 printk(KERN_WARNING SEL_MOUNT_FAIL_MSG);
879 defcontext = match_strdup(&args[0]);
888 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: unknown mount option\n");
895 opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
899 opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SEL_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int), GFP_ATOMIC);
900 if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
901 kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
906 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fscontext;
907 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSCONTEXT_MNT;
910 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = context;
911 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = CONTEXT_MNT;
914 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = rootcontext;
915 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = ROOTCONTEXT_MNT;
918 opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = defcontext;
919 opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = DEFCONTEXT_MNT;
922 opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
933 * string mount options parsing and call set the sbsec
935 static int superblock_doinit(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
938 char *options = data;
939 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
941 security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
946 BUG_ON(sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA);
948 rc = selinux_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
953 rc = selinux_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
956 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
960 static void selinux_write_opts(struct seq_file *m,
961 struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
966 for (i = 0; i < opts->num_mnt_opts; i++) {
967 char *has_comma = strchr(opts->mnt_opts[i], ',');
969 switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
971 prefix = CONTEXT_STR;
974 prefix = FSCONTEXT_STR;
976 case ROOTCONTEXT_MNT:
977 prefix = ROOTCONTEXT_STR;
980 prefix = DEFCONTEXT_STR;
985 /* we need a comma before each option */
990 seq_puts(m, opts->mnt_opts[i]);
996 static int selinux_sb_show_options(struct seq_file *m, struct super_block *sb)
998 struct security_mnt_opts opts;
1001 rc = selinux_get_mnt_opts(sb, &opts);
1003 /* before policy load we may get EINVAL, don't show anything */
1009 selinux_write_opts(m, &opts);
1011 security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
1016 static inline u16 inode_mode_to_security_class(umode_t mode)
1018 switch (mode & S_IFMT) {
1020 return SECCLASS_SOCK_FILE;
1022 return SECCLASS_LNK_FILE;
1024 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1026 return SECCLASS_BLK_FILE;
1028 return SECCLASS_DIR;
1030 return SECCLASS_CHR_FILE;
1032 return SECCLASS_FIFO_FILE;
1036 return SECCLASS_FILE;
1039 static inline int default_protocol_stream(int protocol)
1041 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_TCP);
1044 static inline int default_protocol_dgram(int protocol)
1046 return (protocol == IPPROTO_IP || protocol == IPPROTO_UDP);
1049 static inline u16 socket_type_to_security_class(int family, int type, int protocol)
1055 case SOCK_SEQPACKET:
1056 return SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET;
1058 return SECCLASS_UNIX_DGRAM_SOCKET;
1065 if (default_protocol_stream(protocol))
1066 return SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET;
1068 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1070 if (default_protocol_dgram(protocol))
1071 return SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET;
1073 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1075 return SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET;
1077 return SECCLASS_RAWIP_SOCKET;
1083 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_ROUTE_SOCKET;
1084 case NETLINK_FIREWALL:
1085 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_FIREWALL_SOCKET;
1086 case NETLINK_INET_DIAG:
1087 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_TCPDIAG_SOCKET;
1089 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_NFLOG_SOCKET;
1091 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_XFRM_SOCKET;
1092 case NETLINK_SELINUX:
1093 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SELINUX_SOCKET;
1095 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_AUDIT_SOCKET;
1096 case NETLINK_IP6_FW:
1097 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_IP6FW_SOCKET;
1098 case NETLINK_DNRTMSG:
1099 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_DNRT_SOCKET;
1100 case NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT:
1101 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_KOBJECT_UEVENT_SOCKET;
1103 return SECCLASS_NETLINK_SOCKET;
1106 return SECCLASS_PACKET_SOCKET;
1108 return SECCLASS_KEY_SOCKET;
1110 return SECCLASS_APPLETALK_SOCKET;
1113 return SECCLASS_SOCKET;
1116 #ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS
1117 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1122 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1124 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1129 end = buffer+buflen;
1134 while (de && de != de->parent) {
1135 buflen -= de->namelen + 1;
1139 memcpy(end, de->name, de->namelen);
1144 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1145 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1149 static int selinux_proc_get_sid(struct proc_dir_entry *de,
1157 /* The inode's security attributes must be initialized before first use. */
1158 static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry)
1160 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec = NULL;
1161 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
1163 struct dentry *dentry;
1164 #define INITCONTEXTLEN 255
1165 char *context = NULL;
1169 if (isec->initialized)
1172 mutex_lock(&isec->lock);
1173 if (isec->initialized)
1176 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
1177 if (!sbsec->initialized) {
1178 /* Defer initialization until selinux_complete_init,
1179 after the initial policy is loaded and the security
1180 server is ready to handle calls. */
1181 spin_lock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1182 if (list_empty(&isec->list))
1183 list_add(&isec->list, &sbsec->isec_head);
1184 spin_unlock(&sbsec->isec_lock);
1188 switch (sbsec->behavior) {
1189 case SECURITY_FS_USE_XATTR:
1190 if (!inode->i_op->getxattr) {
1191 isec->sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1195 /* Need a dentry, since the xattr API requires one.
1196 Life would be simpler if we could just pass the inode. */
1198 /* Called from d_instantiate or d_splice_alias. */
1199 dentry = dget(opt_dentry);
1201 /* Called from selinux_complete_init, try to find a dentry. */
1202 dentry = d_find_alias(inode);
1205 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: no dentry for dev=%s "
1206 "ino=%ld\n", __func__, inode->i_sb->s_id,
1211 len = INITCONTEXTLEN;
1212 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1218 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1220 if (rc == -ERANGE) {
1221 /* Need a larger buffer. Query for the right size. */
1222 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX,
1230 context = kmalloc(len, GFP_NOFS);
1236 rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dentry,
1242 if (rc != -ENODATA) {
1243 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: getxattr returned "
1244 "%d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n", __func__,
1245 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1249 /* Map ENODATA to the default file SID */
1250 sid = sbsec->def_sid;
1253 rc = security_context_to_sid_default(context, rc, &sid,
1257 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: context_to_sid(%s) "
1258 "returned %d for dev=%s ino=%ld\n",
1259 __func__, context, -rc,
1260 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
1262 /* Leave with the unlabeled SID */
1270 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TASK:
1271 isec->sid = isec->task_sid;
1273 case SECURITY_FS_USE_TRANS:
1274 /* Default to the fs SID. */
1275 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1277 /* Try to obtain a transition SID. */
1278 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1279 rc = security_transition_sid(isec->task_sid,
1287 case SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT:
1288 isec->sid = sbsec->mntpoint_sid;
1291 /* Default to the fs superblock SID. */
1292 isec->sid = sbsec->sid;
1294 if (sbsec->proc && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode)) {
1295 struct proc_inode *proci = PROC_I(inode);
1297 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1298 rc = selinux_proc_get_sid(proci->pde,
1309 isec->initialized = 1;
1312 mutex_unlock(&isec->lock);
1314 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_FILE)
1315 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
1319 /* Convert a Linux signal to an access vector. */
1320 static inline u32 signal_to_av(int sig)
1326 /* Commonly granted from child to parent. */
1327 perm = PROCESS__SIGCHLD;
1330 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1331 perm = PROCESS__SIGKILL;
1334 /* Cannot be caught or ignored */
1335 perm = PROCESS__SIGSTOP;
1338 /* All other signals. */
1339 perm = PROCESS__SIGNAL;
1346 /* Check permission betweeen a pair of tasks, e.g. signal checks,
1347 fork check, ptrace check, etc. */
1348 static int task_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk1,
1349 struct task_struct *tsk2,
1352 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
1354 tsec1 = tsk1->security;
1355 tsec2 = tsk2->security;
1356 return avc_has_perm(tsec1->sid, tsec2->sid,
1357 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perms, NULL);
1360 #if CAP_LAST_CAP > 63
1361 #error Fix SELinux to handle capabilities > 63.
1364 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a capability. */
1365 static int task_has_capability(struct task_struct *tsk,
1368 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1369 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1371 u32 av = CAP_TO_MASK(cap);
1373 tsec = tsk->security;
1375 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
1379 switch (CAP_TO_INDEX(cap)) {
1381 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY;
1384 sclass = SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2;
1388 "SELinux: out of range capability %d\n", cap);
1391 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsec->sid, sclass, av, &ad);
1394 /* Check whether a task is allowed to use a system operation. */
1395 static int task_has_system(struct task_struct *tsk,
1398 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1400 tsec = tsk->security;
1402 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, SECINITSID_KERNEL,
1403 SECCLASS_SYSTEM, perms, NULL);
1406 /* Check whether a task has a particular permission to an inode.
1407 The 'adp' parameter is optional and allows other audit
1408 data to be passed (e.g. the dentry). */
1409 static int inode_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1410 struct inode *inode,
1412 struct avc_audit_data *adp)
1414 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1415 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
1416 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1418 if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
1421 tsec = tsk->security;
1422 isec = inode->i_security;
1426 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1427 ad.u.fs.inode = inode;
1430 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, adp);
1433 /* Same as inode_has_perm, but pass explicit audit data containing
1434 the dentry to help the auditing code to more easily generate the
1435 pathname if needed. */
1436 static inline int dentry_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1437 struct vfsmount *mnt,
1438 struct dentry *dentry,
1441 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
1442 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1443 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1444 ad.u.fs.path.mnt = mnt;
1445 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1446 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1449 /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to
1450 access an inode in a given way. Check access to the
1451 descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to
1452 check a particular permission to the file.
1453 Access to the descriptor is implicitly granted if it
1454 has the same SID as the process. If av is zero, then
1455 access to the file is not checked, e.g. for cases
1456 where only the descriptor is affected like seek. */
1457 static int file_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1461 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
1462 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
1463 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
1464 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1467 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1468 ad.u.fs.path = file->f_path;
1470 if (tsec->sid != fsec->sid) {
1471 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, fsec->sid,
1479 /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */
1481 return inode_has_perm(tsk, inode, av, &ad);
1486 /* Check whether a task can create a file. */
1487 static int may_create(struct inode *dir,
1488 struct dentry *dentry,
1491 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1492 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
1493 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1495 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1498 tsec = current->security;
1499 dsec = dir->i_security;
1500 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
1502 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1503 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1505 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1506 DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH,
1511 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
1512 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
1514 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, tclass,
1520 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, tclass, FILE__CREATE, &ad);
1524 return avc_has_perm(newsid, sbsec->sid,
1525 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1526 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
1529 /* Check whether a task can create a key. */
1530 static int may_create_key(u32 ksid,
1531 struct task_struct *ctx)
1533 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1535 tsec = ctx->security;
1537 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
1541 #define MAY_UNLINK 1
1544 /* Check whether a task can link, unlink, or rmdir a file/directory. */
1545 static int may_link(struct inode *dir,
1546 struct dentry *dentry,
1550 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1551 struct inode_security_struct *dsec, *isec;
1552 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1556 tsec = current->security;
1557 dsec = dir->i_security;
1558 isec = dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1560 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1561 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
1564 av |= (kind ? DIR__REMOVE_NAME : DIR__ADD_NAME);
1565 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1580 printk(KERN_WARNING "SELinux: %s: unrecognized kind %d\n",
1585 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, av, &ad);
1589 static inline int may_rename(struct inode *old_dir,
1590 struct dentry *old_dentry,
1591 struct inode *new_dir,
1592 struct dentry *new_dentry)
1594 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1595 struct inode_security_struct *old_dsec, *new_dsec, *old_isec, *new_isec;
1596 struct avc_audit_data ad;
1598 int old_is_dir, new_is_dir;
1601 tsec = current->security;
1602 old_dsec = old_dir->i_security;
1603 old_isec = old_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1604 old_is_dir = S_ISDIR(old_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1605 new_dsec = new_dir->i_security;
1607 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
1609 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = old_dentry;
1610 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR,
1611 DIR__REMOVE_NAME | DIR__SEARCH, &ad);
1614 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1615 old_isec->sclass, FILE__RENAME, &ad);
1618 if (old_is_dir && new_dir != old_dir) {
1619 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, old_isec->sid,
1620 old_isec->sclass, DIR__REPARENT, &ad);
1625 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = new_dentry;
1626 av = DIR__ADD_NAME | DIR__SEARCH;
1627 if (new_dentry->d_inode)
1628 av |= DIR__REMOVE_NAME;
1629 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_dsec->sid, SECCLASS_DIR, av, &ad);
1632 if (new_dentry->d_inode) {
1633 new_isec = new_dentry->d_inode->i_security;
1634 new_is_dir = S_ISDIR(new_dentry->d_inode->i_mode);
1635 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, new_isec->sid,
1637 (new_is_dir ? DIR__RMDIR : FILE__UNLINK), &ad);
1645 /* Check whether a task can perform a filesystem operation. */
1646 static int superblock_has_perm(struct task_struct *tsk,
1647 struct super_block *sb,
1649 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
1651 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1652 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
1654 tsec = tsk->security;
1655 sbsec = sb->s_security;
1656 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sbsec->sid, SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
1660 /* Convert a Linux mode and permission mask to an access vector. */
1661 static inline u32 file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1665 if ((mode & S_IFMT) != S_IFDIR) {
1666 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1667 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
1668 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1671 if (mask & MAY_APPEND)
1673 else if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1677 if (mask & MAY_EXEC)
1679 if (mask & MAY_WRITE)
1681 if (mask & MAY_READ)
1689 * Convert a file mask to an access vector and include the correct open
1692 static inline u32 open_file_mask_to_av(int mode, int mask)
1694 u32 av = file_mask_to_av(mode, mask);
1696 if (selinux_policycap_openperm) {
1698 * lnk files and socks do not really have an 'open'
1702 else if (S_ISCHR(mode))
1703 av |= CHR_FILE__OPEN;
1704 else if (S_ISBLK(mode))
1705 av |= BLK_FILE__OPEN;
1706 else if (S_ISFIFO(mode))
1707 av |= FIFO_FILE__OPEN;
1708 else if (S_ISDIR(mode))
1711 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: WARNING: inside %s with "
1712 "unknown mode:%x\n", __func__, mode);
1717 /* Convert a Linux file to an access vector. */
1718 static inline u32 file_to_av(struct file *file)
1722 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
1724 if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) {
1725 if (file->f_flags & O_APPEND)
1732 * Special file opened with flags 3 for ioctl-only use.
1740 /* Hook functions begin here. */
1742 static int selinux_ptrace_may_access(struct task_struct *child,
1747 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_may_access(child, mode);
1751 if (mode == PTRACE_MODE_READ) {
1752 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1753 struct task_security_struct *csec = child->security;
1754 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, csec->sid,
1755 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__READ, NULL);
1758 return task_has_perm(current, child, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1761 static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
1765 rc = secondary_ops->ptrace_traceme(parent);
1769 return task_has_perm(parent, current, PROCESS__PTRACE);
1772 static int selinux_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1773 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1777 error = task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__GETCAP);
1781 return secondary_ops->capget(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1784 static int selinux_capset_check(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1785 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1789 error = secondary_ops->capset_check(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1793 return task_has_perm(current, target, PROCESS__SETCAP);
1796 static void selinux_capset_set(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
1797 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
1799 secondary_ops->capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
1802 static int selinux_capable(struct task_struct *tsk, int cap)
1806 rc = secondary_ops->capable(tsk, cap);
1810 return task_has_capability(tsk, cap);
1813 static int selinux_sysctl_get_sid(ctl_table *table, u16 tclass, u32 *sid)
1816 char *buffer, *path, *end;
1819 buffer = (char *)__get_free_page(GFP_KERNEL);
1824 end = buffer+buflen;
1830 const char *name = table->procname;
1831 size_t namelen = strlen(name);
1832 buflen -= namelen + 1;
1836 memcpy(end, name, namelen);
1839 table = table->parent;
1845 memcpy(end, "/sys", 4);
1847 rc = security_genfs_sid("proc", path, tclass, sid);
1849 free_page((unsigned long)buffer);
1854 static int selinux_sysctl(ctl_table *table, int op)
1858 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
1862 rc = secondary_ops->sysctl(table, op);
1866 tsec = current->security;
1868 rc = selinux_sysctl_get_sid(table, (op == 0001) ?
1869 SECCLASS_DIR : SECCLASS_FILE, &tsid);
1871 /* Default to the well-defined sysctl SID. */
1872 tsid = SECINITSID_SYSCTL;
1875 /* The op values are "defined" in sysctl.c, thereby creating
1876 * a bad coupling between this module and sysctl.c */
1878 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1879 SECCLASS_DIR, DIR__SEARCH, NULL);
1887 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, tsid,
1888 SECCLASS_FILE, av, NULL);
1894 static int selinux_quotactl(int cmds, int type, int id, struct super_block *sb)
1907 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAMOD,
1913 rc = superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__QUOTAGET,
1917 rc = 0; /* let the kernel handle invalid cmds */
1923 static int selinux_quota_on(struct dentry *dentry)
1925 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__QUOTAON);
1928 static int selinux_syslog(int type)
1932 rc = secondary_ops->syslog(type);
1937 case 3: /* Read last kernel messages */
1938 case 10: /* Return size of the log buffer */
1939 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_READ);
1941 case 6: /* Disable logging to console */
1942 case 7: /* Enable logging to console */
1943 case 8: /* Set level of messages printed to console */
1944 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_CONSOLE);
1946 case 0: /* Close log */
1947 case 1: /* Open log */
1948 case 2: /* Read from log */
1949 case 4: /* Read/clear last kernel messages */
1950 case 5: /* Clear ring buffer */
1952 rc = task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__SYSLOG_MOD);
1959 * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual
1960 * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to
1961 * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not.
1963 * Note that secondary_ops->capable and task_has_perm_noaudit return 0
1964 * if the capability is granted, but __vm_enough_memory requires 1 if
1965 * the capability is granted.
1967 * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all
1968 * processes that allocate mappings.
1970 static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages)
1972 int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0;
1973 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
1975 rc = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
1977 rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
1978 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY,
1979 CAP_TO_MASK(CAP_SYS_ADMIN),
1986 return __vm_enough_memory(mm, pages, cap_sys_admin);
1989 /* binprm security operations */
1991 static int selinux_bprm_alloc_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
1993 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
1995 bsec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bprm_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
1999 bsec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
2002 bprm->security = bsec;
2006 static int selinux_bprm_set_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2008 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2009 struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2010 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
2011 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2013 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2016 rc = secondary_ops->bprm_set_security(bprm);
2020 bsec = bprm->security;
2025 tsec = current->security;
2026 isec = inode->i_security;
2028 /* Default to the current task SID. */
2029 bsec->sid = tsec->sid;
2031 /* Reset fs, key, and sock SIDs on execve. */
2032 tsec->create_sid = 0;
2033 tsec->keycreate_sid = 0;
2034 tsec->sockcreate_sid = 0;
2036 if (tsec->exec_sid) {
2037 newsid = tsec->exec_sid;
2038 /* Reset exec SID on execve. */
2041 /* Check for a default transition on this program. */
2042 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2043 SECCLASS_PROCESS, &newsid);
2048 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2049 ad.u.fs.path = bprm->file->f_path;
2051 if (bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_flags & MNT_NOSUID)
2054 if (tsec->sid == newsid) {
2055 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
2056 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__EXECUTE_NO_TRANS, &ad);
2060 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
2061 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
2062 SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__TRANSITION, &ad);
2066 rc = avc_has_perm(newsid, isec->sid,
2067 SECCLASS_FILE, FILE__ENTRYPOINT, &ad);
2071 /* Clear any possibly unsafe personality bits on exec: */
2072 current->personality &= ~PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
2074 /* Set the security field to the new SID. */
2082 static int selinux_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2084 return secondary_ops->bprm_check_security(bprm);
2088 static int selinux_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2090 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2093 if (tsec->osid != tsec->sid) {
2094 /* Enable secure mode for SIDs transitions unless
2095 the noatsecure permission is granted between
2096 the two SIDs, i.e. ahp returns 0. */
2097 atsecure = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid,
2099 PROCESS__NOATSECURE, NULL);
2102 return (atsecure || secondary_ops->bprm_secureexec(bprm));
2105 static void selinux_bprm_free_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2107 kfree(bprm->security);
2108 bprm->security = NULL;
2111 extern struct vfsmount *selinuxfs_mount;
2112 extern struct dentry *selinux_null;
2114 /* Derived from fs/exec.c:flush_old_files. */
2115 static inline void flush_unauthorized_files(struct files_struct *files)
2117 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2118 struct file *file, *devnull = NULL;
2119 struct tty_struct *tty;
2120 struct fdtable *fdt;
2124 mutex_lock(&tty_mutex);
2125 tty = get_current_tty();
2126 mutex_unlock(&tty_mutex);
2129 file = list_entry(tty->tty_files.next, typeof(*file), f_u.fu_list);
2131 /* Revalidate access to controlling tty.
2132 Use inode_has_perm on the tty inode directly rather
2133 than using file_has_perm, as this particular open
2134 file may belong to another process and we are only
2135 interested in the inode-based check here. */
2136 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2137 if (inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2138 FILE__READ | FILE__WRITE, NULL)) {
2145 /* Reset controlling tty. */
2149 /* Revalidate access to inherited open files. */
2151 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2153 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2155 unsigned long set, i;
2160 fdt = files_fdtable(files);
2161 if (i >= fdt->max_fds)
2163 set = fdt->open_fds->fds_bits[j];
2166 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2167 for ( ; set ; i++, set >>= 1) {
2172 if (file_has_perm(current,
2174 file_to_av(file))) {
2176 fd = get_unused_fd();
2186 devnull = dentry_open(dget(selinux_null), mntget(selinuxfs_mount), O_RDWR);
2187 if (IS_ERR(devnull)) {
2194 fd_install(fd, devnull);
2199 spin_lock(&files->file_lock);
2202 spin_unlock(&files->file_lock);
2205 static void selinux_bprm_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm, int unsafe)
2207 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2208 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2212 secondary_ops->bprm_apply_creds(bprm, unsafe);
2214 tsec = current->security;
2216 bsec = bprm->security;
2219 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
2221 if (tsec->sid != sid) {
2222 /* Check for shared state. If not ok, leave SID
2223 unchanged and kill. */
2224 if (unsafe & LSM_UNSAFE_SHARE) {
2225 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2226 PROCESS__SHARE, NULL);
2233 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
2234 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and kill. */
2235 if (unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
2236 struct task_struct *tracer;
2237 struct task_security_struct *sec;
2241 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(current);
2242 if (likely(tracer != NULL)) {
2243 sec = tracer->security;
2249 rc = avc_has_perm(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2250 PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
2262 * called after apply_creds without the task lock held
2264 static void selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
2266 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2267 struct rlimit *rlim, *initrlim;
2268 struct itimerval itimer;
2269 struct bprm_security_struct *bsec;
2272 tsec = current->security;
2273 bsec = bprm->security;
2276 force_sig_specific(SIGKILL, current);
2279 if (tsec->osid == tsec->sid)
2282 /* Close files for which the new task SID is not authorized. */
2283 flush_unauthorized_files(current->files);
2285 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit signal state
2286 from the old SID. If not, clear itimers to avoid
2287 subsequent signal generation and flush and unblock
2288 signals. This must occur _after_ the task SID has
2289 been updated so that any kill done after the flush
2290 will be checked against the new SID. */
2291 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2292 PROCESS__SIGINH, NULL);
2294 memset(&itimer, 0, sizeof itimer);
2295 for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
2296 do_setitimer(i, &itimer, NULL);
2297 flush_signals(current);
2298 spin_lock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2299 flush_signal_handlers(current, 1);
2300 sigemptyset(¤t->blocked);
2301 recalc_sigpending();
2302 spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock);
2305 /* Always clear parent death signal on SID transitions. */
2306 current->pdeath_signal = 0;
2308 /* Check whether the new SID can inherit resource limits
2309 from the old SID. If not, reset all soft limits to
2310 the lower of the current task's hard limit and the init
2311 task's soft limit. Note that the setting of hard limits
2312 (even to lower them) can be controlled by the setrlimit
2313 check. The inclusion of the init task's soft limit into
2314 the computation is to avoid resetting soft limits higher
2315 than the default soft limit for cases where the default
2316 is lower than the hard limit, e.g. RLIMIT_CORE or
2318 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->osid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
2319 PROCESS__RLIMITINH, NULL);
2321 for (i = 0; i < RLIM_NLIMITS; i++) {
2322 rlim = current->signal->rlim + i;
2323 initrlim = init_task.signal->rlim+i;
2324 rlim->rlim_cur = min(rlim->rlim_max, initrlim->rlim_cur);
2326 if (current->signal->rlim[RLIMIT_CPU].rlim_cur != RLIM_INFINITY) {
2328 * This will cause RLIMIT_CPU calculations
2331 current->it_prof_expires = jiffies_to_cputime(1);
2335 /* Wake up the parent if it is waiting so that it can
2336 recheck wait permission to the new task SID. */
2337 wake_up_interruptible(¤t->parent->signal->wait_chldexit);
2340 /* superblock security operations */
2342 static int selinux_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
2344 return superblock_alloc_security(sb);
2347 static void selinux_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
2349 superblock_free_security(sb);
2352 static inline int match_prefix(char *prefix, int plen, char *option, int olen)
2357 return !memcmp(prefix, option, plen);
2360 static inline int selinux_option(char *option, int len)
2362 return (match_prefix(CONTEXT_STR, sizeof(CONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2363 match_prefix(FSCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(FSCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2364 match_prefix(DEFCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(DEFCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len) ||
2365 match_prefix(ROOTCONTEXT_STR, sizeof(ROOTCONTEXT_STR)-1, option, len));
2368 static inline void take_option(char **to, char *from, int *first, int len)
2375 memcpy(*to, from, len);
2379 static inline void take_selinux_option(char **to, char *from, int *first,
2382 int current_size = 0;
2390 while (current_size < len) {
2400 static int selinux_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *copy)
2402 int fnosec, fsec, rc = 0;
2403 char *in_save, *in_curr, *in_end;
2404 char *sec_curr, *nosec_save, *nosec;
2410 nosec = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
2418 in_save = in_end = orig;
2422 open_quote = !open_quote;
2423 if ((*in_end == ',' && open_quote == 0) ||
2425 int len = in_end - in_curr;
2427 if (selinux_option(in_curr, len))
2428 take_selinux_option(&sec_curr, in_curr, &fsec, len);
2430 take_option(&nosec, in_curr, &fnosec, len);
2432 in_curr = in_end + 1;
2434 } while (*in_end++);
2436 strcpy(in_save, nosec_save);
2437 free_page((unsigned long)nosec_save);
2442 static int selinux_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, void *data)
2444 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2447 rc = superblock_doinit(sb, data);
2451 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2452 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = sb->s_root;
2453 return superblock_has_perm(current, sb, FILESYSTEM__MOUNT, &ad);
2456 static int selinux_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
2458 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2460 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2461 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry->d_sb->s_root;
2462 return superblock_has_perm(current, dentry->d_sb, FILESYSTEM__GETATTR, &ad);
2465 static int selinux_mount(char *dev_name,
2468 unsigned long flags,
2473 rc = secondary_ops->sb_mount(dev_name, path, type, flags, data);
2477 if (flags & MS_REMOUNT)
2478 return superblock_has_perm(current, path->mnt->mnt_sb,
2479 FILESYSTEM__REMOUNT, NULL);
2481 return dentry_has_perm(current, path->mnt, path->dentry,
2485 static int selinux_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags)
2489 rc = secondary_ops->sb_umount(mnt, flags);
2493 return superblock_has_perm(current, mnt->mnt_sb,
2494 FILESYSTEM__UNMOUNT, NULL);
2497 /* inode security operations */
2499 static int selinux_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
2501 return inode_alloc_security(inode);
2504 static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
2506 inode_free_security(inode);
2509 static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
2510 char **name, void **value,
2513 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
2514 struct inode_security_struct *dsec;
2515 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2518 char *namep = NULL, *context;
2520 tsec = current->security;
2521 dsec = dir->i_security;
2522 sbsec = dir->i_sb->s_security;
2524 if (tsec->create_sid && sbsec->behavior != SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT) {
2525 newsid = tsec->create_sid;
2527 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid, dsec->sid,
2528 inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode),
2531 printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: "
2532 "security_transition_sid failed, rc=%d (dev=%s "
2535 -rc, inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino);
2540 /* Possibly defer initialization to selinux_complete_init. */
2541 if (sbsec->initialized) {
2542 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2543 isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
2545 isec->initialized = 1;
2548 if (!ss_initialized || sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2552 namep = kstrdup(XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX, GFP_NOFS);
2559 rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid, &context, &clen);
2571 static int selinux_inode_create(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2573 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_FILE);
2576 static int selinux_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2580 rc = secondary_ops->inode_link(old_dentry, dir, new_dentry);
2583 return may_link(dir, old_dentry, MAY_LINK);
2586 static int selinux_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2590 rc = secondary_ops->inode_unlink(dir, dentry);
2593 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_UNLINK);
2596 static int selinux_inode_symlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2598 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_LNK_FILE);
2601 static int selinux_inode_mkdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mask)
2603 return may_create(dir, dentry, SECCLASS_DIR);
2606 static int selinux_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
2608 return may_link(dir, dentry, MAY_RMDIR);
2611 static int selinux_inode_mknod(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, int mode, dev_t dev)
2615 rc = secondary_ops->inode_mknod(dir, dentry, mode, dev);
2619 return may_create(dir, dentry, inode_mode_to_security_class(mode));
2622 static int selinux_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode, struct dentry *old_dentry,
2623 struct inode *new_inode, struct dentry *new_dentry)
2625 return may_rename(old_inode, old_dentry, new_inode, new_dentry);
2628 static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
2630 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2633 static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
2637 rc = secondary_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nameidata);
2640 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__READ);
2643 static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
2647 rc = secondary_ops->inode_permission(inode, mask);
2652 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2656 return inode_has_perm(current, inode,
2657 open_file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask), NULL);
2660 static int selinux_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
2664 rc = secondary_ops->inode_setattr(dentry, iattr);
2668 if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
2671 if (iattr->ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID |
2672 ATTR_ATIME_SET | ATTR_MTIME_SET))
2673 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2675 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__WRITE);
2678 static int selinux_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry)
2680 return dentry_has_perm(current, mnt, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2683 static int selinux_inode_setotherxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2685 if (!strncmp(name, XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX,
2686 sizeof XATTR_SECURITY_PREFIX - 1)) {
2687 if (!strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_CAPS)) {
2688 if (!capable(CAP_SETFCAP))
2690 } else if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) {
2691 /* A different attribute in the security namespace.
2692 Restrict to administrator. */
2697 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the
2698 ordinary setattr permission. */
2699 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__SETATTR);
2702 static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2703 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2705 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2706 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2707 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2708 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
2709 struct avc_audit_data ad;
2713 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2714 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2716 sbsec = inode->i_sb->s_security;
2717 if (sbsec->behavior == SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT)
2720 if (!is_owner_or_cap(inode))
2723 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, FS);
2724 ad.u.fs.path.dentry = dentry;
2726 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass,
2727 FILE__RELABELFROM, &ad);
2731 rc = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &newsid);
2732 if (rc == -EINVAL) {
2733 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
2735 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2740 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid, isec->sclass,
2741 FILE__RELABELTO, &ad);
2745 rc = security_validate_transition(isec->sid, newsid, tsec->sid,
2750 return avc_has_perm(newsid,
2752 SECCLASS_FILESYSTEM,
2753 FILESYSTEM__ASSOCIATE,
2757 static void selinux_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
2758 const void *value, size_t size,
2761 struct inode *inode = dentry->d_inode;
2762 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2766 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) {
2767 /* Not an attribute we recognize, so nothing to do. */
2771 rc = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size, &newsid);
2773 printk(KERN_ERR "SELinux: unable to map context to SID"
2774 "for (%s, %lu), rc=%d\n",
2775 inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, -rc);
2783 static int selinux_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2785 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2788 static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry)
2790 return dentry_has_perm(current, NULL, dentry, FILE__GETATTR);
2793 static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
2795 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX))
2796 return selinux_inode_setotherxattr(dentry, name);
2798 /* No one is allowed to remove a SELinux security label.
2799 You can change the label, but all data must be labeled. */
2804 * Copy the inode security context value to the user.
2806 * Permission check is handled by selinux_inode_getxattr hook.
2808 static int selinux_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, bool alloc)
2812 char *context = NULL;
2813 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2814 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2816 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2820 * If the caller has CAP_MAC_ADMIN, then get the raw context
2821 * value even if it is not defined by current policy; otherwise,
2822 * use the in-core value under current policy.
2823 * Use the non-auditing forms of the permission checks since
2824 * getxattr may be called by unprivileged processes commonly
2825 * and lack of permission just means that we fall back to the
2826 * in-core context value, not a denial.
2828 error = secondary_ops->capable(current, CAP_MAC_ADMIN);
2830 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(tsec->sid, tsec->sid,
2831 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY2,
2832 CAPABILITY2__MAC_ADMIN,
2836 error = security_sid_to_context_force(isec->sid, &context,
2839 error = security_sid_to_context(isec->sid, &context, &size);
2852 static int selinux_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
2853 const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
2855 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2859 if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX))
2862 if (!value || !size)
2865 rc = security_context_to_sid((void *)value, size, &newsid);
2873 static int selinux_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer, size_t buffer_size)
2875 const int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SELINUX);
2876 if (buffer && len <= buffer_size)
2877 memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX, len);
2881 static int selinux_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2883 return secondary_ops->inode_need_killpriv(dentry);
2886 static int selinux_inode_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry)
2888 return secondary_ops->inode_killpriv(dentry);
2891 static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
2893 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2897 /* file security operations */
2899 static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2902 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2905 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2909 /* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
2910 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
2913 rc = file_has_perm(current, file,
2914 file_mask_to_av(inode->i_mode, mask));
2918 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2921 static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
2923 struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
2924 struct task_security_struct *tsec = current->security;
2925 struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
2926 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
2929 /* No permission to check. Existence test. */
2933 if (tsec->sid == fsec->sid && fsec->isid == isec->sid
2934 && fsec->pseqno == avc_policy_seqno())
2935 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(inode, mask);
2937 return selinux_revalidate_file_permission(file, mask);
2940 static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
2942 return file_alloc_security(file);
2945 static void selinux_file_free_security(struct file *file)
2947 file_free_security(file);
2950 static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
2955 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE)
2957 if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)
2962 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2965 static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
2967 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
2968 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && (!file || (!shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE)))) {
2970 * We are making executable an anonymous mapping or a
2971 * private file mapping that will also be writable.
2972 * This has an additional check.
2974 int rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECMEM);
2981 /* read access is always possible with a mapping */
2982 u32 av = FILE__READ;
2984 /* write access only matters if the mapping is shared */
2985 if (shared && (prot & PROT_WRITE))
2988 if (prot & PROT_EXEC)
2989 av |= FILE__EXECUTE;
2991 return file_has_perm(current, file, av);
2996 static int selinux_file_mmap(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot,
2997 unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags,
2998 unsigned long addr, unsigned long addr_only)
3001 u32 sid = ((struct task_security_struct *)(current->security))->sid;
3003 if (addr < mmap_min_addr)
3004 rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT,
3005 MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL);
3006 if (rc || addr_only)
3009 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3012 return file_map_prot_check(file, prot,
3013 (flags & MAP_TYPE) == MAP_SHARED);
3016 static int selinux_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma,
3017 unsigned long reqprot,
3022 rc = secondary_ops->file_mprotect(vma, reqprot, prot);
3026 if (selinux_checkreqprot)
3029 #ifndef CONFIG_PPC32
3030 if ((prot & PROT_EXEC) && !(vma->vm_flags & VM_EXEC)) {
3032 if (vma->vm_start >= vma->vm_mm->start_brk &&
3033 vma->vm_end <= vma->vm_mm->brk) {
3034 rc = task_has_perm(current, current,
3036 } else if (!vma->vm_file &&
3037 vma->vm_start <= vma->vm_mm->start_stack &&
3038 vma->vm_end >= vma->vm_mm->start_stack) {
3039 rc = task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__EXECSTACK);
3040 } else if (vma->vm_file && vma->anon_vma) {
3042 * We are making executable a file mapping that has
3043 * had some COW done. Since pages might have been
3044 * written, check ability to execute the possibly
3045 * modified content. This typically should only
3046 * occur for text relocations.
3048 rc = file_has_perm(current, vma->vm_file,
3056 return file_map_prot_check(vma->vm_file, prot, vma->vm_flags&VM_SHARED);
3059 static int selinux_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
3061 return file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3064 static int selinux_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
3071 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3076 if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && !(arg & O_APPEND)) {
3077 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__WRITE);
3086 /* Just check FD__USE permission */
3087 err = file_has_perm(current, file, 0);
3092 #if BITS_PER_LONG == 32
3097 if (!file->f_path.dentry || !file->f_path.dentry->d_inode) {
3101 err = file_has_perm(current, file, FILE__LOCK);
3108 static int selinux_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
3110 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3111 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3113 tsec = current->security;
3114 fsec = file->f_security;
3115 fsec->fown_sid = tsec->sid;
3120 static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
3121 struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
3125 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3126 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3128 /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */
3129 file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
3131 tsec = tsk->security;
3132 fsec = file->f_security;
3135 perm = signal_to_av(SIGIO); /* as per send_sigio_to_task */
3137 perm = signal_to_av(signum);
3139 return avc_has_perm(fsec->fown_sid, tsec->sid,
3140 SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3143 static int selinux_file_receive(struct file *file)
3145 return file_has_perm(current, file, file_to_av(file));
3148 static int selinux_dentry_open(struct file *file)
3150 struct file_security_struct *fsec;
3151 struct inode *inode;
3152 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3153 inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
3154 fsec = file->f_security;
3155 isec = inode->i_security;
3157 * Save inode label and policy sequence number
3158 * at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
3159 * can determine whether revalidation is necessary.
3160 * Task label is already saved in the file security
3161 * struct as its SID.
3163 fsec->isid = isec->sid;
3164 fsec->pseqno = avc_policy_seqno();
3166 * Since the inode label or policy seqno may have changed
3167 * between the selinux_inode_permission check and the saving
3168 * of state above, recheck that access is still permitted.
3169 * Otherwise, access might never be revalidated against the
3170 * new inode label or new policy.
3171 * This check is not redundant - do not remove.
3173 return inode_has_perm(current, inode, file_to_av(file), NULL);
3176 /* task security operations */
3178 static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
3182 rc = secondary_ops->task_create(clone_flags);
3186 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__FORK);
3189 static int selinux_task_alloc_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3191 struct task_security_struct *tsec1, *tsec2;
3194 tsec1 = current->security;
3196 rc = task_alloc_security(tsk);
3199 tsec2 = tsk->security;
3201 tsec2->osid = tsec1->osid;
3202 tsec2->sid = tsec1->sid;
3204 /* Retain the exec, fs, key, and sock SIDs across fork */
3205 tsec2->exec_sid = tsec1->exec_sid;
3206 tsec2->create_sid = tsec1->create_sid;
3207 tsec2->keycreate_sid = tsec1->keycreate_sid;
3208 tsec2->sockcreate_sid = tsec1->sockcreate_sid;
3213 static void selinux_task_free_security(struct task_struct *tsk)
3215 task_free_security(tsk);
3218 static int selinux_task_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3220 /* Since setuid only affects the current process, and
3221 since the SELinux controls are not based on the Linux
3222 identity attributes, SELinux does not need to control
3223 this operation. However, SELinux does control the use
3224 of the CAP_SETUID and CAP_SETGID capabilities using the
3229 static int selinux_task_post_setuid(uid_t id0, uid_t id1, uid_t id2, int flags)
3231 return secondary_ops->task_post_setuid(id0, id1, id2, flags);
3234 static int selinux_task_setgid(gid_t id0, gid_t id1, gid_t id2, int flags)
3236 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3240 static int selinux_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
3242 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETPGID);
3245 static int selinux_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
3247 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETPGID);
3250 static int selinux_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
3252 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSESSION);
3255 static void selinux_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
3257 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3261 static int selinux_task_setgroups(struct group_info *group_info)
3263 /* See the comment for setuid above. */
3267 static int selinux_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
3271 rc = secondary_ops->task_setnice(p, nice);
3275 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3278 static int selinux_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
3282 rc = secondary_ops->task_setioprio(p, ioprio);
3286 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3289 static int selinux_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
3291 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3294 static int selinux_task_setrlimit(unsigned int resource, struct rlimit *new_rlim)
3296 struct rlimit *old_rlim = current->signal->rlim + resource;
3299 rc = secondary_ops->task_setrlimit(resource, new_rlim);
3303 /* Control the ability to change the hard limit (whether
3304 lowering or raising it), so that the hard limit can
3305 later be used as a safe reset point for the soft limit
3306 upon context transitions. See selinux_bprm_apply_creds. */
3307 if (old_rlim->rlim_max != new_rlim->rlim_max)
3308 return task_has_perm(current, current, PROCESS__SETRLIMIT);
3313 static int selinux_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p, int policy, struct sched_param *lp)
3317 rc = secondary_ops->task_setscheduler(p, policy, lp);
3321 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3324 static int selinux_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
3326 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETSCHED);
3329 static int selinux_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
3331 return task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSCHED);
3334 static int selinux_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
3339 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3341 rc = secondary_ops->task_kill(p, info, sig, secid);
3346 perm = PROCESS__SIGNULL; /* null signal; existence test */
3348 perm = signal_to_av(sig);
3351 rc = avc_has_perm(secid, tsec->sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, perm, NULL);
3353 rc = task_has_perm(current, p, perm);
3357 static int selinux_task_prctl(int option,
3364 /* The current prctl operations do not appear to require
3365 any SELinux controls since they merely observe or modify
3366 the state of the current process. */
3367 return secondary_ops->task_prctl(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5, rc_p);
3370 static int selinux_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
3372 return task_has_perm(p, current, PROCESS__SIGCHLD);
3375 static void selinux_task_reparent_to_init(struct task_struct *p)
3377 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3379 secondary_ops->task_reparent_to_init(p);
3382 tsec->osid = tsec->sid;
3383 tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
3387 static void selinux_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p,
3388 struct inode *inode)
3390 struct task_security_struct *tsec = p->security;
3391 struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
3393 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
3394 isec->initialized = 1;
3398 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3399 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(struct sk_buff *skb,
3400 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3402 int offset, ihlen, ret = -EINVAL;
3403 struct iphdr _iph, *ih;
3405 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3406 ih = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_iph), &_iph);
3410 ihlen = ih->ihl * 4;
3411 if (ihlen < sizeof(_iph))
3414 ad->u.net.v4info.saddr = ih->saddr;
3415 ad->u.net.v4info.daddr = ih->daddr;
3419 *proto = ih->protocol;
3421 switch (ih->protocol) {
3423 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3425 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3429 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3433 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3434 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3439 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3441 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3445 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3449 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3450 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3454 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3455 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3457 if (ntohs(ih->frag_off) & IP_OFFSET)
3461 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3465 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3466 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3477 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3479 /* Returns error only if unable to parse addresses */
3480 static int selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb,
3481 struct avc_audit_data *ad, u8 *proto)
3484 int ret = -EINVAL, offset;
3485 struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h, *ip6;
3487 offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
3488 ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
3492 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.saddr, &ip6->saddr);
3493 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad->u.net.v6info.daddr, &ip6->daddr);
3496 nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
3497 offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
3498 offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr);
3507 struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
3509 th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
3513 ad->u.net.sport = th->source;
3514 ad->u.net.dport = th->dest;
3519 struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
3521 uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
3525 ad->u.net.sport = uh->source;
3526 ad->u.net.dport = uh->dest;
3530 case IPPROTO_DCCP: {
3531 struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
3533 dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
3537 ad->u.net.sport = dh->dccph_sport;
3538 ad->u.net.dport = dh->dccph_dport;
3542 /* includes fragments */
3552 static int selinux_parse_skb(struct sk_buff *skb, struct avc_audit_data *ad,
3553 char **_addrp, int src, u8 *proto)
3558 switch (ad->u.net.family) {
3560 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv4(skb, ad, proto);
3563 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v4info.saddr :
3564 &ad->u.net.v4info.daddr);
3567 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
3569 ret = selinux_parse_skb_ipv6(skb, ad, proto);
3572 addrp = (char *)(src ? &ad->u.net.v6info.saddr :
3573 &ad->u.net.v6info.daddr);
3583 "SELinux: failure in selinux_parse_skb(),"
3584 " unable to parse packet\n");
3594 * selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid - Determine the peer label of a packet
3596 * @family: protocol family
3597 * @sid: the packet's peer label SID
3600 * Check the various different forms of network peer labeling and determine
3601 * the peer label/SID for the packet; most of the magic actually occurs in
3602 * the security server function security_net_peersid_cmp(). The function
3603 * returns zero if the value in @sid is valid (although it may be SECSID_NULL)
3604 * or -EACCES if @sid is invalid due to inconsistencies with the different
3608 static int selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family, u32 *sid)
3615 selinux_skb_xfrm_sid(skb, &xfrm_sid);
3616 selinux_netlbl_skbuff_getsid(skb, family, &nlbl_type, &nlbl_sid);
3618 err = security_net_peersid_resolve(nlbl_sid, nlbl_type, xfrm_sid, sid);
3619 if (unlikely(err)) {
3621 "SELinux: failure in selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(),"
3622 " unable to determine packet's peer label\n");
3629 /* socket security operations */
3630 static int socket_has_perm(struct task_struct *task, struct socket *sock,
3633 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3634 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3635 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3638 tsec = task->security;
3639 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3641 if (isec->sid == SECINITSID_KERNEL)
3644 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3645 ad.u.net.sk = sock->sk;
3646 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
3652 static int selinux_socket_create(int family, int type,
3653 int protocol, int kern)
3656 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3662 tsec = current->security;
3663 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3664 err = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, newsid,
3665 socket_type_to_security_class(family, type,
3666 protocol), SOCKET__CREATE, NULL);
3672 static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
3673 int type, int protocol, int kern)
3676 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3677 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3678 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
3681 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3683 tsec = current->security;
3684 newsid = tsec->sockcreate_sid ? : tsec->sid;
3685 isec->sclass = socket_type_to_security_class(family, type, protocol);
3686 isec->sid = kern ? SECINITSID_KERNEL : newsid;
3687 isec->initialized = 1;
3690 sksec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3691 sksec->sid = isec->sid;
3692 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3693 err = selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(sock);
3699 /* Range of port numbers used to automatically bind.
3700 Need to determine whether we should perform a name_bind
3701 permission check between the socket and the port number. */
3703 static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3708 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__BIND);
3713 * If PF_INET or PF_INET6, check name_bind permission for the port.
3714 * Multiple address binding for SCTP is not supported yet: we just
3715 * check the first address now.
3717 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
3718 if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) {
3720 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3721 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
3722 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3723 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3724 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3725 unsigned short snum;
3726 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3729 tsec = current->security;
3730 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3732 if (family == PF_INET) {
3733 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3734 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3735 addrp = (char *)&addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3737 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3738 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3739 addrp = (char *)&addr6->sin6_addr.s6_addr;
3745 inet_get_local_port_range(&low, &high);
3747 if (snum < max(PROT_SOCK, low) || snum > high) {
3748 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
3752 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3753 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3754 ad.u.net.family = family;
3755 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3757 SOCKET__NAME_BIND, &ad);
3763 switch (isec->sclass) {
3764 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
3765 node_perm = TCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3768 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
3769 node_perm = UDP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3772 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
3773 node_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3777 node_perm = RAWIP_SOCKET__NODE_BIND;
3781 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &sid);
3785 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3786 ad.u.net.sport = htons(snum);
3787 ad.u.net.family = family;
3789 if (family == PF_INET)
3790 ad.u.net.v4info.saddr = addr4->sin_addr.s_addr;
3792 ipv6_addr_copy(&ad.u.net.v6info.saddr, &addr6->sin6_addr);
3794 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid,
3795 isec->sclass, node_perm, &ad);
3803 static int selinux_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen)
3805 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3808 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__CONNECT);
3813 * If a TCP or DCCP socket, check name_connect permission for the port.
3815 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3816 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET ||
3817 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET) {
3818 struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
3819 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3820 struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = NULL;
3821 struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = NULL;
3822 unsigned short snum;
3825 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
3826 addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)address;
3827 if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
3829 snum = ntohs(addr4->sin_port);
3831 addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
3832 if (addrlen < SIN6_LEN_RFC2133)
3834 snum = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
3837 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol, snum, &sid);
3841 perm = (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) ?
3842 TCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT : DCCP_SOCKET__NAME_CONNECT;
3844 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3845 ad.u.net.dport = htons(snum);
3846 ad.u.net.family = sk->sk_family;
3847 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, sid, isec->sclass, perm, &ad);
3856 static int selinux_socket_listen(struct socket *sock, int backlog)
3858 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__LISTEN);
3861 static int selinux_socket_accept(struct socket *sock, struct socket *newsock)
3864 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3865 struct inode_security_struct *newisec;
3867 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__ACCEPT);
3871 newisec = SOCK_INODE(newsock)->i_security;
3873 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3874 newisec->sclass = isec->sclass;
3875 newisec->sid = isec->sid;
3876 newisec->initialized = 1;
3881 static int selinux_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3886 rc = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__WRITE);
3890 return selinux_netlbl_inode_permission(SOCK_INODE(sock), MAY_WRITE);
3893 static int selinux_socket_recvmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
3894 int size, int flags)
3896 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__READ);
3899 static int selinux_socket_getsockname(struct socket *sock)
3901 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3904 static int selinux_socket_getpeername(struct socket *sock)
3906 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETATTR);
3909 static int selinux_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname)
3913 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SETOPT);
3917 return selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(sock, level, optname);
3920 static int selinux_socket_getsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level,
3923 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__GETOPT);
3926 static int selinux_socket_shutdown(struct socket *sock, int how)
3928 return socket_has_perm(current, sock, SOCKET__SHUTDOWN);
3931 static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct socket *sock,
3932 struct socket *other,
3935 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
3936 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3937 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3938 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3941 err = secondary_ops->unix_stream_connect(sock, other, newsk);
3945 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3946 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3948 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3949 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3951 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3953 UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET__CONNECTTO, &ad);
3957 /* connecting socket */
3958 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
3959 ssec->peer_sid = other_isec->sid;
3961 /* server child socket */
3962 ssec = newsk->sk_security;
3963 ssec->peer_sid = isec->sid;
3964 err = security_sid_mls_copy(other_isec->sid, ssec->peer_sid, &ssec->sid);
3969 static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock,
3970 struct socket *other)
3972 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
3973 struct inode_security_struct *other_isec;
3974 struct avc_audit_data ad;
3977 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
3978 other_isec = SOCK_INODE(other)->i_security;
3980 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
3981 ad.u.net.sk = other->sk;
3983 err = avc_has_perm(isec->sid, other_isec->sid,
3984 isec->sclass, SOCKET__SENDTO, &ad);
3991 static int selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(int ifindex, char *addrp, u16 family,
3993 struct avc_audit_data *ad)
3999 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4002 err = avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4003 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__INGRESS, ad);
4007 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4010 return avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4011 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__RECVFROM, ad);
4014 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4015 struct sk_buff *skb,
4016 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4021 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4023 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, recv_perm;
4024 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4026 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4027 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4030 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4031 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_RECV;
4032 node_perm = NODE__UDP_RECV;
4033 recv_perm = UDP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4035 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4036 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_RECV;
4037 node_perm = NODE__TCP_RECV;
4038 recv_perm = TCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4040 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4041 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_RECV;
4042 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_RECV;
4043 recv_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__RECV_MSG;
4046 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_RECV;
4047 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_RECV;
4052 err = sel_netif_sid(skb->iif, &if_sid);
4055 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4059 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4062 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4068 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4069 ntohs(ad->u.net.sport), &port_sid);
4070 if (unlikely(err)) {
4072 "SELinux: failure in"
4073 " selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(),"
4074 " network port label not found\n");
4077 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, recv_perm, ad);
4080 static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4081 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4082 u16 family, char *addrp)
4085 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4087 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4089 if (selinux_compat_net)
4090 err = selinux_sock_rcv_skb_iptables_compat(sk, skb, ad,
4093 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4098 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer) {
4099 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4102 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid,
4103 SECCLASS_PEER, PEER__RECV, ad);
4105 err = selinux_netlbl_sock_rcv_skb(sksec, skb, family, ad);
4108 err = selinux_xfrm_sock_rcv_skb(sksec->sid, skb, ad);
4114 static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4117 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4118 u16 family = sk->sk_family;
4119 u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4120 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4123 if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6)
4126 /* Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */
4127 if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
4130 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4131 ad.u.net.netif = skb->iif;
4132 ad.u.net.family = family;
4133 err = selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL);
4137 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4138 * to the selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat() function to deal with the
4139 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4140 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4141 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4142 return selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(sk, skb, &ad,
4145 if (netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled()) {
4148 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid);
4151 err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(skb->iif, addrp, family,
4155 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, peer_sid, SECCLASS_PEER,
4159 if (selinux_secmark_enabled()) {
4160 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, skb->secmark, SECCLASS_PACKET,
4169 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, char __user *optval,
4170 int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
4175 struct sk_security_struct *ssec;
4176 struct inode_security_struct *isec;
4177 u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL;
4179 isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4181 if (isec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET ||
4182 isec->sclass == SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET) {
4183 ssec = sock->sk->sk_security;
4184 peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4186 if (peer_sid == SECSID_NULL) {
4191 err = security_sid_to_context(peer_sid, &scontext, &scontext_len);
4196 if (scontext_len > len) {
4201 if (copy_to_user(optval, scontext, scontext_len))
4205 if (put_user(scontext_len, optlen))
4213 static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
4215 u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4219 family = sock->sk->sk_family;
4220 else if (skb && skb->sk)
4221 family = skb->sk->sk_family;
4225 if (sock && family == PF_UNIX)
4226 selinux_inode_getsecid(SOCK_INODE(sock), &peer_secid);
4228 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_secid);
4231 *secid = peer_secid;
4232 if (peer_secid == SECSID_NULL)
4237 static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority)
4239 return sk_alloc_security(sk, family, priority);
4242 static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
4244 sk_free_security(sk);
4247 static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
4249 struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sk->sk_security;
4250 struct sk_security_struct *newssec = newsk->sk_security;
4252 newssec->sid = ssec->sid;
4253 newssec->peer_sid = ssec->peer_sid;
4254 newssec->sclass = ssec->sclass;
4256 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newssec, newsk->sk_family);
4259 static void selinux_sk_getsecid(struct sock *sk, u32 *secid)
4262 *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET;
4264 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4266 *secid = sksec->sid;
4270 static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
4272 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(parent)->i_security;
4273 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4275 if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 ||
4276 sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX)
4277 isec->sid = sksec->sid;
4278 sksec->sclass = isec->sclass;
4280 selinux_netlbl_sock_graft(sk, parent);
4283 static int selinux_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
4284 struct request_sock *req)
4286 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4291 err = selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &peersid);
4294 if (peersid == SECSID_NULL) {
4295 req->secid = sksec->sid;
4296 req->peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
4300 err = security_sid_mls_copy(sksec->sid, peersid, &newsid);
4304 req->secid = newsid;
4305 req->peer_secid = peersid;
4309 static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk,
4310 const struct request_sock *req)
4312 struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security;
4314 newsksec->sid = req->secid;
4315 newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid;
4316 /* NOTE: Ideally, we should also get the isec->sid for the
4317 new socket in sync, but we don't have the isec available yet.
4318 So we will wait until sock_graft to do it, by which
4319 time it will have been created and available. */
4321 /* We don't need to take any sort of lock here as we are the only
4322 * thread with access to newsksec */
4323 selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(newsksec, req->rsk_ops->family);
4326 static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk,
4327 struct sk_buff *skb)
4329 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4331 selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, sk->sk_family, &sksec->peer_sid);
4334 static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req,
4337 fl->secid = req->secid;
4340 static int selinux_nlmsg_perm(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4344 struct nlmsghdr *nlh;
4345 struct socket *sock = sk->sk_socket;
4346 struct inode_security_struct *isec = SOCK_INODE(sock)->i_security;
4348 if (skb->len < NLMSG_SPACE(0)) {
4352 nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
4354 err = selinux_nlmsg_lookup(isec->sclass, nlh->nlmsg_type, &perm);
4356 if (err == -EINVAL) {
4357 audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
4358 "SELinux: unrecognized netlink message"
4359 " type=%hu for sclass=%hu\n",
4360 nlh->nlmsg_type, isec->sclass);
4361 if (!selinux_enforcing)
4371 err = socket_has_perm(current, sock, perm);
4376 #ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
4378 static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4383 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4387 if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4390 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4391 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4392 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4395 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4396 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4397 ad.u.net.family = family;
4398 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
4401 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
4405 if (selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(ifindex, addrp, family,
4406 peer_sid, &ad) != 0)
4410 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4411 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
4417 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4418 struct sk_buff *skb,
4419 const struct net_device *in,
4420 const struct net_device *out,
4421 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4423 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET);
4426 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4427 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(unsigned int hooknum,
4428 struct sk_buff *skb,
4429 const struct net_device *in,
4430 const struct net_device *out,
4431 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4433 return selinux_ip_forward(skb, in->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4437 static int selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(struct sock *sk,
4439 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4440 u16 family, char *addrp)
4443 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4445 u32 netif_perm, node_perm, send_perm;
4446 u32 port_sid, node_sid, if_sid, sk_sid;
4448 sk_sid = sksec->sid;
4449 sk_class = sksec->sclass;
4452 case SECCLASS_UDP_SOCKET:
4453 netif_perm = NETIF__UDP_SEND;
4454 node_perm = NODE__UDP_SEND;
4455 send_perm = UDP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4457 case SECCLASS_TCP_SOCKET:
4458 netif_perm = NETIF__TCP_SEND;
4459 node_perm = NODE__TCP_SEND;
4460 send_perm = TCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4462 case SECCLASS_DCCP_SOCKET:
4463 netif_perm = NETIF__DCCP_SEND;
4464 node_perm = NODE__DCCP_SEND;
4465 send_perm = DCCP_SOCKET__SEND_MSG;
4468 netif_perm = NETIF__RAWIP_SEND;
4469 node_perm = NODE__RAWIP_SEND;
4474 err = sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid);
4477 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, if_sid, SECCLASS_NETIF, netif_perm, ad);
4480 err = sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid);
4483 err = avc_has_perm(sk_sid, node_sid, SECCLASS_NODE, node_perm, ad);
4490 err = sel_netport_sid(sk->sk_protocol,
4491 ntohs(ad->u.net.dport), &port_sid);
4492 if (unlikely(err)) {
4494 "SELinux: failure in"
4495 " selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(),"
4496 " network port label not found\n");
4499 return avc_has_perm(sk_sid, port_sid, sk_class, send_perm, ad);
4502 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
4504 struct avc_audit_data *ad,
4509 struct sock *sk = skb->sk;
4510 struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
4514 sksec = sk->sk_security;
4516 if (selinux_compat_net) {
4517 if (selinux_ip_postroute_iptables_compat(skb->sk, ifindex,
4521 if (avc_has_perm(sksec->sid, skb->secmark,
4522 SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__SEND, ad))
4526 if (selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4527 if (selinux_xfrm_postroute_last(sksec->sid, skb, ad, proto))
4533 static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb, int ifindex,
4539 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4545 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, NET);
4546 ad.u.net.netif = ifindex;
4547 ad.u.net.family = family;
4548 if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
4551 /* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
4552 * to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
4553 * special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
4554 * as fast and as clean as possible. */
4555 if (selinux_compat_net || !selinux_policycap_netpeer)
4556 return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, &ad,
4557 family, addrp, proto);
4559 /* If skb->dst->xfrm is non-NULL then the packet is undergoing an IPsec
4560 * packet transformation so allow the packet to pass without any checks
4561 * since we'll have another chance to perform access control checks
4562 * when the packet is on it's final way out.
4563 * NOTE: there appear to be some IPv6 multicast cases where skb->dst
4564 * is NULL, in this case go ahead and apply access control. */
4565 if (skb->dst != NULL && skb->dst->xfrm != NULL)
4568 secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
4569 peerlbl_active = netlbl_enabled() || selinux_xfrm_enabled();
4570 if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
4573 /* if the packet is locally generated (skb->sk != NULL) then use the
4574 * socket's label as the peer label, otherwise the packet is being
4575 * forwarded through this system and we need to fetch the peer label
4576 * directly from the packet */
4579 struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
4580 peer_sid = sksec->sid;
4581 secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
4583 if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid))
4585 secmark_perm = PACKET__FORWARD_OUT;
4589 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, skb->secmark,
4590 SECCLASS_PACKET, secmark_perm, &ad))
4593 if (peerlbl_active) {
4597 if (sel_netif_sid(ifindex, &if_sid))
4599 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, if_sid,
4600 SECCLASS_NETIF, NETIF__EGRESS, &ad))
4603 if (sel_netnode_sid(addrp, family, &node_sid))
4605 if (avc_has_perm(peer_sid, node_sid,
4606 SECCLASS_NODE, NODE__SENDTO, &ad))
4613 static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4614 struct sk_buff *skb,
4615 const struct net_device *in,
4616 const struct net_device *out,
4617 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4619 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET);
4622 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
4623 static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(unsigned int hooknum,
4624 struct sk_buff *skb,
4625 const struct net_device *in,
4626 const struct net_device *out,
4627 int (*okfn)(struct sk_buff *))
4629 return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, out->ifindex, PF_INET6);
4633 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
4635 static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
4639 err = secondary_ops->netlink_send(sk, skb);
4643 if (policydb_loaded_version >= POLICYDB_VERSION_NLCLASS)
4644 err = selinux_nlmsg_perm(sk, skb);
4649 static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct sk_buff *skb, int capability)
4652 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4654 err = secondary_ops->netlink_recv(skb, capability);
4658 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, CAP);
4659 ad.u.cap = capability;
4661 return avc_has_perm(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid, NETLINK_CB(skb).sid,
4662 SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
4665 static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
4666 struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
4669 struct task_security_struct *tsec = task->security;
4670 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4672 isec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4676 isec->sclass = sclass;
4677 isec->sid = tsec->sid;
4678 perm->security = isec;
4683 static void ipc_free_security(struct kern_ipc_perm *perm)
4685 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = perm->security;
4686 perm->security = NULL;
4690 static int msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4692 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4694 msec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
4698 msec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
4699 msg->security = msec;
4704 static void msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4706 struct msg_security_struct *msec = msg->security;
4708 msg->security = NULL;
4712 static int ipc_has_perm(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipc_perms,
4715 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4716 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4717 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4719 tsec = current->security;
4720 isec = ipc_perms->security;
4722 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4723 ad.u.ipc_id = ipc_perms->key;
4725 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, perms, &ad);
4728 static int selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4730 return msg_msg_alloc_security(msg);
4733 static void selinux_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
4735 msg_msg_free_security(msg);
4738 /* message queue security operations */
4739 static int selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4741 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4742 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4743 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4746 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &msq->q_perm, SECCLASS_MSGQ);
4750 tsec = current->security;
4751 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4753 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4754 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4756 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4759 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4765 static void selinux_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
4767 ipc_free_security(&msq->q_perm);
4770 static int selinux_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
4772 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4773 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4774 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4776 tsec = current->security;
4777 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4779 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4780 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4782 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4783 MSGQ__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4786 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
4794 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4795 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4798 perms = MSGQ__GETATTR | MSGQ__ASSOCIATE;
4801 perms = MSGQ__SETATTR;
4804 perms = MSGQ__DESTROY;
4810 err = ipc_has_perm(&msq->q_perm, perms);
4814 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg, int msqflg)
4816 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4817 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4818 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4819 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4822 tsec = current->security;
4823 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4824 msec = msg->security;
4827 * First time through, need to assign label to the message
4829 if (msec->sid == SECINITSID_UNLABELED) {
4831 * Compute new sid based on current process and
4832 * message queue this message will be stored in
4834 rc = security_transition_sid(tsec->sid,
4842 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4843 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4845 /* Can this process write to the queue? */
4846 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_MSGQ,
4849 /* Can this process send the message */
4850 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4851 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__SEND, &ad);
4853 /* Can the message be put in the queue? */
4854 rc = avc_has_perm(msec->sid, isec->sid,
4855 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__ENQUEUE, &ad);
4860 static int selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
4861 struct task_struct *target,
4862 long type, int mode)
4864 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4865 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4866 struct msg_security_struct *msec;
4867 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4870 tsec = target->security;
4871 isec = msq->q_perm.security;
4872 msec = msg->security;
4874 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4875 ad.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.key;
4877 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid,
4878 SECCLASS_MSGQ, MSGQ__READ, &ad);
4880 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, msec->sid,
4881 SECCLASS_MSG, MSG__RECEIVE, &ad);
4885 /* Shared Memory security operations */
4886 static int selinux_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4888 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4889 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4890 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4893 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &shp->shm_perm, SECCLASS_SHM);
4897 tsec = current->security;
4898 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4900 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4901 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4903 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4906 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4912 static void selinux_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
4914 ipc_free_security(&shp->shm_perm);
4917 static int selinux_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
4919 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4920 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4921 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4923 tsec = current->security;
4924 isec = shp->shm_perm.security;
4926 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
4927 ad.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.key;
4929 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SHM,
4930 SHM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
4933 /* Note, at this point, shp is locked down */
4934 static int selinux_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
4942 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
4943 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
4946 perms = SHM__GETATTR | SHM__ASSOCIATE;
4949 perms = SHM__SETATTR;
4956 perms = SHM__DESTROY;
4962 err = ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4966 static int selinux_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp,
4967 char __user *shmaddr, int shmflg)
4972 rc = secondary_ops->shm_shmat(shp, shmaddr, shmflg);
4976 if (shmflg & SHM_RDONLY)
4979 perms = SHM__READ | SHM__WRITE;
4981 return ipc_has_perm(&shp->shm_perm, perms);
4984 /* Semaphore security operations */
4985 static int selinux_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
4987 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
4988 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
4989 struct avc_audit_data ad;
4992 rc = ipc_alloc_security(current, &sma->sem_perm, SECCLASS_SEM);
4996 tsec = current->security;
4997 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
4999 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5000 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5002 rc = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5005 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5011 static void selinux_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
5013 ipc_free_security(&sma->sem_perm);
5016 static int selinux_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
5018 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5019 struct ipc_security_struct *isec;
5020 struct avc_audit_data ad;
5022 tsec = current->security;
5023 isec = sma->sem_perm.security;
5025 AVC_AUDIT_DATA_INIT(&ad, IPC);
5026 ad.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.key;
5028 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, isec->sid, SECCLASS_SEM,
5029 SEM__ASSOCIATE, &ad);
5032 /* Note, at this point, sma is locked down */
5033 static int selinux_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
5041 /* No specific object, just general system-wide information. */
5042 return task_has_system(current, SYSTEM__IPC_INFO);
5046 perms = SEM__GETATTR;
5057 perms = SEM__DESTROY;
5060 perms = SEM__SETATTR;
5064 perms = SEM__GETATTR | SEM__ASSOCIATE;
5070 err = ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5074 static int selinux_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma,
5075 struct sembuf *sops, unsigned nsops, int alter)
5080 perms = SEM__READ | SEM__WRITE;
5084 return ipc_has_perm(&sma->sem_perm, perms);
5087 static int selinux_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, short flag)
5093 av |= IPC__UNIX_READ;
5095 av |= IPC__UNIX_WRITE;
5100 return ipc_has_perm(ipcp, av);
5103 static void selinux_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *secid)
5105 struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
5109 static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
5112 inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
5115 static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5116 char *name, char **value)
5118 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5124 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__GETATTR);
5131 if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5133 else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
5135 else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5136 sid = tsec->exec_sid;
5137 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5138 sid = tsec->create_sid;
5139 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5140 sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5141 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5142 sid = tsec->sockcreate_sid;
5149 error = security_sid_to_context(sid, value, &len);
5155 static int selinux_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
5156 char *name, void *value, size_t size)
5158 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5159 struct task_struct *tracer;
5165 /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own
5166 security attributes. */
5171 * Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
5172 * current == p, but we'll pass them separately in case the
5173 * above restriction is ever removed.
5175 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5176 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETEXEC);
5177 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5178 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETFSCREATE);
5179 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
5180 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE);
5181 else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5182 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE);
5183 else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
5184 error = task_has_perm(current, p, PROCESS__SETCURRENT);
5190 /* Obtain a SID for the context, if one was specified. */
5191 if (size && str[1] && str[1] != '\n') {
5192 if (str[size-1] == '\n') {
5196 error = security_context_to_sid(value, size, &sid);
5197 if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
5198 if (!capable(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
5200 error = security_context_to_sid_force(value, size,
5207 /* Permission checking based on the specified context is
5208 performed during the actual operation (execve,
5209 open/mkdir/...), when we know the full context of the
5210 operation. See selinux_bprm_set_security for the execve
5211 checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
5212 operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
5214 if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
5215 tsec->exec_sid = sid;
5216 else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
5217 tsec->create_sid = sid;
5218 else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
5219 error = may_create_key(sid, p);
5222 tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
5223 } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
5224 tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
5225 else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
5226 struct av_decision avd;
5231 * SELinux allows to change context in the following case only.
5232 * - Single threaded processes.
5233 * - Multi threaded processes intend to change its context into
5234 * more restricted domain (defined by TYPEBOUNDS statement).
5236 if (atomic_read(&p->mm->mm_users) != 1) {
5237 struct task_struct *g, *t;
5238 struct mm_struct *mm = p->mm;
5239 read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
5240 do_each_thread(g, t) {
5241 if (t->mm == mm && t != p) {
5242 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5243 error = security_bounded_transition(tsec->sid, sid);
5249 } while_each_thread(g, t);
5250 read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
5254 /* Check permissions for the transition. */
5255 error = avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5256 PROCESS__DYNTRANSITION, NULL);
5260 /* Check for ptracing, and update the task SID if ok.
5261 Otherwise, leave SID unchanged and fail. */
5264 tracer = tracehook_tracer_task(p);
5265 if (tracer != NULL) {
5266 struct task_security_struct *ptsec = tracer->security;
5267 u32 ptsid = ptsec->sid;
5269 error = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ptsid, sid,
5271 PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
5275 avc_audit(ptsid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
5276 PROCESS__PTRACE, &avd, error, NULL);
5290 static int selinux_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
5292 return security_sid_to_context(secid, secdata, seclen);
5295 static int selinux_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
5297 return security_context_to_sid(secdata, seclen, secid);
5300 static void selinux_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
5307 static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
5308 unsigned long flags)
5310 struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
5311 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5313 ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL);
5317 if (tsec->keycreate_sid)
5318 ksec->sid = tsec->keycreate_sid;
5320 ksec->sid = tsec->sid;
5326 static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k)
5328 struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security;
5334 static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
5335 struct task_struct *ctx,
5339 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5340 struct key_security_struct *ksec;
5342 key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
5344 tsec = ctx->security;
5345 ksec = key->security;
5347 /* if no specific permissions are requested, we skip the
5348 permission check. No serious, additional covert channels
5349 appear to be created. */
5353 return avc_has_perm(tsec->sid, ksec->sid,
5354 SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL);
5357 static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
5359 struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security;
5360 char *context = NULL;
5364 rc = security_sid_to_context(ksec->sid, &context, &len);
5373 static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
5376 .ptrace_may_access = selinux_ptrace_may_access,
5377 .ptrace_traceme = selinux_ptrace_traceme,
5378 .capget = selinux_capget,
5379 .capset_check = selinux_capset_check,
5380 .capset_set = selinux_capset_set,
5381 .sysctl = selinux_sysctl,
5382 .capable = selinux_capable,
5383 .quotactl = selinux_quotactl,
5384 .quota_on = selinux_quota_on,
5385 .syslog = selinux_syslog,
5386 .vm_enough_memory = selinux_vm_enough_memory,
5388 .netlink_send = selinux_netlink_send,
5389 .netlink_recv = selinux_netlink_recv,
5391 .bprm_alloc_security = selinux_bprm_alloc_security,
5392 .bprm_free_security = selinux_bprm_free_security,
5393 .bprm_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_apply_creds,
5394 .bprm_post_apply_creds = selinux_bprm_post_apply_creds,
5395 .bprm_set_security = selinux_bprm_set_security,
5396 .bprm_check_security = selinux_bprm_check_security,
5397 .bprm_secureexec = selinux_bprm_secureexec,
5399 .sb_alloc_security = selinux_sb_alloc_security,
5400 .sb_free_security = selinux_sb_free_security,
5401 .sb_copy_data = selinux_sb_copy_data,
5402 .sb_kern_mount = selinux_sb_kern_mount,
5403 .sb_show_options = selinux_sb_show_options,
5404 .sb_statfs = selinux_sb_statfs,
5405 .sb_mount = selinux_mount,
5406 .sb_umount = selinux_umount,
5407 .sb_set_mnt_opts = selinux_set_mnt_opts,
5408 .sb_clone_mnt_opts = selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts,
5409 .sb_parse_opts_str = selinux_parse_opts_str,
5412 .inode_alloc_security = selinux_inode_alloc_security,
5413 .inode_free_security = selinux_inode_free_security,
5414 .inode_init_security = selinux_inode_init_security,
5415 .inode_create = selinux_inode_create,
5416 .inode_link = selinux_inode_link,
5417 .inode_unlink = selinux_inode_unlink,
5418 .inode_symlink = selinux_inode_symlink,
5419 .inode_mkdir = selinux_inode_mkdir,
5420 .inode_rmdir = selinux_inode_rmdir,
5421 .inode_mknod = selinux_inode_mknod,
5422 .inode_rename = selinux_inode_rename,
5423 .inode_readlink = selinux_inode_readlink,
5424 .inode_follow_link = selinux_inode_follow_link,
5425 .inode_permission = selinux_inode_permission,
5426 .inode_setattr = selinux_inode_setattr,
5427 .inode_getattr = selinux_inode_getattr,
5428 .inode_setxattr = selinux_inode_setxattr,
5429 .inode_post_setxattr = selinux_inode_post_setxattr,
5430 .inode_getxattr = selinux_inode_getxattr,
5431 .inode_listxattr = selinux_inode_listxattr,
5432 .inode_removexattr = selinux_inode_removexattr,
5433 .inode_getsecurity = selinux_inode_getsecurity,
5434 .inode_setsecurity = selinux_inode_setsecurity,
5435 .inode_listsecurity = selinux_inode_listsecurity,
5436 .inode_need_killpriv = selinux_inode_need_killpriv,
5437 .inode_killpriv = selinux_inode_killpriv,
5438 .inode_getsecid = selinux_inode_getsecid,
5440 .file_permission = selinux_file_permission,
5441 .file_alloc_security = selinux_file_alloc_security,
5442 .file_free_security = selinux_file_free_security,
5443 .file_ioctl = selinux_file_ioctl,
5444 .file_mmap = selinux_file_mmap,
5445 .file_mprotect = selinux_file_mprotect,
5446 .file_lock = selinux_file_lock,
5447 .file_fcntl = selinux_file_fcntl,
5448 .file_set_fowner = selinux_file_set_fowner,
5449 .file_send_sigiotask = selinux_file_send_sigiotask,
5450 .file_receive = selinux_file_receive,
5452 .dentry_open = selinux_dentry_open,
5454 .task_create = selinux_task_create,
5455 .task_alloc_security = selinux_task_alloc_security,
5456 .task_free_security = selinux_task_free_security,
5457 .task_setuid = selinux_task_setuid,
5458 .task_post_setuid = selinux_task_post_setuid,
5459 .task_setgid = selinux_task_setgid,
5460 .task_setpgid = selinux_task_setpgid,
5461 .task_getpgid = selinux_task_getpgid,
5462 .task_getsid = selinux_task_getsid,
5463 .task_getsecid = selinux_task_getsecid,
5464 .task_setgroups = selinux_task_setgroups,
5465 .task_setnice = selinux_task_setnice,
5466 .task_setioprio = selinux_task_setioprio,
5467 .task_getioprio = selinux_task_getioprio,
5468 .task_setrlimit = selinux_task_setrlimit,
5469 .task_setscheduler = selinux_task_setscheduler,
5470 .task_getscheduler = selinux_task_getscheduler,
5471 .task_movememory = selinux_task_movememory,
5472 .task_kill = selinux_task_kill,
5473 .task_wait = selinux_task_wait,
5474 .task_prctl = selinux_task_prctl,
5475 .task_reparent_to_init = selinux_task_reparent_to_init,
5476 .task_to_inode = selinux_task_to_inode,
5478 .ipc_permission = selinux_ipc_permission,
5479 .ipc_getsecid = selinux_ipc_getsecid,
5481 .msg_msg_alloc_security = selinux_msg_msg_alloc_security,
5482 .msg_msg_free_security = selinux_msg_msg_free_security,
5484 .msg_queue_alloc_security = selinux_msg_queue_alloc_security,
5485 .msg_queue_free_security = selinux_msg_queue_free_security,
5486 .msg_queue_associate = selinux_msg_queue_associate,
5487 .msg_queue_msgctl = selinux_msg_queue_msgctl,
5488 .msg_queue_msgsnd = selinux_msg_queue_msgsnd,
5489 .msg_queue_msgrcv = selinux_msg_queue_msgrcv,
5491 .shm_alloc_security = selinux_shm_alloc_security,
5492 .shm_free_security = selinux_shm_free_security,
5493 .shm_associate = selinux_shm_associate,
5494 .shm_shmctl = selinux_shm_shmctl,
5495 .shm_shmat = selinux_shm_shmat,
5497 .sem_alloc_security = selinux_sem_alloc_security,
5498 .sem_free_security = selinux_sem_free_security,
5499 .sem_associate = selinux_sem_associate,
5500 .sem_semctl = selinux_sem_semctl,
5501 .sem_semop = selinux_sem_semop,
5503 .d_instantiate = selinux_d_instantiate,
5505 .getprocattr = selinux_getprocattr,
5506 .setprocattr = selinux_setprocattr,
5508 .secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
5509 .secctx_to_secid = selinux_secctx_to_secid,
5510 .release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
5512 .unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
5513 .unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
5515 .socket_create = selinux_socket_create,
5516 .socket_post_create = selinux_socket_post_create,
5517 .socket_bind = selinux_socket_bind,
5518 .socket_connect = selinux_socket_connect,
5519 .socket_listen = selinux_socket_listen,
5520 .socket_accept = selinux_socket_accept,
5521 .socket_sendmsg = selinux_socket_sendmsg,
5522 .socket_recvmsg = selinux_socket_recvmsg,
5523 .socket_getsockname = selinux_socket_getsockname,
5524 .socket_getpeername = selinux_socket_getpeername,
5525 .socket_getsockopt = selinux_socket_getsockopt,
5526 .socket_setsockopt = selinux_socket_setsockopt,
5527 .socket_shutdown = selinux_socket_shutdown,
5528 .socket_sock_rcv_skb = selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb,
5529 .socket_getpeersec_stream = selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream,
5530 .socket_getpeersec_dgram = selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram,
5531 .sk_alloc_security = selinux_sk_alloc_security,
5532 .sk_free_security = selinux_sk_free_security,
5533 .sk_clone_security = selinux_sk_clone_security,
5534 .sk_getsecid = selinux_sk_getsecid,
5535 .sock_graft = selinux_sock_graft,
5536 .inet_conn_request = selinux_inet_conn_request,
5537 .inet_csk_clone = selinux_inet_csk_clone,
5538 .inet_conn_established = selinux_inet_conn_established,
5539 .req_classify_flow = selinux_req_classify_flow,
5541 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
5542 .xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
5543 .xfrm_policy_clone_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_clone,
5544 .xfrm_policy_free_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_free,
5545 .xfrm_policy_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_delete,
5546 .xfrm_state_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_state_alloc,
5547 .xfrm_state_free_security = selinux_xfrm_state_free,
5548 .xfrm_state_delete_security = selinux_xfrm_state_delete,
5549 .xfrm_policy_lookup = selinux_xfrm_policy_lookup,
5550 .xfrm_state_pol_flow_match = selinux_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match,
5551 .xfrm_decode_session = selinux_xfrm_decode_session,
5555 .key_alloc = selinux_key_alloc,
5556 .key_free = selinux_key_free,
5557 .key_permission = selinux_key_permission,
5558 .key_getsecurity = selinux_key_getsecurity,
5562 .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
5563 .audit_rule_known = selinux_audit_rule_known,
5564 .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
5565 .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
5569 static __init int selinux_init(void)
5571 struct task_security_struct *tsec;
5573 if (!security_module_enable(&selinux_ops)) {
5574 selinux_enabled = 0;
5578 if (!selinux_enabled) {
5579 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at boot.\n");
5583 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Initializing.\n");
5585 /* Set the security state for the initial task. */
5586 if (task_alloc_security(current))
5587 panic("SELinux: Failed to initialize initial task.\n");
5588 tsec = current->security;
5589 tsec->osid = tsec->sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
5591 sel_inode_cache = kmem_cache_create("selinux_inode_security",
5592 sizeof(struct inode_security_struct),
5593 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
5596 secondary_ops = security_ops;
5598 panic("SELinux: No initial security operations\n");
5599 if (register_security(&selinux_ops))
5600 panic("SELinux: Unable to register with kernel.\n");
5602 if (selinux_enforcing)
5603 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in enforcing mode\n");
5605 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Starting in permissive mode\n");
5610 void selinux_complete_init(void)
5612 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Completing initialization.\n");
5614 /* Set up any superblocks initialized prior to the policy load. */
5615 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Setting up existing superblocks.\n");
5616 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5617 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5619 if (!list_empty(&superblock_security_head)) {
5620 struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec =
5621 list_entry(superblock_security_head.next,
5622 struct superblock_security_struct,
5624 struct super_block *sb = sbsec->sb;
5626 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5627 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5628 down_read(&sb->s_umount);
5630 superblock_doinit(sb, NULL);
5632 spin_lock(&sb_lock);
5633 spin_lock(&sb_security_lock);
5634 list_del_init(&sbsec->list);
5637 spin_unlock(&sb_security_lock);
5638 spin_unlock(&sb_lock);
5641 /* SELinux requires early initialization in order to label
5642 all processes and objects when they are created. */
5643 security_initcall(selinux_init);
5645 #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER)
5647 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv4_ops[] = {
5649 .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
5650 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5652 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5653 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5656 .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
5657 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5659 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5660 .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5664 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5666 static struct nf_hook_ops selinux_ipv6_ops[] = {
5668 .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
5669 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5671 .hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
5672 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
5675 .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
5676 .owner = THIS_MODULE,
5678 .hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
5679 .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
5685 static int __init selinux_nf_ip_init(void)
5689 if (!selinux_enabled)
5692 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
5694 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5696 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv4: error %d\n", err);
5698 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5699 err = nf_register_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5701 panic("SELinux: nf_register_hooks for IPv6: error %d\n", err);
5708 __initcall(selinux_nf_ip_init);
5710 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5711 static void selinux_nf_ip_exit(void)
5713 printk(KERN_DEBUG "SELinux: Unregistering netfilter hooks\n");
5715 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv4_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv4_ops));
5716 #if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
5717 nf_unregister_hooks(selinux_ipv6_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_ipv6_ops));
5722 #else /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5724 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5725 #define selinux_nf_ip_exit()
5728 #endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
5730 #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_DISABLE
5731 static int selinux_disabled;
5733 int selinux_disable(void)
5735 extern void exit_sel_fs(void);
5737 if (ss_initialized) {
5738 /* Not permitted after initial policy load. */
5742 if (selinux_disabled) {
5743 /* Only do this once. */
5747 printk(KERN_INFO "SELinux: Disabled at runtime.\n");
5749 selinux_disabled = 1;
5750 selinux_enabled = 0;
5752 /* Reset security_ops to the secondary module, dummy or capability. */
5753 security_ops = secondary_ops;
5755 /* Unregister netfilter hooks. */
5756 selinux_nf_ip_exit();
5758 /* Unregister selinuxfs. */